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### TPA DA

Trade promotion authority will pass and is key to the imminent Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement

**Straits Times 3-13** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**SIGNS are pointing to an imminent** deal on a much-touted **free trade agreement among 12 Asia-Pacific** **nations led by the U**nited **S**tates, despite opposition within President Barack Obama's own party, said the US ambassador to Singapore. Mr Kirk **Wagar cited** the **expected passage of** legislation by the US Congress to **fast-track** trade deals, as well as Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe's upcoming summit with Mr Obama in Washington, as reasons for his optimism over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The US has been representing the other 10 TPP members in negotiating outstanding issues like agriculture with Japan. Observers say Mr **Abe would not be going to Washington if there was no deal**. Mr **Wagar noted**, too, **that negotiations had** been **stepped up** in the past 18 months. "When you put it all together, **my optimism is at an all-time high**," he said in an interview with The Straits Times yesterday on the sidelines of an annual gathering of US business executives based in the Asia-Pacific. **"I feel pretty confident we'll be well on our way by the end of this year,** if not 100 per cent," he said. Besides the US and Japan, the TPP comprises Singapore, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, and Vietnam. Chief negotiators from the 12 members held talks in Hawaii this week. Taken together, the 12 economies account for 40 per cent of global gross domestic product and one-third of world trade. The TPP is expected to raise global income by about US$295 billion (S$409 billion) a year, with US$78 billion going to the US. Concerns over the pact have grown since a 2012 target passed with no deal in sight. **Many TPP countries are reluctant** or unwilling **to conclude the negotiations unless** Mr **Obama is given** "fast-track authority" through a Trade Promotion Authority (**TPA**) law, meaning that Congress can vote only for or against the agreement, but cannot amend it. The temporary law expired in 2007 and Mr Obama began seeking a renewal in 2012. However, in January, nine of the 16 new Congressmen from Mr Obama's Democratic Party opposed his request, arguing that deals like the TPP threaten US jobs and hurt American businesses. Mr Wagar noted, however, that Mr Paul Ryan, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee which is responsible for trade, said last month that he expected the TPA to be passed soon, and the TPP to follow soon after. Mr Wagar also reaffirmed the Obama administration's strategy of a "rebalance" of US priorities to Asia, and Washington's support of the Asean Economic Community, an integration of the 10-member bloc into a single market and production base that is expected to begin this year.

TPA has bipartisan support but critics seek to derail it by shifting focus to minimum wage increases. The aff shifts focus exactly how the opposition wants it to

**Needham 1-8** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

A group of House Democrats is teaming up with labor, environmental and religious groups to rally against fast-track trade authority for President Obama. The coalition of **Democrats and interest groups ramped up** their **opposition** Thursday **to t**rade **p**romotion **a**uthority, amid growing Republican support for the Obama administration’s ambitious trade agenda. Rep. Rosa DeLauro (Conn.), who for months has been outspoken against granting fast-track, argued that the agreements “go well beyond trade,” and they need to be carefully scrutinized by lawmakers and the public before they reach Congress. She said the trade deals would seep into and weaken the U.S. regulatory framework on everything from food to medicine and favor big companies over middle-class workers, and that Congress should be move involved in the process, instead of just rubber-stamping deals. “An up or down vote is simply not acceptable,” DeLauro said at a press conference on Capitol Hill. Some Democrats have been arguing for months that the current approach to trade is outdated, needs to be more transparent and leaves them out of the trade-deal shaping process. But the U.S. Trade Representative’s office has regularly emphasized that they have held more than 1,600 meetings with lawmakers on Capitol Hill to discuss the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and the details of the trade deals. Negotiators are nearing the end of talks on TPP talks, a 12-nation agreement that spans from Chile to Japan. Under trade promotion authority, Congress gets an up or down vote on any trade deal that reaches Capitol Hill. Democrats argue that trade deals of the past, like the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement, led to losses of wages and jobs for U.S. workers and that have never recovered. **Rep.** Barbara **Lee** (D-Calif.) **said fast-track needs to be taken off the table and the conversation shifted to** "creating **good paying jobs** for people here in America." **AFL-CIO President** Richard **Trumka said the discussion needs to turn to raising** the **minimum wage**, addressing currency manipulation, passing a long-term highway bill and investing in education and training for students. “The AFL-CIO doesn't just oppose fast-track, **we're fighting to kill it**. And we're fighting to win,” **he said**. Trumka, whose organization had been in full-court-press mode for months against fast-track, said lawmakers face a simple choice to either approve it and “by doing so pull a curtain in front of another effort to drive jobs out of America and push wages down.” “Or you will deny fast-track and give us a chance to raise wages and narrow the ever-widening income gap," he said. The plea for **opposition to fast-track comes as Republican leaders reiterated** their **support for the president’s trade agenda**. On Wednesday, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said he is willing to work with the White House to give him fast-track authority and move forward on the trade agenda. While he called fast-track "an enormous grant of power" he said, "that’s how much we believe in trade as an important part of America's economy." Still, **fast-track has some Democratic backing in both chambers**, and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman has emphasized that it is important to ensure that trade has bipartisan support. Besides TPP, the United States also is involved in crafting a multi-trillion trade agreement with the 28-nation European Union. Some trade advocates argue that fast-track is needed to assure trading partners that a final deal won't be changed after years of talks. Two years ago, the president asked Congress to grant him fast-track authority but efforts stalled out in the last Congress in what is typically a difficult legislative lift. Fast-track authority was last crafted in 2002 and lapsed during the Bush administration in 2007

TPP is key to US leadership – that checks protectionism

**Suominen 12** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

In the 20th century, beginning with the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944, America's great contribution was to champion an economic paradigm and set of institutions that promoted open markets and economic stability around the world. The successive Groups of Five, Seven, and Eight, first formed in the early 1970s, helped coordinate macroeconomic policies among the world's leading economies and combat global financial imbalances that burdened U.S. trade politics. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) spread the Washington Consensus across Asia and Latin America, and shepherded economies in transition toward capitalism. Eight **multilateral trade rounds brought down barriers to global commerce**, culminating in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.¶ Meanwhile, a wave of bank deregulation and financial liberalization began in the United States and proliferated around the world, making credit more available and affordable while propelling consumption and entrepreneurship the world over. The U.S. dollar, the world's venerable reserve currency, economized global transactions and fueled international trade. Central bank independence spread from Washington to the world and helped usher in the Great Moderation, which has produced a quarter-century of low and steady inflation around the world.¶ **Globalization** was not wished into being: It **was** the **U.S.-led** order that generated prosperity unimaginable only a few decades ago. Since 1980, global GDP has quadrupled, world trade has grown more than sixfold, the stock of foreign direct investment has shot up by 20 times, and portfolio capital flows have surged to almost $200 trillion annually, roughly four times the size of the global economy. Economic reforms and global economic integration helped vibrant emerging markets emerge: The "Asian Tigers" (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) that boomed in the 1980s were joined in the 1990s by the awakening giants of Brazil, China, and India.¶ It was the United States that quarterbacked the play, brokering differences among nations and providing the right mix of global public goods: a universal reserve currency, an open-trade regime, deep financial markets, and vigorous economic growth. Trade liberalization alone paid off handsomely, adding $1 trillion annually to the postwar U.S. economy.¶ Talk about American decline notwithstanding, the economic order created by the United States persists. In fact, at first blush, it appears to have only been reinforced in the past few years. New institutions such as the G-20, a forum for the world's leading economies, and the Financial Stability Board, a watchdog for the international financial system, are but sequels to U.S.-created entities: the Group of Five and the Financial Stability Forum. Investors still view America as a financial safe haven, and the dollar remains the world's lead currency. Open markets have survived, and 1930s-style protectionism has not materialized. The WTO continues to resolve trade disputes and recently welcomed Russia as its 154th member, while the mission and resources of the Bretton Woods twins -- the World Bank and IMF -- have only expanded. No country has pulled out of these institutions; instead, emerging nations such as China and India are demanding greater power at the table. Countries have opted in, not out, of the American-led order, reflecting a reality of global governance: There are no rival orders that can yet match this one's promise of mutual economic gains.¶ **Still,** while **the American order** is peerless, it **is** also **imperiled**. The deepening European debt crisis, discord over national policies to restore growth, and the all-but-dead Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations speak to the failures of the global economy's existing instruments to manage 21st-century challenges. Instead of coordinating policies, leading countries are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma, elbowing for an edge in world trade and jockeying for power on the world stage. **Tensions simmer over** issues such as exchange-rate manipulation, capital controls, creeping protectionism, and **financial nationalism**.¶ Right at the moment when we most need to shore up the troubled global economic order, **America** -- the architect of this very order -- **is failing to lead**. Even as the United States remains pivotal to global growth, U.S. corporations -- the engines of the American economy -- are stifled by taxes, regulations, and policy uncertainty. Gaping fiscal deficits in the United States are undermining the dollar, exacerbating trade deficits, and undercutting U.S. economic dynamism and credibility in world affairs, but political posturing has obstructed the country's path to solvency. Earlier this week, the IMF warned that if political deadlock takes America to the so-called fiscal cliff of automatic tax hikes and spending cuts in January 2013, it could have a devastating impact on the U.S. and world economies. No wonder America's image as the global economic superpower is receding around the world.¶ Europe's travails, meanwhile, are reducing U.S. companies' exports and overseas profits, threatening America's recovery. And yet Congress has balked at boosting the IMF's resources to fight the eurozone crisis while the Obama administration has deflected responsibility, framing the crisis as Europe's to manage. It has fallen to countries such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia to instead build the firewall that will shield the rest of the world from Europe.¶ The welcome momentum in negotiations between the United States and Pacific Rim countries on the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement does not undo over three years of drift in U.S. trade policy that has jeopardized the very global trading system that the United States built and powered in the postwar era. **The only trade deals that** the **Obama** administration **has passed** -- with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea -- **were** launched and **negotiated by** the **Bush** administration.¶ **The world is** now **facing** a triple threat of global economic instability, divisions among top powers, and **a global leadership vacuum. This** perfect storm **could produce** a world disorder of mercurial financial markets, widening global imbalances, spreading state capitalism, and beggar-thy-neighbor **protectionism** -- a scenario with a sorry past and few safe exits.¶ In the late 1940s, a new world order arose because of American strength, vision, and leadership, not because global governance was in vogue. Leadership was never easy: Resistance from allies, protectionist pressures at home, and resource-draining wars all stood in the way. But capitalism spread, trade and financial markets were liberalized, and emerging-market crises were defeated. Global economic integration forged ahead.¶ Today, American leadership is again essential. China prioritizes mercantilism over multilateralism, and emerging nations have yet to fully step up to the plate when it comes to global governance, while Europe and Japan are neither able nor willing to lead. In placing their faith in multilateralism, liberal institutionalists often fail to realize that the world economic order is built on American primacy and power, and Washington's willingness to project it.¶ To lead abroad, the United States must reform at home by imposing ironclad fiscal discipline, cutting taxes and red tape for businesses, and locking in long-term policies -- summoning the private sector to reform schools and rebuild infrastructure, for instance -- that harness the productivity of America's future generations.¶ Abroad, the United States needs to focus on pre-empting instability and integrating the global economy. It should push the IMF to address financial risks before they mushroom into catastrophes, revise the multilateral trade regime to allow for fast deals among a critical mass of members rather than agonizing, decade-long talks requiring the consent of the full membership, and work toward unfettered global financial markets -- all the while deepening access to U.S. goods, services, and investment around the world. **A T**rans-**P**acific **P**artnership **agreement** and a transatlantic free trade pact are low-hanging fruits that **can jump-start global growth** without any new stimulus dollars.¶ The quintessential challenge facing U.S. policymakers is to convince other nations to buy into a rules-based order rather than respond to the siren calls of currency wars and capital controls. For example, with most emerging economies uneasy about Beijing's trade and foreign policies, Washington must incentivize others to take the high ground and strengthen investor protections, enforce intellectual property rights, and adhere to trade rules. With others playing by the rules of the game, a misbehaving China would be turned into a pariah.¶ A stable, integrated, and growing world economy serves our national interests. But **such a world is America's to make.**

Protectionism causes multiple scenarios for extinction.

**Panzner 8** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

Rising angst will also wreak havoc with links among markets, financial systems, economies, and countries. Many people could find themselves subject to stricter government controls or even find avenues closed off as a result of attempts to stem contagion effects. The widespread urge to withdraw will feed rising xenophobia, already inflamed by illegal immigration, unfair trade practices, and leaking borders. Playing to populist sentiment, politicians around the country will respond enthusiastically to calls for restrictions on foreigners. This will further feed a brain drain, as scientists, students, and other temporary visa holders are left with little choice but to uproot and go elsewhere, further sapping America’s economic resiliency. Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The **rise in** isolationism and **protectionism will bring about** ever more heated arguments and **dangerous confrontations over** shared sources of oil, gas, and other key **commodities** as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world **where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply**. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such **tensions will give rise to full scale military encounters**, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. **Enabled by** cheap technology and **the waning threat of American retribution,** **terror**ist **groups will** likely **boost the frequency and scale of** their horrifying **attacks**, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. **China will** likely **assume a**n increasingly **belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may** embark on overt **coloniz**ation of **its neighbors** in the Mideast. **Israel**, for its part, **may** look to **draw a dwindling list of allies** from around the world **into** a growing number of **conflicts**. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an **“intense confrontation” between the U**nited **S**tates **and China is “inevitable”** at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. **Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces** using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. **Many will interpret** stepped-up **conflicts** **between Muslims and Western societies as** the **beginnings of a new world war.**

### EITC

The United States federal government should lower the eligibility age for the Earned Income Tax Credit to twenty-one years old, raise the maximum credit to $1,000, and set the credit’s phase-in rate to 15.3 percent.

It’s mutually exclusive.

Minimum wage increase means workers can’t qualify for the EITC.

**Conterio 13** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

Without getting into too much parsing, the standard, accepted figures for minimum wage workers in America remain roughly what Derek cites above, about four million, and indeed half or more are young people just entering the work force. While Derek points out that a certain number of these are college students, no doubt accumulating student loans to pay off, the reality is those loans don’t come due until after the student leaves school, so any minimum wage jobs worked by such students are unlikely to go toward offsetting that debt. But let’s look for a moment at the “poor,” who are the real target of minimum wage increases. At current levels, **a full-time minimum wage employee earns about $15,000 per year**. At this level, **they also qualify for** a whole bucket-full of means-tested government benefits, including food stamps, housing vouchers, **the e**arned **i**ncome **t**ax **c**redit**,** Medicaid, and more. **Should the minimum be bumped** up **to $9.00 per hour, their annual earnings increase by** nearly **$4,000, bumping them out of qualification** for most of those benefits, effectively acting as a 100% tax upon the difference, leaving them exactly where they started. One might honestly ask, what’s fair about that?

The counterplan reduces poverty by uniquely benefitting childless workers.

**Marr and Huang 14** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

To strengthen the EITC for childless workers, policymakers should lower the eligibility age and expand the maximum credit and the credit’s phase-in rate. Lower the Eligibility Age As noted, workers under age 25 are ineligible for the childless workers’ EITC. **Congress set the eligibility age at 25** when establishing the EITC for childless workers in 1993 to avoid giving access to the EITC to college and graduate students from middle-income families, who may currently have very low incomes but depend primarily on their parents for support. **As a result**, however, **the EITC misses many low-income workers** who do not rely on their parents for support, and it thus cannot influence such individuals’ employment decisions at the start of their careers. (Note: in 1993, the IRS had no way to identify tax filers who were students; today, it does.)[23] The **Obama and Ryan proposals** and several of the congressional bills **lower this** age floor **to 21**. (President Obama’s proposal would also raise the age at which a worker could receive the EITC, to allow workers aged 65 and 66 to claim it.) There are small differences in the way that the various proposals treat students, but under all proposals, most full-time students would be ineligible for the childless worker EITC. (Under current law and the proposals, most full-time students under age 24 can be claimed on their parents’ tax return as a qualifying child or dependent.)[24] Raise the Maximum Credit and the Credit’s Phase-in Rate Historically, policymakers have supported the EITC as a mechanism to offset payroll taxes among low-income workers, supplement low wages, and encourage low-wage workers to enter the labor force. Policymakers can and should strengthen the EITC’s ability to accomplish these goals among childless workers. Under current rules, the **EITC for childless workers phases in at** a rate of **7.65 percent**; in other words, a worker receives an EITC of 7.65 cents for each dollar of earnings until the credit is fully phased in at earnings of about $6,600 in 2015. Payroll taxes, in contrast, equal 15.3 percent of a worker’s income (including the employer share). **So**, for childless workers earning up to about $6,600, the **EITC offsets only half of** the **additional payroll taxes** they owe if they raise their incomes. **This is why** the **Obama and Ryan** proposals **would raise the** credit’s **phase-in rate to 15.3 percent** (see Figure 2). So would three congressional proposals —the Brown-Durbin, Neal, and Murray-Reed-Brown bills — as well as some earlier proposals. **This would fully offset payroll taxes** for the lowest-income workers **and** make the credit a more powerful inducement for people to enter the work force; it also would **reduce the extent to which single workers are taxed into**, or deeper into, **poverty**. The Obama and Ryan proposals would fully phase in the credit at earnings of about $6,600; together with the increase in the phase-in rate, this would result in a maximum credit of about $1,000.[25] The Brown-Durbin, Neal, and Murray-Reed-Brown bills would fully phase in the credit at earnings of $9,100 in 2015, expanding the maximum credit to about $1,400.[26] In addition, the Obama and Ryan proposals raise the income level at which the credit starts to phase out for a single childless worker from about $8,250 to $11,500 in 2015; in the Brown-Durbin, Neal, and Murray-Reed-Brown bills, the credit starts to phase out at $10,750. Ideally, the credit’s phase-out rate would be set very low to avoid high marginal tax rates. This would be quite expensive, however, and policymakers should focus budget resources on improving the credit’s phase-in rate and maximum value, since these are the features of the credit most likely to affect an individual’s decision on whether to enter the labor force. Under the Obama and Ryan proposals, the credit would phase out at a 15.3 percent rate and phase out entirely for a single childless worker at an income of about $18,050, or about 125 percent of full-time earnings at the minimum wage. Under the Brown-Durbin, Neal, and Murray-Reed-Brown bills, the credit would phase out at a 15.3 percent rate and phase out entirely at an income of $19,850 — 133 percent of full-time earnings at the minimum wage. The current credit, in contrast, ends at $14,800 in 2015, leaving a full-time, minimum-wage childless worker with an EITC of just $22. As Figure 4 shows, under the Obama and Ryan proposals the credit for a childless adult with wages at the poverty line (projected at $12,566 in 2015) would jump from $171 to $841 in 2015. For a childless adult working full time at the minimum wage (and earning $14,500), the credit would rise from $22 to $542. The Davis and Rangel proposals have higher phase-in rates than the others — 20 percent and 23.15 percent, respectively — and maximum credits of roughly $1,300 and $1,500. The Davis proposal phases out entirely at income of $25,450, or about 175 percent of full-time, minimum-wage earnings. The Rangel proposal phases out entirely at $23,500, or about 166 percent of full-time, minimum-wage earnings.[27] The proposed credit expansions, combined with a reduction in the eligibility age, would reduce poverty substantially among low-income childless workers.[28] **The Obama and Ryan proposals would lift** about **half a million** people **out of poverty and reduce the depth of poverty for** another **10.1 million** people, **according to Treasury estimates**.[29] The Brown-Durbin, Neal, Murray-Reed-Brown, Davis, and Rangel proposals would likely have an even bigger anti-poverty effect since their expansions are larger than the Obama and Ryan proposals. All of the proposals would help a diverse array of individuals: just under half of the workers benefiting from the President’s proposal are women,[30] for example, and while many are young workers just starting out, we estimate that roughly 35 percent are at least 45 years old.[31]

EITC isn’t helpful for low-income childless workers now. The counterplan changes that and increases employment rates

**Marr and Huang 14** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

Credit Misses Many Low-Wage Childless Workers **The EITC misses many low-income childless workers** entirely **and provides** only **minimal help to** many **others**. Childless workers under age 25 are ineligible for the credit and the average credit for eligible workers between ages 25 and 64 is only about $270, or less than one-tenth the average $2,900 credit for filers with children.[5] In addition, the childless workers’ EITC begins phasing out when earnings exceed $8,000, or just 55 percent of full-time, minimum-wage earnings. As a result: A childless adult with wages equal to the Census Bureau’s poverty line (projected at $12,566 in 2015) will face a federal tax burden in 2015 of $1,978 (including the employer share of the payroll tax), after receiving an EITC of just $171. Childless workers are the lone group that the federal tax system taxes into, or deeper into, poverty. (See Figure 1.) **A childless adult working full time at** the **minimum wage** (and earning $14,500) **will have a federal income and payroll tax burden of $2,617** in 2015 — a large tax burden for someone with income this low — **after receiving an EITC of just $22**.[6] Strengthening Credit Could Bring Social as Well as Economic Benefits Providing a more adequate EITC to low-income childless workers and lowering the eligibility age would have several important benefits beyond raising these workers’ incomes and helping offset their federal taxes. Some leading experts believe that an expanded credit would help address some of the challenges that less-educated young people (particularly young African American men) face, including low and falling labor-force participation rates, low marriage rates, and high incarceration rates. For example, Karl **Scholz, an economist and former Treasury official** who is one of the nation’s foremost authorities on the EITC, strongly **recommends a more ample EITC for childless workers** as a way **to raise their employment rate**, explaining: “increasing the return to work for childless workers will lower unemployment rates and achieve the dual social benefits of reducing incarceration rates and increasing marriage rates.”[7] Likewise, Ron Haskins, co-director of the Brookings Institution’s Center on Children and Families and one of the key architects of the 1996 welfare law, argues that an expanded EITC for childless workers would: provide the very thing that most analysts agree is most needed — namely, work incentive … [and] the young man’s prospects in the marriage market would receive a nice boost. Studies show clearly that married young males are healthier, happier, less likely to commit crimes and less likely to abuse drugs than single males. Thus, to the extent that additional income increases marriage rates, the new EITC would produce fringe benefits beyond mere economic outcomes.[8] Low and Falling Labor Force ParticipationYoung men’s attachment to the labor force (measured by the percentage working or actively looking for work) has been declining for over two decades. Between 1990 and 2007, the labor-force participation rate of men aged 20 to 24 fell by 5.7 percentage points — from 84.4 percent of this population being in the labor force to 78.7 percent — one-and-a-half times the decline among men aged 25 to 54. Young men’s labor force participation then fell almost twice as much as that of older workers in the Great Recession.[9] As a result, in 2012, the labor force participation rate among men aged 20 to 24 was 14.2 percentage points lower than among men aged 25 to 54, the largest such gap on record (see Figure 2). Labor-force participation is particularly low for men without a college education. In 2012, fewer than 58 percent of male high-school dropouts over age 25 were in the labor force — a rate 22.5 percentage points below that for men with a college education. Real incomes have also fallen for less educated men. Between 1991 and 2012, the median earnings for a male high-school dropout working full-time fell by 10 percent, from $34,516 to $30,329 (in 2012 dollars).[10] By raising low-income workers’ after-tax incomes, the EITC increases the rewards of low-wage work. Although there is little empirical literature on the impact of the childless workers’ EITC on employment rates, careful **econometric studies** have **demonstrate**d **that** the **expansions in the EITC for families with children during the** 19**90s raised employment rates** markedly among low-skilled single mothers. University of Chicago economist Jeffrey Grogger found that the EITC expansions during this period were at least as important as the 1996 welfare reforms in increasing employment among single mothers. In addition, women eligible to benefit the most from the EITC expansions experienced higher wage growth in subsequent years than other, similar women.[11] Numerous **researchers believe these results are robust enough** to conclude **that** substantially **expanding the childless workers’ credit would increase labor** force **participation** among low-skilled childless men.[12]

EITC reduces crime

**Marr and Huang 14** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

High Involvement in the Criminal Justice System The decline in employment among young men is even greater than the labor-force participation figures cited above suggest, since those figures do not include people who are incarcerated. **Young men have disproportionately high incarceration rates**. According to a recent Justice Department report, 18 percent of men between ages 20 and 24 were arrested in 2009. (Although not everyone who is arrested is imprisoned, incarceration rates are still high: one in 31 adults will be incarcerated at some point in his or her life.)[19] Upon release, these individuals typically face inhospitable labor markets.[20] Some evidence suggests that **by boosting** the **incomes of low-wage workers, an expanded EITC could help reduce crime** rates. Although the relationship between wage rates and crime is difficult to disentangle (due to the many factors that affect crime rates), **researchers have found that lower wages for less-educated people are associated with higher crime rates**.[21] Based on this relationship, several leading analysts such as Harry Holzer of the Urban Institute and Georgetown University and Karl Scholz of the University of Wisconsin have argued that by increasing the wages of low-skilled individuals, an expanded childless EITC would also likely reduce crime rates among young, disadvantaged men.[22]

### Case

### MW High Now

**Minimum wage is high now; other reports oversell inflation**

**Sherk 13**

James Sherk (Senior policy analyst in labor economics at the Heritage Foundation). “A $10.10 Minimum Wage is Historically Unprecedented.” Heritage Foundation. 12 December 2013. <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/12/a-1010-minimum-wage-is-historically-unprecedented>

You would hardly know it from the news coverage, but America has a historically high minimum wage. At the Heritage Foundation we just put out a report looking at how the minimum wage has changed over time. It currently stands at $7.25 an hour, with many states having higher rates. Since 1950, the minimum wage has averaged $6.62 an hour (in 2013 dollars). It peaked in 1968 at $8.28 an hour. Liberals do not see it this way. They argue the inflation-adjusted minimum wage was above $10 in the late 1960s, and raising it to that level would simply restore it to its previous value. President Obama now supports Senate Democrats’ proposal to hike the minimum wage to $10.10 an hour. Where does this disagreement over basic facts come from? The government produces several different measures of inflation. Liberals use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for their calculations and conclude the minimum wage stood at $10.60 an hour in 1968. However, economists have long recognized that the CPI overstates inflation rates. Among other problems, it inadequately accounts for product-quality improvements and changing consumption patterns. In the short term, these errors are small. Compounded over decades, they make a huge difference. Consequently the CBO and the Federal Reserve prefer a different measure of inflation, the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) deflator. The PCE better accounts for changing consumption patterns (as does a variant of the CPI, the chained CPI). While the PCE also overstates inflation, it is much more accurate than the CPI. The better measure shows the minimum wage has never hit the levels President Obama proposes: The last minimum-wage increase occurred just four years ago, and America now has a historically high federal minimum wage. Raising the minimum wage to an unprecedented level in a weak economy with high youth unemployment is questionable at best.

### Solvency

Living wage causes poverty; consensus of economists

**Quigley 1** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

Opponents of living wages argue that these ordinances could potentially increase the local poverty rate and cost too much. **A survey of over 300 economists** conducted in 2000 for the Employment Policies Institute, a nonprofit research organization generally opposed to raises in both the minimum wage and the enactment of living wage ordinances, **found that** nearly **eight in ten** of the labor economists surveyed **thought** **living wag**e ordinances **would result in employers hiring** higher **skilled workers, and over 70% said the laws could** potentially **reduce** the number of **entry-level jobs and thus increase the** local **poverty rate**. [n180](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n180) The opposition also suggests that living wage ordinances increase the cost of governmental contracts. Pasadena, California, estimated their living wage ordinance cost to be about $ 200,000 for the year 2000; Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimated its cost at $ 300,000; Madison, Wisconsin, estimated its cost at $ 47,000. [n181](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n181) While there is certainly some cost associated with living wages, this article will not join in the aforementioned melee of economists. Others disagree. [n182](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n182)

Prefer expert consensus. It’s most likely to be valid.

**LaBossiere 14** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

3. The claims made by the expert are consistent with the views of the majority of qualified experts in the field. This is perhaps the most important factor. **As a general rule, a claim** that is **held as correct by the majority of qualified experts in the field is** the **most plausible** claim. The basic idea is that **the majority of experts are more likely to be right than those who disagree** with the majority. It is important to keep in mind that no field has complete agreement, so some degree of dispute is acceptable. How much is acceptable is, of course, a matter of serious debate. It is also important to be aware that the majority could turn out to be wrong. That said, the reason it is still reasonable for non-experts to go with the majority opinion is that non-experts are, by definition, not experts. After all, **if I am not an expert** in a field**, I would be hard pressed to justify picking the expert I happen to** like or **agree with against the view of the majority** of experts.

Minimum wage hikes can’t solve poverty, but EITC does.

**Saltsman 13** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

**Compared with the EITC,** government-mandated **minimum wage increases hav**e major **flaws**. One is targeting: According to the Census Bureau, 60% of people living below the poverty line didn't work last year. They don't need a raise; they need a job, period. And among those who do work and earn the minimum wage, researchers at Cornell and American University have found that the vast majority live in households above the poverty line. This partially explains why numerous **studies** have **found no relationship between** a **higher minimum wage and lower poverty** rates—**because, unlike** the **EITC,** the **benefits generally aren't accruing to those in poverty. Another reason** a higher minimum wage doesn't reduce poverty rates **is that** a hike in hourly pay doesn't necessarily translate to an annual income bump. **If employers faced with** suddenly **higher labor costs reduce hours or employment, take-home pay will decline. Economists** writing in the Journal of Human Resources in 2005 **found that to be the case**, with the "losers" from a higher minimum wage—who moved closer to the poverty line after the policy was passed—outnumbering the winners. The **EITC has a very different** research **track record**. In a study published by the Employment Policies Institute last year, economists Joseph **Sabia** at San Diego State University **and** Robert **Nielsen** at the University of Georgia **found a 1% drop in state poverty rates** associated **with each 1% increase in a state's EITC**. A 2007 study by Mr. Sabia found that a higher Earned Income Tax Credit can boost the wages and employment of single mothers. But the employment of single mothers dropped by 6% for each 10% hike in the minimum wage. The president can choose to expand or improve the Earned Income Tax Credit and thus have a measurable impact on poverty rates. Or he can hike the minimum wage. This might win him support among his labor-union allies. It won't do any good for the low-income unemployed, and it will add to their numbers.

**Living wage doesn’t help the poor—it’s poorly targeted**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

Recent studies have shown that there is little to no relationship between increases in the minimum wage and reductions in poverty.29 These studies find that, although some lower-skilled workers living in poor families see their incomes rise when the minimum wage increases, others lose their jobs or have their hours substantially cut.30 Economists Joseph Sabia and Richard Burkhauser found that workers living in households below the poverty line received few of the benefits of past minimum wage increases. Even assuming that no minimum wage workers are laid off or have their hours reduced, they found only 10.5 percent of the benefits of a potential federal minimum wage increase would go to individuals living below the poverty line. More than 60 percent of the benefits would help families living at more than 200 percent of the poverty level.31 A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report examining the proposed federal minimum wage increase to $10.10 by 2016 found that, although the proposal would move approximately 900,000 people above the poverty threshold (of the estimated 45 million currently below that threshold), just 19 percent of the increased earnings would go to families below the poverty line.32 The same report found that an increase to $10.10 would reduce total employment by approximately 500,000 workers.33

**Living wage raises food prices, which disproportionately harms the poor**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

However, negative employment effects are not the only consequence of raising the minimum wage. Employers often cannot fully absorb the costs of an increased mandated wage rate by cutting their workforce because they need that labor to successfully run their businesses. Employers are forced to turn to other methods to protect their bottom line and stay in business. The costs of a minimum wage hike are often passed on to consumers in what economist Daniel Aaronson calls “price pass-through.” In a study of prices in the restaurant and fast food industry—an industry that heavily employs and serves low-wage earners—Aaronson, French and MacDonald found an increase in the minimum wage also increases the prices of food items.24 Using data from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 1995 to 1997, the economists examined 7,500 food items (usually a complete meal) from 1,000 different establishments in 88 different geographic areas. They found the increase in menu prices affected limited service restaurants the hardest. These are restaurants where most diners pay at the counter and take their food home with them. These restaurants are also more likely to employ low-wage workers and thus more likely to have their business costs rise as a result of a minimum wage increase. The study found that in these instances, almost 100 percent of the increase in labor costs is passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.25 These results are consistent with most of the economic literature on the subject. Sara Lemos of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) looked at more than 20 papers on the subject and found that most studies predicted a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would result in a 4 percent increase in food prices and a 0.4 percent increase in prices overall.26 Unfortunately, the businesses hit hardest by an increase to the minimum wage are not only the types of places where low-income people are employed, but also businesses frequented by low-income consumers. Food prices are of particular importance to people living near or below the poverty line as they tend to spend a greater percentage of their family budget on food. The low-wage employees who experience an increase to their wages due to a minimum wage increase will have the benefit of higher wages largely offset by higher prices. Additionally, non-minimum wage earners will face higher prices without the corresponding increase in wages. Thus, they will likely cut back spending to compensate. These cutbacks in spending may also result in substitutions toward cheaper, lower quality goods.

Seattle’s gradual living wage law is already causing unemployment—none of their evidence is this recent

**Perry 3-14** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

**Seattle’s new minimum wage law** government-mandated wage floor that guarantees reduced employment opportunities for many workers goes into effect on April 1 and already the city has seen a number of restaurant closings and job losses related to the government-mandated wage hike. The law **will take effect in stages and** will **require Seattle employers to eventually pay** a minimum wage of **$15** hour by 2022, with the first increase to $11 per hour scheduled for April 1 – a 16.2% increase over the state minimum wage of $9.47 per hour. The Seattle City Council takes great pride in its “economic death wish” for the Emerald City and boasts on its website that it “unanimously approved the adoption of a $15 per hour minimum wage, making Seattle the first major city in America to take such an action to address income inequality.” That reminds of something I read recently to the effect that liberals have hearts that bleed so profusely that it often prevents oxygen from getting to their brains and results in extreme lightheadedness, and cloudy and defective decision-making. Not surprisingly, **the first reports of** Seattle **restaurant closings and job losses are** just **coming in**, here are a few: From the Washington Policy Center’s article “Seattle’s $15 wage law a factor in restaurant closings“: As the implementation date for Seattle’s strict $15 per hour minimum wage law approaches, the city is experiencing a rising trend in restaurant closures. The tough new law goes into effect April 1st. The **closings** have occurred **across the city**, from Grub in the upscale Queen Anne Hill neighborhood, to Little Uncle in gritty Pioneer Square, to the Boat Street Cafe on Western Avenue near the waterfront. The shut-downs **have idled dozens of low-wage workers**, the very people advocates say the wage law is supposed to help. **Instead of delivering the promised “living wage”** of $15 an hour, **economic realities** created by the new law **have dropped the hourly wage for these workers to zero**. Advocates of a high minimum wage said businesses would simply pay the mandated wage out of profits, raising earnings for workers. **Restaurants operate on thin margins**, though, with average profits of 4% or less, **and the business is highly competitive**. When prices rise consumers seek alternatives, a behavior economists call the “substitution effect,” which results in lower demand for the higher-priced product. In the case of restaurants, consumers have access to the ultimate substitution – they can stay home. Fewer people will be able to afford to dine out, and as a result there will be fewer great restaurants to enjoy. People probably won’t notice when some restaurant workers lose their jobs, but **as prices rise and** some **neighborhood businesses close,** the **quality of life** in urban Seattle **will become** a little bit **poorer**. From the Seattle Magazine article “Why Are So Many Seattle Restaurants Closing Lately?“: For Seattle restaurateurs recently, there is also another key consideration. Though none of our local departing/transitioning restaurateurs who announced their plans last month have elaborated on the issue, another major factor affecting restaurant futures in our city is the impending minimum wage hike to $15 per hour. Starting April 1, all businesses must begin to phase in the wage increase: Small employers have seven years to pay all employees at least $15 hourly; large employers (with 500 or more employees) have three. Since the legislation was announced last summer, The Seattle Times and Eater have reported extensively on **restaurant owners**’ many concerns about how to compensate for the extra funds that will now be required for labor: They **may need to raise menu prices, source poorer ingredients, reduce** operating **hours,** reduce their **labor and**/or **more**. **Washington Restaurant Association’s** Anthony **Anton puts it** this way**:** “It’s not a political problem; it’s a math problem.” He estimates that a common budget breakdown among sustaining Seattle restaurants so far has been the following: 36 percent of funds are devoted to labor, 30 percent to food costs and 30 percent go to everything else (all other operational costs). The remaining 4 percent has been the profit margin, and as a result, in a $700,000 restaurant, he estimates that the average restauranteur in Seattle has been making $28,000 a year. With the minimum wage spike, however, he says that if restaurant owners made no changes, the labor cost in quick service restaurants would rise to 42 percent and in full service restaurants to 47 percent. “Everyone is looking at the model right now, asking how do we do math?” he says. **“Every operator I’m talking to is in panic mode**, trying to figure out what the new world will look like. Seattle is the first city in this thing and everyone’s watching, asking how is this going to change?”

A large consensus of studies confirms minimum wage hikes cause unemployment

**Neumark 14** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

**An extensive review of** this **new**er wave of **evidence looked at more than 100 studies** of the employment effects of minimum wages, assessing the quality of each study and focusing on those that are most reliable [2], [3]. **Studies focusing on the least skilled were highlighted**, as the predicted job destruction effects of minimum wages were expected to be more evident in those studies. Reflecting the greater variety of methods and sources of variation in minimum wage effects used since 1982, this review documents a wider range of estimates of the employment effects of the minimum wage than does the review of the first wave of studies [1]. **Nearly two-thirds of the studies** reviewed **estimated that** the **minimum wage had negative** (although not always statistically significant) **effects on employment**. Only eight found positive employment effects. **Of the 33 studies judged** the **most credible,** 28, or **85%**, **pointed to negative employment effects**. These included research on Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Portugal, the UK, and the US. In particular, the studies focusing on the least-skilled workers find stronger evidence of disemployment effects, with effects near or larger than the consensus range in the US data. In contrast, few—if any—studies provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages.

**Unemployment is worse for the poor than low wages**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

The problem plaguing America’s poor is not low wages, but rather a shortage of jobs.34 At a time when the nation’s workforce participation is only 62.8 percent, policymakers must avoid policies that destroy job opportunities.35 Increasing the minimum wage does nothing to help the unemployed poor. In fact, as discussed above, it hurts individuals looking for employment as it decreases available job opportunities. So, who is helped by an increase to the minimum wage? According to a 2012 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, although workers under age 25 represented only 20 percent of hourly wage earners, they made up just over half (50.6 percent) of all minimum wage earners.36 The average household income of these young minimum wage earners was $65,900.37 Among adults 25 and older earning the minimum wage, 75 percent live well above the poverty line of $22,350 for a family of four, with an average annual income of $42,500.38 This is possible because more than half of older minimum wage earners work part-time and many are not the sole earners in their households.39 In fact, 83.5 percent of employees whose wages would rise due to a minimum wage increase either live with parents or another relative, live alone, or are part of a dual-earner couple.40 Only 16.5 percent of individuals who would benefit from an increase to the minimum wage are sole earners in families with children.41 With national unemployment still hovering around 7 percent, national, state, and local demands for an increased minimum wage could not be more ill-timed.42 Increasing the minimum wage would make it more difficult for emerging businesses to expand payrolls and for existing businesses to maintain employees. Further, a higher wage rate would make it more difficult for individuals with less education and experience to find work. Raising the minimum wage favors those who already have jobs at the expense of the unemployed. Public policy would be more beneficial if it lowered barriers to entry for employment and increased economic opportunities. Raising the minimum wage may be a politically attractive policy option, but it is harmful to the very people policymakers intend it to help.

### Extinction Focus Good

Any risk of extinction comes first. **Bostrom 11** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that **the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than** the value of 1018 human lives.  This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least ten times the value of a billion human lives.  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or **1052 lives** of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly.  **Even if we give this** allegedly **lower bound** on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization **a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that** the expected value of **reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percent**age point **is worth a hundred billion times** as much as **a billion human lives.**

Existential risks are discounted by arbitrary cognitive biases. **Marcus 13** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

There are known knowns and known unknowns, but what we should be worried about most is the unknown unknowns. Not because they are the most serious risks we face, but because psychology tells us that **unclear risks** that are **in the distant future are** the **risks we are less likely to take seriously** enough. At least four distinct psychological mechanisms are at work. First, we are moved more by vivid information, than by abstract information (even when the abstract information should in principle dominate). Second, **we discount the future**, rushing for the dollar now as opposed to the two dollars we could have a year later if we waited. Third, **the focusing illusion** (itself perhaps driven by the more general phenomenon of priming) **tends to make us dwell on** our most **immediate problems, even if more serious problems loom in the background.** Fourth, we have a tendency to believe in a just world, in which nature naturally rights itself. These four mechanisms likely derive from different sources, some stemming from systems that govern motivation (future discounting), others from systems that mediate pleasure (belief in a just world), others from **the structure of our memory** (the focusing illusion, and the bias from vividness). Whatever their source, the four **together create a** potent **psychological drive** for us **to underweight distant future risks that we cannot fully envision.** Climate change is a case in point. In 1975, the Columbia University geochemist Wallace S. **Broecker wrote** an important and prescient article called **"**Climatic Change: **Are We on the Brink of** a **Pronounced Global Warming?",** **but his worries were ignored for decades,** in part **because many** people **presumed, fallaciously, that nature would** somehow **automatically set itself right.** (And, in keeping with people's tendency to draw their inference primarily from vivid information, a well-crafted feature film on climate change played a significant role in gathering public attention, arguably far more so than the original article in *Science*.) Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom has pointed out that the three greatest unknowns we should be worry about are biotechnology, nanotechnology, and the rise of machines that are more intelligent than human beings. Each sounds like science fiction, and has in fact been portrayed in science fiction, but each poses genuine threats. Bostrom's posits "existential risks": possible, if unlikely, calamities, that would wipe out our entire species, much as asteroids appear to have extinguished dinosaurs. Importantly, many of these risks, in his judgment, exceed the existential risk of other concerns that occupy a considerably greater share of public attention. Climate change, may be more likely, and certainly is more vivid, but is less likely to lead to the complete extinction of the human species (even though it could conceivably kill a significant fraction of us). The truth is that we simply don't know enough about the potential biotechnology, nanotechonology, or future iterations of artificial intelligence to calculate what their risks are, compelling arguments have been made that in principle any of the three could lead to human extinction. These risks may prove manageable, but I don't think we can manage them if we don't take them seriously. In the long run, biotech, nanotech and AI are probably significantly more likely to help the species, by increasing productivity and limiting disease, than they are to destroy it. But we need to invest more in figuring out exactly what the risks are, and to better prepare for then. Right now, the US spends more than $2.5 billion dollars a year studying climate change, but (by my informal reckoning) less than 1% of that total studying the risk of biotech, nanotech, and AI. What **we** really **should be worried** about is **that we are not** quite **doing enough to prepare for the unknown.**

Existential threat focus is key in an interconnected and tech reliant world.

**Connor 13** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

Some of Britain’s finest minds are drawing up a “doomsday list” of **catastrophic events** that could devastate the world, pose a threat to civilisation and **might** even **lead to** the **extinction** of the human species. Leading scholars have established a centre for the study of “existential risk” which aims to present politicians and the public with a list of disasters that could threaten the future of the world as we know it. Lord Rees of Ludlow, the astronomer royal and past president of the Royal Society, is leading the initiative, which includes Stephen Hawking, the Cambridge cosmologist, and Lord May of Oxford, a former government chief scientist. The group also includes the Cambridge philosopher Huw Price, the economist Partha Dasgupta and the Harvard evolutionary geneticist George Church. Initial funding has come from Jaan Tallinn, the co-founder of Skype. “Many scientists are concerned that developments in human technology may soon pose new, extinction-level risks to our species as a whole,” says a statement on the group’s website. Lord Rees said in his closing speech to the British Science Festival in Newcastle this evening that the public and politicians need the best possible advice on low-risk scenarios that may suddenly become reality, with devastating consequences. “Those of us fortunate enough to live in the developed world fret too much about minor hazards of everyday life: improbable air crashes, carcinogens in food, low radiation doses, and so forth,” Lord Rees told the meeting. “But **we are less secure than we think**. It seems to me that our political masters, should worry far more about **scenarios** that have thankfully not yet happened – events that **could arise as unexpectedly as the** 20**08 financial crisis, but which could cause world-wide disruption**,” he said. Professor David Spiegelhalter, an expert in risk at Cambridge University, said that our increasing reliance on technology and the formation of complex interconnected networks is making society more vulnerable. “**We use interconnected systems for everything from power, to food supply and banking, which means there can be real trouble if things go wrong** or they are sabotaged,” Professor Spiegelhalter said. “In a modern, efficient world, **we no longer stockpile food. If** the **supply is disrupted** for any reason, **it would take** about **48-hours before it runs out and riots begin**,” he said. “Energy security is also an issue, as **we import much of our fuel from abroad, so** a **conflict over resources** in the future **is possible**,” he added. According to Lord Rees, the threat of **nuclear war was the main** global **risk** we faced **in the last century, but** in the fast-developing 21st Century **there are new concerns over** risks such as deadly **bioterror**ist attacks, **pandemics** accelerated by global air travel, **cyberattacks** on critical infrastructure **and a**rtificially **i**ntelligent computers that turn hostile. “**In future decades, events with low probability but catastrophic consequences may loom high on the political agenda**,” Lord Rees told the science festival. “That’s why some of us in Cambridge - both natural and social scientists - plan, with colleagues at Oxford and elsewhere, to inaugurate a research programme to compile a more complete register of these existential risks, and to assess how to enhance resilience against the more credible ones,” he said. The Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk is so far a loose coalition of scholars but Lord Rees hopes later this year to announce major funding and a more detailed programme of research into the “doomsday” scenarios. “Our goal is to steer a small fraction of Cambridge’s great intellectual resources, and of the reputation built on its past and present scientific pre-eminence, to the task of ensuring that our own species has a long-term future,” the centre states on its website. Lord Rees, who has written popular science books on 21st Century threats to humanity, said that the organisational aspect of the centre is still being finalised but he hopes to have this clarified by the end of the year. “The response we've had to our proposal has been remarkably wide, and remarkably positive. The project is still embryonic but we are seeking funds via various sources and have strengthened our international advisory network,” he told The Independent. There is a need for a more rational approach to the low risk events that could have devastating consequence because **politicians tend to think of short-term problems** and solutions **while the public is in denial about scenarios that have not yet happened**, he said. “The wide public is in denial about two kinds of threats: those that we’re causing collectively to the biosphere, and those that stem from the greater vulnerability of our interconnected world to error or terror induced by individuals or small groups,” Lord Rees said. “All too often the focus is parochial and short term. We downplay what’s happening even now in impoverished, far-away countries and we discount too heavily the problems we’ll leave for our grandchildren,” he said.

Didn’t read the rest of these

Existential threat focus is key to accurate risk evaluation. **Rees 8** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

These concerns are not remotely futuristic - we will surely confront them within next 10-20 years. But what of the later decades of this century? It is hard to predict because some technologies could develop with runaway speed. Moreover, human character and physique themselves will soon be malleable, to an extent that is qualitatively new in our history. New drugs (and perhaps even implants into our brains) could change human character; the cyberworld has potential that is both exhilarating and frightening. We cannot confidently guess lifestyles, attitudes, social structures or population sizes a century hence. Indeed, it is not even clear how much longer our descendants would remain distinctively 'human'. Darwin himself noted that 'not one living species will transmit its unaltered likeness to a distant futurity'. Our own species will surely change and diversify faster than any predecessor - via human-induced modifications (whether intelligently controlled or unintended) not by natural selection alone. The post-human era may be only centuries away. And what about Artificial Intelligence? Super-intelligent machine could be the last invention that humans need ever make. **We should keep our minds open**, or at least ajar, **to concepts that seem** on the fringe of science **fiction**. These thoughts might seem irrelevant to practical policy - something for speculative academics to discuss in our spare moments. I used to think this. But **humans are now**, individually and collectively, **so** greatly **empowered by** rapidly changing **tech**nology **that we can**—by design or as unintended consequences—**engender** irreversible **global changes**. It is surely irresponsible not to ponder what this could mean; and it is real political progress that the challenges stemming from new technologies are higher on the international agenda and that planners seriously address what might happen more than a century hence. We cannot reap the benefits of science without accepting some risks - that has always been the case. Every new technology is risky in its pioneering stages. But there is now an important difference from the past. Most of the risks encountered in developing 'old' technology were localized: when, in the early days of steam, a boiler exploded, it was horrible, but there was an 'upper bound' to just how horrible. In our evermore interconnected world, however, there are new risks whose consequences could be global. **Even a tiny probability of** global **catastrophe is** deeply **disquieting**. We cannot eliminate all threats to our civilization (even to the survival of our entire species). But it is surely incumbent on us to think the unthinkable and study how to apply twenty-first century technology optimally, while minimizing the 'downsides'. If we apply to catastrophic risks the same prudent analysis that leads us to take everyday safety precautions, and sometimes to buy insurance—**multiplying probability by consequences—we** had surely **conclude that some** of the **scenarios** discussed in this book **deserve more attention** that they have received. My background as a cosmologist, incidentally, offers an extra perspective -an extra motive for concern - with which I will briefly conclude. The stupendous time spans of the evolutionary past are now part of common culture - except among some creationists and fundamentalists. But most educated people, even if they are fully aware that our emergence took billions of years, somehow think we humans are the culmination of the evolutionary tree. That is not so. Our Sun is less than halfway through its life. It is slowly brightening, but Earth will remain habitable for another billion years. However, even in that cosmic time perspective—extending far into the future as well as into the past - the twenty-first century may be a defining moment. It is the first in our planet's history where one species—ours—has Earth's future in its hands and could jeopardise not only itself but also lifes immense potential. **The decisions that we make**, individually and collectively, **will determine** whether **the outcome**s **of** twenty-first century **science**s are benign or devastating. We need to contend not only with threats to our environment but also with an entirely novel category of risks—with seemingly low probability, but with such colossal consequences that they merit far more attention than they have hitherto had. That is why we should welcome this fascinating and provocative book. The editors have brought together a distinguished set of authors with formidably wide-ranging expertise. The issues and arguments presented here should attract a wide readership - and deserve special attention from scientists, policy-makers and ethicists

Experts are right about their subject areas. Tetlock assumes subjects that experts are unfamiliar with. **Caplan 5** writes[[18]](#footnote-18)

Is my confidence in experts completely misplaced? I think not. **Tetlock**'s sample **suffers from** severe **selection bias**. **He deliberately asked** relatively **difficult and controversial questions**. As his methodological appendix explains, **questions had to "Pass the 'don't bother me** too often **with dumb questions' test." Dumb according to who?** The implicit answer is "Dumb according to **the typical expert** in the field." **What Tetlock really shows** is **that experts are overconfident if you exclude the questions where they have reached** a **solid consensus.** This is still an important finding. Experts really do make overconfident predictions about controversial questions. We have to stop doing that! However, this does not show that experts are overconfident about their core findings. It's particularly important to make this distinction because **Tetlock's work is so good that a lot of crackpots will want to highjack it:** "Experts are scarcely better than chimps, so why not give intelligent design and protectionism equal time?" But what **Tetlock** really **shows** is **that experts can raise** their **credibility if they stop overreaching**.

### Nuclear War=Extinction

Computer simulation proves. Nuclear war causes extinction.

**CBS Denver 14** writes[[19]](#footnote-19)

DENVER (CBS4) – **With** an estimated 17,000 **nuclear weapons** in the world, **we have the power to exterminate humanity many times over**. But it wouldn’t take a full-scale nuclear war to make Earth uninhabitable, reports Live Science. Even a relatively small regional nuclear war, like a conflict between India and Pakistan, could spark a global environmental catastrophe, says a new study. “Most people would be surprised to know that **even a very small regional nuclear war** on the other side of the planet **could disrupt global climate** for at least a decade **and wipe out the ozone layer for a decade**,” said lead author Michael Mills, an atmospheric scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Colorado. **Researchers developed a computer model of the** Earth’s **atmosphere and ran simulations to find out what would happen** if there was a nuclear war **with** just **a fraction of the world’s arsenal**. What they saw was the stuff of nightmares: **Firestorms would belch over 5 million tons of ash into the sky. The ash would absorb the sun’s rays, causing deadly cooling** on the surface. **Global temperatures would plummet** my nearly 3 degrees Farenheit on average, with most of North America experiencing winters that would be colder by 4 to 10 degrees. **Lethal frosts would** cover the Earth and **reduce** the **growing seasons** bu about a month **for several years**. Rainfall and other **precipitation would be reduced by** about **10 percent, triggering worldwide droughts and** leading to **wildfires in the Amazon, which would spew more smoke** into the atmosphere. The sky ash would heat the stratosphere and accelerate the chemical reactions that destroy the ozone layer. The **intense u**ltra**v**iolet **radiation** that would get through to the surface **would be a dramatic threat to** human **health and damage fragile ecosystems** on land and sea. “All in all, these effects would be very detrimental to food production and to ecosystems,” Mills said.

# Bronx Science

## Islamophobia 1NC v Diganta

### Topicality

The affirmative should defend the hypothetical government enactment of a living wage policy. The role of the ballot should be to decide whether to pass the affirmative policy.

**“Resolved” makes the topic a state action**

**Words and Phrases 64**

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Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning **“to establish by law”**.

“Just governments” requires implementation.

90% of policymaking is deciding on implementation.

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Prof. Public Affairs at University of Washington, 1980 PolySci Quarterly 79-80, p. 605

The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by **policy** analysts that **decisions are not self-executing.** Analysis of policy choices matter very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood in answering **the** question, "What **percentage of** the **work** of achieving a desired governmental action is **done when the preferred** analytic **alternative has been identified**?" Allison estimated that in the normal case, it **was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation**.

Reasons to Prefer:

1. Policy-oriented debate is key to reclaim the political and bridge the citizen-expert divide. **Kulynych 97**

Jessica, Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Polity, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation”, 30(2) Winter, p. 344-345

When we look at the success of **citizen initiatives** from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those **moments of defiance** and disruption **that bring the invisible** and unimaginable **into view**. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the **policy debate** and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions **could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics**. The **existence of a goal-oriented debate** within a technically dominated arena **defied the** normalizing **separation between expert policymakers and** consuming **citizens. Citizens** momentarily **recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process**, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding.

2. Limits

**Only limited topics protect participants from research overload which materially affects our lives outside of round.**

**Harris 13**

Scott Harris (Director of Debate at U Kansas, 2006 National Debate Coach of the Year, Vice President of the American Forensic Association, 2nd speaker at the NDT in 1981). “This ballot.” 5 April 2013. CEDA Forums. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4762.0;attach=1655

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says **this community doesn’t care whether** its **participants have a life** or **do well in school or spend time with their families.** I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against Topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that **might make debate an unending nightmare** and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.

**Limits turn solvency. Research shows that research overload leads to superficial education, meaning we won’t learn about the aff or anything else.**

**Chokshi 10** Niraj Chokshi is a former staff editor at TheAtlantic.com, where he wrote about technology. He is currently freelancing How Do We Stop the Internet From Making Us Stupid? JUN 8 2010 <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/how-do-we-stop-the-internet-from-making-us-stupid/57796/> BK

When it comes to focus, turning on the spotlight may not matter as much as our ability to dim the ambient light. Nicholas Carr argued on Saturday in The Wall Street Journal that the Internet is making us dumber and on Monday The New York Times had a front-page feature on the mental price we pay for our multi-tasked lifestyles. If we are indeed losing our ability to think deeply, the key to fighting back may lie in a subtlety: focus may be more about our ability to filter out distractions than our ability to home in on the issue at hand. Carr posed his idea that technology is making us stupid in a 2008 Atlantic cover story and his forthcoming book "The Shallows" is a longer rumination on the theory. According to professors and research cited in The Times piece "the idea that information overload causes distraction was supported by more and more research." And those distractions, according to research Carr cites, are forcing us to change the way we think. Deep thought is losing ground to superficiality. So, if our multitasking lifestyle causes distraction, and distraction leads to superficial thinking, how do we fight back? Carr offers some advice:

3. Ground

**Not all topics offer fair and limited ground. Absent a topical fairness requirement, the aff will be biased by competitive incentive to find the most obscure and uncontroversial advocacy within the general vicinity of living wage literature. The only neutral topic debate is one chosen by a 3rd party topic committee.**

**Fairness is a voting issue. Debate is a competitive game, and rigging that game in your favor denies respect for the participants.**

**Galloway 7**

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally **denies the personhood of the other participant** (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).

### Islamophobia Spec

The aff should specify the method by which they deconstruct anti-Muslim racism.

There are two methods for challenging Islamophobia—the integrationist and critical models. Overlooking these differences kills aff solvency

**Tutt 13** writes[[20]](#footnote-20)

While the dust has yet to settle on the horrific Boston bombings by the Tsarnaev brothers, Muslims have already felt the impact of their association with Islam. We have witnessed a rise in Islamophobic discourse in the popular media and blogosphere. As an activist who focuses on studying and combatting Islamophobia, I have wondered how we might effectively re-frame the narrative to prevent more Islamophobia. But at the same time, I have also realized that in our rush to write op-ed's and respond via the media, we should take a step back to consider the literature on Islamophobia and what it might teach us at this moment. **After reading a diverse set of books and studies** by different writers, including anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists and even activists who specifically address Islamophobia, **I have identified two distinctive** and quite different **approaches to understanding how Islamophobia can be reduced** in society. **In** one model, what I call **the integrationist model, Islamophobia is** understood as a "general **fear of the other" that requires a relationship to repair**. The other model, what I call **the critical approach, Islamophobia is** understood as **a systemic problem, generated by cultural, governmental and civil discourses**, and not as a subjective phenomena in need of a "cure." Both of these models not only present a different view on how to effectively treat or combat Islamophobia, each model also presents different theories of social change. While there are overlapping points of analysis regarding the causes of Islamophobia in both models, there are significant differences. **These differences must not be overlooked because they inform** the way in which programs and **grassroots responses** to Islamophobia occur. In the wake of the Boston bombing, **these models can help us** to **think more carefully about whether the way in which we** are **combat**ting **Islamophobia is contributing to** the sorts of **change**s we want to see in the world, **or** whether they are re-enforcing some of the **prejudice**s we are seeking to ameliorate.

Failure to spec a method makes in-depth neg engagement impossible. His advocacy text defends “the 1AC” which is only an FYI that racism is bad; there is no method for me to kritik, which means we can’t have the method debate that he forwards in his role of the ballot.

Independently, it kills fairness because the vagueness of the AC allows him to shift out of neg indicts and permute any kritik, so I can’t win any offense. Fairness is a voter; that’s Galloway 7.

Even if spec isn’t independently a voter, it’s a reason why you should frame all the case turns as floating PIKs. I can’t refute every single component of the AC, because some parts are literally cards saying racism is a bad thing, so you should only hold me to the standard of disproving some part of the case, because disproving the whole aff would be unwinnable.

### Word PIC

The term ‘Islamophobia’ portrays all Muslims as defined by Islam. This locks in discrimination and anti-Muslim alarmism.

**Halliday 99** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

No subject **in** contemporary public **discussion** has attracted more confused discussion than that **of relations between ‘Islam’ and the West**. Whether it be the discussion of relations between Muslim states and non- Muslim countries, or that of the relations between non-Muslims and Muslims within Western countries, **the tendency has** on both sides **been**, with some exceptions , towards **alarmism and simplification**. Alarmism has concerned the ‘threat’ which, from one side, ‘Islam’ poses to the non- Muslim world, and on the other, which ‘the West’ poses to Muslims. Non- Muslim simplification involves many obvious issues: terrorism – as if most Muslims are terrorists or most terrorists are Muslims; the degree of aggressiveness found in the Muslim world and the responsibility of Muslims for this; the willingness of Muslims to allow for diversity, debate, respect for human rights. It is not only the sensationalist media, but also **writers** with an eye to current anxieties of the reading public, such as V. S. Naipaul and Samuel Huntington, who **reinforce** such **misrepresentation. Muslim simplification is** itself two-sided: on the one hand, a stereotyping of the ‘West’; on the other, **the assertion of a unitary identity for** all **Muslims**, and of a unitary interpretation of text and culture. The core **simplification involves** these very **terms themselves**: ‘the West’ is not a valid aggregation of the modern world and lends itself far too easily to monist, conspiratorial presentations of political and social interaction. But **nor is the term ‘Islam’ a valid shorthand for summarizing how a billion Muslims**, divided into over éfty states, and into myriad ethnicities and social groups, **relate** to the contemporary world, to each other or to the non-Muslim world. To get away from such simpliécations is, however, virtually impossible, since both those opposed to ‘Islam’ and those invoking it adhere to such labels. Moreover, as much of this literature shows, **those** who are most **intent on critiquing** standard **Western prejudices** about the Muslim world themselves **fall back on** another set of **simplifcations**. Instead of fearing or hating anti-Muslim stereotypes, **we are** now **invited to respect**, understand, study ‘**Islam’**. **Islamophobia**, Eurocentrism, stereotyping The literature under review here ranges across several aspects of this question. The Runnymede and Wilton Park **reports** identify misinterpretations, above all in the West, of the Muslim world and advocate a more tolerant, informed, relation to the Muslim world. They reèect an approach derived, on the one hand, from race relations and, on the other, from inter-faith dialogue. They both set current frictions in the context of the long historical relations between Muslims and the Christian world, both identify the role of the media in reinforcing stereotypes, both advocate greater discussion between communities. Most signiécantly, perhaps, they **accept the term ‘Islam’ as a denomination of the primary identity of those who are Muslims; they avoid discussion of** the **diversities within** Muslim **societies, on ethnic grounds** or on the interpretation of the Muslim tradition and on its application to the contemporary world.

“Islamophobia” is too imprecise. It’s nebulous and has zero causal explanatory power. **Bleich 11** writes[[22]](#footnote-22)

Islamophobia is a widely used concept in public and scholarly circles. It was originally developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s by political activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), public commentators, and international organizations to draw attention to harmful rhetoric and actions directed at Islam and Muslims in Western liberal democracies. For actors like these, the term not only identifies anti- Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments, it also provides a language for denouncing them. In recent years, Islamophobia has evolved from a primarily political concept toward one increasingly deployed for analytical purposes. Researchers have begun using the term to identify the history, presence, dimensions, intensity, causes, and consequences of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments. In short, Islamophobia is an emerging comparative concept in the social sciences. Yet, **there is no widely accepted definition of the term. As a result, it is extremely difficult to compare levels of Islamophobia** across time, location, or social group, **or to levels of analogous categories such as racism, anti-Semitism, or xenophobia**. Without a concept that applies across these comparative dimensions, **it is** also virtually **impossible to identify** the **causes and consequences of Islamophobia with** any **precision**.

The alternative is to do the aff without the “Islamophobia” rhetoric in favor of challenging “anti-Muslim sentiment” as a starting point. The term “anti-Muslim sentiment” is preferable

**Griffiths 11** writes[[23]](#footnote-23)

**Islamophobia is an imperfect term**, the value judgement it automatically intones, the suggestion of a homogeneity which simply isn’t there and the insinuation that a problem taken with Muslims automatically equates to a problem with Islam is unaccommodating. Though undoubtedly possessing its own problems, the label which this essay initially chose out of deference to neutrality, **“Anti-Muslim sentiment”** appears popular with some commentators who take issue with the term but accept what it is seeking to address, it **avoids many of the pitfalls which have befallen Islamophobia; it is** notably **similar to Anti-Semitism which has gained widespread acceptance**. A viewpoint which this writing has not addressed but certainly warrants study is the related term “Islam anxiety” as expounded by Juan Cole in his text Engaging the Muslim world.

### Case

The aff’s speaking out in the name of their religion means they get co-opted by government normalization. The state applauds “moderate” Muslims so it can demonize the “extreme” ones

**Tutt 13** writes[[24]](#footnote-24)

Rascoff points out how the **Obama** administration**'s** unique **approach to collaboration with the Muslim community** under the banner of "countering violent extremism" a new euphemism **for countering terrorism**, **is to establish a version of Islam that is normative to** the values of **the U**nited **S**tates **government.** **By recruiting** so called **"moderate Muslims"** as agents of the United States diplomatic efforts abroad in Muslim countries and having government officials attend Islamic religious events and conferences, Rascoff argues that the government is promoting a threat to the establishment clause of the US Constitution and the First Amendment that preserves the right for private citizens to practice and define their religion without the incursion of any government agency. The ostensible efforts of **the U.S. government** here seem to be well intentioned. They **want to** strengthen moderate Islam and help to **portray certain** moderate **strands of Islam as** the correct and **acceptable** version of Islam. But **what ends up taking place is** a form of **Muslim identity** that **is regulated by the government**, whereby the government goes to co-define what is normative within Islam, and what is not. While many Muslims in the U.S. and the west more broadly participate in these efforts to strengthen moderate Islam by collaborating with the government, **it is** at the same time, **a mode** of of the philosopher Michel **Foucault called governmentality that perpetuate**s a sense of **religious insiders and outsiders**. Muslim Americans, for example, have already shown time and again that they are often the first responders to radicalism and that their version of Islam is not in need of governmental collaboration in this hands on manner. The truth is that **Muslims** living in the west, and around the world for that matter, **have the most to lose when it comes to combatting radicalism in the name of their religion**. This is why the Muslim community in Toronto turned in the suspects in the recent planned terrorist attack. While public condemnations of terrorism in the name of Islam coming from Muslims are a good thing to hear, we have to understand that combatting Islamophobia is a much larger systemic challenge that requires a combination of both the integrationist personal engagement as well as the critical approach.

They’re wrong that modern-day Islamophobia is the new Orientalism. Grounding their critique on the notion of Orientalism is monolithic and counterproductive

**Kamiya 6** writes[[25]](#footnote-25)

Irwin’s book would have been stronger if he had grappled with these issues. But the (brief) **triumph of neoconservative ideology** in the United States **does not prove Said’s thesis**. Lewis may be a one-man pinup for Orientalism, but he is the exception that proves the rule, at least in the academy and among specialists. The truth is that most experts on Islam and the Arab world are appalled at the Bush administration policies. Public prejudice against Arabs and Muslims exists, of course, but it is not the clanking monolith Said described. **Public support for the “war on terror”** (now rapidly dwindling) **has had more to do with** a **visceral** public **reaction to 9/11**, and the anomalous, single-issue sacred cow of Israel, **than** with a **historic bias against the Middle East** and Arabs that allegedly goes back to Aeschylus. Ironically, **Said himself recognized this. Criticizing the Arab world’s** crude **polemics against America, he wrote, “It is not acceptable to** sit in Beirut or Cairo meeting halls and **denounce American imperialism** (or Zionist colonialism for that matter) **without** a whit of **understanding that these are complex societies not always truly represented by their governments**’ stupid or cruel policies.” It is striking how little Said, the practical Palestinian politician, dealing with real-world issues, sounds like the grand theoretician of “Orientalism.” At the end of “Dangerous Knowledge,” Irwin asks why “Orientalism” has been so successful. “It is a scandal and damning comment on the quality of intellectual life in Britain in recent decades that Said’s argument about Orientalism could ever have been taken seriously,” he writes. “If Said’s book is as bad as I think it is, why has it attracted so much attention and praise in certain quarters?” His answer: resentment of established Orientalists by partisans of new disciplines like cultural studies and sociology; anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism; the allure of trendy figures like Foucault and Gramsci; and general Western “hand-wringing and guilt about its imperialist past.” There is no doubt that the same reasons apply to certain quarters in the United States. The larger question raised by the success of “Orientalism” is the venerable one of ends and means. Its defenders say that the West really does have much to feel guilty about, and they argue that Said’s book, though flawed, is praiseworthy because it has forced the West to be more self-critical. But this position is a slippery slope, only a step removed from defending Stalinist realism and other “dialectically justified” hack work. **An unflinching look at America’s imperialist past** — and the crude stereotypes about the Middle East, ignorant hostility and out-and-out racism that underlie much of our current foreign policy and helped pave the way for the Iraq war — **is** indeed **necessary. But Said’s** everything-but-the-kitchen-sink **approach is counterproductive**. It may have swelled the ranks of subaltern studies programs and provided grist for numerous postcolonial studies Ph.D. theses, but that doesn’t make his argument correct. In the end, bad books are just bad books, and when they are canonized for instrumental reasons, the result is a coarsening of thought and an ever-widening and unhealthy divide between the academy and mainstream culture. Indeed, there is reason to believe that such **sweeping indictments produce** a **public backlash and result in more bigotry, not less**. Demands that villains du jour — whether males, white people, the West, heterosexuals or thin people — reflect on their guilt do not seem to lead to greater enlightenment.

The aff’s rejection of a living wage is wrong.

A higher minimum wage is key to increasing bargaining power

**Konczal 14** writes[[26]](#footnote-26)

When low-wage workers protest at fast food restaurants, low wages are not necessarily their sole concern. The working conditions may be equally important. **Between** a **lack of sick days, random shift scheduling, and working without pay, there is a host of problems** and humiliations **from which workers seek redress**. Civic republicanism presses against these practices. Philip Pettit, the philosopher most associated with this strain of thinking, defines its goal in terms of “freedom as non-domination,” freedom “as a condition under which a person is more or less immune to interference on an arbitrary basis.” In what sense can people be considered free if their means of survival places them at the mercy of an erratic schedule, thereby preventing the formation of civic and communal ties? **Surveys of New York City’s low-wage workers find that 84 percent** of them **are not paid for their entire workday. When bosses can flout labor contracts** and arbitrarily impose working conditions in this way, **workers lack** the kind of **freedom** that civic republicans celebrate. **By making the labor market tighter through lower turnover and vacancies, a higher minimum wage creates bargaining power for workers** and will help **to eliminate these kinds of domination.**

Improving low-wage workers’ bargaining power makes workers better off

**Gupta 15** writes[[27]](#footnote-27)

**Greedy corporations** have been on a decades-long bender to **take advantage of working people — depressing wages, benefits and job standards**, which has led to record inequality and poverty. At Jobs With Justice, we believe that **fighting poverty requires expanding** and protecting **the ability of workers to bargain with their employers** to demand higher wages, better working conditions and better living standards. As the nature of work changes, we look at collective bargaining through the union workplace campaign lens, but also through nontraditional forms, including legislative, policy, rulemaking and industry-wide interventions that put more money in workers’ pockets and improve standards and conditions for workers. **Only through bargaining do workers have** the **power to directly confront** the **corporate actors behind poverty and inequality**. Video From Jobs With Justice San Francisco: Fight for $15 and Just Hours Protest One example of this effort is our Retail Workers Bill of Rights campaign – led by Jobs With Justice San Francisco. **Retail jobs are** well understood to be **some of the fastest growing and most poorly paid jobs** in our economy, **and an increasing number** of people employed in this industry **aren’t able to get the hours they need to earn enough to support their families**. Working with the city’s Board of Supervisors, we pushed legislation to offer workers access to fairer, more predictable schedules. And in response to growing outrage over the turbulence families are experiencing due to a rise in inflexible and erratic schedules, community and labor advocates in a half dozen cities are planning to move similar reforms in 2015. Beyond winning better scheduling practices from employers, these campaigns – and others like them – have the potential to set workers up for more transformational fights, making bolder demands that increase onramps to collective bargaining and ultimately confront corporate power and fight poverty and inequality. Sign up now to join the fight for fair schedules and expanded bargaining for workers.

## Disability 1NC v Griffin

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When we look at the success of **citizen initiatives** from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those **moments of defiance** and disruption **that bring the invisible** and unimaginable **into view**. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the **policy debate** and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions **could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics**. The **existence of a goal-oriented debate** within a technically dominated arena **defied the** normalizing **separation between expert policymakers and** consuming **citizens. Citizens** momentarily **recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process**, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding.

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**Harris 13**

Scott Harris (Director of Debate at U Kansas, 2006 National Debate Coach of the Year, Vice President of the American Forensic Association, 2nd speaker at the NDT in 1981). “This ballot.” 5 April 2013. CEDA Forums. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4762.0;attach=1655

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says **this community doesn’t care whether** its **participants have a life** or **do well in school or spend time with their families.** I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against Topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that **might make debate an unending nightmare** and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.

**Limits turn solvency. Research shows that research overload leads to superficial education, meaning we won’t learn about the aff or anything else.**

**Chokshi 10** Niraj Chokshi is a former staff editor at TheAtlantic.com, where he wrote about technology. He is currently freelancing How Do We Stop the Internet From Making Us Stupid? JUN 8 2010 <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/how-do-we-stop-the-internet-from-making-us-stupid/57796/> BK

When it comes to focus, turning on the spotlight may not matter as much as our ability to dim the ambient light. Nicholas Carr argued on Saturday in The Wall Street Journal that the Internet is making us dumber and on Monday The New York Times had a front-page feature on the mental price we pay for our multi-tasked lifestyles. If we are indeed losing our ability to think deeply, the key to fighting back may lie in a subtlety: focus may be more about our ability to filter out distractions than our ability to home in on the issue at hand. Carr posed his idea that technology is making us stupid in a 2008 Atlantic cover story and his forthcoming book "The Shallows" is a longer rumination on the theory. According to professors and research cited in The Times piece "the idea that information overload causes distraction was supported by more and more research." And those distractions, according to research Carr cites, are forcing us to change the way we think. Deep thought is losing ground to superficiality. So, if our multitasking lifestyle causes distraction, and distraction leads to superficial thinking, how do we fight back? Carr offers some advice:

3. Ground

**Not all topics offer fair and limited ground. Absent a topical fairness requirement, the aff will be biased by competitive incentive to find the most obscure and uncontroversial advocacy within the general vicinity of living wage literature. The only neutral topic debate is one chosen by a 3rd party topic committee.**

**Fairness is a voting issue. Debate is a competitive game, and rigging that game in your favor denies respect for the participants.**

**Galloway 7**

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally **denies the personhood of the other participant** (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).

4. Switch side topical debate is the only meaningful forum to foster critical thinking. The impact is extinction. **Harrigan 8**

Casey Harrigan, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May 2008, pp.6-9

Additionally, **there are social benefits to the practice of requiring students to debate both sides of controversial issues**. Dating back to the Greek rhetorical tradition, great value has been placed on the benefit of testing each argument relative to all others in the marketplace of ideas. **Like** those who argue on behalf of the efficiency-maximizing benefits of **free market competition**, it is believed that **arguments are most rigorously tested** (and conceivably refined **and improved**) **when compared to all available alternatives.** Even for beliefs that have seemingly been ingrained in consensus opinion or in cases where the public at-large is unlikely to accept a particular position, it has been argued that they should remain open for public discussion and deliberation (Mill, 1975). Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do" (Ennis, 1987, p.10), **critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how to** advocate and **argue, but how to decide as well.** Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, **critical thinking is necessary to assess all** the **possible outcomes** of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are "issues of unsurpassed important in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people...being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking" (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that "The next Pearl Harbor could be 'compounded by hydrogen" (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p.3) is greatly reduced, **the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq** in 2003 **points to the continuing necessity of** training **a** well-informed and **critically-aware public** (Zarefsky, 2007). **In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant** but ambitious **politicians and** persuasive but **nefarious leaders would** be much more likely to **draw the** country, and possibly the **world**, **into conflicts** with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad **threats of global proportions** that **will require incisive solutions, including global warming,** the spread of **pandemic disease**s, **and** the **proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction, **cultivating a** robust and effective **society of critical decision-makers is essential.**

5. Topical version of the aff. The aff’s evidence is specific to minimum wage laws, so he can say a living wage for disabled people addresses important issues.

6. Focus on institutional change is empirically successful for the disabled

**DSQ 3** writes[[28]](#footnote-28)

The history of the **efforts of the disability rights movement on behalf of legislation** which would **facilitate** the attainment of its twin goals of the **inclusion and empowerment** of persons with disabilities can be said to begin in the 1950s. Specifically, it can be traced (Varela 1983: 35) to the "paralyzed veterans . . . fighting for more parking spaces, and for more accessible commodes . . ." and to the fight by people with disabilities "for local and state accessibility laws throughout the 1950s." The first significant federal legislation advancing the goals of the movement came in 1965 with the creation of the National Commission on Architectural Barriers to the Rehabilitation of the Handicapped. The Commission was to "study the problems involved in making all federal buildings accessible to disabled citizens" (Varela 1983: 36). However, the import of the work of the Commission on such problems is not limited to problems of access. As Varela (1983: 36) observes, "the work of the Commission, and, more importantly, of disabled activists . . . [changed] attitudes toward disability . . . ." The change was from "an emphasis on services (that is, on doing something about 'those people')" to "an emphasis on civil rights (that is, the notion that once certain obstacles were removed, disabled people would be able to do a lot more for themselves than society had imagined)" (Varela 1983: 36). In short, efforts to include those with disabilities became efforts to empower them as well. Moreover, the notion that environmental obstacles and not just the impairment of individuals were worthy of attention rendered it plausible to seek the enactment of laws and regulations that would do so. In other words, "**environmental variables**, unlike individual characteristics **can be rectified through legislative** and administrative **action**" (DeJong 1983: 25). In 1968, the Architectural Barriers Act was passed. It stipulated that any facility built with or merely receiving federal funds had to be accessible to all. However, enforcement was minimal (Varela 1983: 36). Fortunately, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in a provision welcomed by the disability right movement, established the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (A&TBCB) to investigate and enforce compliance with established standards. Unfortunately, it "never received the funding it needed to enforce the law or even to investigate all . . . violations . . . reported by disabled consumers" (Varela 1983: 37). Nevertheless, **the fight for accessibility did advance the cause of the disability rights** movement. **It helped make** it **clear** that **barriers included "social, political and intellectual obstacles,** as well as physical ones" (Varela 1983: 37). Moreover, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act contained provisions in addition to the establishment of the A&TBCB which were important to the movement (Varela 1983: 40-41). It required the establishment, by state rehabilitation agencies, of selection methods that would ensure that people with severe impairments were not excluded from the agency's programs. In effect, then, the Act made it clear that no impairment, no matter how severe, was to be allowed as a consequences of a state agency's denial of services to become a disability. In addition, the 1973 act included provisions for client rights and for civil rights. Specifically, Section 504 prohibited discrimination against persons with so-called disabilities by any federally supported program. Thus, Section 504 was important to persons with so- called disabilities "who were looking for jobs . . . who wanted to use the same clinic as everyone else, who wanted the same choice of apartments, and who wanted to get into the polling places on election day" (Varela 1983: 42), who wanted simply to be an autonomous, contributing member of society. The next step in the history of legislation to empower and include people with impairments was the passage of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, originally called the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, P. L. 94-142). IDEA set "forth a comprehensive scheme" to ensure "two basic substantive rights of eligible children with disabilities . . . ." These were: "(1) the right to a free appropriate public education, and (2) the right to that education in the least restrictive environment" (National Council on Disability 2000: 28). The law applied in every state that receives federal funds under IDEA and to all public agencies authorized to provide special education and related services in a state that receives such funds. The Act was amended and reauthorized in 1997 (NCD 2000 30-31). In 1978, the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments (P. L. 95-602) of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act were passed. The amendments evinced Congress' endorsement of the autonomy premise of the social model described above. That is, the Amendments acknowledged that persons with disabilities should be involved in forming the policies and practices which affect their lives. Specifically, it mandated that a grant for an independent living center "provide assurances that handicapped individuals be substantially involved in [the] policy direction and management of such center, and will be employed by such center" (P. L.. 95-602 as quoted by Varela 1983: 46). **Many**, if not most, however, **view the** enactment of the Americans with Disability Act (**ADA**) in 1990 **as the crowning achievement of the disability rights movement**. That act (P. L. 101-336) extended provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 1978 amendments well beyond the earlier application to federally supported programs and the state rehabilitation agencies and of the IDEA to special education. Indeed, it "codified into law important principles that would henceforth govern the relationship between [American] society and its citizens with disabilities . . . [and] altered public discourse about disability and about the role of people with disabilities in American society" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4-5). It did so, first, by, in effect, **making** the **marginalization**, the exclusion of people with impairments from the mainstream of society in the United States, **illegitimate**. Specifically, **it declared** that "**people with disabilities are an integral part of society and**, as such, **should not be** segregated**,** isolated, or **subjected to** the effects of **discrimination**" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4). Furthermore, it sought **to enable "people with disabilities to take charge of their lives** . . . by fostering employment opportunities, facilitating access to public transportation and public accommodation, and ensuring the use of our nation's communication system" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4). Moreover, the **principles of the ADA can serve as a basis to test and challenge public policies and practices not consistent with** those **principles and** even to **demand they be changed**. The **ADA**, then, "**upholds** the **principle** that **each individual has the** potential, and deserves, the **right to participate in**, and contribute to, **society**" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 5).

### Cap Good K

The aff’s criticism of productivity is fundamentally a criticism of capitalism

**Young 12** writes[[29]](#footnote-29)

**Productivity**, what some call efficiency, **is a** mundane **but fundamental** economic **concept** that is **at the heart of capitalism**. In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith used the example of the “trifling manufacture” of a pin; labor specialization and capital investment in machinery permit man’s productivity and wealth to be vastly increased. **Productivity is the principal driving force for positive economic growth** (and attendant tax revenue) **and an improving standard of living**. Economic growth is of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the total output value of all the final goods and services produced in the nation’s formal economy. Productivity is measured in output per hour worked in the economy’s nonfarm business sector. The economy can grow without inflation only as fast as the growth of the labor force plus the rate of productivity improvement.

**Their aff’s opposition to capitalism is profoundly dangerous. It independently spills over to government policies that stifle creativity at the center of capitalism.**

**Allison, 2013:**

(The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure. 2013. John A. Allison, Chairman and CEO BB&T Corporation. p. 7-8)

**5. The deeper causes of our financial challenges are philosophical**, not economic. **All of the destructive government policies are based on philosophical ideas taught in our elite universities to future leftist leaders**. These ideas are inconsistent with the founding principles that made America great. They are also inconsistent with individual rights, especially property rights. At a deeper level, **these ideas are inconsistent with humans’ fundamental nature as thinking beings who must make independent judgments that are based on the fact and that use their ability to reason**. Academics purport to defend academic freedom. They are right to do so. However, **when put in government policy positions, the same academics somehow believe that businesspeople can continue to innovate and create wealth despite the ball and chain of government regulations. In reality, government regulations prevent businesspeople from being innovative and from thinking creatively.** In my career, I have seen a number of significant opportunities to add products and services that would unquestionably benefit our clients, and yet some law made this impossible. **All human progress is, by definition, based on creativity, because anything that is better is different. Creativity is possible only for an independent thinker.** Someone who is not creative, who cannot innovate, cannot contribute to human progress. **Government policies often provide incentives for destructive activities and prevent productive innovations.** In a broader context, **our lives ultimately depend on our individual ability to make independent judgments based on our assessments of the consequences of our actions for us.** These regulatory policies are typically based on a fundamental misunderstanding of human nature, the means of human survival, and the nature of the production process. Ideas have consequences. **We need to ensure that our future leaders are taught ideas consistent with the laws of nature and human nature, which are the foundation for a successful society and individual happiness.**

**Collectivism Is The Root Cause Of Exclusionary Ideologies; Only Free Market Individualism Solves**

**Binswanger, 2013:**

(Selfish Greed Wipes Out Racism. 12/26/2013. Harry Binswanger, Contributor To Forbes, Senior Contributor At RealClearMarkets and PhD. In The Philosophy Of Biology. Note: This evidence has been gender-modified. )

By “selfish” I mean: exclusive concern with one’s own self-interest, never sacrificing to others. Think of a Warren Buffett with no interest in philanthropy. It’s beside the point whether you evaluate selfishness as noble, as I do, or as depraved, as most people do. Why selfishness is sacred is a topic for another column. What we’re going to see here is that an exclusive concern with making all the money one can rules out acting as a racist. So, what is racism? By the term’s constant appearance in the media and in public discussion, you would think it well understood. But no. The Left, in particular, can’t afford to look too closely at what racism is. That’s because racism is a form of collectivism. “**Racism,” means racial collectivism. The theory of racism holds that the autonomous individual is a myth: what you are is determined by your race**, your “blood.” **The practice that results is racial discrimination: judging a person by reference to his [her] race rather than his individual attributes.** We don’t have to be too fussy about whether the bigotry is directed at a literal race or a nationality or a religious or ethnic group. **It’s the same kind of evil whether a bigoted employer says “No blacks” or “No Irish” or “No Jews.” All these are forms of discriminating against an individual on the basis of some group, some collective**, to which he belongs. **The group (racial, national, religious, or whatever) is all, the individual nothing. The alternative is individualism: the autonomous individual is all, the group is only a number of individuals. Individualism in practice means judging the individual for what he is as an individual, regardless of accidental, irrelevant facts about his physiology or where he was born, or the religious tradition in which he was raised.** Now, what about a racist bigot who is also selfish and greedy? He’s caught in a dilemma. As greedy, he craves his profit. Money is supposed to be the only thing he cares about. But as a racist, he has to care about something unrelated to money: race. What to do? You see the problem for him is one simple fact: racism is irrational. **The rational way to make hiring decisions is not by skin color but by expected performance. Selfish greed says: hire those who will contribute the most to the bottom line.** Racism says: don’t look at that, look at race. There’s another problem for the bigot. What if men of the race he hates, who are equally qualified, are willing to work for less? Say the employer is anti-black. Is he going to refuse to hire blacks who are asking lower wages than whites are getting? How much is he willing to pay to indulge his racism? And if he does indulge it, how will he compete with other employers who hire strictly by ability? Just yesterday, my iPhone music happened to bring up Joan Baez singing “Lowlands.” I was struck by the line: “Five dollars a day is white man’s pay. Mine’s a dollar and a half a day.” What an opportunity for a greedy man! **Absent Jim Crow laws, selfish greed would cause employers to swoop in to hire cheap black labor, bidding up their wage-rates.** That process would continue until wage rates were color-blind. Money has no color. Selfish greed eliminates racism. You’re skeptical? Then why is there outsourcing? Why have hordes of American companies flocked to hire Chinese labor? Because they’re cheaper. Only a failure to understand the meaning of the concepts one uses allows such contradictory thoughts as: “Greedy bigots won’t hire minorities” and “Greedy business owners are replacing American workers with cheaper Asian workers.” **Racial discrimination cannot last long when [wo]men are free to be greedy–i.e., when there is laissez-faire capitalism. Making economic decisions based on race is irrational, costly, and puts one at a competitive disadvantage**. **The same is true of any form of irrational discrimination–whether based on race, nationality, gender, age, or sexual preference.** The only way to argue the contrary would be to stand up and proclaim: “No, people in these groups really are less competent and don’t add as much to a company’s bottom line.” I don’t think anti-capitalists want to go there. But that’s what their position implies. Many timid people on the Right try to defend capitalism as “consumer sovereignty.” It isn’t that. **Capitalism is the sovereignty of reason. In reason, productive ability not race is what counts. When men are free to act on selfish greed, the more rational tend to succeed and the more irrational tend to fail. That’s why selfish greed wipes out racism.**

#### Profit motive is key to accessibility

Dermer 13

Simon Dermer (Managing Director of Essential Accessibility). “A CEO Perspective on Disability.” Autumn 2013. http://www.essentialaccessibility.com/newsletter/march/

Some of **the highest profile companies in** the U.S. and around **the world** are creating economic and social value by factoring people with disabilities into their planning. For many, a key step has been to enroll in the Disability Community Involvement Initiative, spearheaded by eSSENTIAL Accessibility™ and championed by leading advocacy groups. The Initiative's mandate is to represent organizations and brands meaningfully in the disability community to empower its members accordingly. With **19**.6**%** of Americans identifying themselves as having a disability, higher ambition leaders are tailoring their information and offerings to the last hidden demographic. In a statement of strategic intent, chieftains across all sectors from 3M and Kraft through to MasterCard and Walgreens are tuning in to the disability space. **By tapping their** firm's **capacity to profitably address social problems,** they are doing well by doing good.

Free markets help disabled people; life insurance proves

**Wright 3** writes[[30]](#footnote-30)

In the late 1910s, life insurers in the United States began to offer insurance against the risk of “total” and “permanent” inability to work by offering, in return for a rationally calculated premium, periodic cash payments to life-insurance policyholders if and when they became disabled. Rather unwisely, the companies linked the amount of the payment to the face value of the policy rather than to the policyholder’s current income. Predictably, during the Great Depression disability claims skyrocketed. Though not as liable to abuse as unemployment insurance, disability insurance claims are subject to fraud, misrepresentation, and ambiguity. Insurance companies suffered losses, but at the same time they learned that disability insurance will be abused unless the monthly payment is less than the policyholder’s net remuneration from work. As the payment approaches or exceeds take-home pay, the policyholder will find it increasingly tempting to claim disability. **Life insurers** also learned that individuals are not equally likely to suffer from a disabling illness or accident. As they **learn more about** the **variables that increase** the **likelihood of disability,** **they develop premium rate books** which ensure that each policyholder pays an actuarially sound premium based on the probability that he will become disabled. Moreover, **simple business competition ensures that disability premiums tend toward their rational** or natural **level. If an insurer charges premiums that are too high, it** makes large profits and **attracts new entrants that in turn create downward pressure on premiums**. If an insurer charges premiums that are too low, it suffers losses until it raises premiums or exits. Regulations and artificial barriers to entry limit the efficiency of the market to some extent, but all in all, **market forces prevail and disability premiums are** as rational and **fair** as the government allows. In addition, life insurers have incentives to pay legitimate claims in a timely manner, to deny spurious claims, and to monitor disability beneficiaries closely. Any insurer that fails to pay legitimate claims, or that delays payment, will see its reputation suffer. Likewise, any insurer that pays fraudulent claims incites further instances of moral hazard and soon becomes unprofitable. Similarly, the profitability of insurers that do not regularly check to ensure that beneficiaries remain disabled also suffers. Insurers therefore give their claims representatives incentives to treat policyholders fairly, which means catching fakers but not begrudging the truly disabled their contractual due. Equitable Market Indeed, **the private system of disability is**, like all free markets, **equitable. Individuals can choose to go uninsured if they desire**; healthy individuals who desire coverage may obtain it at a rational and competitive market price. **Claimants are treated fairly;** if a disagreement arises, **both parties have access to objective courts of law**, arbitration proceedings, or private negotiation. In borderline cases, for example, parties are free to settle the claim with a lump sum payment or a reduced level of periodic payments. Private disability insurance became an even better bargain in the 1950s because of the rapid proliferation of “group insurance,” a fringe benefit many employers offered to employees. For a variety of reasons, group insurance greatly reduced insurers’ administrative costs, allowing them to offer the same coverage for lower premiums. The same incentives to offer low-cost policies and excellent claims services held as strongly for group insurance as for individual disability insurance. **Private disability insurance**, then, be it of the individual or group variety, **is economically efficient. Wealth is redistributed from healthy policyholders to disabled ones**, but only by the terms of inviolable contracts properly priced. Consumers are free to choose the companies with which they wish to attempt to contract. Albeit subject to certain regulations, companies are free to accept or reject applicants as their underwriters see fit. Accepted applicants exchange cash premiums for “peace of mind,” the knowledge that should they become disabled they and their families will not be left destitute.

**The Alternative Is To Retake Academic Spaces From The Left; Their Criticism Makes Statism Inevitable While Destroying Free Markets**

**Allison, 2013:**

(The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure. 2013. John A. Allison, Chairman and CEO BB&T Corporation. p.230-233)

However, **ideas ultimately determine outcomes. The great ideas that are the foundation of Western civilization and especially modern market economies are under attack in our most important educational institutions.** **Rome fell when the principles that had made it successful were abandoned** and replaced by mysticism, debased currency, authoritarianism, and the “circus.” Western civilization went into decline for almost 1,000 years. The Egyptian dynasties experienced long periods (hundreds of years) of decline and then semirevival over ideas. The same pattern can be observed in Chinese history. Cultures are very intangible. **Human progress is not one straight upward spiral; rather, there are many long periods of significant decline.** It is clearly a two steps forward, one step back process. There is evidence that Egyptian technology was more advanced in 5000 BC than in 2000 BC. What happened to the Mayans? **Progress has to be earned based on the right ideas. Even if the long, long term is positive, there could a hundred or a thousand years of decline.** The Founding Fathers of the United States grasped, at least implicitly, the principles underlying a successful social system—a recognition of reason as a means of knowledge, rational self-interest as a motivaor, and individual rights as the condition necessary for optimal human well-being. Fortunately, the American sense of life still captures these ideas. As defined by Ayn Rand, “A sense of life is an emotional, subconsciously integrated appraisal of man and of existence. It sets the nature of a man’s emotional response and his basic character.” The American sense of life is individualistic, self-responsible, hardworking, “can do,” and benevolent. The Tea Party movement, despite its flaws, is driven by the American sense of life. Americans are skeptical of big government and skeptical of elitists. They value freedom and common sense. These are great protectors. The American sense of life is very different from the dominant sense of life in Western Europe and most of the rest of the world. Our sense of life is my greatest source of optimism that we will ultimately face our challenges and return to the principles that made us great. However, a sense of life is subconscious and intangible, and it can be led in a destructive direction when it is not consciously held and fully integrated. **The objective reality is that the most likely for the United States is a long-term and significant decline into statism.** The reason for this trend is not economic policy but philosophy. **As long as both liberals and religious conservatives defined altruism and attack rational self-interest, our decline is inevitable**. On the other hand, I am at heart an optimist. While the most likely scenario is negative, there is still hope. That is why I bothered to write this book. **If the ideas that made America great can be rediscovered and combined with knowledge on people’s productive nature gained since the Industrial Revolution (as expressed by Ayn Rand), the United States can be returned to greatness.** Our children and grandchildren can have wonderful lives. **The long-term key to success is to recapture the elite universities from the Left. It is critical that we restore meaningful academic freedom in which there is honest and open debate about important ideas.** In relation to this issue, there is a very interesting question regarding about how the United States moved from ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (that is, limited government, individual rights, and free markets) to the “redistributive state” (big government, statism, collectivism, and a highly regulated economy). These trends have been in motion at least since Woodrow Wilson. **The answer is that by the power of philosophical ideas, the Left took over our universities, and therefore the education of future leaders.** In the late 1800s, college professors in the United States were still defenders of the Founding Fathers’ principles. Twenty years later, the culture in universities had changed radically. At the same time, the United States was rising as a world economic power, and our colleges wanted to become world-class universities. To become universities, they needed to have PhD program, but since they did not have PhD faulty members, they could educated PhDs. To solve this problem, the American colleges hired a large numbers of PhDs from Europe beginning in the late 100s (and American students went to German universities to earn their PhDs). The strategy was a huge success in the hard sciences. The U.S. colleges and universities attracted world-class scientists, propelling our economic development. Unfortunately, the strategy was a disaster in the liberal arts, especially philosophy. The students (who were now PhDs themselves) of the German philosophers (such as Kant and Hegel) who had laid the intellectual foundations for collectivism and statism in Europe were attracted to the United States. In Europe, these ideas ultimately led to Nazism and Communism. In the United States, the ideas were partly moderated by the American sense of life, but they led ot the New Deal and the ideology of the current administration. Of course, the universities educate the teachers. Therefore, the Left took over the K-12 educational system by indoctrinating schoolteachers. Because the professors determine which new PhD graduates will get tenure at the university, the system is closed. This is particularly true in the liberal arts, where evaluating accomplishments is highly subjective. **If you are in significant disagreement with your professors over fundamental issues, you are unlikely to get a PhD, get a tenure-track job, get published in the “best” journals, or get tenure.** Numerous studies have documented that the faculties at the vast majority of universities are far to the left of the American mainstream. **It is a closed self-reinforcing system that educates elitists** who at a deep level believe that they are smarter than the rest of us, and that their ideas are more insightful. Of course, there are some high-quality, thoughtful, honest people in academia. But **even the best often operate with subconscious premises that drive their thinking—premises that are inconsistent with a free and “messy” society that is not ordered and directed by the “best and the brightest,” the elite who know what is good for you and have only your welfare as their goal.** Even though history is littered with multiple failures of elitist-driven culture, the Left always attributes to poor execution—errors that will not be made in the future. Despite the fact that communism killed hundreds of millions of people, there are many defenders of communism on university campuses.

### UE DA (LW Good)

Minimum wage increase increases employment

**Card and Krueger 94** write[[31]](#footnote-31)

Contrary to the central prediction of the textbook model of the minimum wage, but **consistent with** a number of **recent studies based on cross-sectional time-series comparisons of affected and unaffected** markets or **employers, we find no evidence that the rise in New Jersey's minimum wage reduced employment at fast-food restaurants** in the state. Regardless of whether we compare stores in New Jersey that were affected by the $5.05 minimum to stores in eastern Pennsylvania (where the minimum wage was constant at $4.25 per hour) or to stores in New Jersey that were initially paying $5.00 per hour or more (and were largely unaffected by the new law), we find that the increase in the minimum wage increased employment. We present a wide variety of alternative specifications to probe the robustness of this conclusion. None of the alternatives shows a negative employment effect. **We also** check our findings for the fast-food industry by **compar**ing **changes in teen**age **employment** rates **in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York in the year following the increase** in the minimum wage. Again, **these results point toward a relative increase in employment of low-wage workers** in New Jersey. We also find no evidence that minimum-wage increases negatively affect the number of McDonald's outlets opened in a state.

**States with high minimum wage see faster job growth**

**Covert 14**

Citing Ben Wolcott (Center for Economic and Policy Research)

Bryce Covert (Economic Policy Editor for ThinkProgress; She was previously editor of the Roosevelt Institute’s Next New Deal blog and a senior communications officer; she is also a contributor for The Nation and was previously a contributor for ForbesWoman. Her writing has appeared on The New York Times, The New York Daily News, The Nation, The Atlantic, The American Prospect, and others). “States That Raised Their Minimum Wages Are Experiencing Faster Job Growth.” ThinkProgress. 3 July 2014. http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/07/03/3456393/minimum-wage-state-increase-employment/

Think a higher minimum wage is a job killer? Think again: The states that raised their minimum wages on January 1 have seen higher employment growth since then than the states that kept theirs at the same rate. The minimum wage went up in 13 states — Arizona, Connecticut, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington — either thanks to automatic increases in line with inflation or new legislation, as Ben Wolcott reports in his analysis at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. The average change in employment for those states over the first five months of the year as compared with the last five of 2013 is .99 percent, while the average for all remaining states is .68 percent. Digging deeper, all but one of those states are experiencing increases in employment, and nine of them have seen growth above the median rate. Wolcott’s analysis builds on a previous one from Goldman Sachs, which did the same evaluation for just January and compares it to December of last year. It found that the states that had minimum wage increases experienced faster job growth than those without a raise. This doesn’t mean that increasing the minimum wage necessarily creates more jobs. “While this kind of simple exercise can’t establish causality, it does provide evidence against theoretical negative employment effects of minimum-wage increases,” Wolcott writes. Indeed, it adds to the evidence that higher minimum wages may not hurt job growth as much as some have warned. Washington has the highest minimum wage and saw the biggest increase in small business jobs last year. Its job growth has also remained steady and above average in the 15 years since it raised its wage. When economists studied state-level minimum wage increases over two decades they didn’t find any conclusive evidence that the raises impacted job creation.

**Disability reforms won’t happen during high unemployment**

**Greve 9**

Bent Greve (Professor, University of Roskilde, Denmark) “The labour market situation of disabled people in European countries and implementation of employment policies: a summary of evidence from country reports and research studies.” Report prepared for the Academic Network of European Disability experts (ANED). April 2009. http://www.disability-europe.net/content/aned/media/ANED%20Task%206%20final%20report%20-%20final%20version%2017-04-09.pdf

This report is based on evidence submitted in national reports produced by members of the Academic Network of European Disability experts (ANED) representing the EU Member States (except Luxembourg) plus Norway and Iceland. It is supplemented with evidence from existing studies with a focus on disabled people’s access to integration and retention in the labour market, and recommendations to enhance the current position. Action on the employment situation of disabled people in European countries should be considered in the context of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, the Lisbon Agenda and European Employment Strategy, the Employment Directive 2000/78/EC, and the European Disability Action Plan. Labour market activation and inclusion for disabled people are easier to address in periods of increasing labour demand and lower levels of unemployment than in times of recession. The current economic downturn raises substantial challenges to the goals and actions proposed in recent periods of policy development. It will be important to review national developments in light of this situation.

### Case

**Their social model of disability is counter-productive and trades off with more pragmatic politices**

**Dewsbury et al 2k4**

(Guy, Lancaster Univ, Karen Clarke, Lancaster Univ, Dave Randalll, Manchester Metropolitan Univ, Mark Rouncefield Lancaster, Ian Sommerville, Lancaster, The anti-social model of disability, Disability & Society, 19.2 March)

We do not share all **these concerns** as they **apply to the social model of disability**, for we are not menaced by constructionism, nor do we wish to promote one variety of truth claim over another. We are concerned specifically with how this helps. The constructionist focus, we feel, has altered our perspective on expertise such that **where we had previously unquestioningly accepted the professional expertise of medical practitioners, we now equally unquestioningly accept the expertise of the sociologist who wishes to undermine it.** **The social constructionist**, that is, **provides professional explanation by revealing the hidden nature of the social world in and through a number of typical steps.** These include: 1. **Showing that definitions** of a given concept **are shifting**, especially historically. Many social constructionist studies draw attention to the ways in which explanations that were accepted as matters of fact were embedded in the ideologies or discourses of the time and can now be clearly seen as absurd or wrong. 2. **Deriving from this that ‘things could be otherwise’** insofar as new and ‘constructionist’ models can be used contrastively with models that have preceded them, including models that still have a currency. 3. **Arguing that in some way this challenges the ‘social reality’** of the concept in question. 4. **Suggesting that this challenge to the social reality of any given social fact has important political consequences** and that the social constructionist is pivotal in the realization of these consequences. We think **there may be problems here**, mainly with steps 3 and 4. As Hacking (1999) has convincingly shown the validity and importance of challenges to social reality depend very much on what kind of challenge they are. Equally, we will suggest that **the apparent political importance of the constructionist position is largely rhetorical**. This is not to understate its importance, for rhetoric is a powerful force, but **it does not assist us with our ‘what to do next’ problem**. In explicating the various ways in which disability is a social construct the Social Model highlights the social features of what, on first consideration, might appear as a purely physical problem. As Humphrey argues: ‘… the social model harbours a number of virtues in redefining disability in terms of a disabling environment, repositioning disabled people as citizens with rights, and reconfiguring the responsibilities for creating, sustaining and overcoming disablism’ (Humphrey, 2000, p. 63). Again, there are self-evident, political, advantages in adopting this position. As Hacking suggests, ‘it **can still be liberating suddenly to realize that something is constructed and is not part of the nature of things**, of people, or human society’ (Hacking, 1999, p. 35). **However, the metaphor has grown tired, if not tiresome, and in the matter of what we call ‘practical politics’**, **that is the quite ordinary business of making-do, managing, coping** (and obviously everyone ‘makes do’, not just disabled people) **that might inform the design-related questions we want to ask, it is for the most part empty.** In order to pursue this theme, **we need to examine the sense in which the ‘social model’ can be seen as ‘radical’**, **for as with so many similar avowals there is less to this than meets the eye**. **Despite the supposedly ‘radical’ nature and claims of the social model of disability it clearly engages in the ordinary business of sociology** and, as Button (1991) suggests, **any radical claims are readily absorbed into everyday sociological debate.** **That is, radical political commitments are not radical sociologies**—**they are,** from within a sociological perspective**, unremarkable**. Radical causes are the very stuff of conventional sociology, conducted along conventional lines. Even, for example, **the argument that some current sociological approaches propagate a ‘disablist’ view of society that legitimates the treatment of disabled people, whilst simultaneously obscuring their real position within society is but a pale imitation of earlier, similar, Feminist and Marxist arguments. The application of the idea may be new but the idea itself, and the argument presented, is not.**

**Aff doesn’t solve- exposing disability oppression does not lead to social change, non-disabled won’t surrender power**

**Donoghue, 2k3**

(Christopher, Fordham University, Challenging the authority of the medical definition of disability: an analysis of the resistance to the social constructionist paradigm, Disability & Society 18.2)

**In an effort to debunk the entrenched authority of the medical model, a social constructionist paradigm has been adopted** by many disability theorists and activists. They have suggested that society normally creates a negative social identity for people with disabilities (Gergen, 1985; Fine & Asch, 1988; Scotch, 1988; Brzuzy, 1997). **Through the construction of this identity, which is typically characterised by deviant or abnormal behaviour, the non-disabled majority is granted a legitimate means to exclude and isolate people with disabilities**. As removed members of society, their contributions are often discredited and their successes are treated as aberrations. Likewise, the expectations of people with disabilities are chronically low, and there is an ever-present suggestion that their lives are not necessarily worth living. This identity has been argued to derive from the medical model, which defines a disability as a deficiency that restricts one’s ability to perform normal life activities. By adopting the social constructionist viewpoint, theorists and activists have contended that society has created disability by choosing not to remove structural constraints that would enable more people to participate and gain access to social resources. **The social constructionist approach was an effective ideological rejoinder to the established medical model**. Yet the question of how to convince the non-disabled majority that society has disabled certain individuals has not been adequately resolved. The **activists** attempted to adopt the social constructionist theory as a basis for a minority group model of disability. They would **use this model to support a plea for action to people with disabilities as a mechanism to overcome the oppression being inflicted upon them by the non-disabled majority**. While it is clear that such a transformation of the definition of disability among academics and disability activists has clearly taken hold, **the disability movement appears to have achieved only limited success in changing the views of the non-disabled majority**. By accepting the reward of civil rights protection without insisting that the medical model be publicly dismantled, the hopes of the disability activists to change the views of the broader public may have been sacrificed. The willingness to make this concession may have stemmed from **the belief among social constructionist theorists that society will change its perception of disability if it is merely demonstrated that the prior notion has been made unjustly**. From a structural point of view, **it would seem to take much more to convince a dominant group in society that it needs to redistribute power and access to its treasured resources.** **The more desirable arrangement to the non-disabled majority is one that maintains the superiority of people with ‘normal’ abilities**. **As a result, the disabled are typically described as dysfunctional and are often perceived to be incapable of understanding the world in the same way that ‘normal’ people do.** Although **social constructionists** argue that such judgements regarding how people should be able to think or act are subjective notions that stem from dominant social ideologies, they may be said to **underestimate the extent to which those ideologies are created and legitimated by the non-disabled majority because they best serve their interests.**

**The politics of the 1ac reify the abled/disabled dichotomy while creating a purism test for membership in the disabled community allowing for the ghettoization of unacceptable forms of disability and excluding participation from non-disabled academics and citizens**

**Humphrey, 2k**

(Jill C. Faculty of applied social science @ the Open University, Researching disability politics, or, some problems with the social model in practice, Disability & Society 15.1)

ABSTRACT This article arises from a research project involving the disabled members’ group in UNISON, and problematises the social model which explicitly undergirds the discourses and practices of this group. In abstract terms, **there are dangers that the social model can be interpreted in a way which privileges some impaired identities over others, sanctions a separatist ghetto which cannot reach out to other groups of disabled and disadvantaged people, and weaves a tangled web around researchers who adhere to the emancipatory paradigm.** In concrete terms, **these dangers are explored with reference to the stories of impaired people who believe that they are excluded from the disabled members’ group**, the **predicaments of ex-disabled and differently-disabled people in relation to the movement, and the culture of suspicion surrounding academics, particularly the `non-disabled’ researcher as would-be ally**. It is argued that, whilst such identities and issues might appear to be `marginal’ ones in the sense of occurring at the boundary of disabled communities, disability politics and disability studies, they should not be `marginalised’ by disabled activists and academics, and indeed that they pose challenges to our collective identities, social movements, theoretical models and research paradigms which need to be addressed. Introduction The social model arose as a reaction against the medical model of disability, which reduced disability to impairment so that disability was located within the body or mind of the individual, whilst the power to de® ne, control and treat disabled people was located within the medical and paramedical professions (Oliver, 1996). Under the bio-medical reÂ gime, material deprivation and political disenfranchisement continued unabated, whilst institutional discrimination and social stigmatisation were exacerbated by segregation (Barnes 1991). In this context, the social model harbours a number of virtues in rede® ning disability in terms of a disabling environment, repositioning disabled people as citizens with rights, and reconfiguring the responsibilities for creating, sustaining and overcoming disablism. Indeed, when the social model is confronted with the resurrection of the medical model in its bio-medical, psychological, psychiatric and sociological guises, then it needs to be vigorously defended (Shakespeare & Watson, 1997). However, this does not mean that the social model is flawless, in either its design or its implementation. More precisely, if it is interpreted in a way which undermines the very communities, politics and studies it was supposed to enhance, it is incumbent upon us to inquire `What’ s going on? What’ s going wrong?’ A fruitful starting point and indeed one which already contains an answer to the above questions, is to recognise that there are two main versions of the social model, which are necessarily interrelated, but which will lead into opposing directions if we are not careful. In academic texts, the social model begins with an appreciation of the individual and collective experiences of disabled people (e.g. Swain et al., 1993). It goes on to elaborate the nature of a disabling society in terms of the physical environment, the political economy, the welfare state and sedimented stereotypes (e.g. Barnes et al., 1999). Finally, it endorses a critical or emancipatory paradigm of research (e.g. Barnes & Mercer 1997a) . This analysis lends itself to a recognition of the array of diverse experiences of disabling barriers; a realistic appraisal of the need for broader political coalitions to combat entrenched structural inequalitie s and cultural oppressions; and an openness about the potential for non-disabled people to contribute to critical theory and research. **In activist discourses, the emphasis is upon the fact that it is non-disabled people who have engineered the physical environment, dominated the political economy, managed welfare services, controlled research agendas, recycled pejorative labels and images, and translated these into eugenics policies**. **This analysis lends itself to a dichotomy between non-disabled and disabled people which becomes coterminous with the dichotomy between oppressors and oppressed; and this tightens the boundaries around the disabled identity, the disabled people’s movement and disability research**. **Whilst this hermeneutic closure is designed to ward off incursions and, therefore, oppressions from non-disabled people, it may also have some unfortunate consequences.** I would like to illustrate these consequences by drawing upon a research project involving the four self-organised groups (SOGs) for women, black people, disabled members, and lesbian and gay members in UNISON (see Humphrey, 1998, 1999). Material drawn directly from conversations and observations in the disabled members’ group is supplemented by interview transcripts with members of the lesbian and gay group, my own personal experiences of and re¯ ections upon disability and discrimination, and recent developments in various social movements and critical research texts. The rest of the article depicts three problematic consequences of the social model in practice and redirects them back to the social model as critical questions which need to be addressed by its proponents. First, **there are questions of disability identity where a kind of `purism’ has been cultivated from the inside of the disability community. Here, it can be demonstrated that some people with certain types of impairments have not been welcomed into the disabled members’ group** in UNISON, **which means that the disability community is not yet inclusive, and that its membership has been skewed in a particular direction.** Second, **there are questions of disability politics where a kind of `separatism’ has been instituted.** Whilst the UNISON constitution allows for separatism to be supplemented by both coalitions and transformations, these have been slow to materialise in practice, and the dearth of such checks and balances in the wider disabled peoples’ movement **implies that the danger of developing a specific kind of disability ghetto is more acute**. Third, there are questions of disability research where a kind of `provisionalism’ is suspended over the role of researchers. The most obvious dilemmas arise for the non-disabled researcher as would-be ally, but it is becoming clear that disabled academics can also be placed in a dilemmatic position, and it is doubtful whether any researcher can practise their craft to their own standards of excellence when operating under the provisos placed upon them by political campaigners.

# Brophy

## Ethics of Care 1NC (in progress)

### Inherency

A. the aff has an a priori burden to specify in the AC what prevented the plan in the past and what keeps it from happening in the squo.

B. The aff isn’t inherent.

Lots of cities have living wage ordinances now.

**ALICE 13** writes[[32]](#footnote-32)

**Living wage ordinances are enacted by local governments** to raise job standards for workers at firms that do business with a city or county, or that benefit from taxpayer assistance. **At least 140 communities in the U.S.** have **passed such laws over the past two decades**, and there is now a significant body of research on their effect. The evidence shows that living wage ordinances raise wages for low-income workers, often by a significant amount, with few if any measurable negative effects on either employment or taxes. Any government considering a living wage ordinance of its own should consider the track record of living wage laws in other communities in order to implement the best living wage law possible. This white paper provides these details.

C. Standards

1. The status quo is the only predictable or stable neg ground, and the aff steals it. It’s key to check back infinite aff prep and choice of AC because I can’t cut a counter-plan for every possible aff.

2. “Resolved” means “firmly determined to do something,” so if the aff does not advocate a clear change from the squo, he isn’t topical.

3. It’s not enough to say the plan hasn’t passed yet. The inherent barrier must be identified in the AC.

**Zarefsky 87** writes[[33]](#footnote-33)

Similarly, **inherency becomes** a **crucial** consideration. Some answer must be offered to the causal question, “Absent the action envisioned by the proposition, why would presumably good people tolerate evil?” **It will not do to report “the facts” and then** to **infer, without analysis, the existence of some causal force that would be removed if the action** stated in 0the proposition **were taken**. The reason is that **there are other, equally plausible, inferences which can be made from the same data**. For example, **policymakers** simply **may not yet perceive a situation as a problem**. Or **they may have determined that the problem cannot be solved**. Or **they may have concluded that**, on balance, **solving the problem would bring about** far **worse consequences** than the evils which would be removed. **Each** of these inferences, because it offers a different interpretation of reality, **stands as an alternate hypothesis that must be defeated** in order to provide a unique defense of the proposition. To defeat the alternatives, the affirmative will need to answer the causal question which is at the base of the analysis of inherency.

### T – Ordinances

A. The affirmative must defend living wage for all employers, not just contractors.

“Governments” represent the whole nation

**Random House no date** writes[[34]](#footnote-34)

4. **a branch or service of the supreme authority of a state or nation,** taken as **representing the whole: “a dam built by the government”**

“Employers” without an article implies a general principle.

**UltraLingua 11** writes[[35]](#footnote-35)

The definite article does not always precede nouns: sometimes indefinite articles or partitive articles will be used. Often, though, no article at all is necessary, as in the following cases: As a general rule, **the definite article is omitted before abstract nouns or nouns representing general categories.** It is often omitted after verbs expressing opinions or preferences:

B. He specifies living wage ordinances for contractors

1. Ground. The stock neg ground is “free market good,” which I can’t access because the aff defends government jobs that aren’t part of the free market. Stock ground outweighs because it’s the neg’s only defense against unpredictable ACs. Otherwise, the aff could switch cases to moot my NC prep, and I’d always lose.

There’s no lit on the aff; experts agree

**Fairris et al 5** writes[[36]](#footnote-36)

Local governments are increasingly turning to living wage policies as a means to improve job quality for low-income workers. To date, more than 100 local governments around the country have passed living wage ordinances. Living wage laws set wage and benefit standards for workers employed by government contractors or other firms that have a financial relationship with the government. These laws have, in part, been a response to the stagnation of state and federal minimum wages, which have failed to keep pace with inflation. In addition, these laws represent a reaction to the growing interest in contracting out city services as a means to cut costs, a strategy that advocates argue penalizes the low wage workers who perform city services. However, **despite** the prominence and **continued growth in** the number of **living wage ordinances, only a handful of** retrospective **studies** of firms **have been published on the impacts of these laws**. This study is the first to combine a random sample survey of affected firms and workers, a control group analysis of low-wage employers, and a matched firm and worker dataset. These elements make us confident that our survey results both isolate the effects of the living wage and accurately represent the experiences of living wage workers and firms.” (6)

2. Limits – allowing the aff to defend any less than a general principle opens the flood gates to small affs, like prison labor, disability laws, or any subsector of the economy. Unlimited topics create prohibitive research burdens which makes clash or education impossible and excludes small schools.

D. Fairness is a voter since it’s a gateway issue to deciding the better debater. Education is a voter since it’s the end-goal of debate; substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational value to discussing it.

Drop the debater—

1. The NC was skewed. I can’t redo it after the 1AR shifts.

2. Key to deterrence. Drop the arg means aff will run abusive cases for the time skew.

3. Depth. Reject-the-arg theory forces us to cover theory and substance which leads to shallow theory debates that set worse norms for the activity.

Prefer competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

### Case (FW)

#### Ethics of care creates irresolvable conflicts

Bloom 13

Paul Bloom (Professor of Psychology and Cognitive Science at Yale). “THE BABY IN THE WELL The case against empathy.” The New Yorker. 20 May 2013. http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2013/05/20/130520crat\_atlarge\_bloom?currentPage=all

A “politics of empathy” doesn’t provide much clarity in the public sphere, either. Typically, political disputes involve a **disagreement over whom we should empathize with.** Liberals argue for gun control, for example, by focussing on the victims of gun violence; conservatives point to the unarmed victims of crime, defenseless against the savagery of others. Liberals in favor of tightening federally enforced safety regulations invoke the employee struggling with work-related injuries; their conservative counterparts talk about the small [businessperson] ~~businessman~~ bankrupted by onerous requirements. So **don’t suppose that if your** ideological **opponents could only ramp up their empathy they would think just like you.**

#### Ethics of care doesn’t resolve util or deontology. It just randomly fluctuates between the two. Sometimes it’s even racist.

Allmark 95

Peter Allmark (Sheffield and North Trent College of Nursing and Midwifery). “Can there be an ethics of care?” J Med Ethics. 1995 February; 21(1): 19–24. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1376527/

1. There is a vagueness about the approach which manifests itself in a disturbing lack of content. This is clear in the discussion of problematic situations given by Noddings. She gives an example of a mother whose son is at a school which has a rule that any absence must be due to illness or bereavement (15). Other absences are punished. Her son needs permission to do something away from school on a regular basis which she considers worthwhile. She therefore writes regular letters saying her son is ill. Noddings believes that the 'masculine' ethics would have to justify this deception. For example, it might put someone under an obligation to try to change the stupid rule. The 'feminine' approach is unconcerned with this debate. The mother remains faithful as 'one-caring', (Noddings's compound noun for someone who cares behaviourally and emotionally for another, 'the cared-for'). For Noddings, this is an example of how caring ethics will not put principle over person. The question which arises is, how far will 'one-caring' go? This question arises more acutely when Noddings discusses an example developed in critiques of utilitarianism (1 6). In essence the situation is one where someone is forced to choose between killing one innocent person, or allowing several innocent people to be killed by an evil person. Noddings suggests that the one-caring might try to kill the innocent person but that 'as I reach toward [her] ~~him~~, I feel the life, and fear, and trust, and hope ... emanating from [her] ~~him~~. She suggests then that the 'one-caring' could not kill. But what if she felt the life, fear and so on emanating from the others? Perhaps then she would kill. In a later example (17) Noddings suggests that 'one-caring' might fight for the bigoted white people one grew up with if it 'came to the crunch' in a civil rights- type war. Noddings does try to suggest that there would be limits beyond which one would not go, if, for example, the person one cared for became involved in setting up concentration camps (1 8). However, it is hard to conceive how 'care' sets any limits or what rationale lies behind them.

#### Empathy’s not key to doing what’s right; Asperger’s proves.

Bloom 13

Paul Bloom (Professor of Psychology and Cognitive Science at Yale). “THE BABY IN THE WELL The case against empathy.” The New Yorker. 20 May 2013. http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2013/05/20/130520crat\_atlarge\_bloom?currentPage=all

But a spark may be all that’s needed. Putting aside the extremes of psychopathy, **there is no evidence to suggest that the less empathetic are morally worse than the rest of us. Simon Baron-Cohen observes that some people with autism and Asperger’s syndrome, though typically empathy-deficient, are highly moral, owing to a strong desire to follow rules and insure that they are applied fairly.**

# Clements

## Kenya Flowers 1NC

### Inherency

A. Inherency is an a priori issue that requires the aff to specify what prevented the plan in the past and what keeps it from happening in the squo.

B. The AC had zero explanation as to why the aff is inherent.

The aff isn’t inherent, structurally or attitudinally. Interviews and Kenya’s bill of rights confirm

**WWW 13** writes[[37]](#footnote-37)

**Researchers in Kenya**, Tanzania and Uganda also identified and where possible, **interviewed** a wider range of stakeholders and **key informants on** the **possibilities for** wages to be increased to **living wage** levels. Interviewees included local shopkeepers and landlords, labour rights activists, trade unionists and academics. **All indicated that there was capacity to pay a living wage to flower workers, suggesting there is broad political will in support of a living wage in flower communities**. In Tanzania, the employers acknowledged that the minimum wage set by the government for the agriculture and plantation sub-sector was not a living wage, but stressed that they were unable to afford the wage level demanded by the unions. The research reports from Tanzania and Uganda identified some of the challenges to a living wage and these are considered below. Political support for a living wage Building political will for a living wage will be a key element of WWW’s future work on the living wage issue, both at the U.K./European level and in project/producing countries. Our exploratory study in Tanzania suggests that a number of employers could pay living wages now, but are happy to simply comply with minimum wage legislation. **In Kenya,** it was noted that **the new bill of rights made it a duty of employers and** the **government to ensure its citizens can live a decent and affordable life**. But translating this into practice is a longer-term process.

C. Standards

1. Without inherency, they can’t solve and they create a world where debate only focuses on bureaucratic trivia, killing education.

**Paterno 94** writes[[38]](#footnote-38)

Perhaps the myth of policy makers never voting on inherency has been abusively extrapolated from the desires of a true policy-maker: discovering solutions that solve problems and implementing a plan of action with desirable side-effects. As such, it seems logical to focus the debate on what can be done rather than on why it is not being done currently in the status quo. However, one must realize that such a sterile analysis is premature, failing to account for the initial steps of the problem solving process. The result of which is the practice of instrumentalism, described by James Rule (1971) as "the concentration on the adequacy of means rather than the moral quality of the ends being sought." Thus, **the policy maker who fails to consider inherency constructs, perpetuates a system which focuses on the means and not the ends**. Avoidance of instrumentalism and **the implementation of successful policies is achieved through the sound identification of** what is being sought, **the desired end-state**. James Wilson (1967) contends that "the only point at which very much leverage can be gained on the problem is when we decide what it is we are trying to accomplish." For example, if the problem of hunger in the United States is being attacked, the effective policy -- maker envisions the end-state desired: the ability of individuals to feed themselves and/or their families. With this as the target objective it is clear why hunger still exists in America--policies are directed at giving food to the hungry, not at enabling individuals to provide for their own food needs. Thus it is evident that any problem being attacked must begin with a clear delineation of objectives, a clear statement of the desired endstate. **Simply saying something is a problem**, treating the symptoms **and ignoring the causes does little to solve problems**. One way of deciding what the end-result should be is to examine what it is not. This is where inherency comes into play. While the surface question of inherency might be what is preventing the affirmative plan, the answer is a much deeper analysis of the status quo. Even policy makers are concerned with why a problem exists, for without the cause how could any plan to solve be identified and adopted? In addition, the policy maker in search of a solution will always ask certain basic questions: why does the problem exist? what is the probable cause? who is affected? Such questions relate to the first and second steps of problem solving outlined by Gaw and Sayer (1979): defining the nature of the problem and analyzing the problem for causes and effects. Policy makers also subscribe to the third step of problem solving: suggesting solutions. Note the plurality of solution. Policy makers brainstorm a variety of answers to problems and then examine each one carefully. **Thus, the inherency burdens of "has it been done before" and "why isn't it being done now**" comes into question. Good policy makers seek to learn from the past -both successes and failures. It makes little sense to duplicate a past effort that has failed, unless of course the causes of failure have been removed or accounted for in the new proposal. All of **this** is not to say that the affirmative must propose ten or fifteen different policies for consideration. It **does**, however, **suggest that an affirmative be able to respond to past efforts, similar efforts currently being practiced, and how preventative structures -- attitudinal, structural, or motivational - are being overcome or accounted for in the affirmative plan**. Moreover, if the status quo is doing the affirmative, even on a small scale, the burden to show the value of duplication is high. Double efforts do not necessarily yield double results. In fact, the two can work against each other, fighting for resources, diminishing the others competitiveness to bolster one's own efforts, etc. **Inherency** in this line of argumentation **is the policy making judge's a priori issue**, if she is truly seeking to achieve a superior policy that provides desirable side-effects with minimal disadvantages.

2. Ground. Without specific inherency, I’m denied stable links to every conceivable disad. The aff can always shift stories to avoid my links.

If there's even a question of whether the plan is inherent then you have to vote neg because it makes it impossible to defend the squo vis-a-vis the plan.

3. It’s not enough to say the plan hasn’t passed yet. If they don’t have a specific explanation for inherency, then they haven’t defended the resolution

**Zarefsky 87** writes[[39]](#footnote-39)

Similarly, **inherency becomes** a **crucial** consideration. Some answer must be offered to the causal question, “Absent the action envisioned by the proposition, why would presumably good people tolerate evil?” **It will not do to report “the facts” and then** to **infer, without analysis, the existence of some causal force that would be removed if the action** stated in 0the proposition **were taken**. The reason is that **there are other, equally plausible, inferences which can be made from the same data**. For example, **policymakers** simply **may not yet perceive a situation as a problem**. Or **they may have determined that the problem cannot be solved**. Or **they may have concluded that**, on balance, **solving the problem would bring about** far **worse consequences** than the evils which would be removed. **Each** of these inferences, because it offers a different interpretation of reality, **stands as an alternate hypothesis that must be defeated** in order to provide a unique defense of the proposition. To defeat the alternatives, the affirmative will need to answer the causal question which is at the base of the analysis of inherency.

4. Real-world decision-making.

Inherency improves debate’s ability to teach real-world decision making skills

**Paterno 94** writes[[40]](#footnote-40)

**Inherency** is not a dead issue. It is a facet of debate as worthy of consideration as any other issue. It **gains** in **importance as one begins to think of debate as a problem solving entity**, a body-politic seeking to improve the conditions present in the status quo. **Critical examination of inherency provides a data base of experience against a world of speculation**. Policy makers who value the knowledge to be gained through inherency argumentation demonstrate the needed discretion and sincere desire to discover a superior policy for the betterment of the human condition. **Perspective is maintained and actions taken are superior when inherency burdens are closely examined and utilized** as a backdrop to the debate.

Real-world decision making is a voting issue and outweighs fairness and education.

**Strait and Wallace 7** writes[[41]](#footnote-41)

Why debate? Some do it for scholarships, some do it for social purposes, and many just believe it is fun. These are certainly all relevant considerations when making the decision to joining the debate team, but as debate theorists they aren’t the focus of our concern. Our concern in finding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of students with the highest quality of skills, while at the same time preserving competitive equity. The ability to make decisions deriving from discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. **It is the one thing every single one of us will do every day** besides breathing. **Decision making transcends boundaries between categories of learning like “policy education” and “kritik education,**” it makes irrelevant considerations of whether we will eventually be policymakers **and** it transcends questions of **what substantive content a debate round should contain.** The implication for this analysis is that the critical thinking and argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making are comparatively greater than any educational disadvantage weighed against them. It is the skills we learn, not the content of our arguments, that can best improve all of our lives. While **policy comparison** skills are going to be learned through debate in one way or another, those **skills are useless if they are not grounded in the** kind of **logic actually used to make decisions.**

D. Fairness is a voter since it’s a gateway issue to deciding the better debater. Education is a voter since it’s the end-goal of debate; substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational value to discussing it.

Drop the debater—

1. The NC was skewed. I can’t redo it after the 1AR shifts.

2. Key to deterrence. Drop the arg means aff will run abusive cases for the time skew.

3. Depth. Reject-the-arg theory forces us to cover theory and substance which leads to shallow theory debates that set worse norms for the activity.

Prefer competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

### Baudrillard K

The aff’s reliance on the abstract sign of labor undermines any attempt to liberate people within the current system. Abstract signs like labor are hyperreal; they are copies without an original, signs that refer to other signs, not reality.

**Mendoza 10** writes[[42]](#footnote-42)

Baudrillard argues that the sign-form, the image, which at first – through analysis- stems from economic-exchange, cannot merely be enframed so long within the cage of political economy. As signs, it transmutes everything into signs, i.e., as soon as an object is conceived as a sign it extends itself to other objects, it signifies other objects and therefore rendering them also as signs. The very conception of **the Sign, particularly the Signifier**, initiates a semiotic process that **affects the entire structure of society and culture**. Everything is reduced to sign. **This is precipitated by** modern forms of **Mass communication and** the **commodification of culture**. In this mad propagation, signification can no longer retrace itself merely as a product of the mode of production in Marx, for according to Baudrillard, even the mode of production is merely a sign of something else. Perhaps Baudrillard’s analysis of this point in which the signifier could no longer locate its signified can be owed to Derrida’s earlier lecture on the scandal in the “history of structure.”43 As Derrida presented a rupture in Structure, particularly in Levi-Strauss, so did Baudrillard with Marx. And such is why Baudrillard argues that Marx’s analysis was not radical enough. **If** the very fundamental assumptions of Marx: **“needs” “labour” and “production” are mere signs,** then **they can be reduced as ideological concepts created by the system** itself **to insinuate its survival**. But this becomes the problem, for if the entire movement of material history, together with its critique, is grounded upon these key axiomatic concepts in the Marxist discourse which are merely sign’s signifying other signs in an infinite exchange, then what then is the future of Material History? He writes: in a work, man is not only qualitatively exploited as a productive force by the system of capitalist political economy. In the last instance, the system rationalizes its power here. And **in this Marxism assists the cunning of capital. It convinces** men **[people] that they are alienated by** the **sale of their labour power,** thus **censoring the** much more **radical hypothesis that they might be alienated as labor power**, as the “inalienable” power of creating value by their labor.45 With this Marx, according to Baudrillard, tried to turn the order of Capital using its own ideological phantasms. Baudrillard argues that: Marx really “changed nothing basic: nothing regarding the idea of man producing himself in his infinite determination,”46 “Production, labor, value, everything through which an objective world emerges and through which man recognizes himself objectively – this is the imaginary”47 The progress of the commodity form from its material beginnings towards both its radicalization, and the same time, its abstraction has led the entire structure of historical materialism to become “a giant simulation model” which the “’dialectical’ generalization of this concept is merely the ideological universalization of this system’s postulates.”48 At this point, production in Marx ceases. There is nothing more coming to be, no more production; everything is reproduced by the system49 as a sign. This is the juncture which Baudrillard calls the “End of production,” when the distinction between the Super and Base structure collapses. And with it, the entire structure of Marxist discourse. The very concepts that grounds Political Economy as structure, begins to leave its own confines. Political Economy has become a model to the violence that it once propagated. There is therefore no more Political Economy, in the sense that Marx imagined: no more labour, no more needs, no more production. Political economy here, and all its concepts, are reduced as simulations, that assure us of the reproduction of its violence in a “dialectical equilibrium.” **Political economy** and its critical discourse **once sought Nature as its “great referent”, now it has become its own reference**. From the “Revolution of the Law of Value”, he writes: From now on political economy is the real for us, which is to say precisely that it is the sign’s referential, the horizon of a defunct order whose simulation preserves it in a ‘dialectical’ equilibrium. It is the real and therefore the imaginary, since here again the two formerly distinct categories have fused and drifted together.50 Once, the mode of production was the hidden reality, and social consciousness, with ideology, its appearance. Now, ideology itself no longer knows what it hides. Social Consciousness is the Mode of Production. “Needs, “Labour” and “Production” these are no longer the reality that grounds the system; they are the imaginary that propagates the system. Earlier, Needs was presented to be mythical. While **Labour, according to Baudrillard, “shines through non-labour,”**51 **because through wages, the system buys back labour in non-labour**, i.e., non-work is the venue to consume through wages. **It returns back** the **capital that was expended and continues to circulate the spiral of** income and expense, **labour and play**, re-production and consumption. This is the point when the whole system short-circuits. The beginning was merely a phantasm, the reference is erased, and the end merely an illusion.52 For Baudrillard, already leaving the neo-marxist embrace, leaving behind the analysis of Debord and others, considers that **any attempt to talk about emancipation** or alienation **will be futile, because the system itself is no longer grounded** up**on** a “great signified”, a presence, or **the real – emancipated from what? Everything has become a circular play.**

The idea of “basic needs” is also hyperreal. Rather than being grounded in objective reality, it is a sign promoted by capitalist ideology.

**Mendoza 10** writes[[43]](#footnote-43)

Beyond the Use and Exchange Value: The Myth of Needs and the Reign of the Sign When Marx bifurcated needs into primary and secondary needs, the former is premised on an “anthropological minimum” while the latter is founded on the “post-survival threshold.” From this he is able to cement the concept of the Use-Value. Because the Use-Value is subjective, 22 it therefore requires a value that is objective that standardizes the utility of an object. (This object may be useful for you, but this is junk to me.) In order to find a standard value for exchange, Marx introduces the Exchange-Value. The exchange – value is merely secondary to the use-value for the former merely standardizes the latter, since the latter is already inherent in the object. The exchange-value is the appearance, the “socially recognized standards of measurement for the quantities of these useful objects.”23 But according to **Baudrillard**, this form of analysis in our contemporary society no longer follows. He **argues that** the core of which **a commodity's value is determined is not by** the **use-value** or the value in which a subject satiates a need, **but** by the **exchange-value**. In here, he again subverts two conceptually related terms in Marx. He argues that there is really no more "objective" value of a commodity because the exchange-value only uses the use-value, as a mere alibi for its existence. The exchange-value uses the use-value as a legitimizing factor that initiates the exchange process. This reduction of the use-value as an imaginary excuse for the exchange-value has rendered it as a value that is non-objective and use-less. How is this so? The **use-value operates on the assumption of need**. Precisely because an object is needed then it is accrued with a use-value. **But** according to Baudrillard, **needs** and everything that possesses a use-value **only occur**s **within a system of exchange** since the use-value cannot be realized without its exchange-value. **Within this system of exchange,** and coming from the importance of communication that Baudrillard earlier presented, **the commodity** therefore not merely **possesses** an exchange -value but **a Sign value**.24 Thus with the eclipse of use-value, exchange-value exchanges not just the inherent utility in objects but already what it signifies in a system of integration. This is the value that Baudrillard supplemented in the analysis of society. **Thus, primary needs, which possess the premise of an “anthropological minimum”** according to Baudrillard **is** merely **a myth**, and that needs are always secondary since a primary need is a concept organized to ground the system of exchange, similar to the Signified in the semiotic process.25 But here we witness a spiral, Baudrillard cites Marx in saying that: “**Production not only produces goods; it produces people to consume them, and** the **corresponding needs**.” Thus, **when one "needs" he has to enter** the realm of **the social, and** when he enters he **does not only exchange a commodity, but** also **language, concepts and signs**. In this realm, primary and secondary needs blur, so far as I want to “eat” to satiate my hunger, I may chose not to, or I may choose to do so,26 and if I do so I have to face the tyranny of choice, or what Baudrillard calls "discretionary income"27, one chooses what to consume in which the limitation is income. In contemporary society, one could no longer consume the foodcommodity in its raw sense, one always consume its sign-value inherent in the commodity as it is exchanged in the current system. Hence, **when one chooses a restaurant, it is hardly** a choice **governed by** need in the context of **survival, it is** a choice **prompted by the spectacle of the image and** the **limitation of income**. To choose between fast-food over five-star dining, between Chinese or French cuisine is a choice for signification rather than a choice for survival. Another example would be Bread. There is no such thing as a generic loaf of bread, not even homemade bread is generic in a sense since the ingredients, the qualities, the brands, the labels, that it takes to create the bread, is loaded with Signs. Signs are interchange in society, anything up for exchange, also possesses this Sign-value. The raw object is nowhere to be found; the raw object which is ideally what the primary need correspond to is blurred with the presence and ubiquity of the Sign in our times. Baudrillard even asks: “Is loss of status- or social non-existence less upsetting than hunger?”28 With this, needs become problematic in the political economy. There is no such thing as **an “anthropological minimum”** this premise **was** only **created** as an ideology **by the System** as **to convince** man **of a primary need, which** in turn **convinces him of a secondary need** that crosses what the primary needs encapsulate**; the drive for meaning, in which meaning is found in consumption**. He writes: Even before survival has been assured, every group or individual experiences a vital pressure to produce themselves meaningfully in a system of exchange and relationships. Concurrently, with the production of goods, there is a push to elaborate significations, meaning with the result that the one-for-the-other exists before the one and the other exist themselves. Thus, the there could be a million possible motivation of one's consumption of a certain good, but what lies underneath is always a meaning. This meaning does not exist in the relation of the subject and the object in rational ends (needs) but in difference and signification. One's difference from another person through his consumption of objects loaded with signification that determines difference.29 Baudrillard’s radical analysis of Marx’s critique of society through the supplementation of semio-linguistics, has introduced the importance of the Sign in political economy. As the sign-value begins to overshadow both exchange-value and use-value, so do all commodities become an Image. For Baudrillard, **as signs proliferate, needs no longer arise from objective** and stable **origins as objects transmuted to signs become Ideological**. Baudrillard states that: “needs could no longer be defined in the naturalist-idealist thesis (need as objective and rational) rather they are defined as function induced by the internal logic of the system – there are only needs because the system needs them”30 This last statement necessitates a revisiting of Marx’s moment of inverting his Master to stand on his feet, his theory of the Base Structure and Super Structure. How could the concept of needs be ideological if need is located as an assumption in the Base Structure and ideology in the Marxist conception as “false-consciousness” is located in the Superstructure? Here, Baudrillard once again radicalizes Marx’s analysis, and presents how this spectrum, the material life and Consciousness, is de-leveled. In this stage, the reality problematic in Baudrillard slowly crystallizes, to replace the commodity paradigm that serves as the theme in his earlier analysis of society.

Labor is symbolically dead. It is founded on the slow death of the worker. The employer dominates the employee because they have the privilege of deciding that they are worthy of life.

**Baudrillard 93** writes[[44]](#footnote-44)

[Brackets for gendered language] Labour power is instituted on death. A man must die to become labour power. He converts this death into a wage. But the **economic violence** capital inflicted on him in the equivalence of the wage and labour power **is nothing next to** the **symbolic violence inflicted** on him **by** his **[one’s] definition as a productive force**. Faking this equivalence is nothing next to the equivalence, qua signs, of wages and death. The very possibility of quantitative equivalence presupposes death. **The equivalence of wages and labour power presupposes the death of the worker**, while that of any commodity and any other presupposes the symbolic extermination of objects. Death makes the calculation of equivalence, and regulation by indifference, possible in general. **This death is not violent and physical, it is** the indifferent consumption of life and death, the mutual **neutralisation of life and death in survival**, or death deferred. **Labour is slow death.** This is generally understood in the sense of physical exhaustion. But it must be understood in another sense. Labour is not opposed, like a sort of death, to the "fulfilment of life", which is the idealist view; labour is opposed as a slow death to a violent death. That is the symbolic reality. Labour is opposed as deferred death to the immediate death of sacrifice. Against every pious and "revolutionary" view of the "labour (or culture) is the opposite of life" type, we must maintain that the only alternative to labour is not free time, or non-labour, it is sacrifice. All **this becomes clear in the genealogy of the slave.** First, **the prisoner of war is** purely and **simply put to death** (one does him honour in this way). **Then he is "spared"** [épargné] and conserved [conservé] (=servus), **under the category of** spoils of war and **a prestige good: he becomes a slave** and passes into sumptuary domesticity. It is only later that he passes into servile labour. However, he is no longer a "labourer", since **labour** only **appears in the phase of** the serf or **the emancipated slave,** finally **relieved of the mortgage of being put to death. Why** is he **[are they] freed?** Precisely **in order to work.** Labour therefore everywhere draws its inspiration from deferred death. It comes from deferred death. Slow or violent, immediate or deferred, the scansion of death is decisive: it is what radically distinguishes two types of organisation, the economic and the sacrificial. We live irreversibly in the first of these, which has inexorably taken root in the différance of death. The scenario has never changed. Whoever works has not been put to death, he is refused this honour. And **labour is** first of all **the sign of being judged worthy only of life**. Does capital exploit the workers to death? Paradoxically, the worst it inflicts on them is refusing them death. It is **by deferring** their **death** that **they are made into slaves and condemned to** the **indefinite abjection of a life of labour**.

2 impacts.

a. The abstraction of labor is a simulation which creates the conditions for hyperreality. Meaning and value are impossible in a hyperreal order, so the alternative is an epistemic prerequisite to the aff.

**LaFountain 8** writes[[45]](#footnote-45)

The source of the reversal and the ascendancy of the object over the subject is a central focus of Baudrillard’s work. Beginning with his earlier Marxist works, the concern was the political economy of the sign. That is, he was concerned not so much with work and political economy but with the increasing structuring of society by and as a system of signs. At one point in modern history, Baudrillard argued, there was a relatively fixed relationship between the object world and those signs and meanings used to understand them. Individuals were assumed to be the authors of these meanings and were considered capable of using them to represent the world and their own interior realities. In the mid-twentieth century, however, the relationship between the sign and the world was profoundly altered by developments in information technology, media, and advertising. No longer did signs represent the world. Instead, the referents of signs became other signs. As Boorstin noted earlier, **images replace or are substituted for,** rather than represent, **the outside world of reality**. Thus, **“reality” is what emerges as signs refer to signs, and signs** themselves **become more real than “the real”. This self-referential order** is what Baudrillard described in the 1980s in *Simulations*, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majority*, *Fatal Strategies*, and the *Ecstasy of Communication*. The self-referential relationship between signs **produces “simulations”, which are the basis of “hyperreality”**. In **hyperreality**, signs do not exchange with nonlinguistic reality, or with the objective world. They exchange only with each other in an “ecstasy of communication” that does not produce meaning or value. What it **produces** is **the frenzy of signs pointing to their equivalents. Because the relationship between the sign and the objective world has been effaced** and replaced by simulations**, there are no referent points between signs and “the real”** by which **to establish value or difference. When meaning and value can be established no longer,** and when they themselves are simulated by a profusion of simulations, the social world “implodes” and a silent majority arises. The silence of the majority is marked by a restless consumption of signs and by an inability to determine what values, if any, are at stake in the treadmill of consumption. **What then are the possibilities for critical thought**, for assertive individualism, **or** for **emancipatory practice? For Baudrillard, there are none.**

b. Those in power rely on simulations to maintain their power. This delays the collapse of oppressive institutions. **Baudrillard 81** writes[[46]](#footnote-46)

Conjunction of the system and of its extreme alternative like the two sides of a curved mirror, a "vicious" curvature of a political space that is henceforth magnetized, circularized, reversibilized from the right to the left, a torsion that is like that of the evil spirit of commutation, the whole system, the infinity of capital folded back on its own surface: transfinite? And is it not the same for desire and the libidinal space? Conjunction of desire and value, of desire and capital. Conjunction of desire and the law, the final pleasure as the metamorphosis of the law (which is why it is so widely the order of the day): only capital takes pleasure, said Lyotard, before thinking that we now take pleasure in capital. Overwhelming versatility of desire in Deleuze, an enigmatic reversal that brings desire "revolutionary in itself, and as if involuntarily, wanting what it wants," to desire its own repression and to invest in paranoid and fascist systems? A malign torsion that returns this revolution of desire to the same fundamental ambiguity as the other, the historical revolution. All the referentials combine their discourses in a circular, Mobian compulsion. Not so long ago, sex and work were fiercely opposed terms; today both are dissolved in the same type of demand. Formerly the discourse on history derived its power from violently opposing itself to that of nature, the discourse of desire to that of power-today they exchange their signifiers and their scenarios. It would take too long to traverse the entire range of the operational negativity of all those **scenarios of deterrence,** which, **like Watergate, try to regenerate a moribund principle through simulated** scandal, phantasm, and murder-a sort of hormonal treatment through **negativity and crisis**. It is always a question of moving the real through the imaginary, proving truth through scandal, proving the law through transgression, proving work through striking, proving the system through crisis, and capital through revolution, as it is elsewhere (the Tasaday) of proving ethnology through the dispossession of its object-without taking into account: the proof of theater through antitheater; the proof of art through antiart; the proof of pedagogy through antipedagogy; the proof of psychiatry through antipsychiatry, etc. **Everything is metamorphosed into its opposite to perpetuate itself in its expurgated form**. All the powers, all the **institutions speak of themselves through denial,** in order **to attempt, by simulating death, to escape their real death throes. Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence** and legitimacy. Such was the case with some American presidents: the Kennedys were murdered because they still had a political dimension. The others, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, only had the right to phantom attempts, to simulated murders. But this aura of an artificial menace was still necessary to conceal that they were no longer anything but the mannequins of power. **Formerly, the king** (also the god) **had to die, therein lay his power. Today, he is miserably forced to feign death**, in order **to preserve the blessing of power. But it is lost. To seek new blood in its own death**, to renew the cycle through the mirror of crisis, negativity; and antipower**: this is the only solution-alibi of every power**, of every institution **attempting to break the vicious circle** of its irresponsibility and of its fundamental nonexistence, of its already seen and **of its already dead.**

The alternative is to refuse labor. Only putting our symbolic death at stake by refusing the power relation through which we are judged worthy of life can eliminate domination. **Baudrillard 93** writes[[47]](#footnote-47)

This changes every revolutionary perspective on the abolition of power. If power is death deferred, it will not be removed insofar as the suspension of this death will not be removed. And if power, of which this is always and everywhere the definition, resides in the act of giving without being given, it is clear that the power the master has to unilaterally grant life will only be abolished if this life can be given to him -- in a non-deferred death. There is no other alternative; you will never abolish this power by staying alive, since there will have been no reversal of what has been given. Only **the surrender of** this **life**, retaliating against a deferred death with an immediate death, **constitutes** a radical response, and **the only possibility of abolishing power. No revolutionary strategy can begin without the slave putting his own death back at stake, since** this is what the master puts off in the différance from which he profits by securing his power. Refuse to be put to death, refuse to live in the mortal reprieve of power, refuse the duty of this life and never be quits with living, in effect be under obligation to settle this long-term credit through the slow death of labour, since this **slow death does not alter the future of this abject dimension**, in the fatality of power. Violent death changes everything, slow death changes nothing, for there is a rhythm, a scansion necessary to symbolic exchange: something has to be given in the same movement and following the same rhythm, otherwise there is no reciprocity and it is quite simply not given. **The strategy of the system** of power **is to displace the time of the exchange, substituting continuity** and mortal linearity **for** the **immediate** retaliation of **death. It is thus futile for** the slave (**the worker**) **to give little by little**, in infinitesimal doses, **to the rope of labour on which he is hung to death**, to give his life to the master or to capital, **for this "sacrifice" in small doses** is no longer a sacrifice -- it doesn't touch the most important thing, the différance of death, and **merely distils a process whose structure remains the same**. We could in fact advance the hypothesis that in labour the exploited renders his life to the exploiter and thereby regains, by means of this very exploitation, a power of symbolic response. There was counter-power in the labour process as the exploited put their own (slow) death at stake. Here we agree with Lyotard's hypothesis on the level of the libidinal economics: the intensity of the exploited's enjoyment [jouissance] in their very abjection. And Lyotard is right. Libidinal intensity, the charge of desire and the surrendering of death are always there in the exploited, but no longer on the properly symbolic rhythm of the immediate retaliation, and therefore total resolution. The enjoyment of powerlessness (on sole condition that this is not a phantasy aimed at reinstating the triumph of desire at the level of the proletariat) will never abolish power. The very modality of the response to the slow death of labour leaves the master the possibility of, once again, repeatedly, giving the slave life through labour. The accounts are never settled, it always profits power, the dialectic of power which plays on the splitting of the poles of death, the poles of exchange. **The slave remains the prisoner of the master's dialectic**, while his death, or his distilled life, serves the indefinite repetition of domination. **This domination increases as the system is charged with neutralising** the **symbolic retaliation by buying it back through wages**. If, through labour, the exploited attempts to give his life to the exploiter, the latter wards off this restitution by means of wages. Here again we must take a symbolic radiograph. **Contrary to all appearances** and experience (capital buys its labour power from the worker and extorts surplus labour), **capital gives labour to the worker** (and the worker himself gives capital to the capitalist). In German this is Arbeitgeber: the entrepreneur is a "provider of labour"; and Arbeitnehmer: it is the capitalist who gives, who has the initiative of the gift, which secures him, as in every social order, a preeminence and a power far beyond the economic. The **refusal of labour**, in its radical form, **is the refusal of this symbolic domination** and the humiliation of being bestowed upon. **The gift and** the **taking of labour function** directly **as the code of the dominant social relation**, as the code of discrimination. **Wages are the mark of this poisonous gift, the sign which epitomises the whole code**. They sanction this unilateral gift of labour, or rather wages symbolically buy back the domination exercised by capital through the gift of labour. At the same time, **they furnish capital with** the possibility of confining the operation to **a contractual dimension**, thus stabilising confrontation on economic grounds. Furthermore, **wages turn the wage-earner into a "consumer of goods", reiterating his status as a "consumer of labour"** and reinforcing his symbolic deficit. To refuse labour, to dispute wages is thus to put the process of the gift, expiation and economic compensation back into question, and therefore to expose the fundamental symbolic process. Wages are no longer "grabbed" today. You too are given a wage, not in exchange for labour, but so that you spend it, which is itself another kind of labour. **In** the **consumption** or use of objects, **the wage-consumer finds himself reproducing** exactly the same symbolic relation of **slow death** as he undergoes in labour. **The user experiences** exactly the same **deferred death in the object (he does not sacrifice it, he "uses"** it **and "uses" it functionally) as the worker does in capital.** And just as wages buy back this unilateral gift of labour, the price paid for the object is only the user buying back the object's deferred death. The proof of this lies in the symbolic rule which states that what falls to you without charge (lotteries, presents, gambling, wins) must not be devoted to use, but spent as pure loss. Every domination must be bought back, redeemed. This was formerly done through sacrificial death (the ritual of the death of the king or the leader), or even by ritual inversion (feasts and other social rites: but these are still forms of sacrifice). This social game of reversal comes to an end with the dialectic of the master and the slave, where the reversibility of power cedes its place to a dialectic of the reproduction of power. The redemption of power must always, however, be simulated, and this is done by the apparatus of power where formal redemption takes place throughout the immense machine of labour, wages and consumption. Economics is the sphere of redemption par excellence, where the domination of capital manages to redeem itself without ever really putting itself at stake. On the contrary, it diverts the process of redemption into it own infinite reproduction. This is perhaps where we find the necessity of economics and its historical appearance, at the level of societies so much more vast and mobile than primitive groups, where the urgency of a system of redemption which could be measured, controlled and infinitely extended (which rituals cannot be) all at the same time, and which above all would not put the exercise and heredity of power back into question. Production and consumption are an original and unprecedented solution to this problem. By simulating redemption in this new form, the slide from the symbolic into the economic allows the definitive hegemony of political force over society to be secured. Economics miraculously succeeds in masking the real structure of power by reversing the terms of its definition. While power consists in unilateral giving (of life in particular, see above), a contrary interpretation has been successfully imposed: power would consist in a unilateral taking and appropriation. Under cover of this ingenious retraction, real symbolic domination can continue to do as it will, since all the efforts of those under this domination will rush into the trap of taking back from power what it has taken from them, even "taking power" themselves, thus blindly pushing on along the lines of their domination. In fact, labour, wages, power and revolution must all be read against the grain: - **labour is not exploitation, it is given by capital**; - wages are not grabbed, capital gives them too -- it does not buy a labour power, it buys back the power of capital; - the slow death of labour is not endured, it is a desperate attempt, a challenge to capital's unilateral gift of labour; - **the only effective reply to power is to give it back what it gives you, and this is only symbolically possible by** means of **death.**

The alternative is a protest strategy, not a mere rejection. This protest strategy is the only way to challenge the system

**Dant 3** writes[[48]](#footnote-48)

In marked contrast to Andre Gorz, Baudrillard argues that **renegotiating the relation between labour and free time**, or non-work, **is futile**. Instead, **what is required to stall the code is to refuse the** slow, **deferred death that capital gives** as the gift of work **to labour**: ‘To refuse labor, to dispute wages is thus to put the process of the gift, expiation and economic compensation back into question, and therefore to expose the fundamental symbolic process’ (Baudrillard 1993a: 41). The power of capital is not confronted in the labour process, Baudrillard warns, and it cannot be seen as merely exercised in the work-for-wages that is labour. It is in a symbolically violent form that the dispersed power of capital can be seen to operate and a refusal to participate is the only response: ‘**This is the only absolute weapon, and the mere collective threat** of it **can make power collapse. Power, faced with this symbolic “blackmail”** (the barricades of ’68, hostage-taking), **loses its footing**: since it thrives on slow death, I will oppose it with my violent death’ (Baudrillard 1993a: 43). This refusal is reminiscent of Marcuse’s ‘Great Refusal’, and indeed with the very risky response of the Metropolis workers to their situation, which exchanged the slow death of their work for the life-threatening violence of flooding their underground workplace. However, **Baudrillard is suggesting that** the **symbolic violence of public demonstration (which might include** the often **violent, risky and dramatic actions** of green activists, roads **protesters** and anti-capitalist demonstrators that have become more familiar since he was writing) **is** much **more appropriate than simply refusing to participate in** circulating **the code.**

### Case

Asserting respect for the Other’s codified differences justifies violent extermination

**Baudrillard 6** writes[[49]](#footnote-49)

The risibility of our altruistic “understanding” is rivaled only by the profound contempt it is designed to conceal. **For “We respect** the fact **that you are different” read: “You people who are underdeveloped would do well to hang on to this distinction because it is all you have left.”** (The **signs of** folklore and **poverty are excellent markers of difference**.) Nothing could be more contemptuous – or more contemptible – than this attitude, which exemplifies the most radical form of incomprehension that exists. It has nothing to do, however, with what Segalen calls “eternal incomprehensibility”. Rather, it is a product of eternal stupidity – of that stupidity which endures for ever in its essential arrogance, feeding on the differentness of other people. **Other cultures**, meanwhile, **have never laid claim** to universality. Nor did they ever claim **to be different** – **until difference was forcibly injected into them** as part of a sort of cultural opium war. **They live on** the basis of **their own singularity**, their own exceptionality, on **the irreducibility of their own** rites and **values**. **They find no comfort in the lethal illusion that all differences can be reconciled – an illusion that for them spells** only **annihilation**. To master the universal symbols of otherness and difference is to master the world. Those who conceptualize difference are anthropologically superior – naturally, because it is they who invented anthropology. And they have all the rights, because rights, too, are their invention. Those who do not conceptualize difference, who do not play the game of difference, must be exterminated. **The Indians of America, when the Spanish landed, are a case in point**. They understood nothing about difference; **they inhabited radical otherness**. (The Spaniards were not different in their eyes: they were simply gods, and that was that.) **This is the reason for the fury with which the Spaniards set about destroying these peoples**, a fury for which there was no religious justification, nor economic justification, nor any other kind of justification, except for the fact that the Indians were guilty of an absolute crime: their failure to under­stand difference. When they found themselves obliged to become part of an otherness no longer radical, but negotiable under the aegis of the universal concept, they preferred mass self-immolation-whence the fervour with which they, for their part, allowed themselves to die: a counterpart to the Spaniards' mad urge to kill. The Indians' strange collusion in their own extermination represented their only way of keeping the secret of otherness. Cortes, the Jesuits, the missionaries and, later on, the anthropologists – even Tzvetan Todorov himself in his Conquest of America – all came down on the side of negotiable otherness. (Las Casas is the sole exception: towards the end of his life he suggested that the Conquest be purely and simply abandoned, and that the Indians be put back in the hands of their own destiny.) All these enlightened souls believe in a proper use of difference. **The radical Other** is intolerable: he **cannot be exterminated, but** he **cannot be accepted either, so the negotiable other, the other of difference, has to be promoted. This is where a subtler form of extermination begins –** a form **involving** all the **humanist virtues of modernity.**

# Cypress Bay

## Intuitionism 1NC

### Util FW

**Revisionary intuitionism is true—while intuitions are key, some are circular and incoherent**

**Yudkowsky 8**

Eliezer Yudkowsky (research fellow of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute; he also writes Harry Potter fan fiction). “The ‘Intuitions’ Behind ‘Utilitarianism.’” 28 January 2008. LessWrong. http://lesswrong.com/lw/n9/the\_intuitions\_behind\_utilitarianism/

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless. And this appears to be a general syndrome - people do much better when discussing whether torture is good or bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level wherever I possibly can. Occasionally people object to any discussion of morality on the grounds that morality doesn't exist, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that "exist" is not the right term to use here, I generally say, "But what do you do anyway?" and take the discussion back down to the object level. Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. I see the project of morality as a project of renormalizing intuition. We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. Delete all the intuitions, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, you're left with a rock. Keep all your specific intuitions and refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, you're left with a grunting caveperson running in circles, due to **cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies**. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. Even modus ponens is an "intuition" in this sense - it's just that modus ponens still seems like a good idea after being formalized, reflected on, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition".

**Revisionary intuitionism means util.**

**Yudkowsky 8**

Eliezer Yudkowsky (research fellow of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute; he also writes Harry Potter fan fiction). “The ‘Intuitions’ Behind ‘Utilitarianism.’” 28 January 2008. LessWrong. http://lesswrong.com/lw/n9/the\_intuitions\_behind\_utilitarianism/

However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, if you try to violate "utilitarianism", you run into paradoxes, contradictions, circular preferences, and other things that aren't symptoms of moral wrongness so much as moral incoherence. After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. After the two hundred and eighty-seventh research study showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, you could look at this intuition, and think it was revealing some kind of incredibly deep moral truth which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? Or you could look at that and say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't successfully multiply by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. But it ought to, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. When you've read enough heuristics and biases research, and enough coherence and uniqueness proofs for Bayesian probabilities and expected utility, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, then you don't see the preference reversals in the Allais Paradox as revealing some incredibly deep moral truth about the intrinsic value of certainty. It just goes to show that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of symbols standing for small quantities - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. When you've reflected on enough intuitions, and corrected enough absurdities, you start to see a common denominator, a meta-principle at work, which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply." Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. And that's why I'm a utilitarian - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

### Farmers DA

#### Minimum wage hike causes farmers to lay people off—this encourages greater mechanization

**Owens 15**

Howard Owens. “Farmers say increase in minimum wage will hurt agriculture in New York.” The Batavian. March 18th, 2015. http://thebatavian.com/howard-owens/farmers-say-increase-minimum-wage-will-hurt-agriculture-new-york/47083

Farmers are facing ever escalating expenses, lower prices and now Gov. Andrew Cuomo wants to raise the minimum wage on them. That's just more than many New York farmers are going to be able to bear, said Dean Norton, a farmer in Elba and president of the New York State Farm Bureau. "New York is already a tough state to do business in and a minimum wage increase is going to continue to make us disadvantageous," Norton said during a conference call this morning with media from throughout the state. Joining Norton on the call were Sandi Prokop and Brian Reeves, owners of multi-generation farms in Middleburgh and Baldwinsville. Each said a minimum wage increase would add significant costs to their operations, $44,000 annually for Prokop and $50,000 for Reeves. And that doesn't include the pressure a minimum age increase would put on suppliers and service companies to raise their rates, driving operational costs up even further. The average farm worker in New York earns $12.50 an hour already, Norton said. Even though the proposed increase from Cuomo is less than that -- to $10.50 an hour -- a minimum wage increase tends to drive up wages across the board. When trainees and entry-level workers get more money, the people above them want to keep pace with the higher pay, so they demand higher wages. Farmers who don't meet those demands, Norton said, risk losing skilled and experienced workers to other farmers willing to pay those wages, or the workers will look for work in other states where conditions are more favorable. Workers who are dissatisfied with their current conditions will also change careers, going into related industries, Reeves said. The upward pressure on wages just encourages farmers to abandon labor-intensive crops or move to greater mechanization, such as robotics at dairy farmers, which means fewer workers churning economic buying power in their local communities. Both Prokop and Reeves noted that in their segments of agriculture -- dairy and vegetables -- they're not price makers, they're price takers." The food processors and supermarket chains who purchase their crops set the prices, based on supply and demand and in competition with other states. "We're already one of the higher cost states," Reeves said. "When I sell a box of zucchini, I'll have a buyer tell me he can get it cheaper in another state. He'll say, 'I can buy all I want for $11 a box, why do you want $13 or $14 a box?' " Dairy prices have been falling for months, Prokop said, and haven't hit bottom yet. In February, she said, she received $24,000 less for milk than the month before, and her revenue was down $13,000 the month before that. "It's only going to get worse this month," she said. "The price is now below the cost of production." It would help, Reeves said, if Congress would step in and set a higher minimum wage across the board, because at least then farmers in all states would be paying the same price for labor. "We need to be able to compete," he said, "with Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan."

#### Mechanized agriculture causes soil erosion

**Trautmann et al 12**

Nancy M. Trautmann and Keith S. Porter (Center for Environmental Research ) and Robert J. Wagenet (Dept. of Agronomy, Cornell University). “Modern Agriculture: Its Effects on the Environment.” 2012. http://psep.cce.cornell.edu/facts-slides-self/facts/mod-ag-grw85.aspx

Farm labor requirements diminished with the introduction of mechanization. Invention of machines for tilling, planting, reaping, and threshing vastly increased farm efficiency in the mid 1800s. The internal combustion engine was invented in Europe in the late 1800s, and in 1892 the first successful gasoline-powered tractor was introduced in Iowa. By the early 1900s tractors that were small enough and cheap enough to interest the average farmer and could do the work of 17 men and 50 horses were being produced. Tractors gradually became popular, although it was not until 1953 that there were more tractors than horses on U.S. farms. Ever since colonial days, agricultural leaders have been interested in increasing the productivity of American farming. George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were leading agricultural reformers in the late eighteenth century, experimenting with crop rotation, manure applications, new crops, and improved livestock. In 1862 President Lincoln signed legislation creating the U.S. Department of Agriculture and granting public land to the states for establishment of agricultural colleges. Federal support for state agricultural experiment stations began in 1887, providing the basis for scientific improvement of American agriculture. As land became less available for settlement in the West, people became more interested in maintaining soil fertility and increasing crop yields on their existing farms. In 1914 Congress responded to this need by providing funds for state agricultural extension programs assist farmers in adopting improved farming methods. Conservation Beginnings. The unprecedented damage to farmland caused by the dust bowl storms of the 1930s focused national attention on the need for soil and water conservation measures to maintain farm productivity. Before settlement the Great Plains had consisted of vast acreages of grasslands roamed by wandering herds of bison and antelopes. The grasses were adapted to cycles of moisture and drought, and their dense root systems held the powdery soils in place against the strong prairie winds. The Homestead Act signed by President Lincoln in 1862 offered free land to anyone willing to cultivate it for 5 years, but it was not until production of the steel plow in the late 1800s that widespread cultivation became possible on the dense sods of the plains. The rich soils produced bountiful crops, and between 1870 and 1910 the population of seven plains states increased by a factor of 10, faster than any other section of the country at any time. In the 1930s, however, disaster struck. Several years of severe drought caused crop failures leaving the light-textured, powdery soils unprotected against the strong prairie winds. Millions of tons of rich topsoils were lost in dust storms so severe that they caused virtual blackouts in the middle of the day and left houses, roads, and fields buried by dust and sand. Skies were blackened as far east as New York City, and even ships 300 miles out in the Atlantic Ocean reported dust accumulations on board. In response to the urgent need for soil and water conservation programs to halt farmland destruction, the Soil Conservation Service was established in 1935. SCS employees set up demonstration plots and taught methods such as contour plowing, terracing, and strip-cropping to retain water on the fields and reduce runoff and erosion. Windbreaks were planted to break the force of the prairie winds, tillage methods were changed to reduce exposed soils, and vegetation or stubble was retained on the fields after the growing season to provide protective cover. With these methods, damaged lands were reclaimed and the dust storms were brought under control. Intensification of Agriculture. Productivity of U.S. agriculture increased gradually until World War II when the additional demands for food led to rapid changes in farming methods. The war economy stimulated the conversion from animal to mechanical power, resulting in increased output per worker. Use of fertilizer increased by 50 percent between 1940 and 1944, resulting in greater crop returns. The discovery of DDT and other synthetic organic pesticides vastly increased pest control capabilities and made it possible to increase efficiency through practices such as continuous cropping and devoting large acreages to a single crop. In the 25-year period between 1950 and 1975, agricultural productivity changed more rapidly than at any other time in American history (fig. 1. See fact sheet). Although the acreage in farming dropped by 6 percent and the hours of farm labor decreased by 60 percent, farm production per hour of on-farm labor practically tripled, and total farm output increased by more than half. These dramatic changes were produced by technological innovations, development of hybrid strains and other genetic improvements, and a fourfold increase in the use of pesticides and fertilizers (fig. 2. See fact sheet). The result of all these changes has been that agriculture has become more intensive, producing higher yields per acre by relying on greater chemicals use and technological inputs. It also has become more expensive, relying on purchase of machinery and chemicals to replace the heavy labor rcquirements of the past. To remain competitive, farmers have been forced to become more efficient, farming ever larger acreages with bigger equipment and more fertilizers and pesticides. Small farms growing a wide variety of crops have in large part been replaced by much larger farms consisting of extensive fields of a single crop. As a result, the number of farms has dropped by half since 1950, and average farm size has doubled (fig. 3. See fact sheet). Today only 2 percent of U.S. farms produce 70 percent of the vegetables, 50 percent of the fruit and nuts, and 35 percent of the poultry products grown in this country. Although the intensification of agriculture has vastly increased productivity, it also has had a number of potentially detrimental environmental consequences, ranging from rapid erosion of fertile topsoils to contamination of drinking water supplies by the chemicals used to enhance farmland productivity.

#### Soil erosion causes extinction

**Monbiot 15**

George Monbiot 15, British author and syndicated columnist, environmental activist, “We’re treating soil like dirt. It’s a fatal mistake, as our lives depend on it,” 3/25/15, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/treating-soil-like-dirt-fatal-mistake-human-life

Imagine a wonderful world, a planet on which there was no threat of climate breakdown, no loss of freshwater, no antibiotic resistance, no obesity crisis, no terrorism, no war. Surely, then, we would be out of major danger? Sorry. Even if everything else were miraculously fixed, we’re finished if we don’t address an issue considered so marginal and irrelevant that you can go for months without seeing it in a newspaper.¶ It’s literally and – it seems – metaphorically, beneath us. To judge by its absence from the media, most journalists consider it unworthy of consideration. But all human life depends on it. We knew this long ago, but somehow it has been forgotten. As a Sanskrit text written in about 1500BC noted: “Upon this handful of soil our survival depends. Husband it and it will grow our food, our fuel and our shelter and surround us with beauty. Abuse it and the soil will collapse and die, taking humanity with it.”¶ The issue hasn’t changed, but we have. Landowners around the world are now engaged in an orgy of soil destruction so intense that, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, the world on average has just 60 more years of growing crops. Even in Britain, which is spared the tropical downpours that so quickly strip exposed soil from the land, Farmers Weekly reports, we have “only 100 harvests left”.¶ To keep up with global food demand, the UN estimates, 6m hectares (14.8m acres) of new farmland will be needed every year. Instead, 12m hectares a year are lost through soil degradation. We wreck it, then move on, trashing rainforests and other precious habitats as we go. Soil is an almost magical substance, a living system that transforms the materials it encounters, making them available to plants. That handful the Vedic master showed his disciples contains more micro-organisms than all the people who have ever lived on Earth. Yet we treat it like, well, dirt.¶ The techniques that were supposed to feed the world threaten us with starvation. A paper just published in the journal Anthropocene analyses the undisturbed sediments in an 11th-century French lake. It reveals that the intensification of farming over the past century has increased the rate of soil erosion sixtyfold.¶ Another paper, by researchers in the UK, shows that soil in allotments – the small patches in towns and cities that people cultivate by hand – contains a third more organic carbon than agricultural soil and 25% more nitrogen. This is one of the reasons why allotment holders produce between four and 11 times more food per hectare than do farmers.¶ Whenever I mention this issue, people ask: “But surely farmers have an interest in looking after their soil?” They do, and there are many excellent cultivators who seek to keep their soil on the land. There are also some terrible farmers, often absentees, who allow contractors to rip their fields to shreds for the sake of a quick profit. Even the good ones are hampered by an economic and political system that could scarcely be better designed to frustrate them.¶ This is the International Year of Soils, but you wouldn’t know it. In January, the Westminster government published a new set of soil standards, marginally better than those they replaced, but wholly unmatched to the scale of the problem. There are no penalities for compromising our survival except a partial withholding of public subsidies. Yet even this pathetic guidance is considered intolerable by the National Farmers’ Union, which greeted them with bitter complaints. Sometimes the NFU seems to me to exist to champion bad practice and block any possibility of positive change.¶ Few sights are as gruesome as the glee with which the NFU celebrated the death last year of the European soil framework directive, the only measure with the potential to arrest our soil-erosion crisis. The NFU, supported by successive British governments, fought for eight years to destroy it, then crowed like a shedful of cockerels when it won. Looking back on this episode, we will see it as a parable of our times.¶ Soon after that, the business minister, Matthew Hancock, announced that he was putting “business in charge of driving reform”: trade associations would be able “to review enforcement of regulation in their sectors.” The NFU was one the first two bodies granted this privilege. Hancock explained that this “is all part of our unambiguously pro-business agenda to increase the financial security of the British people.” But it doesn’t increase our security, financial or otherwise. It undermines it.¶ The government’s deregulation bill, which has now almost completed its passage through parliament, will force regulators – including those charged with protecting the fabric of the land – to “have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth”. But short-term growth at the expense of public protection compromises long-term survival. This “unambiguously pro-business agenda” is deregulating us to death.¶ There’s no longer even an appetite for studying the problem. Just one university – Aberdeen – now offers a degree in soil science. All the rest have been closed down.¶ This is what topples civilisations. War and pestilence might kill large numbers of people, but in most cases the population recovers. But lose the soil and everything goes with it.¶ Now, globalisation ensures that this disaster is reproduced everywhere. In its early stages, globalisation enhances resilience: people are no longer dependent on the vagaries of local production. But as it proceeds, spreading the same destructive processes to all corners of the Earth, it undermines resilience, as it threatens to bring down systems everywhere.¶ Almost all other issues are superficial by comparison. What appear to be great crises are slight and evanescent when held up against the steady trickling away of our subsistence.

#### Disad turns the case. Soil erosion and extinction are unintuitive.

### UBI CP (Intuition)

**Counterplan: Just governments should provide every citizen 18 years of age and older the opportunity to receive a guaranteed basic income adjusted for inflation. Unemployment compensation and food stamps will phase out. Funding is through a reduction in corporate tax loopholes.**

UBI is intuitive—it’s simple and fair

**De Rugy 14** writes[[50]](#footnote-50)

Switzerland will soon hold a nationwide referendum on granting a **guaranteed** and unconditional minimum **monthly income** of $2,800 for each Swiss adult. In America, where Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty just celebrated its 50th anniversary of failing to achieve victory, liberals jumped on the Swiss news to reconsider the un-American-sounding idea of a universal basic income. Surprisingly to some, they were joined by many libertarians. The list of intellectuals who have made cases for a guaranteed minimum income over the years includes such laissez-faire luminaries as Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and Charles Murray. Friedman favored a negative income tax (NIT), in which taxpayers who earn less than the established minimum taxable income level would receive a subsidy equal to some fraction of that difference. (A watered-down version of this became the Earned Income Tax Credit.) Hayek defended a minimum income floor, in which the government provides a conditional income to each adult. Murray's 2006 book In Our Hands argued for an unconditional $10,000 annual cash payment to all adult Americans, coupled with a repeal of all other welfare transfer programs. Their **proposals aim to fully replace the current welfare state with a less-bad alternative. In a world where government already redistributes** income**, with** all of the **inefficiency that comes with overlapping bureaucracies,** the idea of **direct cash payments has** an **intuitive appeal because of its comparative simplicity and fairness.**

Living wage is unintuitive; it’s a form of moral outsourcing

**Brennan 13** writes[[51]](#footnote-51)

**Isn’t it more plausible to think that** if there’s some enforceable positive duty to provide Bob with enough stuff to lead a life, that **all of us**, together **share this burdensome duty, rather than just Bob’s employer? Why should Bob’s employer**, specifically, be the one that has to bear the burden and **lose all this money to keep him alive** (at whatever level you consider decent)**? This** just **seems like** a kind of **moral outsourcing** to me. Why not instead Bob’s neighbors, parents, friends, or sexual partners? Bob does McBurger a service, and McBurger pays him for that service.

Taxpayer-funded stuff like the counterplan solves; it emphasizes society’s collective responsibility to help the poor

**Mankiw 14**

N. Gregory Mankiw (Chairman and Professor of Economics at Harvard University). “Help the Working Poor, but Share the Burden.” New York Times. 4 January 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/business/help-the-working-poor-but-share-the-burden.html?\_r=0

As a result, those who are worried about inequality look for more immediate ways to help workers with limited skills. Before turning to President Obama’s proposal, let’s consider two other possibilities. For lack of better terms, call them Plan A and Plan B: PLAN A **The government subsidizes** the incomes of **low-wage workers.** These subsidies are financed by increasing taxes on middle- and upper-income Americans. PLAN B The government again subsidizes the incomes of low-wage workers. But under this plan, the subsidies are financed by taxing those companies that hire low-wage workers. Stop reading for a moment and consider: Which of these plans would you prefer, and why? If you have a pen or pencil handy, jot down your reasons. O.K. — and now, here are my answers: To me, Plan A is distinctly better than Plan B, which suffers from two problems — one involving fairness, and one involving efficacy. First, fairness: If we decide as a nation that we want to augment the income of low-wage workers, it seems only right that we all share that responsibility. Plan A does that. By contrast, Plan B concentrates the cost of the wage subsidy on a small subset of businesses and their customers. There is no good reason this group has a special obligation to help those in need. Indeed, one might argue that this group is **already doing more than its share**. After all, it is providing jobs to the unskilled. Asking it to do even more, while letting everyone else off the hook, seems particularly churlish. But even putting fairness aside, there is reason to doubt the efficacy of Plan B. Taxing businesses that hire unskilled workers would alter their behavior in ways that would hurt those we are trying to help. To avoid the tax, businesses would have an incentive to hire fewer of these workers. For example, they would have greater incentive to replace workers with labor-saving machines. In addition, some of the tax would be passed on to customers in the form of higher prices. These customers, in turn, would have an incentive to spend more of their income elsewhere. Over time, these businesses would shrink, reducing the job opportunities for the unskilled. All in all, the Plan B tax-and-subsidy plan sounds like a pretty bad idea. Why, you might wonder, did I bring it up? Because it is the one favored by President Obama. He calls it an increase in the minimum wage. To be sure, the minimum wage isn’t exactly a system of taxes and subsidies. But its effects are much the same as those of Plan B. Unskilled workers earn more, and the businesses that hire them pay more. The main difference between the minimum wage and Plan B is that, under a minimum wage, the extra compensation is paid directly from the business to the worker, rather than indirectly via the government. When proposing to increase the minimum wage, President Obama said that “there’s no solid evidence that a higher minimum wage costs jobs.” In fact, many studies suggest that it does precisely that. Mr. Obama is like a physician who prescribes a medicine based on a few studies that find no side effects while ignoring others that report debilitating effects.

### \*\*\*Case

### AT Framework

Non-consequentialist theories are unintuitive; they appear heartless to us because we have assumed the truth of non-cognitivism

**Smart 73** writes[[52]](#footnote-52)

Thirdly, any system of deontological ethics, that is **any system which does not appeal to** the **consequences** of our actions, but which appeals to conformity with certain rules of duty, **is open to a persuasive** type of **objection** which may well be found convincing by some of those people who have the welfare of humanity at heart. For though, conceivably, in most cases the dictates of a deontological ethics might coincide with those of human welfare and of an act-utilitarian ethics, **there must be** some **possible cases in which** the **dictates of the system clash with** those of human **welfare**, indeed in which the deontological principles prescribe actions which lead to avoidable human misery. In the most attractive forms of deontological ethics the conflict with utilitarianism is in consequence of some principle of 'justice' or faimcss', and I shall revert to this issue later} In other cases, however, **the conflict can be traced to** some sort ofoonfusion, perhaps even to some sort of superstitious **'rule worship'. There is prima facie** a **necessity for** the **deon**tologist to **defend** himself **against the charge of heartlessness, in** his apparently **preferring abstract conformity to a rule to** the **prevention of avoidable** human **suffering**. Of course some deontologists might claim that though it is logically possible that their principles might conflict with the utilitarian one. infaa such a muffin weld ncvcr 99cm- lt scan: that ifsuch 2. .dcomol: ogy did exist. the utilitarian need not be concerned to defend himself against it, since its practical consequences would not differ from those of utilitarianism. However all deontological systems which are known to me do seem to differ from utilitarianism not only in theory but also in practice. **Such a ‘persuasive' objection** to deontology **is possible simply because we have assumed the truth of non-cognitivist** (or possibly, subjectivist) **meta-ethics. A cognitivist** in meta- ethics of the type of Sir David Ross1 **could resist any such appeal to the heart** by saying that whether we like it or not his deontological principles can be seen to be true. That they might sometimes conflict with human happiness or welfare might seem to him to be more of sentimental than of philo- sophic concern. But if we strip of? the cognitivist meta- ethics from Ross's theory, then his deontology may come to look artificial and perhaps infected by a sort of 'rule worship'. For example the obligation to keep promises seems to be too artificial, to smack too much of human social conventions, to do duty as an ultimate principle. On the other hand it is, as we shall see, harder to produce persuasive arguments against a restrained deontology which supplements the utilitarian principle by principles related to abstract justice and fair distribution.

Appearances are not beliefs; specific intuitions can deceive us like optical illusions

**Huemer 5** writes[[53]](#footnote-53)

There is a type of mental state, which I call an 'appearance', that we avow when we say such things as 'It seems to me that p', 'It appears that p', or 'p is obvious', where p is some proposition. **Appearances** have propositional contents--things they represent to be the case--but they **are not beliefs, as can be seen from the intelligibility of, 'The arch seems to be taller than it is wide, but I don't think it is'**. Nevertheless, appearances normally lead us to form beliefs. 'Appearance' is a broad category that includes mental states involved in perception, memory, introspection, and intellection. Thus, we can say, 'This line seems longer than that one', 'I seem to recall reading something about that', 'It seems to me that I have a headache', and 'It seems that any two points can be joined by a single straight line'.(2) All of those statements make sense, using the same sense of 'seems'. **Appearances can be deceiving, and** appearances **can conflict** with one another**, as in the Müller-Lyer illusion: It initially seems that the top line is longer than the bottom line. But if you get out a ruler and measure them, you will find them to be of the same length**. The top line will seem, when holding a ruler next to it, to be 2 inches long, and the bottom line will similarly appear to be 2 inches long. So, all things considered, it seems that the two lines are of the same length. As this example illustrates, an initial appearance can be overruled by other appearances (this does not mean the initial appearance goes away, but only that we don't believe it), and only by other appearances. **Some appearances are stronger than others**--as we say, some things are 'more obvious' than others--**and this determines what we hold on to and what we reject** in case of conflict. Presumably, it more clearly seems to you that the result of measuring the lines is accurate than that the result of eyeballing them is, so you believe the measurement result (this may have to do with background beliefs you have about the reliability of different procedures--which would themselves be based upon the way other things seem to you). Things can become complicated when many different beliefs and/or appearances are involved, but the basic principle is that we are more inclined to accept what more strongly seems to us to be true.

Squo intuitions are formed by natural selection, including notions of fairness

**Singer 5** writes[[54]](#footnote-54)

**Hume** opens his discussion of justice by asking the question whether justice is a natural or an artificial virtue. In discussing that question he **writes: A [hu]man naturally loves** his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousins, his **cousins better than strangers**, where every thing else is equal. Hence arise our common measures of duty, in preferring the one to the other. Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions.5 Hume gets very close to an evolutionary understanding of the common sense of duty, but he could not explain, as modern evolutionary theory can, why ‘‘the common and natural course of our passions’’ takes the form it does. We now understand that the **genes** that lead to the forms of love **Hume describes are more likely to** survive and **spread** among social mammals **than genes that do not lead to preferences for** one’s **relatives** that are typically proportional to the proximity of the relationship. For we share more genes with our children than with our cousins, and more with our cousins than with strangers. We can also now provide a deeper explanation of the truth of Hume’s converse, and more controversial, observation that ‘‘there is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself.’’6 Much as we may regret it, **most** human beings **lack a general feeling of benevolence for** the **strangers** we pass in the street. In evolutionary terms, when we consider the species as a whole, the unit of selection is too large for natural selection to have much impact. Despite the picture books we had as children, early human life was not, by and large, a struggle for survival between humans and sabre-tooth tigers. It was much more often a struggle for survival between different human beings. There is no evolutionary advantage in concern for others simply because they are members of our species. In contrast to the selection of individual organisms within the species, which is going on all the time, selection between different species happens too slowly and too rarely to play much of a role in evolution. Note, however, the factors that Hume lists as generating love for others: personal qualities, services, and relation to oneself. Relatedness we have already discussed. **Personal qualities may generate positive feelings because they are likely to** be of **benefit** to **us, or** to **a small group** to which we belong. In contrast to selection between species, which is rare and of little importance in evolution, **selection within the species, between smaller**, isolated breeding **groups, happens** much **more often**. These smaller groups do compete with each other and, in comparison with species, are relatively short-lived. The countervailing pressures of selection at the level of the individual or the gene would still apply, but less effectively. In some circumstances, there could be selective pressures that favor self-sacrifice for the benefit of the group. There would also, of course, be countervailing pressures favoring self-interested actions that do not benefit the group. If, however, the group develops a culture that rewards those who risk their own interests in order to benefit the group, and punishes those who do not, the cost-benefit ratio would be tilted so as to make benefiting the group more likely to be compatible with leaving offspring in the next generation. The third exception that Hume mentioned was ‘‘services.’’ Here again he touches upon a focus of recent evolutionary theory, which has meshed with game theory in exploring such situations as the Prisoners’ Dilemma. This work enables us to give a fuller and more persuasive answer than Hume could to the question with which he began his discussion of justice. Hume asked whether justice is a natural or an artificial virtue, and answered that it is an artificial one. By that he meant that ‘‘the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, though necessarily from education, and human conventions.’’ He adds that though the rules of justice are artificial, this does not mean that they are arbitrary. Justice is, for Hume, a human invention, though one that is ‘‘obvious and absolutely necessary.’’ But justice is not, at least not in its origins, a human invention. We can find forms of it in our closer nonhuman relatives. A monkey will present its back to another monkey, who will pick out parasites; after a time the roles will be reversed. A monkey that fails to return the favor is likely to be attacked, or scorned in the future. Such reciprocity will pay off, in evolutionary terms, as long as the costs of helping are less than the benefits of being helped and as long as animals will not gain in the long run by ‘‘cheating’’ – that is to say, by receiving favors without returning them. It would seem that the best way to ensure that those who cheat do not prosper is for animals to be able to recognize cheats and refuse them the benefits of cooperation the next time around. This is only possible among intelligent animals living in small, stable groups over a long period of time. Evidence supports this conclusion: **reciprocal behavior has been observed in birds and mammals**, the clearest cases occurring among wolves, wild dogs, dolphins, monkeys, and apes. **Many features of human morality could have grown out of** simple **reciprocal practices such as** the **mutual removal of parasites** from awkward places. Suppose I want to have the lice in my hair picked out and I am willing in return to remove lice from someone else’s hair. I must, however, choose my partner carefully. If I help everyone indiscriminately, I will find myself delousing others without getting my own lice removed. To avoid this, I must learn to distinguish between those who return favors and those who do not. In making this distinction, I am separating reciprocators and nonreciprocators and, in the process, developing crude notions of fairness and of cheating. I will strengthen my links with those who reciprocate, and bonds of friendship and loyalty, with a consequent sense of obligation to assist, will result. This is not all. As we see with monkeys, reciprocators are likely to react in a hostile and angry way to those who do not reciprocate. More sophisticated reciprocators, able to think and use language, may regard reciprocity as good and ‘‘right’’ and cheating as bad and ‘‘wrong.’’ From here it is a small step to concluding that the worst of the nonreciprocators should be driven out of society or else punished in some way, so that they will not take advantage of others again. Thus a system of punishment and a notion of desert constitute the other side of reciprocal altruism. So Hume was not entirely wrong to say that justice is an artificial virtue, but he was not entirely right either. The basic rule of reciprocity, which includes the **ability to detect cheats and** the sense of **indignation required** to exclude them, **is natural in the sense that it has evolved**, is part of our biological nature, and is something we share with our closer nonhuman relatives. But the more detailed rules of justice typical of human, language-using societies are refinements on the instinctive sense of reciprocity, and so may be considered artificial. Our biology does not prescribe the specific forms our morality takes. There are cultural variations in human morality, as even Herodotus knew.8 Nevertheless, it seems likely that all these different forms are the outgrowth of behavior that exists in social animals, and is the result of the usual evolutionary processes of natural selection. Morality is a natural phenomenon. No myths are required to explain its existence.

That means don’t accept all intuitions on face; util could still be correct regardless of our current intuitions

**Singer 5** writes[[55]](#footnote-55)

Shortly after The Origin of Species appeared, Darwin wrote to a friend: ‘‘I have received in a Manchester newspaper rather a good squib, showing that I have proved ‘might is right’...’’19 Darwin knew, of course, that he had done nothing of the sort. The Social Darwinists committed the same fallacy when they argued against state interference with the free market on the grounds that protecting the poor and weak was interfering with natural selection. Assuming that we can define the term ‘‘natural’’ in a way that makes it meaningful to say that protecting the poor and weak interferes with natural selection, we would still need an ethical argument to say that it is wrong to do so. The direction of evolution neither follows, nor has any necessary connection with, the path of moral progress. **‘‘More evolved’’ does not mean ‘‘better.’’** No matter how often the fallacy of reading a moral direction into evolution has been pointed out, people still commit it, and it is not difficult to find otherwise excellent contemporary writers in evolutionary theory who continue to make this mistake. Nevertheless, it is a mistake.20 So while I have claimed that **evolutionary theory explains much of common morality**, including the central role of duties to our kin, and of duties related to reciprocity, I do not claim that this justifies these elements of common morality. I am a supporter of an evolutionary approach to human behavior, and I am interested in ethics, but I am not an advocate of an ‘‘evolutionary ethic.’’ The impossibility of deducing ethical conclusions from the facts of evolution does not mean that recent advances in our scientific understanding of ethics have no normative significance at all. These advances are highly significant for normative ethics, but in an indirect way. To appreciate this, we need to look at the current debate over methodology in normative ethics. A dominant theme in normative ethics for the past century or more has been the debate between those who support a systematic normative ethical theory – utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism have been the leading contenders – and those who ground their normative ethics on our common moral judgments or intuitions. In this debate, the **chief weapons of opponents of util**itarianism **have been examples intended to show that** the **dictates of util**itarianism **clash with** moral **intuitions** that we all share. Perhaps the most famous literary instance occurs in The Karamazov Brothers, where Dostoyevsky has Ivan challenge Alyosha to say whether he would consent to build a world in which people were happy and at peace, if this ideal world could be achieved only by torturing ‘‘that same little child beating her chest with her little fists.’’ Alyosha says that he would not consent to build such a world on those terms.21 Hastings Rashdall thought he could refute hedonistic utilitarianism by arguing that it cannot explain the value of sexual purity.22 H. J. McCloskey, writing at a time when lynchings in the U.S. South were still a possibility, thought it a decisive objection to utilitarianism that the theory might direct a sheriff to frame an innocent man in order to prevent a white mob lynching half a dozen innocents in revenge for a rape.23 Bernard Williams offered a similar example, of a botanist who wanders into a village in the jungle where 20 innocent people are about to be shot. He is told that nineteen of them will be spared, if only he will himself shoot the twentieth. Though Williams himself did not say that it would necessarily be wrong to shoot the twentieth, he thought that utilitarianism could not account for the difficulty of the decision.24 Initially, the **use of such examples** to appeal to our common moral intuitions against consequentialist theories **was an ad hoc device lacking metaethical foundations**. It was simply a way of saying: ‘‘If Theory U is true, then in situation X you should do Y. But we know that it would be wrong to do Y in X, therefore U cannot be true.’’ This is an effective argument against U, as long as the judgment that it would be wrong to do Y in X is not challenged. But the argument does nothing to establish that it is wrong to do Y in X, nor what a sounder theory than U would be like. In A Theory of Justice, John **Rawls took the crucial step** towards **fusing this argument with an ethical methodology when he argued** that the test of a sound moral theory is that it can achieve a **‘‘reflective equilibrium’’** with our considered moral judgments. By ‘‘reflective equilibrium’’ Rawls meant that, where there is no inherently plausible theory that perfectly matches our initial moral judgments, we should modify either the theory, or the judgments, until we have an equilibrium between the two. The model here is the testing of a scientific theory. In science, we generally accept the theory that best fits the data, but sometimes, if the theory is inherently plausible, we may be prepared to accept it even if it does not fit all the data. We might assume that the outlying data are erroneous, or that there are still undiscovered factors at work in that particular situation. In the case of a normative theory of ethics, Rawls assumes, the raw data is our prior moral judgments. We try to match them with a plausible theory, but if we cannot, we reject some of the judgments, and modify the theory so that it matches others. Eventually the plausibility of the theory and of the surviving judgments reach an equilibrium, and we then have the best possible theory. On this view the acceptability of a moral theory is not determined by the internal coherence and plausibility of the theory itself, but, to a significant extent, by its agreement with those of our prior moral judgments that we are unwilling to revise or abandon. In A Theory of Justice Rawls uses this model to justify tinkering with his original idea of a choice arising from a hypothetical contract, until he is able to produce results that are not too much at odds with our ordinary ideas of justice.25 The model of **reflective equilibrium has** always **struck me as dubious**. The analogy between the role of a normative moral theory and a scientific theory is fundamentally misconceived.26 A scientific theory seeks to explain the existence of data that are about a world ‘‘out there’’ that we are trying to explain. Granted, the data may have been affected by errors in measurement or interpretation, but unless we can give some account of what the errors might have been, it is not up to us to choose or reject the observations. **A normative ethical theory**, however, **is not trying to explain our common** moral **intuitions. It might reject all of them, and still be superior** to other normative theories that better matched our moral judgments. For a normative moral theory is not an attempt to answer the question ‘‘Why do we think as we do about moral questions?’’ Even without an evolutionary understanding of ethics, it is obvious that the question ‘‘Why do we think as we do about moral questions?’’ may require a historical, rather than a philosophical, investigation. On abortion, suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, for instance, we may think as we do because we have grown up in a society that was, for nearly 2000 years, dominated by the Christian religion. We may no longer believe in Christianity as a moral authority, but we may find it difficult to rid ourselves of moral intuitions shaped by our parents and our teachers, who were either themselves believers, or were shaped by others who were**. A normative** moral **theory is an attempt to answer** the question **‘‘What ought we** to **do?’’ It is perfectly possible to answer** this question by saying**: ‘‘Ignore all our ordinary moral judgments, and do what will produce the best consequences.’’** Of course, one would need to give some kind of argument for this answer. My concern now is not to give this argument, or any other argument for possible alternatives to whatever theory best explains our intuitive judgments. My point is that the model of reflective equilibrium, at least as presented in A Theory of Justice, appears to rule out such an answer, because it assumes that our moral intuitions are some kind of data from which we can learn what we ought to do.

### AT Can’t Weigh Frameworks w/o Intuition

1. Doesn’t assume revisionary intuitionism. We can weigh which moral theories are less cognitively biased.

2. Even if warrant comparison relies on a notion of plausibility, that’s different from substantive intuitions we have about specific cases.

### Polls

Luce is a poll, so polls turn the case. Polls come first under his version of intuitionism because they’re the most verifiable account of people’s current intuitions.

The aff’s poll isn’t about the aff—it’s about living wage ordinances for city contractors—the Anker 11 definition they defend isn’t.

**Aff Polls Are Biased; Question Framing Is Everything**

**Dorfman, 2014:**

(People Support Raising The Minimum Wage Until Told The Costs. 5/22/2014. Professor of Economics At The University Of Georgia. Jeffrey Dorman)

**Support for** a **higher minimum wage in the polls is** also **aided by the way the question is typically framed**. For example, a recent Reason-Rupe Poll of 1,003 American adults found **that 67 percent** of respondents **supported raising the minimum wage when the question was: “The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. Do you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour?” However, when the question was changed to: “What about if raising the minimum wage caused some employers to lay off workers or hire fewer workers? Would you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage?” support for raising the minimum wage dropped to 39 percent with 58 percent opposed. If the question was phrased as: “What about if raising the minimum wage caused some employers to raise prices? Would you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage?” the results were split with 51 percent in favor and 46 percent opposed to raising the minimum wage. This is a statistical tie given the poll’s margin of error of +/- 3.6 percent.**

**Unemployment Turns The Framework; the consequences flip the poll results**

**Ekins, 2014:**

(Americans Will Only Support Obama’s Minimum Wage Increase If It Doesn’t Harm Jobs. July 28, 2014. Emily Ekins, Director Of Polling For He Reason Foundation. Ph.D. Candidat At The University Of California Los Angeles)

However, **once Americans consider costs, support for a minimum wage plummets. If raising the minimum wage were to cause some employers to lay-off or hire fewer workers, 57 percent of Americans would oppose a minimum wage hike** and 38 percent would favor. **Additionally, if a minimum wage increase were to harm jobs, Democrats would swing 38 points,** such that half would then oppose a wage hike. Likewise, **majorities of independents (53 percent) and Republicans (68 percent) would oppose raising the wage floor.** In both scenarios, the fact that Republicans are more likely to oppose raising the minimum wage is partly driven by their belief that doing so would harm employment. Indeed, a majority (54 percent) of Republicans believe raising the minimum wage would reduce jobs; however, this is a view only shared by 39 percent of Americans overall. Instead 69 percent of Democrats and 56 percent of independents believe Congress can raise the minimum wage with no adverse effects on employment.

### AT Helping the Poor=Intuitive

Following our intuitions on helping the poor is counter-productive; child tax exemptions prove

**Zwolinski 12** writes[[56]](#footnote-56)

In his new book, Thinking Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman illustrates a lesson of central importance to bleeding heart libertarians: that **if you want to help the poor, trusting your intuitions** about how to do so **is a bad way to go**. Kahneman illustrates this point with a story from Thomas Schelling’s Choice and Consequence. Schelling was teaching at Harvard’s Kennedy school on the topic of child exemptions in the tax code. **Schelling** told his students that a standard exemption is allowed for each child, and that the amount of the exemption is independent of the taxpayer’s income. He **asked** their opinion of the following proposition**: should the child exemption be larger for the rich** than for the poor**?** Of course, **almost all** of the students **said** that it should **no**t. And I’m sure your intuitions were the same. But then Schelling did something interesting. **He pointed out that the tax code could have been** set up **different**ly **–** that **instead of assuming zero children** as the default **and** then **giving tax credits for** those families who have **more, it could** have **assume**d, say, **two children** as the default **and** then **impose surcharges on those who have fewer**. He then asked the following question: **Should the childless poor pay as large a surcharge as the childless rich? Your intuitive reaction** to this question, like that of the students, **was** probably immediate: **“No.” But** there’s a problem. Our intuitions say that the rich should not receive a higher credit than the poor, but that they should pay a higher surcharge. But as Schelling pointed out, **“surcharge” and “credit” are** just two different ways of describing **the same thing**, a purely verbal distinction created by an arbitrary choice about how many children we assume as the baseline case. **So what our intuitions** are **tell**ing **us** to do **– have the rich pay a higher surcharge but receive a lower credit – is** logically **impossible**. Kahneman’s diagnosis: [Relying on our intuitions] delivers an immediate response to any question about rich and poor: when in doubt, favor the poor. The surprising aspect of Schelling’s problem is that this apparently simple moral rule does not work reliably. It generates contradictory answers to the same problem, depending on how that problem is framed. And it’s not just that framing effects distort our reliable judgments about reality. It’s worse. Framing should not be viewed as an intervention that masks or distorts an underlying preference. At least in this instance – and also in the problems of the Asian disease and of surgery versus radiation for lung cancer – there is no underlying preference that is masked or distorted by the frame. **Our preferences are about framed problems, and our moral intuitions are about descriptions, not** about **substance.**

### Misc. Turns

The logic behind minimum wage hikes is as absurd as denying gravity

**Hennessey 13** writes[[57]](#footnote-57)

**If raising** the **minimum wage is good** economic policy, why stop at $9 per hour? **Why not increase it to $90** per hour**?** By the President’s logic, doing so would dramatically increase the income of not just millions of working families, but tens of millions of working families, and indeed of almost all working Americans. By the President’s logic, a $90 minimum wage would be good for American businesses because their customers would have more money in their pockets. A full-time worker making the minimum wage wouldn’t make $18,000 per year as the President proposes, but $180,000 per year. I am, of course, joking, and in doing so I’m trying to demonstrate the flawed logic of a minimum wage increase of any size. In my example **a typical worker** whose labor is worth $20 per hour to his employer would not suddenly find himself being paid $90 per hour. He **would find himself laid off** because his employer would choose not to employ him rather than to pay a wage more than the value the worker produces for the firm. Since almost all Americans produce less than $180,000 of value per year for their employer, layoffs would skyrocket. Customers of American businesses would not have more money to spend, they’d have much less because they’d be unemployed. **The same logic holds**, just to a much lesser degree, **for a minimum wage increase of any size**, including the increase to $9 proposed tonight by the President. A minimum wage increase precludes employers from hiring, or from continuing to employ, those workers whose productive value to the firm is worth less than the new minimum wage. **Like any** price ceiling **or price floor a minimum wage restricts supply, and an increase** in the minimum wage **restricts supply more**. Raise the minimum wage and you will eliminate jobs for the lowest-skilled workers in America. Who are the lowest-skilled workers? Many of them are teenagers, new immigrants, and high school dropouts. They would be the most harmed by a minimum wage increase. **Minimum wage increases** are politically attractive because they **sound like they’re going to help poor people** and because the economic argument against it takes a little time and effort to explain. When pressed, proponents of raising the minimum wage argue that it wouldn’t reduce the number of available jobs that much because even the lowest-skilled workers are worth more than the proposed higher minimum wage. Or they argue that when the minimum wage has been increased in the past, they couldn’t find evidence that employment declined. It’s absurd to argue that a policy is good because “we don’t think it will do much harm,” or “we couldn’t find evidence of harm when we did this policy before.” Another version of this argument is that because the minimum wage is not indexed to inflation, the real (inflation-adjusted) minimum wage declines over time without new legislation to raise it. **But** if the real minimum wage does decline, then a few more of the even lowest-skilled workers will now have job opportunities available to them. No matter how hard they try, **Congress can’t outlaw economics any more than they can outlaw gravity**. Congress should reject the President’s proposal and in doing so maximize job opportunities for teenagers, high school dropouts, new immigrants and other low-skilled workers.

Living wage is unintuitive; it doesn’t make sense to pay people more than what their labor is worth to you

**Brennan 13** writes[[58]](#footnote-58)

EDIT: A question about living wage arguments. **Suppose a homeless person offers to squeegee my car** window while I’m stopped at an intersection. Suppose washing my window will take 60 seconds. **Suppose that having my window washed is worth very little to me–I’d lose money on the transaction if I paid more than 10 cents. However, suppose that a living wage amounts to $30/hr. Am I morally obligated** (not out of duties of beneficence, but **out of justice**) **to pay him 50 cents, and** thus **lose 40 cents on the transaction?**

## Assorted Stuff for Polls Aff

### Baudrillard K

Polls are hyperreal, or simulate a supposed reality of public opinion that never existed. Polls create meaning and prevent criticism of said meaning.

**Pawlett 7** writes[[59]](#footnote-59)

A common variant of the test is the opinion poll. **Opinion polls**, Baudrillard argues, are not ‘real’ or unreal but exist beyond this binary opposition—they **are hyperreal**. The hyperreal is a state ‘beyond’ dialectics, not in the sense of passing through dialectics, but a state where the dialectic and its distinctive binary oppositions collapse and implode. **With opinion polls,** meaning, as far as it exists at all, is present from the beginning of the operation; it is contained in **the question**. The question **is an ultimatum because you are expected to accept the terms of the question**; indeed, **you must accept them simply to respond**, to have your say. **You are**, of course, **at liberty to answer ‘no’** or ‘strongly disagree’, **but in doing so you accede to the form of the test**, representing yourself through a preset binary or Likert scale of simplified, reductive choices (1998a: 168). Significantly, **any** dissent or **critique of** the way the **questions and answers** are set up utterly **fails to challenge the form of the test; either you refuse to answer at all and are eliminated from** the field of **enquiry or your criticisms are absorbed by** the apparatus of the test through **the category ‘Don’t know’**. **Opinion polls do not ‘capture’** meaning or **opinion, they simulate it**, they do not replace a lived, meaningful reality with an image of it, they simulate something that is not, and never was, there. Polled public opinion is ‘both the medium and message’ (1993a: 66) because ‘medium and message can only be separated in the second order’ (1993a: 84 n. 4).

2 impacts.

(a) Meaning and value are impossible in a hyperreal order, so the alternative is an epistemic prerequisite to the aff.

**LaFountain 8** writes[[60]](#footnote-60)

The source of the reversal and the ascendancy of the object over the subject is a central focus of Baudrillard’s work. Beginning with his earlier Marxist works, the concern was the political economy of the sign. That is, he was concerned not so much with work and political economy but with the increasing structuring of society by and as a system of signs. At one point in modern history, Baudrillard argued, there was a relatively fixed relationship between the object world and those signs and meanings used to understand them. Individuals were assumed to be the authors of these meanings and were considered capable of using them to represent the world and their own interior realities. In the mid-twentieth century, however, the relationship between the sign and the world was profoundly altered by developments in information technology, media, and advertising. No longer did signs represent the world. Instead, the referents of signs became other signs. As Boorstin noted earlier, **images replace or are substituted for,** rather than represent, **the outside world of reality**. Thus, **“reality” is what emerges as signs refer to signs, and signs** themselves **become more real than “the real”. This self-referential order** is what Baudrillard described in the 1980s in *Simulations*, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majority*, *Fatal Strategies*, and the *Ecstasy of Communication*. The self-referential relationship between signs **produces “simulations”, which are the basis of “hyperreality”**. In **hyperreality**, signs do not exchange with nonlinguistic reality, or with the objective world. They exchange only with each other in an “ecstasy of communication” that does not produce meaning or value. What it **produces** is **the frenzy of signs pointing to their equivalents. Because the relationship between the sign and the objective world has been effaced** and replaced by simulations**, there are no referent points between signs and “the real”** by which **to establish value or difference. When meaning and value can be established no longer,** and when they themselves are simulated by a profusion of simulations, the social world “implodes” and a silent majority arises. The silence of the majority is marked by a restless consumption of signs and by an inability to determine what values, if any, are at stake in the treadmill of consumption. **What then are the possibilities for critical thought**, for assertive individualism, **or** for **emancipatory practice? For Baudrillard, there are none.**

(b) Structural violence. Participating in ostensibly democratic procedures means any critique of the political system itself gets subverted.

**Daly 10** writes[[61]](#footnote-61)

But is this distinction so clear cut? Badiou, for example, argues convincingly that what is called the political cannot be universalised or resolved philosophically in a onceand- for-all manner (Badiou, 2006). The political, in this regard, is always bound by a politics (Badiou, 2006: 16-25). Moreover Lefort’s characterisation of politics (la politique) as essentially a formal-spatial realm is arguably too simplistic. As was familiar to Hegel, **the state** does not exist in its own positive terms but **is always accompanied by** an **inherent Otherness and negativity with which it seeks to** engage in order to **(re-)produce itself. Politics**, in this sense, **strives to** recognise and **mediate its own failures and** forms of **subversion.** The distinction Lefort makes between politics and the political becomes consequently more blurred. There exists rather an ongoing interweaving of the two moments (of politics and the political), in characteristic fashion, within the terms of a broader configuration which we might call the historical mode of politics. 5 In this context, the logics of subversion are essentially ambiguous. **What appears, on the surface, as contestation** and challenge **against a social totality may in reality become caught up in the latter and** actually serve to reinforce and **stabilise it: e.g. democratic subversion** as an outlet for protest and good conscience but which **implicitly accepts, and legitimises, the** rules/**grammar of political encounter.** In order to reach the dimension of politics proper, the more radical question is whether forms of subversion can be developed that are capable of subverting the very logics of existing subversion (see Endnote). This is a pressing task for today’s left, and one which Žižek continues to undertake.

Structural violence transcends ethics. It pervades our thought processes and leads us to exclude others and consider violence against them acceptable.

**Winter and Leighton 99** write[[62]](#footnote-62)

Finally, **to recognize** the operation of **structural violence forces us to ask** questions about **how and why we tolerate it**, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section ishow and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that **our normal** perceptual/**cognitive processes divide people into in-**groups **and out-groups.** Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. **We do not** seem to be able to **open our minds and** our **hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines** between those who are in and out of our moral circle. **Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible,** or demeaned **in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge** the **injustice they suffer.** Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. **To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing** and listening to **oppressed, invisible**, **outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered** by relationships, **communication, and appreciation of diversity.** Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that **structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of it**s operation**, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects.** Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it.

The alternative is to withdraw from democratic processes which reinforce the system. This is an essential starting point for alternative forms of resistance outside of the system.

**Daly 10** writes[[63]](#footnote-63)

It is in this context that we can make sense of Žižek’s reference to the Melville character, Bartleby, and his ‘I would prefer not to’. Thus **what is being is affirmed is** a strategic form of non-intervention and a **refusal** to participate in what Žižek calls the ‘rumspringa of resistance’: that is, a refusal **of ‘all** the **forms of resisting which help the system** to **reproduce itself by ensuring our participation in it’** (Žižek, 2006: 381-385). The problem is not so much direct participation in the system but rather the implicit forms of participation in the hegemonic practices and rituals that are expected of contemporary democratic-multiculturalist left resistance: it is this type of resistance (resistance-assurrender) that needs to be resisted. So **what needs to be developed is** a kind of **aggressive-passivity along the lines of ‘”I would prefer not to** give to charity to support a Black orphan in Africa, engage in the **struggle to prevent oil-drilling** in a wildlife swamp, send books to educate our liberal-feminist-spirited women in Afghanistan**”’** (Žižek, 2006: 383). And here I think that Stavrakakis misses his target when he criticises Žižek for arguing the case for political withdrawal: ‘(s)urely “to do nothing” does not make sense as a remedy against those who supposedly argue that “nothing should happen”’ (Stavrakakis, 2007: 133). Žižek’s argument needs to be read in terms of the discourse of the obsessiveneurotic in which there is engagement in all kinds of frantic activity (filling up the gaps/silences) precisely in order that nothing Real should happen. So what we have is rather a paradox wherein the possibility of genuine transformation is repressed through hyperactivity; an activism without action. The point is that ‘we’ (i.e. the Left) should not participate in the terms of today’s dominant ethos of obsessive-neurosis and its hyperactive culture of political inaction. To avoid misunderstanding, the argument is not that we are obliged to choose between choosing and not-choosing or between capitulation and full scale assault on the existing mode of choosing. There is more ambiguity than may appear at first sight. **A** particular **choice may be** ‘officially’ permitted and yet **implicitly prohibited (e.g.** the declaration of **atheism in** American **public life) and thus** the **making** of **that choice ‘within’ an existing modality may** very well have the effect of **undermin[e]**ing **the modal logic.** Equally, **refusing to** engage in **mak[e]**ing **decisions or**, what amounts to the same thing, making ‘impossible demands’ without any real substance can very quickly evoke a beautiful-soulsyndrome and an intrinsic passivity/inaction in the face of existing states of affairs. Insurrection, as Engels argued, is an art: it is a process where, quoting Danton, one must ‘dare, dare and dare again’ (Engels in Marx & Engels, 1969: 377). Such an art, I would argue, involves the **subversion of subversion**: that is to say, the development of forms of subversion that do not condone existing logics of subversion but which seek rather to undermine and repudiate the latter and to thereby open up new spaces of political possibility and creativity. It **would mean not only breaking with** the **implicit grammar** and interdictions **of political discourse** (the veiled agreements over the ‘need’ for low corporate taxation, for re-capitalizing global markets, for continuing with providing incentives for financiers-investors and so on), **but** also **more direct, and even violent, forms of confrontation** as well. **Both are ultimately aspects of** the same undertaking: the **deidentification with** ‘due process’ and the **existing horizons of possibility and political choice.** 15 Through subtlety, force and inspiration the modal logics themselves become subject to a radical historicity. This marks the approach to what Lacan calls the act, and to what Badiou identifies as the evental.

### $10.10 CP

Counterplan: The United States federal government should raise its minimum wage to $10.10 an hour and increased periodically to account for rising costs. I reserve the right to clarify.

It’s mutually exclusive. $10.10 isn’t a living wage

**Fox 14** writes[[64]](#footnote-64)

[Brackets in original] Kevin **Burgos works full-time, earns more than** the **minimum wage and** even **fixes cars on the side** to bring in extra money **to support his family**. Yet, **it's barely enough to cover** his **basic living expenses**, and Burgos finds himself in a $600 hole each month. Burgos' situation represents the woeful inadequacy of minimum wage and what could be a central question in the income inequality debates -- **what is** a person's **living wage? For Burgos, it would mean an additional $6.50 an hour over what he makes now. Currently, he makes $10.50 per hour** as an assistant manager at Dunkin Donuts in Hartford, Connecticut. It's well above both the federal and state minimum wages of $7.25 and $8.70, respectively. It's even more than the $10.10 per hour wage that Senate Democrats are fighting for. He brings in an extra $400 each month by fixing cars on the side. He works 35 hours each week to support his family of three young children. All told, Burgos makes about $1,800 each month. But his bills for basic necessities, including rent for his two-bedroom apartment, gas for his car, diapers and visits to the doctor, add up to $2,400. To cover these expenses without falling short, Burgos would need to make at least $17 per hour. "I am always worried about what I'm going to do for tomorrow," Burgos said. Related: Millennials turn up the heat against low wages As the debate over the federal wage floor heats up in Washington, experts are making the point that the minimum wage does not equal a living wage. Amy Glasmeier, a professor of economic geography at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has created a living wage calculator based on government data, which bears out this argument. She breaks down the total cost of living, including food, housing, transportation, child and health care, based on the county in which people live. Glasmeier said the cost of living rises with the size of the city. For instance, in places with fewer than 250,000 people, Glasmeier found that the living wage would be between $12 and $15 per hour. In cities with 250,000 to 1 million residents, its $17, and in cities with more than one million residents, it's $20 per hour. "The living wage calculator shows what you really need to make it, to survive," Glasmeier siad. "The minimum wage was never meant to be something for people to live on." Related: 2014 minimum wage, state by state Using Glasmeier's calculator, Burgos would need to make about $15 per hour. But because he has three kids, his living wage would need to be slightly higher. Any increase in his wage would make a huge difference to his life, Burgos said. That's why he's participated in several union-backed fast food strikes that have been building momentum across the country in the last couple of years. He hopes lawmakers will try to bridge the gap. Plight of the fast food worker **"[Politicians] don't** really **know how it feels to live in poverty, so they say** let's **raise the minimum wage to $10.10** and maybe they'll shut up," he said. "**But $10.10 means we'll still** have to **struggle. It's really not a living wage."**

Most Americans support $10.10

**Winograd 13** writes[[65]](#footnote-65)

The vast majority of Americans support increasing the national minimum wage, according to a recent poll commissioned by the National Employment Law Project Action Fund, a non-profit group that supports increasing the minimum wage. The poll, which was conducted by the public opinion research firm **Hart Research Associates**, **found 80 percent of** the **respondents agree that** the **minimum wage should be raised to $10.10 an hour and increased periodically to account for rising costs**. Support for the measure among registered Democrats was especially high, with 92 percent in favor of the proposal. Among Republicans, 62 percent supported the wage increase. About three quarters of the respondents said that raising the minimum wage should be a top Congressional priority. A recent study from Restaurant Opportunities Centers United found that raising the minimum wage would have significant economic benefits. The report estimates that 58 percent Americans living below the poverty line would no longer struggle with hunger if the minimum wage were raised to $10.10 an hour. The NELP poll was released as the minimum wage debate plays out on the national stage and in cities around the country. President Obama has called on Congress to increase the minimum wage to $9 an hour, a proposal Republican lawmakers oppose. The federal minimum wage, which is currently $7.25 per hour, has not been raised since July 24, 2009. As of now, the House of Representatives has not had a hearing on the issue this year, according to CNN. No votes are currently scheduled. **The poll of 1,010 U.S. adults was conducted between July 15 and** July **17.**

### EITC CP

Counterplan: The United States federal government should lower the eligibility age for the Earned Income Tax Credit to twenty-one years old, raise the maximum credit to $1,000, and set the credit’s phase-in rate to 15.3 percent.

Most labor economists support the counterplan. Majority opinion is against the aff, so the perm is bad for polls.

**Fowler 7** writes[[66]](#footnote-66)

The 2007 Minimum Wage Survey was conducted by the University of New Hampshire Survey Center for the Employment Policies Institute from January to April, 2007. A similar survey on Living Wages was conducted in 2000. Two hundred eighty (**280**) **labor economists** in the United States completed mail questionnaires for the survey. A list of economists was obtained from the American Economic Association (AEA) and consisted of all AEA members who indicated that their primary or secondary area of expertise is labor economics. For a more complete description of the survey methodology, please see the attached Technical Report. The major findings of this survey include: • Almost three-fourths of labor economists (73%) believe that a mandated minimum wage increase set at 150% of the current wage would result in employment losses. Similarly, more than two-thirds of labor economists (68%) believe a mandated minimum wage would result in employers hiring more applicants with greater skills, and nearly one-third (31%) believe there would be no change in hiring practices. Figure 1 and 2 • Nearly half of labor economists (49%) believe a mandated minimum wage set at 150% of the current wage would lead to no change in poverty rates, 32% believe it will reduce poverty rates and 19% believe it will increase poverty rates. Figure 3 • Labor economists **were asked to rate the efficiency of** three proposed policies which address the income needs of poor families: **a higher minimum wage,** the **E**arned **I**ncome **T**ax **C**redit**, and** general **welfare** supports. Of these three options, the **E**arned **I**ncome **T**ax **C**redit **is rated most efficient** followed by general welfare supports. A higher minimum wage is judged least efficient.Economists’ ratings of the efficiency of welfare and the EITC did not change between 2000 and 2007; the minimum wage question was not asked in 2000. Figure 4 • More than half of labor economists (53%) rated the Earned Income Tax Credit as very efficient, another 42% believe it is somewhat efficient, and only 5% think it is not at all efficient. • General welfare grants are rated very efficient by 12% of labor economists, 67% believe they are somewhat efficient, and 21% think they are not at all efficient. • Only 6% of labor economists believe a higher minimum wage is a very efficient way to address the income needs of poor families, 39% think it is somewhat efficient, and 55% think it is not at all efficient. • Not surprisingly, **when asked which** of these three **best addresses** the **income needs of poor families, 70% said an expanded EITC,** 21% said general welfare supports, and **only 9% said a higher minimum wage**. Figure 5

Accurate epistemology requires trust. We often lack relevant information, so trusting qualified authorities can be more rational than trusting our own beliefs.

**Baurmann 7** writes[[67]](#footnote-67)

**Our knowledge of the world is** largely **dependent on testimony**. This is **especially** true **in a modern world with** a high degree of **division of cognitive labour.** We are, our day and age, not only dependent on testimony but especially on the testimony of experts and specialists whose qualifications and competence cannot directly be judged by us as laypersons (Hardwig 1985). Nevertheless we routinely believe the testimony of historians, physicists, chemists, meteorologists, doctors, lawyers and (sometimes) sociologists. Furthermore, this is not only true in regard to scientists and academics. We also rely in many cases on the epistemic authority of priests, politicians, opinion-leaders or visionaries in metaphysical, political, moral or ideological matters. This deference to authority seems to be an unavoidable corollary of the ever-increasing process of cognitive specialization and differentiation. **We can be experts ourselves only in a very tiny section of** the **collective knowledge** production, most of the time we are laypersons in the majority of fields. One can indeed call it a “paradox of knowledge” that the more we know collectively the less we know as individuals (Weber 1946). **Our faith in epistemic authorities** and knowledge specialists **is** often **connected with the fact that they** are members of special institutions: universities, research institutions, scientific labs, hospitals, courts, churches. We may think that these institutions exhibit special features and that their members will **have special qualifications and incentives to produce reliable knowledge.** But institutions are also important in respect to the general production of information. In developed societies, people get the largest part of their information by all kinds of media, such as books, newspaper, television or the internet. And we rely very heavily on testimony which comes from these sources.

### Polls Bad

Polls aren’t genuinely democratic. Multiple warrants

**Gans 13** writes[[68]](#footnote-68)

Polls have long been newsworthy, but never more so than when their conclusions can be compared to contrary politician behavior, the recent gun control debate being a particularly dramatic example. The pollsters’ finding that 90 percent of their respondents said they favored universal background checks for guns was juxtaposed (except by Fox News) with the Senate’s filibustered rejection of such legislation. More interesting and important, the news media turned poll respondents’ answers to pollsters’ questions into the expression of public opinion. In effect, the news media, and later many politicians, including President Obama, seemed to imply that the Republicans refused to listen to vox populi. Some may even have been thinking that the polls were sometimes a better instrument of American democracy than its elected officials. In one respect, the polls are more democratic; they report the opinions of a random sample of the entire population, while elected officials have been chosen by an electorate which at best includes 60 percent of the eligible voters and at worst many fewer. Thus, when 90 percent of poll respondents agree on the answers to polling questions, the polls are sending a message about majoritarian democracy. In other respects, however, polls are not the best representative of the popular will, for **people’s answers to poll**ster **questions are not quite the same as** their opinions — or, for that matter, **public opinion**. The **pollsters** typically ask people whether they favor or oppose, agree or disagree, approve or disapprove of an issue, and their wording generally follows the centrist bias of the mainstream news media. They **offer** respondents **only two sides** (along with the opportunity to say “don’t know” or “unsure”), thus **leaving out** alternatives proposed by people with **minority political views**. Occasionally, one side is presented in stronger or more approving language — but by and large, poll questions maintains the balanced neutrality of the mainstream news media. The pollsters’ reports and press releases usually begin with the asked question and then present tables with the statistical proportions of poll respondents giving each of the possible answers. However, the news media stories about the polls usually report only the results, and by leaving out the questions and the don’t knows, transform answers into opinions. When these opinions are shared by a majority, the news stories turn poll respondents into the public, thus giving birth to public opinion. Normally, the news story tells what proportion of that public favors the legislation being questioned or rejected by the Beltway politicians. Indeed, such polls are newsworthy in large part because the reportage is framed as a conflict between majoritarian opinions and politicians’ rejection of the popular will. To be sure, poll respondents favor what they tell the pollsters they favor. But still, poll answers are not quite the same as their opinions. **While** their **answers may reflect** their already **determined opinions, they** **may** also **express** what they feel, or believe they ought to feel, at the moment. Pollsters should therefore distinguish between respondents with previously determined opinion and those with **spur-of-the-moment answers** to pollster questions. However, **only rarely do pollsters ask whether** the **respondents have thought about the question** before the pollsters called, or whether they will ever do so again. In addition, polls usually do not tell us whether respondents have talked about the issue with family or friends, or whether they have expressed their answer cum opinion in other, more directly political ways. In fact, **respondents incur no responsibilities with their answers, no subsequent obligation to vote or do anything** else. Conversely, politicians can lose the next election with a vote that angers their base. If poll results can be interpreted as opinion, they are pollster-evoked or passive opinions. **They are not** the **active opinions of citizens who** feel strongly about, or **participate in some way in** the **debates about** forthcoming **legislation** or a presidential decision. Elected officials may take passive opinions into account but they pay far more attention to active opinions. Above all, however, politicians listen most closely to the usual suspects with power: influential citizens, Congressional leaders and whips, lobbies, and campaign funders. Jennifer Steinhauer of The New York Times was right on target when she described the poll results as an expression of “national sentiment,” which she then contrasted with the Senate’s “political dynamic.”

Polls are flawed in so many ways

**BPS no date** writes[[69]](#footnote-69)

Theories on Erroneous Polling Results A number of theories and mechanisms have been offered to explain erroneous polling results. Some of these reflect errors on the part of the pollsters; many of them are statistical in nature. Others blame the respondents for not giving candid answers (the controversial Bradley effect & Shy Tory Factor). **Non-response Bias** Since **some people do not answer calls from strangers or refuse to answer the poll**, poll samples may not be representative samples from a population due to a non-response bias. Because of this selection bias, the characteristics of those who agree to be interviewed may be markedly different from those who decline. That is, the actual sample is a biased version of the universe the pollster wants to analyze. In these cases, bias introduces new errors, in addition to errors caused by sample size. Error due to bias does not become smaller with larger sample sizes--taking a larger sample size simply repeats the same mistake on a larger scale. **Response Bias** Surveys may be affected by response bias, where the **answers given by respondents do not reflect their true beliefs.** This may be deliberately engineered by unscrupulous pollsters in order to generate a certain result or please their clients, but more often is a result of the detailed wording or ordering of questions. **Respondents may** deliberately try to manipulate the outcome of a poll by advocating a more extreme position than they actually hold in order to boost their side of the argument or **give** rapid and **ill-considered answers** in order **to hasten** the end of their **questioning. Respondents may** also **feel under social pressure not to give an unpopular answer**. In American political parlance, this phenomenon is often referred to as the Bradley effect. If the results of surveys are widely publicized this effect may be magnified in a phenomenon commonly referred to as the spiral of silence. **Wording of Questions** It is well established that the wording of the questions, the order in which they are asked, and the number and form of alternative answers offered can influence results of polls. For instance, **the public is more likely to indicate support for a person** who is **described** by the operator **as one of the "leading candidates."** A common technique to control for this bias is to rotate the order in which questions are asked. Many pollsters also split-sample in that one of two different versions of a question are presented to half the respondents. **Coverage Bias** Another source of error is the use of samples that are not representative of the population as a consequence of the polling methodology. For example, **telephone sampling has a built-in error because** in many times and places, **those with telephones have generally been richer** than those without. **Selection Bias** Selection bias occurs when some units have a differing probability of selection that is unaccounted for by the researcher. For example, **some households have multiple phone numbers making them more likely to be selected** in a telephone survey than households with only one phone number. In statistics, self-selection bias arises in any situation in which individuals select themselves into a group, causing a biased sample with non-probability sampling. It is commonly used to describe situations where the characteristics of the people which cause them to select themselves in the group create abnormal or undesirable conditions in the group. There may be a purposeful intent on the part of respondents leading to self-selection bias whereas other types of selection bias may arise more inadvertently, possibly as the result of mistakes by those designing any given study.

Poll methodologies are becoming increasingly outdated and there’s no consensus on how to do them right

**Hawkins 12** writes[[70]](#footnote-70)

What gives? A recent New York magazine story offers a fascinating, compulsively readable feature on the chaos plaguing polling, “The. Polls. Have. Stopped. Making. Any. Sense.” That headline being the 46-character tweet sent out by polling wunderkind Nate Silver after a post-Democratic National Convention poll showed Obama beating Mitt Romney decisively in scarlet Wisconsin and Romney besting Obama in New Hampshire. Silver, of course, is the onetime baseball-stat geek whose uncanny knack for calling elections dead-on got his blog, FiveThirtyEight, picked up by the New York Times. He has a new book out, “The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail.” The New York piece is truly worth a read. Its gist, which isn’t done justice by condensing here, is that while Americans are increasingly hungry for poll data, fewer and fewer media outlets are paying for polls, leaving the field to pollsters with skin in the game. 'Polling's dark age' At the same time, **conventional polling methodologies are increasingly outdated, to the point where** the **percent of potential voters contacted who** actually **agree to answer** poll questions **may be in the single digits**. And without reliable mechanisms for compensating, **outcomes are ever more dependent on “weighting,” or the pollster’s statistical adjustment for variables**. To wit: “The rising demand for trustworthy polling analysis also reflects something disturbing about the data itself. The central problem is that prototypically modern science is being disrupted by **new tech**nologies, which **have created a flood of new firms and new methods**. ‘We’re in sort of what I would call polling’s dark age,’ says Jay Leve, who runs the polling firm Survey USA. ‘We’re coming out of a period of time where everyone agreed about the right way to conduct research, and we’re entering into a time where **no one can agree what the right way to conduct research is**.’” And the release of a poll can have an immediate effect on a candidate or campaign, particularly late in the game when undecideds may find it tempting to join what looks to be the winning side. Will this October’s “surprises” be polls skewed to affect the outcomes of various contests? Stay tuned.

### AT WashPost

This evidence is about public opinion polls for national security policy, not economic policy

**WashPost 13** write[[71]](#footnote-71)

Working with the Teaching and Research in International Politics (TRIP) project at the College of William and Mary, we have taken a first step to get a better sense of when and under what conditions policymakers pay attention to the work of academic social scientists. **Our** unique **survey of** nearly 1,000 current and former **national security decision-makers** (of whom 25 percent responded) **provides** the most **systematic evidence** to date **of what** the **highest-level national security decision-makers want from** academic **i**nternational **r**elations **scholars**. Among many other things, we asked about the usefulness of various approaches or methodologies for conducting social science research. For policymakers, the most useful approaches included area studies, contemporary case studies, historical case studies and policy analysis (see figure 1). As one respondent put it in the open-ended responses, “most of the useful writing is done by practitioners or journalists. Some area studies work is useful as background material/context.” Another cited “any analysis (e.g., in area studies) that gets at the UNDERLYING causes, rather than current symptoms, of problems has deep policy value.” A third listed “case studies — Kennedy School, Maxwell School, Georgetown-Pew” as an example of social science research that has been, is, or will be useful to policymakers in the formulation and/or implementation of foreign policy. Conversely, the more sophisticated social science methods such as formal models, operations research, theoretical analysis and quantitative analysis tended to be categorized more often as “not very useful” or “not useful at all.” Indeed, the only methodology that more than half of the respondents characterized as “not very useful” or “not useful at all” was formal models. To be sure, one respondent observed that “the work of scholars such as Howard Raiffa and Thomas Schelling in the area of game theory and systems analysis has been of great utility.” But more typical were the negative responses to our open-ended invitation for policymakers to “list an example of social science research that you believe has NOT been, is NOT, or will NOT be useful to policymakers in the formulation and/or implementation of foreign policy.” Some replies: — “Most formal modeling” — “Large-N studies” — “The time spent on computer modeling of international systems or conflict resolution is a complete waste. Much of the theory work is as well” — “Highly theoretical and quantitative analysis that seems to be more concerned about the elegance of the model than the policy utility” — “Many micro-economic models and fitting of history into larger theories is not very useful. Many professors do not want to influence contemporary policy.” — “Highly theoretical writings[;] complex statistical analysis of social science topics (except Economics). Writings that use arcane academic jargon” — “Most any quantitative study; virtually every article in APSR” — “Formal/game theoretical work and quant in Political Science — most of what passes as ‘methodologically sophisticated’ international relations work.” **One exception to policymakers’ aversion to quantitative social science was in the area of public opinion analysis**: Respondents included among “useful” approaches “public opinion research/analysis of foreign audiences by whomever.” Another argued that “polling data and its analysis is perhaps the most basic and certainly among the most useful such products.” Multiple policymakers specifically cited the Pew Research Center as doing useful survey research. Finally, a fourth agreed that “opinion polling can be very useful in trying to determine what populations think, especially in countries where freedom of expression is limited.” **Overall, we find that policymakers** do **regularly follow academic social science research** and scholarship **on national security affairs** in hopes of drawing upon its substantive expertise. But our results also call into question the direct relevance to policymakers of the most scientific approaches to international relations. It is worth noting, as the TRIP project reports, that the majority of articles in top international relations journals utilize these approaches, and graduate programs increasingly emphasize formal and quantitative training. To be clear, we agree with Farrell that “methodological sophistication is not a natural enemy of public interest.” Rather, we are making a more nuanced argument: That policymakers often find contemporary scholarship less than helpful when it employs such methods across the board, for their own sake, and without a clear sense of how such scholarship will contribute to policymaking.

### Representative Democracy Turn

TURN – at a meta-level most people empirically prefer a representative democracy to a direct democracy even if they disagree with specific policies, so there’s an obligation to do what current politicians suggest instead of presumed consent.

# Dougherty Valley

## Ni Una Mas 1NC

### Extra-T

The aff defends the Ni Una Mas movement. Even if the aff defends a living wage, Ni Una Mas includes much more than that

**Ni Una Mas 11** writes[[72]](#footnote-72)

This website is devoted to raising an international awareness of the plight of the "Daughters of Juarez." The missing, disappeared and the endless list of victims need a voice of reason. A voice that cries out for higher standards in police, prosecutorial, and investigative professionals. **If the Mexico judicial system cannot function** and hold those responsible for these crimes to Justice, **get out of the way and let and international team investigate and solve these crimes. We are dedicated to** raising the public awareness as to these crimes and **raising** the **standards for investigation and accountability** for both those who commit these heinous crimes and those who fail to properly investigate these crimes. While we are not in the business of hunting criminals, **we hope to assist in** the **heightening** of **the Rule of Law and the increased Professionalization of police** investigative **techniques.**

**Extra-T is a voter** because (a) it logically proves that the topic is insufficient, (b) it supercharges aff solvency and allows him to avoid indicts of living wage effectiveness which is a core part of the topic lit, (c) I can’t predict the extra-topical portions of the plan, which means even if I have ground, I can’t prepare for it, and (d) it means negs are expected to contest the validity of the movement itself which is substantially more difficult than contesting living wage.

### Femicide K

The “femicide” stuff is overblown and their sensationalist narrative distracts us from the real nature of violence along the Mexican border

**Hooks 14** writes[[73]](#footnote-73)

For years, a specter hung over Ciudad **Juárez**. In the 1990s, the largest city on the Texas-Mexico border **became infamous for** its gruesome **“femicides”**—the murders of hundreds of women. The murders, held to be predominantly mysterious and sexual in nature, grew in the public’s imagination. Juárez developed an international reputation as a place of horrific violence against women, a reputation that has become an internationally dominant narrative about the city. The femicides of Juárez have spurred activism and academic study, and become a major part of artistic and cultural depictions of life in Juárez—from the Tori Amos song “Juárez,” to Roberto Bolaño’s novel 2666, to FX’s recent drama The Bridge. Some who write about the femicides speculate wildly about the source of the violence, suggesting the killers “belong to street gangs, organized crime syndicates, powerful families, a satanic cult, an underground snuff film industry, the police—or all of the above.” The killings, they claim, are sexual, brutal, commonplace, and above all, inexplicable. That’s a narrative that Molly **Molloy, a research librarian** and professor at New Mexico State University, finds deeply troubling. Molloy **has studied Juárez for two decades**, and has written for The Nation, Phoenix New Times, Narco News Bulletin and The Texas Observer. She’s also the force behind Frontera List, an invaluable and long-running repository of raw information and discussion about border issues. In recent years, **she’s** become increasingly **convinced that the commonly accepted story of the Juárez femicides is a myth**. While violence has extracted a horrific toll in the city, Molloy says, **the proportion of homicides** with female victims in Juárez **is less than** it is **in many American cities**. What’s more, she says, **the sensationalistic narrative** of the sexual murders of young women in Juárez **distracts Americans from** the **real social dysfunction experienced by Mexican**s living **near the border**. It’s a contention that’s been hotly contested by others who write about the femicides, but Molly says careful study of Juárez paints an unambiguous picture.

Femicide in Mexico is massively overstated. Empirics go neg.

**Hooks and Molloy 14** writes[[74]](#footnote-74)

[Brackets in original] TO: How confident are you in the accuracy of the available statistics? MM: Mexican statistics are notoriously difficult to get and unreliable. That said, statistics do exist—and they can be very useful, especially when you can track them over time. And there are other sources. From the late 1980s until her death in 2009, Esther Chavez Cano, one of the most eloquent voices on women’s rights and human rights in Juárez, wrote hundreds of columns in Juárez newspapers to draw attention to the lack of social services in the city and especially to the ravages of domestic violence that primarily affected women and children. She became a spokesperson and a resource for families of victims, and she began to keep meticulous records of the crimes against women. **Of the** roughly **400 cases documented** in Esther Chavez’ files from **1990 to 2005, about three-quarters** of the cases **were domestic violence, and the cases wer**e essentially **resolved.** That is, the killer was known as an acquaintance or domestic partner or other relative of the victim. Only about **100** were completely **unsolved cases**. These are the cases that have **receive**d (and continue to receive) **most** of the **media**, artistic and academic **attention. The only real statistic**al study **on the topic**, done in 2008, **found that the proportion of female homicides in** Ciudad **Juárez was lower than Houston’s**. Support the Texas Observer What’s more, until 2008, when the violence associated with organized crime escalated and the Mexican military was deployed, Juárez was not exceedingly violent—at least not compared to other places around the globe that have similar kinds of social pressures. Before 2007, as far as I know, there was never a year with more than 300 murders, and that ends up being a murder rate of somewhere between 25 to 30 per 100,000 people. That’s a relatively high rate, but it’s not as high as some of the rates you see in U.S. cities like Detroit and New Orleans, where the murder rate can be upwards of 60 per 100,000. When you look at **the 427 murders**—that’s the figure usually quoted for the number of women killed between 1993 and 2007—those are all of the female murder victims. Those **are not categorized by** the type of **crime. If a woman is shot in a robbery, it goes into that number and is categorized [by some] as a femicide, even though there would be nothing to indicate** in that crime that **she was killed because she was a woman**. There was a famous case in 2004 that Mexican reporter Sandra Rodríguez wrote about in her book La Fábrica del Crimen of these young boys who murdered their family—mother, father and sister. The mother and sister are counted as femicides, even though that wasn’t a gender-specific crime.

The alternative is to reject the aff’s fetishization of the dead bodies of women. This is key to valuing all victims of violence and challenging generalizations about problems along the border

**Hooks and Molloy 14** writes[[75]](#footnote-75)

TO: But what’s the problem with focusing on femicides if it heightens awareness of the real problem of violence in Juárez? MM: I have a problem with this extreme focus on the women victims. I think every single one of the victims matter. The fact that a crime or homicide victim is a woman, or a child, or a man—it makes a different story. But in human terms, **no one victim should be more highly valued** than another. If 300 people are killed and 30 of them are women, but the **women’s murders** are the ones that **get all of the attention, I find that** to be **absolutely** mistaken and **wrong**. There are so many other victims and people are killed for many different reasons. **Not every woman victim is killed** for some sexual reason, or **simply because she’s a woman. Sometimes people** say to me, well, **the women are innocent, the men** that are killed **are narcos and criminals. That’s** such **an oversimplification**, and it is a statement made with absolutely no evidence. It is a criminalization of the great majority of all of the homicide victims. This is what has happened especially since the number of murders exploded in Juárez in 2008. And it is false. **It’s almost like we’re fetishizing** these **dead women**. To always be looking back at these women as if their bodies are this kind of sacrificial host—I find that to be troubling, in terms of our culture and our focus on life and death and what it means. In other words, **if you’re constantly focusing on women as if they’re this symbol for suffering, you never move beyond that** particular **death to look at** the **social conditions that gave** that kind of life, and **that kind of death, for** so, so **many** people.

### Framework

[Note: This only applies if they say that the poem is independent offense.]

The affirmative should defend the hypothetical government enactment of a living wage policy. The role of the ballot should be to decide whether to pass the affirmative policy.

**“Resolved” makes the topic a state action**

**Words and Phrases 64**

Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning **“to establish by law”**.

“Just governments” requires implementation.

90% of policymaking is deciding on implementation.

**Elmore 80**

Prof. Public Affairs at University of Washington, 1980 PolySci Quarterly 79-80, p. 605

The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by **policy** analysts that **decisions are not self-executing.** Analysis of policy choices matter very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood in answering **the** question, "What **percentage of** the **work** of achieving a desired governmental action is **done when the preferred** analytic **alternative has been identified**?" Allison estimated that in the normal case, it **was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation**.

Reasons to Prefer:

1. Policy-oriented debate is key to reclaim the political and bridge the citizen-expert divide. **Kulynych 97**

Jessica, Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Polity, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation”, 30(2) Winter, p. 344-345

When we look at the success of **citizen initiatives** from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those **moments of defiance** and disruption **that bring the invisible** and unimaginable **into view**. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the **policy debate** and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions **could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics**. The **existence of a goal-oriented debate** within a technically dominated arena **defied the** normalizing **separation between expert policymakers and** consuming **citizens. Citizens** momentarily **recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process**, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding.

2. Limits

**Only limited topics protect participants from research overload which materially affects our lives outside of round.**

**Harris 13**

Scott Harris (Director of Debate at U Kansas, 2006 National Debate Coach of the Year, Vice President of the American Forensic Association, 2nd speaker at the NDT in 1981). “This ballot.” 5 April 2013. CEDA Forums. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4762.0;attach=1655

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says **this community doesn’t care whether** its **participants have a life** or **do well in school or spend time with their families.** I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against Topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that **might make debate an unending nightmare** and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.

**Limits turn solvency. Research shows that research overload leads to superficial education, meaning we won’t learn about the aff or anything else.**

**Chokshi 10** Niraj Chokshi is a former staff editor at TheAtlantic.com, where he wrote about technology. He is currently freelancing How Do We Stop the Internet From Making Us Stupid? JUN 8 2010 <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/how-do-we-stop-the-internet-from-making-us-stupid/57796/> BK

When it comes to focus, turning on the spotlight may not matter as much as our ability to dim the ambient light. Nicholas Carr argued on Saturday in The Wall Street Journal that the Internet is making us dumber and on Monday The New York Times had a front-page feature on the mental price we pay for our multi-tasked lifestyles. If we are indeed losing our ability to think deeply, the key to fighting back may lie in a subtlety: focus may be more about our ability to filter out distractions than our ability to home in on the issue at hand. Carr posed his idea that technology is making us stupid in a 2008 Atlantic cover story and his forthcoming book "The Shallows" is a longer rumination on the theory. According to professors and research cited in The Times piece "the idea that information overload causes distraction was supported by more and more research." And those distractions, according to research Carr cites, are forcing us to change the way we think. Deep thought is losing ground to superficiality. So, if our multitasking lifestyle causes distraction, and distraction leads to superficial thinking, how do we fight back? Carr offers some advice:

3. Ground

**Not all topics offer fair and limited ground. Absent a topical fairness requirement, the aff will be biased by competitive incentive to find the most obscure and uncontroversial advocacy within the general vicinity of living wage literature. The only neutral topic debate is one chosen by a 3rd party topic committee.**

**Fairness is a voting issue. Debate is a competitive game, and rigging that game in your favor denies respect for the participants.**

**Galloway 7**

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally **denies the personhood of the other participant** (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).

4. Solves “poetry good.” They can read the poem to illuminate what the aff policy is about, not as independent offense.

### \*\*\*Case

### Ableism

The aff emphasizes the “voice” that their poem brings to women in Mexico.

Metaphors of “voice” degrade Deaf people and reinforce subjugation of Deaf culture to voice culture.

**Tremain 97** writes[[76]](#footnote-76)

In response to remarks I made on a panel at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy, focusing on Wendell's book, Wendell commented that we ought to distinguish between the use of ability as metaphor and the use of disability as metaphor, and she expressed regret that she had not done so in the book. Wendell thinks that although we should often eschew the latter linguistic practices (for example, when used as an insult), we need not refuse the former practices. As 1 suggested to Wendell when I spoke with her afterwards, I believe that **ableist and disableist metaphors**, like dualistic racist metaphors (such as light and dark) **are** always already **asymmetrically related**, inextricably intertwined, mutually constitutive, **and mutually reinforcing**. Elsewhere 1 argue that insofar as the **metaphors of "voice" and "silence" (**currently **ubiquitous in feminist discourse)** are related in this way, they **degrade Deaf people and also reinforce** the **ways Deaf culture is subjugated to voice culture** (Tremain 1996). [Note: The term "Deaf is capitalized when it is intended to signify a political identity as opposed to the audiological condition.] I develop a fuller anti-ableist critique of disability as metaphor in Tremain, in progress.

This is an independent reason to reject the aff. Exposing and confronting ableist language like “voice” metaphors enhances social justice practice

**Ortiz and Elrod 2** writes[[77]](#footnote-77)

As with racism, sexism, classism, and homophobia, **we began increasingly to notice how** our **everyday experiences are rife with** examples of **ableism**. In particular, **we started noting with more critical awareness** the recurrent, and often inadvertent, **exam­ples** of ableism **in the very language of crit­ical discourse**: Think of "the ways in which the terms 'visible' and 'invisible' are used as metaphors [in much outsider culture and jurisprudence]. Notice how these metaphors privilege *seeing.* [**Notice**, too, the] **metaphors of 'voice'** and 'silence.'"19 **The critique of dis­ability theorists thus raises** a broad range of **matters pertinent to outsider jurisprudence** as anti- subordination method; **disability the­ories**, from many different vantage points, **enhance social-justice** scholarship and **prac­tice**. The addition of Disability Theory to the expanding universe of outsider scholarship has enriched both our work and our Lives.

### NAFTA Good

NAFTA has reduced the gender wage gap in Mexico. Export production is primarily female.

**Dell 5** writes[[78]](#footnote-78)

Barriers to trade and foreign investment had important gender implications. The **barriers** that existed **prior to NAFTA led import-competing production to be**come **highly concentrated in Mexico City and** to a lesser degree in **Guadalajara**, the largest domestic markets in Mexico. The few existing export industries located near the Mexico-U.S. border in order to minimize transport costs to the United States, the principal export market. To the extent that **export production was female** (low skill) **intensive and import-competing production was male** (high skill) **intensive**, female labor participation rates should have increased most in regions where NAFTA led to the largest expansion in export production. The existing literature sheds little light on how NAFTA potentially affected female labor participation rates. Several studies examine the female labor force in Turkey, but primarily investigate how changes in the level and volatility of GDP following reform affect FLP.vii **Two** other unpublished **studies** focus on Mexico. These studies do not investigate female labor participation rates but do **find** either **a** statistically significant or weakly significant **reduction of the gender wage gap as a result of increased product market competition** (Artecona and Cunningham, 2002; Garcia-Cuellar, 2001). **Garcia-Cuellar has conducted the most extensive investigation of NAFTA’s impact on the Mexican female labor force. She** examines the effect of NAFTA on the low skilled gender wage gap in two trade-impacted regions – northern cities and central cities – and **finds that NAFTA led the gender gap to fall in central cities**. However, she focuses exclusively on wages of those with less than six years of formal education. This study will concentrate instead on the industrial labor force and female labor participation rates by individuals of all skill levels, something that has not yet been done. By so doing, it aims to resolve some of the controversies about Mexican trade policy and the female labor force.

NAFTA boosted overall female employment in Mexico and reduced discrimination against women

**Dell 5** writes[[79]](#footnote-79)

Part of the increase in FLP following NAFTA can be attributed to a direct trade effect, but this may not explain the whole story. The Becker model suggests that **increased product** market **competition resulting from trade may have led firms to discriminate less against women**. In order to test Becker’s hypothesis, I use a triple differences (DDD) approach that examines the impact of NAFTA on female intensity in initially concentrated relative to competitive industries.xxvi Column (3) of Table 4 lists the price-cost margin estimates that I use to classify industries as concentrated or competitive, and column (1) of Table 6 displays the results of the following regression: FIsti = 0 + 1concentratedit +2Rst + 3Rsconcentratedi + 1Rsconcentratedi t + 0Tt + oSs + oIi +  (5) where FIsti is the percentage of employees that was female and concentratedi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if industry i’s price-cost margin was significantly above 1.xxvii The coefficients of interest in Table 6 are the triple interaction terms between concentration, region, and the afterNAFTA dummy. These terms are all positive and highly significant, indicating that **female intensity increased more in concentrated, trade-impacted industries** than in competitive, tradeimpacted industries **as a result of NAFTA**. This provides strong support for the Becker model. xxviii The results above indicate that increased product market competition resulting from NAFTA led firms to discriminate less against women, causing female intensity to increase in initially concentrated industries. While this approach illuminates an increase in the percentage of employees that was female, it does not reveal whether the Becker effect increased the level of female employment. In order to investigate this question, I regress the right-hand side variables from equation (5) on the log number of employees in state s in year t in industry i. The results are displayed in Table 6. In column (2), the sample is restricted to females, and in column (3), to males. The triple interactions between region, concentration, and the after-NAFTA dummy tell how much either female (column (2)) or male (column (3)) employment changed in initially concentrated as compared to competitive industries, relative to the control region, after NAFTA. In column (2) where the sample is restricted to females, none of the triple interaction terms are statistically significant. This indicates that while the Becker effect increased female intensity, it did not increase the level of female employment. In contrast, in column (3) where the sample contains only males, the triple interaction terms are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for the central and Mexico City regions and at the 10% level for the north. **In** the central states, **Mexico City, and Guadalajara** (Jalisco), **NAFTA led male employment to fall by 27**.5**% in concentrated industries**. In the north, this decline was 19.7%. The coefficients on the central and DF/Jalisco regions are most likely larger than the one on the north because these regions specialized in non-competitive, import-competing production prior to NAFTA. These results confirm the predictions of both Heckscher-Ohlin and the Becker model. **NAFTA led the labor force in concentrated, import-competing industries to contract,** as Heckscher-Ohlin predicts. Furthermore, in accordance with the Becker model, female intensity in concentrated relative to competitive industries increased. While female employment did not change in initially concentrated relative to competitive industries in any of the regions, **NAFTA led overall female employment to expand** in the central region through a Heckscher-Ohlin trade effect.

NAFTA makes goods affordable for the average Mexican and reduces Mexico’s risk of economic crisis

**Sergie 14** writes[[80]](#footnote-80)

Experts say **trade liberalization** between Mexico and the United States **has had positive consequences for Mexicans** generally, not just Mexican business interests. For instance, **the deal has led to** a dramatic **reduction in Mexican prices for clothes**, televisions, **and food**, which helps offset slow income growth. GEA, a Mexico City-based economic consulting firm, estimates that **the cost of basic household goods in Mexico has halved** since NAFTA's implementation. Mexican workers in the car manufacturing and aeronautics sectors of northern Mexico have benefitted from the treaty and helped expand the country's manufacturing base. And Mexico has enjoyed **an intangible benefit of NAFTA: The country** has adopted orthodox economic management practices and **is no longer prone to crises. "The agreement ended up straitjacketing a government accustomed to overspending**, overpromising, **and underachieving**," wrote Castañeda. The government abandoned many protectionist policies and allowed the prices of tradable goods to converge on both sides of the border, which reduced deficits and limited the potential for currency crises, he added.

Even when Mexico’s economy does decline, NAFTA means they recover faster

**Griswold 98** writes[[81]](#footnote-81)

Opponents of free trade blame NAFTA for Mexico’s painful peso crisis of 1994-95. But the plunge in Mexico’s output in 1995 had nothing to do with free trade and everything to do with politics and botched monetary policy. Mexico’s peso collapse was caused by a lethal combination of loose monetary policy and an inflexible and overvalued exchange rate, both aimed at boosting consumption in an election year. Indeed, Mexico has suffered a severe financial crisis in every election cycle since 1976 — long before anyone had ever heard the term NAFTA.8 To blame the peso crisis on NAFTA makes no more sense than to blame a drunken driver’s latest accident on his new car. In reality, **NAFTA** and other market reforms **softened** the **severity of** the **crisis and spurred Mexico’s recovery**. Today, **the Mexican economy has resumed a growth rate of more than 5 percent**, the unemployment rate has fallen to precrisis levels and personal consumption of goods and services is once again rising at a healthy, sustainable rate.9 This **NAFTA-era recovery contrasts starkly with** the **protracted slump in Mexico that followed the** 19**82 debt crisis**. Then **it took the Mexican economy six years to recover** its **precrisis** levels of **production**.10 More important, whereas the slump of 1982 prompted the Mexican government to nationalize its banks and raise trade barriers, the present government successfully resisted backsliding. Just as **NAFTA** supporters on both sides of the border had predicted, the trade treaty **helped** to **lock in Mexico’s broader economic reforms.**

NAFTA’s helped Mexico’s auto industry and the overall economy

**Wharton School 14** writes[[82]](#footnote-82)

[Brackets in original] According to Robinet, “**NAFTA** has driven down our costs,” **making it possible for** an integrated **North America** — as a single manufacturing platform — **to become a major force in global auto**motive trade. Thanks to NAFTA trade preferences, automotive companies in the U.S.,Canada and Mexico “can use an engine from Mexico and a transmission from Canada, and then build the car in the U.S.” and still enjoy the NAFTA preferential treatment, so long as 62.5% of the value of that vehicle comes from within those three countries. Nowadays, the “vast majority” of vehicles built in North America have at least 75% (combined) value-added from those three countries, while some have well over 90% of North American value-added. Meanwhile,**Mexico’s emergence as an export-focused auto**motive **manufacturing center is having a growing impact on other sectors of Mexico’s economy** as well, Guillen notes. “We have seen, since the beginning of NAFTA, that **productivity has increased in pretty much all** of the **export-oriented industries [in Mexico]**, especially manufacturing, where it has more than doubled.” That is to be expected for several reasons, he says. Before NAFTA, “there were automobile plants in Mexico, but they were not really oriented toward the U.S. market. They were mostly for the Mexican market, and they were not very efficient. So in anticipation of NAFTA, and during the NAFTA period, American companies, the Japanese and South Korean firms have invested in world-class factories — with the best equipment — for the export market, which is primarily the U.S.” So part of the increase in productivity is due to better equipment in new plants. Another part is training of the labor force, for the same reason. These were cars made for export, so they needed to be well-done cars. The third reason is that Mexico, in general, even without NAFTA, would have made progress. “People have brought in better machinery,” on which workers have been trained, and educational levels, in general, have improved. Guillen argues that “you see the same things in electronics, especially appliances, automotive parts, furniture” and other sectors such as aerospace and computers. However, the trend is more visible in the automotive sector because there are less than two dozen vehicle assembly plants in Mexico. “That’s why one decision by Nissan or Volkswagen – for example, to set up a world-class factory — makes a big difference. You can more readily see the changes in the automotive industry, but it is happening in the others too…. “Now think of where Mexico would be today without NAFTA,” Guillen adds. “Today, **Mexican migration to the U.S. has come to a halt**. There are Central Americans coming to the U.S. – but virtually no Mexicans. That’s **because Mexico is doing well**. So just imagine, without NAFTA and with Mexico not doing that well, we would have had the additional problem of an unstable Mexico with lots of people wanting to come to the United States.”

NAFTA’s helped low-wage workers. The alternative would be unemployment

**Wharton School 14** writes[[83]](#footnote-83)

Has the success of Mexico’s automotive sector accentuated the imbalance between NAFTA’s winners and losers? **Some Mexican critics worry about** the income **inequality** between those industrial workers who have benefitted from the country’s globalization and those who have been shut out of those benefits, especially the rural poor. Guillen says he “completely disagrees with those economists who say this has generated inequality. **Whenever there is this kind of growth** process, especially when foreign investment comes in, **you always get that inequality. Are you better as a country** – or worse off**? Ask the 30% of Mexicans who got well-paying jobs. Without NAFTA, they wouldn’t have those jobs, because those jobs would be in China** or somewhere else.” **Guillen contrasts the Mexican situation with** that of **the U.S., where “we are generating inequality because** the **lower wages are** either **stagnating** or going down. How do they go down? When a factory worker is earning $35 an hour, gets laid off and has to go to the service sector and only makes $12 an hour.”

NAFTA has been overall great for Mexico—outweighs aff offense

**Beltrame 13** writes[[84]](#footnote-84)

OTTAWA - Ross Perot may have had it right after all about who would win under NAFTA. The North American Free Trade Deal was an important step for all three members, but the evidence points to Mexico — at the time the weak sister in the group that included two G7 economies, the United States and Canada — as by far the biggest winner. On the 20th anniversary of the pact, Mexico — in 1994, an insular, economic basket case — has in two decades emerged as a forward-looking country with expanding global reach, a handful of world-class corporations and a ballooning middle class. Perot, who twice ran for U.S. president in the 1990s and made his name as an anti-NAFTA crusader, generally saw that coming although he focused his barbs on what the U.S. would lose in what he termed "the giant sucking sound of jobs going south." Perot's fear was that U.S. firms would flock to where labour costs were cheapest. To an extent that has happened, and it can be argued that Canada too lost critical manufacturing jobs to Mexico. While there are some in Mexico who would dispute the characterization of their country as the big winner, the numbers make a strong case. **Mexico** under NAFTA had a rough start, because of a coincidental pesos crash just as the deal was getting under way. But the country **has grown into** the **one of the more robust emerging economies** with exports of about $1 billion a day, more than 10 times what they were in 1994. Mexico is now estimated to be the world's 13th-largest economy with total output similar to Canada's, although on a per capita basis it still lags. "I think **NAFTA has been excellent for Mexico," says economist** Jaime Serra **Puche**, the Mexican trade minister at the time, adding it would have worked even better if Mexico had not waited almost 20 years to bring in internal reforms to the economy. "Now **with** the **reforms** that are **finally taking place** I think **we are going to gain competitiveness and** the platform that has been constructed mostly for exports and **manufacturing is going to become stronger**." Some of that has come at the expense of Canada, or so believes Jim Stanford, an economist with the Unifor union. Under the deal, Mexico has gone from a bit player in the North American auto sector to the second-largest participant with almost 20 per cent of total production, compared with Canada's 16 per cent. "Heavy truck shipments in Canada collapsed by 75 per cent between 2006 and 2011. It's an incredible example of a manufacturing catastrophe and NAFTA was absolutely a key part of it," he says. Serra and others who have studied post-NAFTA impacts agree that Mexico's manufacturing sector, and particularly the auto industry, has been a big beneficiary. But they don't give all the credit to the deal. Even before 1994, Mexico had started on the road to trade liberalization and economic stability, by giving its central bank independence, for instance. NAFTA may have been the last and most important piece of the puzzle, but not the only one, they say. Overall, trade deals are often oversold by both proponents and critics, says Angeles Villarreal, a trade specialist with the U.S. Congressional Research Service who co-authored a paper on the deal earlier this year. "It didn't benefit as much as the optimists predicted, but also the negative effects weren't as severe. There weren't huge job losses," she says. On the plus side for Mexico, the auto industry has taken off, skills have improved and manufacturing has increased — and not just low-skilled factory jobs, she says. On the negative side, there were losers as well, particularly firms propped up by high tariff walls and small subsistence farmers, although even here the evidence is unclear. Villarreal says it's difficult to separate the NAFTA effect on farming from that of land reform that came at about the same time. Christopher Wilson of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington says **while there were losers, NAFTA has to be considered an overall success** for the country. "Mexico at the time was the smallest, now the Mexican and Canadian economies are similar in size," he points out. "**One of the big stories in Mexico has been** the slow but **steady emergence of a middle class that's now about half of the country**. "It's not the same as the middle class as the U.S. or Canada, but it does mean **they are not in poverty, they now own a car,** they **go to the movies,** they **take a vacation**. It's transforming the country," he says.

# Evanston

## Cap 1NC

### Topicality

The affirmative should defend the hypothetical government enactment of a living wage policy. The role of the ballot should be to decide whether to pass the affirmative policy.

**“Resolved” makes the topic a state action**

**Words and Phrases 64**

Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning **“to establish by law”**.

“Living wage” is a policy

**Raterman and Allen 5** writes[[85]](#footnote-85)

The **living wage is a policy through which wages are increased for certain workers in a city or county** in hopes of alleviating workers out of poverty. The number of cities and counties that have implemented living wage laws has increased since the first one began in Baltimore in 1994. Today there are 123 cities or counties that have living wage laws, with more than one hundred cities, counties, colleges, universities, and states considering such policies, including Eugene and Medford, Oregon.

Reasons to prefer:

1. Policy-oriented debate is key to reclaim the political and bridge the citizen-expert divide. **Kulynych 97** writes[[86]](#footnote-86)

When we look at the success of **citizen initiatives** from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those **moments of defiance** and disruption **that bring the invisible** and unimaginable **into view**. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the **policy debate** and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions **could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics**. The **existence of a goal-oriented debate** within a technically dominated arena **defied the** normalizing **separation between expert policymakers and** consuming **citizens. Citizens** momentarily **recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process**, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding.

2. Limits

**Only limited topics protect participants from research overload which materially affects our lives outside of round.**

**Harris 13**

Scott Harris (Director of Debate at U Kansas, 2006 National Debate Coach of the Year, Vice President of the American Forensic Association, 2nd speaker at the NDT in 1981). “This ballot.” 5 April 2013. CEDA Forums. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4762.0;attach=1655

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says **this community doesn’t care whether** its **participants have a life** or **do well in school or spend time with their families.** I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against Topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that **might make debate an unending nightmare** and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.

**Limits turn solvency. Research shows that research overload leads to superficial education, meaning we won’t learn about the aff or anything else.**

**Chokshi 10** Niraj Chokshi is a former staff editor at TheAtlantic.com, where he wrote about technology. He is currently freelancing How Do We Stop the Internet From Making Us Stupid? JUN 8 2010 <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/how-do-we-stop-the-internet-from-making-us-stupid/57796/> BK

When it comes to focus, turning on the spotlight may not matter as much as our ability to dim the ambient light. Nicholas Carr argued on Saturday in The Wall Street Journal that the Internet is making us dumber and on Monday The New York Times had a front-page feature on the mental price we pay for our multi-tasked lifestyles. If we are indeed losing our ability to think deeply, the key to fighting back may lie in a subtlety: focus may be more about our ability to filter out distractions than our ability to home in on the issue at hand. Carr posed his idea that technology is making us stupid in a 2008 Atlantic cover story and his forthcoming book "The Shallows" is a longer rumination on the theory. According to professors and research cited in The Times piece "the idea that information overload causes distraction was supported by more and more research." And those distractions, according to research Carr cites, are forcing us to change the way we think. Deep thought is losing ground to superficiality. So, if our multitasking lifestyle causes distraction, and distraction leads to superficial thinking, how do we fight back? Carr offers some advice:

3. Ground

**Not all topics offer fair and limited ground. Absent a topical fairness requirement, the aff will be biased by competitive incentive to find the most obscure and uncontroversial advocacy within the general vicinity of living wage literature. The only neutral topic debate is one chosen by a 3rd party topic committee.**

**Fairness is a voting issue. Debate is a competitive game, and rigging that game in your favor denies respect for the participants.**

**Galloway 7**

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally **denies the personhood of the other participant** (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).

4. Topical version of the aff. Lots of authors say that a living wage challenges capitalism, and Curry argues that it’s key to value re-orientation that benefits black people.

5. A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference with fairly and predictably divided ground in order to promote effective exchange – that’s key to inculcate decision making and advocacy skills

**Steinberg and Freeley 13** write[[87]](#footnote-87)

**Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy**, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest **before** there can be a **debate**. **If everyone is in agreement** **on a** feet or **value** or policy, **there is no need or opportunity for debate**; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. **Where there is no clash of** ideas, **proposals**, interests, or expressed positions of issues, **there is no debate.** Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. **Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question** or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely **you can** **think of many** more **concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area** of illegal immigration. Participation in **this “debate”** is likely to be emotional and intense. However, **it is not likely to be productive** or useful **without** focus on **a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides** in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies are best** understood when seated clearly **such that all parties** to the debate **share an understanding about the objec­tive** of the debate. **This enables** focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues **facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions**. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. **Of course**, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. **However, by definition, debate requires** "reasoned **judgment on a proposition**. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. **The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision** process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, **the proposition provides essential guidance** **for** the **preparation** of the debaters prior to the debate, **the** case building and **discourse presented** during the debate, **and the decision to be made** by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for** their **discussions, they could** easily **agree** about the sorry state of education **without finding points of clarity or potential solutions.** **A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed**—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then **a more profitable** area of **discussion is opened** up simply **by placing a focus on the search** for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. **To** have a productive debate, which **facilitate**s effective **decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined**. **If we merely talk about a topic,** such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” **we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not** to establish **a profitable** basis for **argument**. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable and flexible skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

**Steinberg and Freeley 13** write[[88]](#footnote-88)

**In** the spring of **2011**, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack **Obama considered** its **options in** providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in **Libya**. Public debate was robust as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, **the past decade has challenged American leaders to make** many difficult **decisions in response to** potentially **catastrophic problems**. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. **Individuals also faced** daunting **decisions. A** young **couple**, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, **considered walking away from their loan**; elsewhere **a** college **sophomore** **reconsidered his major** **and a senior her choice of** law school, graduate **school**, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. **Each of these** situations **called for decisions** to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. **We make countless** individual **decisions every day**. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. **Every profession requires effective** and ethical **decision making**, **as do our school, community, and social organizations**. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet **even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making**. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated. **The ability** of every decision maker **to make good**, reasoned, and ethical **deci­sions' relies** heavily up**on their ability** **to think critically**. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength, And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message under consider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. **Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs**, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 **Debate** as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving **uniquely** **promotes** development of each of **these skill sets.** Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary **research confirms** the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our **success or failure in life is** largely **determined by our ability to make** wise decisions for ourselves **and** to **influence the decisions of’ others** in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the thousands of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, **mature adults** **require** a **reasoned methods of decision making**. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

### Cap K

“Black occupation” of debate forecloses genuine class analysis which undermines our ability to challenge capitalism

**McLaren 4** writes[[89]](#footnote-89)

Another caveat. In making such a claim, we are not renouncing the concept of experience. On the contrary, we believe it is imperative to retain the category of lived experience as a reference point in light of misguided post-Marxist critiques which imply that all forms of Marxian class analysis are dismissive of subjectivity. We are not, however, advocating the uncritical **fetishization of** ‘experience’ that tends to assume that experience somehow guarantees the **authenticity** of knowledge and which often **treats experience as self-explanatory**, transparent, **and** solely **individual**. Rather, we advance a framework that seeks to make connections between seemingly isolated situations and/or particular experiences by exploring how they are constituted in, and circumscribed by, broader historical and social circumstances. Experiential understandings, in and of themselves, are suspect because, dialectically, they constitute a unity of opposites—they are at once unique, speciﬁc, and personal, but also thoroughly partial, social, and the products of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing (Gimenez, 2001). In this sense, a rich description of immediate experience in terms of consciousness of a particular form of oppression (racial or otherwise) can be an appropriate **and** indispensable point of departure. Such an understanding, however, **can** easily **become an isolated ‘difference’ prison** unless it transcends the immediate perceived point of oppression, confronts the social system in which it is rooted, and expands into a complex and multifaceted analysis (of forms of social mediation) that is capable of mapping out the general organization of social relations. That, however, requires a broad class-based approach.—¶ Having a concept of **class helps us** to **see** the network of social relations constituting an **overall social organization** **which** both implicates and **cuts through racialization**/ethnicization **and gender**… [a] radical political economy [class] perspective emphasizing exploitation, dispossession and survival takes the issues of … diversity [and difference] beyond questions of conscious identity such as culture and ideology, or of a paradigm of homogeneity and heterogeneity … or of ethical imperatives with respect to the ‘other’. (Bannerji, 2000, pp. 7, 19)¶ A radical political economy framework is crucial since various ‘culturalist’ perspectives seem to diminish the role of political economy and class forces in shaping the ediﬁce of ‘the social’—including the shifting constellations and meanings of ‘difference.’ Furthermore, none of the ‘differences’ valorized in culturalist narratives alone, and certainly not ‘race’ by itself can explain the massive transformation of the structure of capitalism in recent years. We agree with Meyerson (2000) that ‘race’ is not an adequate explanatory category on its own and that the use of **‘race’ as a descriptive or analytical category** has serious consequences for the way in which social life is presumed to be constituted and organized. The category of ‘race’—the conceptual framework that the oppressed often employ to interpret their experiences of inequality **‘often clouds the concrete reality of class, and blurs the** actual **structure of power** and privilege.’ In this regard, ‘race’ is all too often a ‘barrier to understanding the central role of class in shaping personal and collective outcomes within a capitalist society’ (Marable, 1995, pp. 8, 226). In many ways, the use of ‘race’ has become an analytical trap precisely when it has been employed in antiseptic isolation from the messy terrain of historical and material relations. **This**, of course, **does not imply that we ignore racism** and racial oppression; rather, an analytical shift from ‘race’ to a plural conceptualization of ‘racisms’ and their historical articulations is necessary (cf. McLaren & Torres, 1999). However, it is important to note that **‘race’ doesn’t explain racism** and forms of racial oppression. **Those relations are best understood within** the context of **class** rule, as Bannerji, Kovel, Marable and Meyerson imply—but **that compels us** to forge **a conceptual shift in theorizing, which entails** (among other things) **moving beyond** the ideology of ‘difference’ and ‘**race’ as the** dominant **prism**s **for understanding** exploitation and oppression. We are aware of some potential implications for white Marxist criticalists to unwittingly support racist practices in their criticisms of ‘race-ﬁrst’ positions articulated in the social sciences. In those instances, white criticalists wrongly go on ‘high alert’ in placing theorists of color under special surveillance for downplaying an analysis of capitalism and class. These activities on the part of white criticalists must be condemned, as must be efforts to stress class analysis primarily as a means of creating a white vanguard position in the struggle against capitalism. **Our position** is one that attempts to **link** practices of **racial oppression to the** **central, totalizing dynamics of capitalist society** in order **to resist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy more fully**.7¶ We have argued that it is virtually impossible to conceptualize class without attending to the forms and contents of difference, but we insist that this does not imply that class struggle is now outdated by the politics of difference. As Jameson (1998, p. 136) notes, we are now in the midst of returning to the ‘most fundamental form of class struggle’ in light of current global conditions. Today’s climate suggests that class struggle is ‘not yet a thing of the past’ and that those who seek to undermine its centrality are not only ‘morally callous’ and ‘seriously out of touch with reality’ but also largely blind to the ‘needs of the large mass of people who are barely surviving capital’s newly-honed mechanisms of globalized greed’ (Harvey, 1998, pp. 7–9). In our view, a more comprehensive and politically useful understanding of the contemporary historical juncture necessitates foregrounding class analysis and the primacy of the working class as the fundamental agent of change.8¶ This does not render as ‘secondary’ the concerns of those marginalized by race, ethnicity, etc. as is routinely charged by post-Marxists. **It is** often **assumed that foregrounding capitalist** social **relations** necessarily undermines the importance of attending to ‘difference’ and/or **trivializes** struggles against **racism**, etc., **in favor of** an **abstract**ly deﬁned **class**-based **politics** typically **identiﬁed as ‘white**.’ **Yet, such** formulations rest on a **bizarre but** generally **unspoken logic** that **assumes that racial** and ethnic ‘**minorities’ are only conjuncturally related to the working class. This** stance **is** patently **absurd** since the concept of the ‘working class’ is undoubtedly comprised of men and women of different races, ethnicities, etc. (Mitter, 1997). A good deal of post-Marxist **critique** is subtly racist (not to mention essentialist) insofar as it implies **that ‘people of color’ could not** possibly **be concerned with issues beyond** those related to their **‘racial’** or ‘ethnic’ ‘**difference.’** This **posits ‘people of color’ as single-minded**, one-dimensional **caricatures** and assumes that their working lives are less crucial to their self-understanding (and survival) than is the case with their ‘white male’ counterparts.9 It also ignores ‘the fact that class is an ineradicable dimension of everybody’s lives’ (Gimenez, 2001, p. 2) and that social oppression is much more than tangentially linked to class background and the exploitative relations of production. On this topic, Meyerson (2000) is worth quoting at length: ¶ Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One of course is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent—a primacy which does not render women and people of color ‘secondary.’ This view assumes that ‘working class’ means white—this division between a white working class and all the others, whose identity (along with a corresponding social theory to explain that identity) is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid … [T]he primacy of class means … that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement so that the primacy of class puts the ﬁght against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of **this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender, and class** oppression. **Oppression is** multiple and **intersecting but its causes are not**.¶ The cohesiveness of this position suggests that forms of exploitation and oppression are related internally to the extent that they are located in the same totality— one which is currently deﬁned by capitalist class rule. Capitalism is an overarching totality that is, unfortunately, becoming increasingly invisible in post-Marxist ‘discursive’ narratives that valorize ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct.

[Needs lining down]

Whiteness discourse culturalizes racist oppression and mystifies political economy---analytical slippage renders it a tool of neoliberal inclusion

**Reed 13** writes[[90]](#footnote-90)

Chang’s perspective may help us see more clearly how ascriptive ideologies function. It certainly is no surprise that dominant classes operate among themselves within a common sense that understands their dominance unproblematically, as decreed by the nature of things. At moments when their dominance faces challenges, those narratives may be articulated more assertively and for broader dissemination. This logic, for example, underlay the antebellum shift, in the face of mounting antislavery agitation, from pragmatic defenses of slavery as a necessary evil—a stance that presumed a ruling class speaking among itself alone—to **essentialist** **arguments**, putatively transcending class interests, namely, that slavery was a positive good. It also **may be seen in** the explosion of **racialist ideology** in its various forms, including eugenics, in justifying imperialist expansionism and **consolidating the defeat of** populism and **working-class insurgency** in the years overlapping the turn of the twentieth century. That same dynamic was at work displacing the language of class and political economy by culture and culturology in the postwar liberalism that consolidated the defeat of CIO radicalism. Later, racial **essentialism helped reify** the **struggles against southern segregation, racial discrimination,** inequality, **and poverty during the** 19**60s by separating discussions of injustice from capitalism’s logic** of reproduction. Poverty was reinvented as a cultural dilemma, and **“white racism” singled out as the root of racial inequality**. In this way, Chang’s perspective can be helpful in sorting out several important limitations in discussions of race and class characteristic of today’s left. It can also help to make sense of the striking **convergence between** the relative success of **identitarian understandings of social justice and the** steady, intensifying **advance of neoliberalism**. It **suggests a kinship** where many on the left assume an enmity. The rise of neoliberalism in particular suggests a serious problem with arguments that represent race and class as dichotomous or alternative frameworks of political critique and action, as well as those arguments that posit the dichotomy while attempting to reconcile its elements with formalistic gestures, for example, the common “race and class” construction. This sort of historical materialist perspective throws into relief a fundamental limitation of **the “whiteness” notion** that has been fashionable within the academic left for roughly two decades: it **reifies whiteness as a transhistorical social category**. In effect, **it treats “whiteness”—and** therefore “**race**”—**as existing prior to and above social context**.10 **Both who qualifies as white and the significance of being white have altered over time**. Moreover, **whiteness discourse functions as a** kind of **moralistic exposé rather than a basis for strategic politics**; this is clear in that the program signally articulated in its name has been simply to raise a demand to “abolish whiteness,” that is, to call on whites to renounce their racial privilege. In fact, its **fixation on** demonstrating the depth of whites’ embrace of what was known to an earlier generation’s version of this argument as “**white** skin **privilege**” and the inclination to slide into teleological accounts in which groups or individuals “approach” or “pursue” whiteness **erases the** real **historical dynamics and contradictions of American racial history**. The whiteness discourse overlaps other arguments that presume racism to be a sui generis form of injustice. Despite seeming provocative, these arguments do not go beyond the premises of the racial liberalism from which they commonly purport to dissent. They differ only in rhetorical flourish, not content. Formulations that invoke metaphors of disease or original sin reify racism by disconnecting it from the discrete historical circumstances and social structures in which it is embedded, and treating it as an autonomous force. **Disconnection from political economy is** also **a crucial feature of** postwar **liberalism’s construction of racial inequality as prejudice** or intolerance. **Racism becomes an independent variable in a moralistic argument that is idealist intellectually and** ultimately **defeatist politically.** **This tendency to see racism as sui generis** also generates a resistance to precision in analysis. It **is fueled by a tendency to** **inflate** the language of **racism to the edge of its reasonable conceptual limits**, if not beyond. Ideological commitment to shoehorning into the rubric of racism all manner of inequalities that may appear statistically as racial disparities has yielded two related interpretive pathologies. One is a constantly expanding panoply of neologisms—“institutional racism,” “systemic racism,” “structural racism,” “color-blind racism,” “post-racial racism,” etc.—intended to graft more complex social dynamics onto a simplistic and frequently psychologically inflected racism/anti-racism political ontology. Indeed, these efforts bring to mind [Thomas S.] Kuhn’s account of attempts to accommodate mounting anomalies to salvage an interpretive paradigm in danger of crumbling under a crisis of authority.11 A second essentialist sleight-of-hand advances claims for the primacy of race/racism as an explanation of inequalities in the present by invoking analogies to regimes of explicitly racial subordination in the past. In these arguments, analogy stands in for evidence and explanation of the contemporary centrality of racism. Michelle Alexander’s widely read and cited book, The New Jim Crow, is only the most prominent expression of this tendency; even she has to acknowledge that the analogy fails because the historical circumstances are so radically different.12 Rigorous pursuit of equality of opportunity exclusively within the terms of capitalist class relations has been fully legitimized under the rubric of “diversity.”

The alternative is to move beyond a politics of difference and prioritize socialist pedagogy

**McLaren 4** writes[[91]](#footnote-91)

For well over two decades we have witnessed the jubilant liberal and conservative pronouncements of the demise of socialism. Concomitantly, history's presumed failure to defang existing capitalist relations has been read by many self-identified ‘radicals’ as an advertisement for capitalism's inevitability. As a result, the chorus refrain ‘There Is No Alternative’, sung by liberals and conservatives, has been buttressed by the symphony of post-Marxist voices recommending that we give socialism a decent burial and move on. Within this context, to speak of the promise of Marx and socialism may appear anachronistic, even naïve, especially since the post-al intellectual vanguard has presumably demonstrated the folly of doing so. Yet we stubbornly believe that the chants of T.I.N.A. must be combated for they offer as a fait accompli, something which progressive **Leftists should refuse to accept**—namely **the triumph of capital**ism and its political bedfellow neo-liberalism, which have worked together to naturalize suffering, undermine collective struggle, and obliterate hope. We concur with Amin (1998), who claims that such chants must be defied and revealed as absurd and criminal, and who puts the challenge we face in no uncertain terms: **humanity may let itself be led by capitalism**'s logic **to** a fate of **collective suicide or** it may **pave the way for an alternative** humanist project **of global socialism.** The **grosteque conditions** that inspired Marx to pen his original critique **of capitalism are** present and **flourishing**. The inequalities of wealth and the gross imbalances of power that exist today are leading to abuses that exceed those encountered in Marx's day (Greider, 1998, p. 39). Global capitalism has paved the way for **the obscene concentration of wealth** in fewer and fewer hands and **created a world** increasingly **divided between** those who enjoy opulent **affluence and** those who languish in **dehumanizing conditions** and economic misery. In every corner of the globe, we are witnessing social disintegration as revealed by a rise in abject poverty and inequality. At the current historical juncture, the combined assets of the 225 richest people is roughly equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world's population, while the combined assets of the three richest people exceed the combined GDP of the 48 poorest nations (CCPA, 2002, p. 3). Approximately **2.8 billion** people—almost half of the world's population—struggle in desperation to **live on less than two dollars** a day (McQuaig, 2001, p. 27). As many as **250 million children are wage slaves** and there are over a billion workers who are either un- or under-employed. **These** are the concrete **realities** of our time—realities that **require** a vigorous class analysis, **an unrelenting critique of capitalism** and an oppositional politics capable of confronting what Ahmad (1998, p. 2) refers to as ‘capitalist universality.’ They are realities that require something more than that which is offered by the prophets of ‘difference’ and post-Marxists who would have us relegate socialism to the scrapheap of history and mummify Marxism along with Lenin's corpse. Never before has a Marxian analysis of capitalism and class rule been so desperately needed. That is not to say that everything Marx said or anticipated has come true, for that is clearly not the case. Many critiques of Marx focus on his strategy for moving toward socialism, and with ample justification; nonetheless **Marx did provide us with fundamental insights into class society that have held true** to this day. Marx's enduring relevance lies in his indictment of capitalism which continues to wreak havoc in the lives of most. While capitalism's cheerleaders have attempted to hide its sordid underbelly, Marx's description of capitalism as the sorcerer's dark power is even more apt in light of contemporary historical and economic conditions. Rather than jettisoning Marx, decentering the role of capitalism, and discrediting class analysis, radical educators must continue to engage Marx's oeuvre and extrapolate from it that which is useful pedagogically, theoretically, and, most importantly, politically in light of the challenges that confront us. The urgency which animates Amin's call for **a collective socialist vision necessitates**, as we have argued, **moving beyond** the **particularism** and liberal pluralism **that informs the ‘politics of difference**.**’** It also requires challenging the questionable assumptions that have come to constitute the core of contemporary ‘radical’ theory, pedagogy and politics. In terms of effecting change, what is needed is a cogent understanding of the systemic nature of exploitation and oppression based on the precepts of a radical political economy approach (outlined above) and one that incorporates Marx's notion of ‘unity in difference’ in which people share widely common material interests. Such an understanding extends far beyond the realm of theory, for the manner in which we choose to interpret and explore the social world, the concepts and frameworks we use to express our sociopolitical understandings, are more than just abstract categories. They imply intentions, organizational practices, and political agendas. Identifying class analysis as the basis for our understandings and class struggle as the basis for political transformation implies something quite different than constructing a sense of political agency around issues of race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Contrary to ‘Shakespeare's assertion that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,’ it should be clear that this is not the case in political matters. Rather, in politics ‘the essence of the flower lies in the name by which it is called’ (Bannerji, 2000, p. 41). The task for progressives today is to seize the moment and plant the seeds for a political agenda that is grounded in historical possibilities and informed by a vision committed to overcoming exploitative conditions. These seeds, we would argue, must be derived from the tree of radical political economy. **For** the vast majority of people today—**people of all** ‘racial classifications or **identities**, all genders and sexual orientations’—**the common frame of reference** arcing across ‘difference’, the ‘concerns and aspirations that are most widely shared **are** those that are **rooted in the** common experience of everyday life shaped and constrained by **political economy’** (Reed, 2000, p. xxvii). While post-Marxist advocates of the politics of ‘difference’ suggest that such a stance is outdated, we would argue that the categories which they have employed to analyze ‘the social’ are now losing their usefulness, particularly in light of actual contemporary ‘social movements.’ **All over the globe, there are large anti-capitalist movements** afoot. In February 2002, chants of ‘Another World Is Possible’ became the theme of protests in Porto Allegre. It seems that those people struggling in the streets haven’t read about T.I.N.A., the end of grand narratives of emancipation, or the decentering of capitalism. It seems as though the struggle for basic survival and some semblance of human dignity in the mean streets of the dystopian metropoles doesn’t permit much time or opportunity to read the heady proclamations emanating from seminar rooms. As E. P. Thompson (1978, p. 11) once remarked, sometimes ‘experience walks in without knocking at the door, and announces deaths, crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide.’ This, of course, does not mean that socialism will inevitably come about, yet a sense of its nascent promise animates current social movements. Indeed, noted historian Howard Zinn (2000, p. 20) recently pointed out that after years of single-issue organizing (i.e. the politics of difference), **the WTO** and other anti-corporate capitalist protests **signaled a turning point in the ‘history of movements** of recent decades,’ for it was the issue of ‘class’ that more than anything ‘bound everyone together.’ History, to paraphrase Thompson (1978, p. 25) doesn’t seem to be following Theory's script. Our vision is informed by Marx's historical materialism and his revolutionary socialist humanism, which must not be conflated with liberal humanism. For left politics and pedagogy, a socialist humanist vision remains crucial, whose fundamental features include the creative potential of people to challenge collectively the circumstances that they inherit. This variant of humanism seeks to give expression to the pain, sorrow and degradation of the oppressed, those who labor under the ominous and ghastly cloak of ‘globalized’ capital. It calls for the transformation of those conditions that have prevented the bulk of humankind from fulfilling its potential. It vests its hope for change in the development of critical consciousness and social agents who make history, although not always in conditions of their choosing. The political goal of socialist humanism is, however, ‘not a resting in difference’ but rather ‘the emancipation of difference at the level of human mutuality and reciprocity.’ This would be a step forward for the ‘discovery or creation of our real differences which can only in the end be explored in reciprocal ways’ (Eagleton, 1996, p. 120). Above all else, **the** enduring **relevance of a** radical **socialist pedagogy and politics is the centrality it accords to** the **interrogation of capital**ism. We can no longer afford to remain indifferent to the horror and savagery committed by capitalist's barbaric machinations. We need to recognize that capitalist democracy is unrescuably contradictory in its own self-constitution. Capitalism and democracy cannot be translated into one another without profound efforts at manufacturing empty idealism. **Committed Leftists must** **unrelentingly cultivate a democratic socialist vision** that refuses to forget the ‘wretched of the earth,’ the children of the damned and the victims of the culture of silence—a task which requires more than abstruse convolutions and striking ironic poses in the agnostic arena of signifying practices. Leftists must illuminate the little shops of horror that lurk beneath ‘globalization’s’ shiny façade; they must challenge the true ‘evils’ that are manifest in the tentacles of global capitalism's reach. And, more than this, **Leftists must search for the cracks in the edifice of** globalized **capital**ism **and shine light on** those **fissures that give birth to alternatives**. Socialism today, undoubtedly, runs against the grain of received wisdom, but its vision of a vastly improved and freer arrangement of social relations beckons on the horizon. Its unwritten text is nascent in the present even as it exists among the fragments of history and the shards of distant memories. Its potential remains untapped and its promise needs to be redeemed.

The alternative is the only way to ensure any criticism of capitalism is effective

**Hill 9** writes[[92]](#footnote-92)

In contrast to both Critical Race Theorists and revisionist socialists/left liberals/equivalence theorists, and those who see caste as the primary form of oppression, Marxists would agree that objectively- **whatever our “race”** or gender or sexuality or current level of academic attainment or religious identity, whatever the individual and group history and fear of oppression and attack- **the** fundamental **objective and material** form of **oppression** in capitalism **is class** oppression**. Black and Women capitalists, or Jewish and Arab capitalists**, or Dalit capitalists in India, **exploit** the **labour** power of their multi-ethnic men and women workers, essentially (in terms of the exploitation of labour power and the appropriation of surplus value) in just **the same way as** do **white male capitalists**, or upper-caste capitalists. But the subjective consciousness of identity, this subjective **affirmation of** one particular **identity**, while seared into the souls of its victims, **should not mask the objective nature of** contemporary oppression under **cap**italism – class oppression that, of course, hits some “raced” and gendered and caste and occupational sections of the working class harder than others. Martha Gimenez (2001:24) succinctly explains that “**class is not simply another ideology** legitimating oppression.” Rather, class denotes “exploitative relations between people **mediated by** their relations to the **means of production**.” Apple’s “parallellist,” or **equivalence** model of exploitation (equivalence of exploitation based on “race,” class and gender, his “tryptarchic” model of inequality) produces valuable data and **insights** into aspects of and the extent and manifestations of gender oppression and “race” oppression in capitalist USA. However, such analyses serve to **occlude the** class-capital **relation**, the class struggle, to obscure an essential and defining nature of capitalism, class conflict. Objectively, whatever our “race” or gender or caste or sexual orientation or scholastic attainment, whatever the individual and group history and fear of oppression and attack, the fundamental form of oppression in capitalism is class oppression. While the capitalist class is predominantly white and male, capital in theory and in practice can be blind to colour and gender and caste – even if that does not happen very often. African Marxist-Leninists such as Ngugi wa Thiong’o (e.g., Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Ngugi wa Mirii, 1985) know very well that **when** the **white colonialist oppressors were ejected** from direct rule over African states **in the 1950s** and 60s, the **white bourgeoisie in** some African **states such as Kenya was replaced by a black bourgeoisie, acting** in concert **with** transnational capital and/or capital(ists) of **the former** colonial **power.** Similarly **in India, capitalism is no longer exclusively white**. It is Indian, not white British alone. As Bellamy observes, the **diminution of class analysis “denies** immanent critique of any **critical bite,” effectively disarming** a meaningful **opposition to** the **cap**italist thesis (Bellamy, 1997:25). And as Harvey notes, neoliberal rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of justice through the conquest of state power. (Harvey, 2005:41) To return to the broader relationship between “race,” gender, and social class, and to turn to the USA, are there many who would deny that Condoleeza Rice and Colin Powell have more in common with the Bushes and the rest of the Unites States capitalist class, be it white, black or Latina/o, than they do with the workers whose individual ownership of wealth and power is an infinetismal fraction of those individual members of the ruling and capitalist class? The various oppressions, of caste, gender, “race,” religion, for example, are functional in dividing the working class and securing the reproduction of capital; constructing social conflict between men and women, or black and white, or different castes, or tribes, or religious groups, or skilled and unskilled, thereby tending to dissolve the conflict between capital and labor, thus occluding the class-capital relation, the class struggle, and to obscure the essential and defining nature of capitalism, the labor-capital relation and its attendant class conflict.

### Case

Debate’s not a leisure activity for the 1%. Plenty of people from public schools who aren’t the top earners participate.

**The aff is corporate feudalism**

**Marker 14**

Dennis Marker (Marker has worked for the US Congress and the EPA) “Teaching People to Hate Their Own Govt. Is at the Core of the Project to Destroy the Middle Class.” Alternet. 14 October 2014. http://www.alternet.org/tea-party-and-right/teaching-people-hate-their-own-govt-core-project-destroy-middle-class-0?paging=off

**Teaching the middle class to hate their government was** an **essential** part of the plan **to** implement **Corporate Feudalism.** A middle class cannot exist without a strong government. This is because only a government has the power to stand up to the giant corporations of today’s world, or the powerful individuals and private armies of earlier times. It is the government that enforces the laws to protect the middle class from those who would like to become their economic rulers. That is why prior to the Industrial Revolution and the creation of the middle class all economies were run according to some version of the feudal system. If you want to put an end to the middle class and replace it with a feudal republic, **you would need to change people’s perception of their government.** Obviously a government does not have to be on the side of its people, as can be seen by the existence of countless dictatorships and oligarchies throughout the world. Even the corporatocracy that currently exists in the United States falls far short of being on the side of its middle class. But US history shows that a government committed to serving its citizens can, in fact, help create and maintain a healthy middle class even in the face of powerful corporations whose only interest is maximizing their own power and profits. It is like the story in old westerns of a big bad landowner who takes what he wants when he wants it, ruthlessly terrorizing a town without a strong sheriff. Any individual who tries to stop the landowner is beaten into submission or killed. The situation continues until the town finds a strong enough sheriff to regain control over the landowner and his gang. **This is the Old West version of the feudal system.** In westerns, the feudal lord comes first and the sheriff comes later. But in the United States of thirty years ago, the government was the strong sheriff keeping the late-twentieth-century feudal lords from taking what they wanted. As long as the government was supported by its citizens—particularly its middle class—no one could ride into town and steal what belonged to the people. But if the government were weakened or destroyed, a different situation would arise. The intent of the plan for Corporate Feudalism was to convince the middle class to fire their sheriff. And that’s just what happened.

**Monolith DA – their static framing of the state undermines social change and justifies exclusion; turns the aff**

**Schwedler et. al 11**

[Jillian Schwedler teaches political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst Josh Stacher is an assistant professor of political science at Kent State University Stacey Philbrick Yadav is the coordinator of the Middle Eastern Studies program and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges Jadaliyya June 10 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1826/three-powerfully-wrong\_and-wrongly-powerful\_americ]

We can expect that Islamists are likely to point out the inconsistencies in our policies, most acutely (but not exclusively) with regard to Israel. It is, of course, perfectly reasonable to question the casual way in which US and Israeli interests have for so long been conflated. Governments accountable to emboldened electorates—regardless of the role played by Islamists—are likely to push that conversation along. But the justification of US policy inconsistencies rests on a more foundational myth about the very nature of interests as enduring and self-evident. The truth? ? There are no US interests. It is impossible to speak of interests in the absence of collective identities. One can describe the interests of a group, or identify one’s interest as a member of a collective, but the idea that individuals (let alone states) have interests that exist outside of these categories of belonging just doesn’t hold up. Speaking of “US interests” masks this fact with what sounds like a commonsensical idea: we have to look after our interests first. But in whose interest—precisely—does the government of the United States pursue a given policy? The “average” citizen (as if there is such a thing)? Congressional lobbyists? The contractors who directly profit from our relations with foreign regimes? Rather than viewing this as a polemical bête noir, this is a question that we should be asking regularly, as part of the practice of engaged citizenship. If we view the United States as a democracy, then we ought to see the origin of US policy as the collective will of the demos that US institutions reflect, and we can work to change that collective will or at least represent it more accurately. If, by contrast, we view the United States as a plutocracy, we might find the answer in a particular constellation of specific industries, stakeholders, etc., and pursue a strategy of lobbying, targeted boycott, etc. Either approach requires that we ask how interests come to be articulated by people who see themselves as sharing something essential in common. When people accept the argument that inconsistencies in US policies regarding the Arab uprisings are an unavoidable consequence of “our vital national interests,” they are ceding serious ground. They are suggesting that we understand ourselves to be bound first and foremost along the dimension of national identity, and that we share an understanding of what precisely our interests are. They are also flattening what might be a robust understanding of ourselves and our interests into a nationalistic and/or plutocratic materialism. None of these assumptions match reality. What this narrative forecloses is the possibility of alternative ways of imagining ourselves as bound to others (whether along dimensions of class or gender solidarity, or a cosmopolitan commitment to global citizenship). In short, when we are cajoled into accepting a policy that supports Libyan rebels and renegotiates debt in Egypt but leaves Bahrainis to the wolves and shrugs its shoulders at that incomprehensible Yemen, it is because we have tacitly accepted a narrow definition of “ourselves” – as Americans principally interested in the projection of US power and the cultivation of regimes that we can influence, irrespective of how they are constituted. Each of us – individually, through myriad institutional and communicative channels – can help to rework the forms of solidarity that will enable a more (consistently) progressive policy toward the popular uprisings in the Middle East. After all, we may not all be Khalid Sa’id or Manal al-Sharif, but we can do more to show our support for what they have come to represent.

**Empirics prove engaging the state is the most productive mode of activism**

**Themba-Nixon 2K**

Makani Themba-Nixon, 7-31-2000, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, a nonprofit organization helping communities use media and policy advocacy, Colorlines, Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing, Vol 3.2

“This is all about policy," a woman complained to me in a recent conversation. "I'm an organizer." The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, **if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies?** Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - **Over 600 local policies have been passed** to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. **History has taught us that, for** social services and **civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards** and mechanisms for accountability **lead to** uneven enforcement and even **discriminatory implementation of policies**. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our box.

**Racial progress has occurred though legal change --- pessimism ignores specific reforms that achieved lasting reductions in racial inequality**

-- desegregation of the armed forces, the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, repeal of anti-miscegenation laws

-- spills over to legal access for feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements

-- antiblackness is political, not ontological; incarceration is used as a tool to suppress voting rights, women of color are policed via reproductive rights laws

**Omi and Winant 13**

Michael Omi (Sociologist at UC Berkeley, focusing on antiracism scholarship and Asian American studies) and Howard Winant (Professor of Sociology affiliated with the Black Studies and Chicana/o Studies departments of UC Santa Barbara), Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory. 2013.

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways **the most important accomplishment** of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and **validation by both the state and civil society** of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave **feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements** among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today. What are the political implications of contemporary racial trends? Feagin and Elias's use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone; anyone writing about race and racism needs to frame terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to ‘racial lumping’ and essentialisms of various kinds. This imprecision is heightened in polemic. In the Feagin and Elias essay the term ‘whites’ at times refers to all whites, white elites, ‘dominant white actors’ and very exceptionally, anti-racist whites, a category in which we presume they would place themselves. Although the terms ‘black’, ‘African American’ and ‘Latino’ appear, the term ‘people of colour’ is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black reference points. In the USA today it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become more ‘coloured’. A ‘majority–minority’ national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state's population. While the decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias's essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of race and racism in new ways that the ‘systemic racism’ approach is not prepared to explain.3 Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites, while others are subject to what we might call ‘engineered poverty’ in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined groups (‘black/brown’ conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the ‘new white ethnics’, able to ‘work toward whiteness’4 at least in part, and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007). We question that argument in light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism on a global scale, all drive migration. The country's economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when the ‘whitening’ of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument's key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants ‘of a different color’ (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case study – one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and Elias's systemic racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues. It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has important consequences, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the degree of power available to different racial actors to define, shape or contest the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and Elias's account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant ‘white racial frame’, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially subordinate groups interact and influence each others’ boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups – as well as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) – play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely. We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Elias's critique of the reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The ‘new Jim Crow’ (Alexander 2012) or even the ‘new slavery’ that the present system practises is something that was just in its beginning stages when we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global scandal. How is it to be understood? Of course there are substantial debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But beyond Feagin and Elias's denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here, deeper political implications are worth considering. As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker Center argue, the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates for black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-and-order appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the ‘Southern strategy’. Perhaps even more central, racial repression aims at restricting the increasing impact of voters of colour in a demographically shifting electorate. There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second, for all the horrors and injustices that the ‘new Jim Crow’ represents, incarceration, profiling and similar practices remain political issues. These practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, **resistance is not futile**. Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should President Barack Obama be politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite amazingly, his name does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an ‘oreo’, a shill for Wall Street? Or does Obama represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer demographic reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white people's party, the Republicans? If the President is neither the white man's token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again we are in the world of politics: neither the near-total white despotism depicted by Feagin and Elias, nor a racially inclusive democracy. President Obama continues to enjoy widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in history. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely symbolic. Workers and lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the subprime home mortgage crisis, with black families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers have explained Obama's centrism and unwillingness to raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue 2010). The black community – and other communities of colour as well – remains politically divided. While black folk have taken the hardest blows from the reactionary and racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if not since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always important political activity underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a ‘black bourgeoisie’ in Frazier's (1957) terms, has generally maintained its position since the end of the civil rights era. Largely based in the public sector, and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that Frazier – and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars – identified: vacillation between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in Latino communities as well, where the ‘working towards whiteness’ framework coexists with a substantial amount of exclusion and super-exploitation. Alongside class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of blue-collar work, combined with the assault by the criminal justice system – chiefly profiling by the police (‘stop and frisk’) and imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men, especially youth. Women of colour are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009). Here again we are in the realm of racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black community on Obama's credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe to say that in North Philly, Inglewood or Atlanta's Lakewood section, the president remains highly popular. Latino support for Obama remains high as well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities or has it been captured by the white racial frame? Is Obama's election of no importance? \*\*\* In conclusion, do Feagin and Elias really believe that white power is so complete, so extensive, so ‘sutured’ (as Laclau and Mouffe might say) as they suggest here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that ‘resistance is futile?’ This seems to be the underlying political logic of the ‘systemic racism’ approach, perhaps unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the always- absurd colour categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that matter? We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that racial conflict, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing **political realities of race provide extensive evidence** that **people of colour** in the USA **are not** so **powerless**, and that whites are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism – largely white – continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes, there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.

# Greenhill

## Cards for Quare Aff

### \*\*\*Reformism DA

### Link (General)

#### Academic Criticism Is Too Insular; They Trade Off With Actual Political Action

O'Callaghan, 2002:

( Lecturer in IR, 02 (Terry , lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia, International Relations and the third debate, ed: Jarvis, 2002, p. 80-81)

There are also a host of technological and logistical questions that plague George's scheme and make problematic his recommendations. For example, through what medium are those on the fringes of the international system going to speak to the world? Although it may be true that the third world has now been integrated into the global polity via the advent of technological innovations in communications, allowing for remote access to information sources and the Internet, it also remains true that the majority of those on the fringes continue to be disenfranchised from such mediums, whether as a result of a lack of economic resources, the prevalence of illiteracy, or social, cultural and political circumstances that systemically exclude, women (among others) from economic resources and certain political and social freedoms. Need we remind George that social, political, and individual autonomy is at a minimum in these parts of the world, and an intellectual approach as controversial as postmodernism is not likely to achieve the sorts of goals that George optimistically foreshadows. Indeed, on practical questions such as these, matters otherwise central to the success of postmodern visions, George prefers to be vague, suggesting instead that the intricacies of such details will somehow work themselves out in a manner satisfactory to all. Such a position reveals George's latent idealism and underscores how George's schema is an intellectual one: a theory of international politics written for other theorists of international politics. George's audience is thus a very limited and elite audience and begs the question of whether a senior, middle-class scholar in the intellectual heartland of Australia can do anything of real substance to aid the truly marginalized and oppressed. How is it possible to put oneself in the shoes of the "other," to advocate on his or her behalf, when such is done from a position of affluence, unrelated to and far removed from the experiences of those whom George otherwise champions? Ideals are all good and well, but it is hard to imagine that the computer keyboard is mightier than the sword, and hard to see how a small, elite, affluent assortment of intellectuals is going to generate the type of political momentum necessary to allow those on the fringes to speak and be heard! 1 . Moreover, why should we assume that states and individuals want to listen and will listen to what the marginalized and the oppressed have to say? There is precious little evidence to suggest that "listening" is something the advanced capitalist countries do very well at all. Indeed, one of the allegations so forcefully alleged by Muslim fundamentalists as justification for the terrorist attacks of September I I is precisely that the West, and America in particular, are deaf to the disenfranchised and impoverished in the world. Certainly, there are agencies and individuals who are sensitive to the needs of the "marginalized" and who champion institutional forums where indigenous voices can be heard. But on even the most optimistic reckoning, such forums and institutions represent the exception, not the rule, and remain in the minority if not dwarfed by those institutions that represent Western, first world interests. To be sure, this is a realist power-political image of the current configuration of the global polity, but one apparently, and ironically, endorsed by George if only because it speaks to the realities of the marginalized, the imposed silences, and the multitude of oppressions on which George founds his call for a postmodern ethic. Recognizing such realities, however, does not explain George's penchant for ignoring them entirely, especially in terms of the structural rigidities they pose for meaningful reform. Indeed, George's desire to move to a new "space beyond International Relations" smacks of wishful idealism, ignoring the current configuration of global political relations and power distribution; of the incessant ideological power of hyperindividualism, consumerism, advertising, Hollywood images, and fashion icons; and of the innate power bestowed on the (institutional) barons of global finance, trade, and transnational production. George seems to have little appreciation of the structural impediments such institutions pose for radical change of the type he so fiercely advocates. Revolutionary change of the kind desired by George ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work lives. And institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted, consumer tastes altered, and political sensibilities reformed. Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. The cycle of wealth creation and distribution that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana. More generally, of course, what George fails to consider is the problem of apathy and of how we get people to care about the plight of others. What do we with the CEOs of multinational corporations, stockbrokers, accountants, ctory workers, and the unemployed, who, by and large, fail to consider the omeless and destitute in their own countries, let alone in places they have never isited and are never likely to visit? Moral indignation rarely translates into action, and apathy about the plight of others is a structural impediment as strong any idea, theory, or writing. What George's treatise thus fails to consider is how we overcome this, and how we get others to listen. He needs to explain how the social, political, psychological, and moral structures that define the parameters of existence for the many millions of ordinary citizens in the first world, and that deflects attention from the marginalized and the oppressed can be broken down. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that George has thought much about this, suggesting that his commitment to postmodern theory is not likely to make much difference. In fact, in the academy the postmodern light is already beginning to dim in certain quarters, having registered scarcely a glimmer in the broader polity, where, if change was to ensue, it needed to burn brightly. Even among those versed in the nomenclature of scholarly debate, theorists of international politics remain skeptical of the value of postmodern discourse, by and large rejecting it. This does not portend well for postmodern visionaries and the future of postmodern discourse. But can George really be surprised by this? After all, his discourse indicts the "backward discipline" for complicity in crimes against humanity, calling for a repudiation of realism and with it a repudiation of the lifelong beliefs and writings of eminent theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen Krasner who have otherwise defined the parameters of the discipline, its projects, and research agendas. Can George really expect discipline-wide capitulation to an intellectual diaspora that would see theorists repudiate their beliefs and works in order to take up the creed of postmodernism, as vague, open-ended, and indeterminate as it is? Without a clear and credible plan of how to get from "incarceration and closure" to intellectual freedom, creativity, and openness, George's postmodern musings have understandably attracted few disciples.

### Link (Queer Theory)

#### Queer Theory’s Focus On Deconstruction Incorrectly Locates The Individual As The Site Of Resistance; Trades Off With Institutional Action

Gamson, 1995:

(Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma. Social Problems, Vol. 42, No. 3, August 1995, pp. 390-407. Joshua Gamson, Chair of the Department of Sociology AT The University of San Francisco. NOTE: WE DO NOT ENDORSE THE ABLEIST LANGUAGE IN THIS EVIDENCE.)

Yet queer theory and politics tend to run past a critique of the particular, concrete forces that make sexual identity, in stabilized and binary form, a basis for discipline, regulation, pleasure, and political empowerment. In the hurry to deconstruct identity, they tend to "slide into viewing identity itself as the fulcrum of domination and its subversion as the center of an anti-identity politic" (Seidman 1993:132); the politic becomes overwhelmingly cultural, textual, and subjectless. Deconstructive strategies remain quite deaf and blind to the very concrete and violent institutional forms to which the most logical answer is resistance in and through a particular collective identity. The overarching strategy of cultural deconstruction, the attack on the idea of the normal, does little to touch the institutions that make embracing normality (or building a collective around inverted abnormality) both sensible and dangerous. Mall kiss-ins by San Francisco's Suburban Homosexual Outreach Program (SHOP) and other actions that "mime the privi- leges of normality" (Berlant and Freeman 1993:196), "Queer Bart" (Simpson, the popular cartoon character) T-shirts and other actions that "reveal to the consumer desires he/she didn't know he/she had, to make his/her identification with the product 'homosexuality' both an unsettling and a pleasurable experience" (Berlant and Freeman 1993:208), do very little to take on the more directly political: regulatory institutions such as law and medicine, for example, that continue to create and enforce gay/straight and male/female divisions, often with great physical and psychic violence. They do not do justice to the degree to which closing group boundaries is both a necessary and fulfilling survival strategy.

#### Queer Theory; It Emulates Late Capitalism And Trades Off With Collective Action

Kirsch, 2006:

(Max, PhD Florida Atlantic University, “Queer Theory, Late Capitalism and Internalized Homophobia,” Journal of Homosexuality, Harrington Park Press, Vol. 52, No. ½, 2006, pp. 19-45)

**This mirroring of late capitalism in queer theory has unforeseen consequences for the individual in society and has hindered its practioners from engaging important ways of envisioning collective action. Queer theory promotes the “self” of the individual as an alternative to wider social interaction, disassembling the social ties that bind**. Recognizing that **oppression and violence, symbolic and physical, are part of the daily reality for those of us who do not correspond to dominant standards is compromised by queer theory’s rejection of the category of identity, and indeed, categories as a whole. The stance that it is limiting to pose categories of behavior and belief, even if those constructs are fluid and changing, puts the individual subject in the position of internalizing thoughts and feelings without the benefit of peer feedback. Too, this aspect of marginality can itself become an identity: if one recognizes and embraces the fact that one is marginalized, there is no need to seek support or to engage social action. It declares that the only way to prevent being overwhelmed by power is to “disclaim**” (Butler, 1993, p. 308). **But to simply disclaim creates isolation, and, as I will maintain, reinforces internalized homophobia**.

### Impact (Heteronormativity)

#### Engaging The Law Is Key To Queer Politics

Duggan, 1994:

(Queering the State, Lisa Duggan, associate professor of American studies and history at New York University, Social Text, No. 39 (Summer, 1994), pp. 1-14, http://www.jstor.org/stable/466361

When we turn our attention to this project, we run into difficulty the moment we step outside our classrooms, books, journals, and conferences. How do we represent our political concerns in public discourse? In trying to do this, in trying to hold the ground of the fundamental criticism of the very language of current public discourse that queer theory has enabled, in trying to translate our constructionist languages into terms that have the power to transform political practices, we are faced with several difficulties. First, the discussion of the construction of categories of sexual identity resists translation into terms that are culturally legible and thus usable in consequential public debates. To illustrate this difficulty, let's imagine that you are asked to appear on the Oprah Winfrey show to talk about public school curriculums. Guest A says material on gays will influence children to think gay is okay and thus to become disgusting perverts themselves. Guest B, from Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, says that this will not happen because sexual identity is fixed by the age of three, if not in utero. You are Guest C-what do you say? That "the production of queer sexualities is historically and culturally conditioned," that if gay materials in class are conducive to the production of queer sexualities, you are squarely in favor of their use? The difficulties here on the level of legibility and on the level of political palatability are readily apparent. Second, the use of constructionist language to discuss homosexuality tends to leave heterosexuality in its naturalized place-it can be taken up by homophobes to feed the fantasy of a world without homosexual bodies and desires. "If history can make them, history can also UNmake them" seems to be the logic here. At a conference in Toronto a decade ago, Dorothy Allison and Esther Newton suggested responding to this danger in constructionist arguments by producing buttons demanding "Deconstruct Heterosexuality First." Of course, we can respond as the button suggests and work to denaturalize heterosexuality (which queer studies is, in fact, doing), but this is unlikely to be received in current public debates without guffaws and disbelief. The usual response to these difficulties is to resort to what is called "strategic essentialism": the use of essentialist categories and identity politics in public debates because that is all anyone can understand, and we need to be effective in the political arena. I take the concerns that lead to the embrace of strategic essentialism seriously, but I think that it is ultimately an unproductive solution.8 It allows sexual difference and queer desires to continue to be localized in homosexualized bodies. It consigns us, in the public imagination, to the realms of the particular and the parochial, the defense team for a fixed minority, that most "special" of special interest groups-again, letting everyone else off the hook. I would argue that we need to find a way to close the language gap in queer studies and queer politics. We need to do this especially with reference to the operations of the state. Though queer politics is presently claiming public and cultural space in imaginative new ways (kiss-ins, for example), the politics of the state are generally being left to lesbian and gay civil rights strategies. These strategies are greatly embattled at present, and there are still many gains to be made through their deployment. But they are increasingly ineffective in the face of new homophobic initiatives; they appear unable to generate new rhetorics and tactics against attacks designed specifically to disable identity-based antidiscrimination policies.9 We cannot afford to fall back on strategic essentialism (it will not get us out of the trouble we are now in), and we cannot afford to abandon the field. We do have some precedents. Scholars and activists working on the issues surrounding the AIDS crisis have managed to transport the work of theory into the arena of politics and public policy with astonishing speed and commitment.10 In the arts the films of Isaac Julien and the Sankofa collective and those of Marlon Riggs (Tongues Untied and Color Adjustment, both shown on public television) have brought into public discourse very complex ideas about the construction of racial and sexual identities and their intersections.

#### Assimilation Arg Are Wrongs, Especially For Queer Politics. Struggles For For Legal Reform Radically Challenge The Concept Of liberalism And Civil Society For Everyone

Brenkman, 2002:

John, Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the CUNY and Baruch College, Narrative, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 188-189

Innovation is a crucial concept for understanding the gay and lesbian movement, which emerged from within civil society as citizens who were stigmatized and often criminalized for their sexual lives created new forms of association, transformed their own lifeworld, and organized a political offensive on behalf of political and social reforms. There was an innovation of rights and freedoms, and what I have called innovations in sociality. Contrary to the liberal interpretation of liberal rights and freedoms, I do not think that gays and lesbians have merely sought their place at the table. Their struggle has radically altered the scope and meaning of the liberal rights and freedoms they sought, first and foremost by making them include sexuality, sexual practices, and the shape of household and family. Where the movement has succeeded in changing the laws of the state, it has also opened up new possibilities within civil society. To take an obvious example, wherever it becomes unlawful to deny housing to individuals because they are gay, there is set in motion a transformation of the everyday life of neighborhoods, including the lives of heterosexuals and their children. [End Page 188] Within civil society, this is a work of enlightenment, however uneven and fraught and frequently dangerous. It is not a reaffirmation of the symbolic and structural underpinnings of homophobia; on the contrary, it is a challenge to homophobia and a volatilizing of social relations within the nonpolitical realm.

#### Learning The Language Of Elites Is Key To Queer Politics

Duggan, 1994:

(Queering the State, Lisa Duggan, associate professor of American studies and history at New York University, Social Text, No. 39 (Summer, 1994), pp. 1-14, http://www.jstor.org/stable/466361

But the challenge is not only organizational and financial. The rightwing antigay zealots have mobilized new strategies and new rhetorics that challenge the customary practices, arguments, and slogans of liberal gay rights organizations. Successful opposition to the onslaught on the local, state, and national levels will **require more** than gearing up another round of the same kind of struggle. The opposition has changed its colors, and so must we. The crisis specifically challenges those of us who teach and write about queer issues. We have already been faced with the rhetoric of crisis in higher education, mobilized by conservatives-a rhetoric that targets teaching and scholarship in the areas of class, race, gender, and sexuality as "politically correct" and as an effort to split, fragment, and destroy the idea of a common culture transmitted through education. In right-wing attacks on the state of higher education, lesbian and gay teachers and writers are often singled out as scholars of the particularly frivolous and absurd, though we are also often represented as uniquely powerful, able to overwhelm and destroy the very conception of a common culture. These attacks are now paralleled by similar ones launched in the arena of national politics. Lesbian and gay efforts to secure civil rights protections have quickly become central in public debates of various kinds since the election of Bill Clinton. In conservative attacks on the new administration, queers are represented as ridiculous, with trivial political concerns, but also as a frightfully controlling presence in national politics. Shrill cries of the dominance of the Gay Lobby have been mobilized with lightning speed, especially in response to the debates surrounding the military. Local and state initiatives to roll back or prevent antidiscrimination measures pick up and elaborate these themes, as they also try out new strategies and rhetorics. Even in friendly internal critiques of the state of progressive politics critiques in which the problem of fragmentation is addressed-gay and lesbian politics are sometimes invoked to represent the narrowing of focus (what could be narrower?) and the neglect of the common interest. In a field of progressive alliances often pejoratively described as a conglomeration of "special interest groups," lesbian and gay organizations seem to represent the most "special" interests of all. In this way we appear, on both the right and the left, as signifiers of the "crisis" of liberal politics itself.4 The problem for those of us engaged in queer scholarship and teaching, who have a stake in queer politics, is how to respond to these attacks at a moment when we have unprecedented opportunities (we are present in university curriculums and national politics as never before), yet confront perilous and paralyzing assaults. It is imperative that we respond to these attacks in the **public arena** from which they are launched. We cannot defend our teaching and scholarship without engaging in public debate and addressing the nature and **operations of the state** upon which our jobs and futures depend. In other words, the need to **turn our attention to state** politics is not only theoretical (though it is also that). It is time for queer intellectuals to concentrate on the creative production of strategies at the boundary of queer and nation-strategies specifically for queering the state.5

### AT Queer Nation

#### Queer Nation Alienates Lower-Class/African-American Queers And Is Incapable Of Challenging The Intersectional Oppression At The Heart Of Heteronormativity

Watson, 2009:

(Being Inappropriate: Queer Activism In Context. 2009. Amy Watson, Masters of Arts in Gender Studies From Central European University)

Queer Nation has come, it seems, to represent the paradigmatic site of queer activism for many people. As the most vocal and visible organization of activists affiliated under the banner of queer, it is no surprise that they have received canonical status. Yet, Queer Nation’s use of consumerist spaces and commodities to engage in a de-heterosexualization of public space and icons has prompted critical engagement from some academic theorists such as Cathy Cohen and Rosemary Hennessy. Before I go into their engagements, I will first outline specific Queer Nation’s actions which will be used for analysis. Berlant and Freeman describe two groups under the banner of Queer Nation: the Queer Shopping Network in New York and the Suburban Homosexual Outreach Program (SHOP) in San Francisco (1993: 210). Their goal was to make the queer subject visible in public space. These groups infiltrated shopping malls in urban and suburban cities dressed in highly camp inflected outfits, enacting spectacular “miniature parades” by chanting “’We’re Here. “We’re Queer, We’re Not Going Shopping” or “We’re Here. We’re Queer. You’re Going Shopping” in order to “disrupt the antiseptic asexual surface of the malls” (ibid: 211). By invading the mall SHOP and Queer Shopping Network aimed to insert an overtly queer visibility in what Berlant and Freeman call “asexual” space; asexual to the extent that its heterosexuality is not contested. Queer Nation also sought to question the implicit heterosexuality of American national icons by producing T-shirts with “Queer Bart” or replacing the ‘p’ in the name brand ‘GAP’ with a ‘y’. While Cathy Cohen states that such tactics were able to disrupt the implicit normality of heterosexual, family-oriented space, her discontent with the practices of Queer Shopping Network and SHOP lies in her consideration of “poor and working class queers” who experience the space of the suburban mall through the lens of different intersecting power structures other than just sexuality minority status (1997: 211). She states that these queers experience “exclusion and alienation” not only limited to the normative sexual codes associated with the mall” but also to “the assumed economic status quo of those shopping in suburban malls” (ibid). Furthermore, a “queer of color” might also experience the mall differently due to “racial norms and stereotypes that construct you as a threatening subject every time you enter this economic institution” (ibid). As such, the actions of Queer Shopping Network and SHOP by white queer activists failed to take into account that overlapping axes of power are imbued with racial, class-inflected and sexual identities all at the same time. This echoes Cohen’s overall critical engagement with queer politics as being too invested in what she calls the “single oppression model”. This follows that because heteronormativity is also informed by institutional racism, patriarchy, and class exploitation, identities can not be reduced to one feature.

#### Queer Nation Creates A Monolithic Straight And Queer Identity, Leading To Hatred Of Heterosexual Individuals While Ignoring The Intersectional Power Structures At The Heart Of Heteronormativity

Cohen, 1997:

(Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics. GLQ, Vol. 3, pp. 437—465. Cathy J. Cohen, Professor of Political Science At The University of Chicago.)

This reconstruction of a binary divide between heterosexuals and queers, while discernible in many of the actions of Queer Nation, is probably most evident in the manifesto “I Hate Straights.” Distributed at gay pride parades in New York and Chicago in 1990, the declaration written by an anonymous group of queers begins, I have friends. Some of them are straight. Year after year, I see my straight friends. I want to see how they are doing, to add newness to our long and complicated histories, to experi­ence some continuity. Year after year I continue to realize that the facts of my life are irrele­vant to them and that I am only half listened to, that I am an appendage to the doings of a greater world, a world of power and privilege, of the laws of installation, a world of exclusion. ‘That’s not true,’ argue my straight friends. There is the one certainty in the politics of power: those left out of it beg for inclusion, while the insiders claim that they already are. Men do it to women, whites do it to blacks, and everyone does it to queers. . . . The main dividing line, both conscious and unconscious, is pro­creation . . . and that magic word—Family, (emphasis added) Screaming out from this manifesto is an analysis which places not hetero­normativity, but heterosexuality, as the central “dividing line” between those who would be dominant and those who are oppressed. Nowhere in this essay is there recognition that “nonnormative” procreation patterns and family structures of people who are labeled heterosexual have also been used to regulate and exclude them. Instead, the authors declare, “Go tell them [straights] to go away until they have spent a month walking hand in hand in public with someone of the same sex. After they survive that, then you’ll hear what they have to say about queer anger. Otherwise, tell them to shut up and listen.” For these activists, the power of heterosexuality is the focus, and queer anger the means of queer politics. Missing from this equation is any attention to, or acknowledgment of, the ways in which identities of race, class, and/or gender either enhance or mute the marginalization of queers, on the one hand, and the power of heterosexuals, on the other. The fact that this essay is written about and out of queer anger is undoubt­edly part of the rationale for its defense (Berlant and Freeman 200). But I question the degree to which we should read this piece as just an aberrational diatribe against straights motivated by intense queer anger. While anger is clearly a motivating factor for such writing, we should also understand this action to represent an analysis and politics structured around the simple dichotomy of straight and queer. We know, for instance, that similar positions have been put forth in other anonymously published, publicly distributed manifestos. For example, in the document Queers Read This, the authors write, “Don’t be fooled, straight people own the world and the only reason you have been spared is you’re smart, lucky or a fighter. Straight people have a privilege that allows them to do whatever they please and fuck without fear.” They continue by stating that “Straight people are your enemy.”

#### Queer Nation Recreates Monolithic Heteronormative Identities While Serving As A Front For Hating Heterosexuals

Watson, 2009:

(Being Inappropriate: Queer Activism In Context. 2009. Amy Watson, Masters of Arts in Gender Studies From Central European University)

Furthermore, Cohen questions the effectiveness of queer politics, because although emphasis is placed on destabilization or deconstruction of sexual categories, queer politics still seems to gain its impetus by defining who is queer and who is heterosexual (1997: 203). In this sense, heterosexuals are being targeted and not heteronormativity. This can be seen with the “I Hate Straights” manifesto that was circulated by Queer Nation. This came from an anonymously written essay, which was widely circulated to the “gay population”, deriding procreating heterosexuals because queers were being denied the “privilege” to family life, especially from the “public fantasy” of visible family life (Berlant and Freeman 1993: 200). While this slogan came out of what Berlant and Freeman have called queer “rage” from being consistently marginalized and rendered invisible by heterosexual privilege (ibid). Cohen points out that “I Hate Straights” is a “reconstruction of a binary divide between heterosexuals and queers” as heterosexuals are targeted and not heteronormativity (1997: 209 – 210). While “I Hate Straights” contests the privilege of the heterosexual family, the rage expressed at not being able to visibly take part in this institution, ultimate calls for inclusion into it. Furthermore, it assumes a coherent heterosexual identity, one which apparently does not engage in “’nonnormative’ procreation patterns and family structures” (ibid:210).

#### Queer Nation Constructs A Monolithic Queer Identity, Turning The Kritik

Watson, 2009:

(Being Inappropriate: Queer Activism In Context. 2009. Amy Watson, Masters of Arts in Gender Studies From Central European University)

As I have discussed previous, one of the points where queer politics differ from lesbian and gay politics is on how to approach the notion of identity. Gay and lesbian politics concentrate on solidifying a homosexual identity, which, by default, relies on correlating gender and sexuality identities and buttresses a division between heterosexuality and homosexuality, men and women, female and male. While gay and lesbian activists were fighting for tolerance and inclusion, earlier moments of queer activism fought with rage to be accepted on their own terms. Yet the tactics they employed, could, in hindsight, be seen as counterproductive to the queer project of questioning reified identities. I ask you to recall Queer Nation’s utilization of slogans such as “I Hate Straights” which I discussed in the previous chapter. I explained that this slogan assumes a coherent heterosexual identity, one which apparently does not engage in “’nonnormative’ procreation patterns and family structures” (Cohen 1997: 210).

#### Queer Nation Fails; They Can’t Deal With The Material Conditions That Construct Heteronormativity In The First Place

Watson, 2009:

(Being Inappropriate: Queer Activism In Context. 2009. Amy Watson, Masters of Arts in Gender Studies From Central European University)

While Hennessy, like Cohen, admits that Queer Nation’s tactics had the ability to create cracks in heteronormative assumptions, she problematizes Queer Nation’s use of the spaces of commodity consumption as being counterproductive to their claims of anti-assimilation. First, “If the aim of mall visibility actions was to make the pleasures of consumption available to gays too, and to commodify queer identity as ‘the most stylish of the may attitudes on sale at the mall,’ then inclusion seems to be precisely the point” (Hennessy 2000: 128). Furthermore, the use of the commodity further facilitates its fetishization. While Queer Nation’s tactics exposed the invisible heterosexual meanings assumed in the commodity, they failed to disrupt its material implications. IN other words, and this is Hennessy’s main contention with queer theory and activism, these actions only had the potential to shift the cultural meaning or significance of the commodity (i.e. exposing that there is implied heterosexual meaning in everything) and not to disrupt or question the material process of the commodity (i.e. exposing the abstract labor or conditions that went behind its production). This follows her claims that queer does not engage with the social realm and relies only on the cultural; or rather, she contends that queer “praxis” erroneously collapses the social into the cultural, meaning that material conditions which also construct power structures get lost along the way.

#### Queer Nation Can’t Solve; Their Focus On Cultural Production Ignores The Political Economy

Watson, 2009:

(Being Inappropriate: Queer Activism In Context. 2009. Amy Watson, Masters of Arts in Gender Studies From Central European University)

Queer activism, as coming from Queer Nation, celebrated diverse desires and identities through resistance to normality. They sought visibility and behaved inappropriately in public space in order to expose underlying heteronormative imperatives. Yet, their practices were not without their limitations. In pursuing destabilization of heteronormative meaning through use of the commodity and consumerist spaces, their actions were deemed as counterproductive in their claims to anti-assimilation. Furthermore, queer activism was seen as being too invested in a “single oppression model”. The assertion was that queer activism has/ had the tendency to disengage with issues surrounding the political economy in favor of cultural production.

### AT Queer Theory

#### Queer Theory Fails; Counter-Publics Can’t Create Change

Jagose, 2009:

(Feminism’s Queer Theory: Feminism & Psychology. 2009. 19: 157. Annamarie Jagose, Professor Of Feminist/ Queer Studies AT The University Of Sydney.)

Tracing the critical trajectory of queer theory, it becomes apparent that attempts to describe and define it – already a paradoxical ambition for a concept that prominently insists on the radical unknowability of its future formations – occur simultaneously alongside harsher assessments of its limitations or expiry. For every theorist who claims (or hopes) that queer theory ‘describes a horizon of possibility whose precise extent and heterogeneous scope cannot in principle be delimited in advance’ (Halperin, 1995: 62), there is another who argues that queer theory has not delivered on its potential, that queer theoretical practice tends to reproduce the exclusionary normalizing effects it is nominally intended to counter (Johnson, 2005; Prosser, 1998). Yet while there is no shortage of people claiming that queer theory is finished, washed-up and over (for a particularly complacent account, see Bawer 1996), it is less commonly noted that a sense of queer theory’s finitude has animated from the start attempts to specify quite what queer theory is or does. These anxious notings of the waning of queer theoretical vitality at the moment of its inauguration might usefully be seen as an instantiation of what has recently been theorized as queer temporality, a mode of inhabiting time that is attentive to the recursive eddies and back-to-the-future loops that often pass undetected or uncherished beneath the official narrations of the linear sequence that is taken to structure normative life (Freeman, 2007). Regularly announced by its critics, queer theory’s death has been even more frequently anticipated in work that identifies with queer theory as a rubric and attempts, often passionately, to convey some sense of its emergent critical coordinates. In her foreword to *Tendencies*, for example, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick takes the 1992 New York City Gay Pride parade with its numerous performances of cross-gender identification as a spectacular instantiation of ‘the moment of Queer’ (Sedgwick, 1993: xii). Recalling the sheer number of women and men in t-shirts proclaiming ‘Faggot’ and ‘Dyke’ respectively, Sedgwick reads the parade as crystallizing a certain transitive energy also in hyper-evidence in other activist and pedagogic contexts. It is the prospect of a mass counter-public mobilized around the cross-relational promise of queer, however, that gives Sedgwick pause. ‘In the short shelf-life American marketplace of images,’ she muses, ‘maybe the queer moment, if it’s here today, will for that very reason be gone tomorrow’ (1993: xii). Even though she intends her work as ‘a counterclaim against that obsolescence’ (1993: xii), Sedgwick’s is not an idiosyncratic assessment. When Judith Halberstam suggests ‘Queer may soon lose all affectivity as a word, a marker, or a threat,’ before parenthetically adding ‘(it may already have done so)’ (1997: 256) she joins with other prominent defenders and explicators of queer theory who similarly note that, almost before it is clear what it describes exactly, the widespread take-up of queer might mean that queer theory’s time is up.

**Queer Theory Bad; It’s Demobilizing And Locked Within The Ivory Tower**

McNulty, 2003:

Charles, , head of Brooklyn College's MFA program in dramaturgy and theater criticism “Queer Misgivings,” *Theater* 33.3 (2003) 112-117 AJM

When I wrote "The Queer As Drama Critic" for the Queer Theater issue of Theater that I guest-edited in 1993, the term queer had been newly radicalized. From its long-held derisive meaning—a variant of queen and fag—the word had been reclaimed by gay and lesbian theorists and activists as a defiant call for building a broader coalition in the fight against AIDS. **Rallying together** those **minority groups** most vulnerable to the epidemic's color-blind assault, **queer became a banner under which more than just white, middle-class gays and lesbians could march. Implicit was the recognition that our identities were plural, not singular**—**that we belonged to concentric communities even as we are made to feel like we're living in the cracks of no community whatsoever. The new queer vision offered a revision of those identity politics movements, steeped in too fixed and narrow a sense of group belonging**, which at best amounted to a temporary corrective or reverse discourse, at worst a form of mini-nationalism blind to all but its own parochial struggle. As the opening of "Queer As Drama Critic" reveals, I couldn't resist adopting the new rainbow rhetoric, an academic form of hippiedom that was infinitely seductive to my graduate student ears: "**The term Queer is manifold; it seeks to encompass that which has been excluded, ridiculed, oppressed. Life caught in the margins.** **Sex** yes, and sexuality, **but also gender, race and class**, and that which refuses easy taxonomy and suffers the fate of difference. A philosophy never fixed nor realized, but a politics of shared struggle, and a striving for community." [End Page 112] Queers pursued this quixotic agenda raucously in the streets with ACT UP and Queer Nation, to name two of the more prominent avatars of the new militancy, which derived much of its rage from the mourning and melancholia of stigma. Meanwhile, **queer academics opted for a more abstract form of revolution, with a new generation of lesbian and gay scholars arming themselves with post-structuralist weapons to dismantle the calcified assumptions of identity**. At question were the very tenets that had formed the basis of the gay and lesbian civil rights movements—that homosexuality was the basis of a valid minority identity. Though no queer theorists wanted to roll back the modest protections accrued since the Stonewall rebellion, there began a vigorous interrogation of the politics of identity categories, in particular the way binaries such as male/female, white/black, and straight/gay had shaped our social geography and thus distorted the internal landscape on which we patch together a sense of self. Admittedly, there was from the beginning a disconnection between the guerrilla-style protests taking place in New York, Washington, and San Francisco and the often recondite scholarly indirection of the theory. Worse, **the academic face of the movement didn't adequately reflect the new diversity that queer was meant to denote. Its look**, in fact, **was every bit as ivory tower as its formidable jargon**. After the first flush of intellectual passion, a kind of hypocrisy dogged queers in the university. Ironically, the real nail in the coffin came as a consequence of the miraculous changes wrought by medical breakthroughs in the fight against AIDS. The relative success of protease cocktails—the wonder drug every HIV+ person can't help wondering about—sapped the queer movement's sense of urgency. Though access to health care and the spread of new infection among the world's poor only went from worse to worse, activism in the United States measured steep declines. With the black and Latino inner-city communities being ravaged by the epidemic, never mind sub-Saharan Africa, the queer movement began to seem as phony about its political commitments as the ending of Tony Kushner's Angels in America, where the character Prior, somehow surviving his illness, utters the Pollyannaish sentiment, "The disease will be the end of many of us, but not nearly all, and the dead will be commemorated and will struggle on with the living, and we are not going away. We won't die secret deaths anymore. The world only spins forward. We will be citizens. The time has come." From its brief rabble-rousing caper, the word queer has now come full circle, returning to its primary definition of "strange, odd or unconventional in behavior, eccentric"—though this time with a faddish (Queer As Folk) rather than freakish (Quentin Crisp) twist. What is the legacy of the queer movement? Even the most superficial glance at the current American milieu would suggest that the answer is neither political nor intellectual but cultural. Call it the Will and Grace phenomenon, which is essentially a nonnude version of the Terrence McNally phenomenon—Love! Valour! Compassion! for the PG-13 boob tube. Undoubtedly, gays and lesbians have [End Page 113] gained wider acceptance in the media, owning their social identities without apology or plea for tolerance. Homo—a gay bar coinage that sums up the community's apolitical insouciance—has become fashionable in the urbanmainstream. Like much else in the triumphal capitalism of the slaphappy Clinton nineties and the current Bush imperium, **the term reflects the national trend of pervasive, even assaultive, commodification**. Just as the mainstream's uncritical faith invested globalization with the capacity to initiate democratic change, so there has been a ditzy sense that TV and Disney can more effectively pursue social justice than communal enlightenment and grassroots engagement can. Yet representation doesn't necessarily imply progressiveness, as any Will and Grace episode will attest. (For starters, why not try the gender-retarded one when Grace gets into a jealous snit because Will offers his sperm to another woman friend desperate to have a baby?) Meanwhile, nothing short of a dirty bomb seems capable of awakening the complacently gayish American theater from its self-engrossed torpor of queeny jokes and drag musicals inspired by Hollywood hiccups. Assimilation in queer theater has left the scene intellectually impoverished at its core, financially so at its fringe.As I write this on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the New York City terrorist threat level still a menacing orange, **consideration of queer theory seems somehow quaint, a throwback to an era when the domestic scene could be fictitiously divorced from an international context**. At this turbulent hour, it feels rather indulgent to parse Lacanian-inflected notions of desire and identity, yet the unique potential of queer theory to deconstruct the boundaries between self and Other has never been more needed in the current military climate. **The major thrust of the queer movement, naively utopian as it may have been, was to bridge together disparate forms of marginalization under a proud sign of difference and to reflect on the paradoxical nature of identity, which can't help containing those debased terms it most vigilantly tries to exclude.** If sexual practice was the underlying queer theme, it wasn't exclusively so, as sex was understood to be one point in an interlocking matrix of personal data that includes gender, race, class, and as we so often conveniently forgot, national origin.In his new book, Savran tries to expand the queer construct so that it can grapple with concerns that include but are not limited to the usual queer bric-a-brac: sexual orientation, gender, and identity politics. Many of the essays were written after September 11, 2001, and hence give voice to a refreshing internationalist perspective. But what unites the work from both before and after this watershed historical moment is Savran's commitment to Marxism, which he treats as purely a tool of analysis and not an ideology.Questions of culture and identity are, for him, inseparably related to concerns of economics and power. Can there be a legitimate queer agenda that distances itself from such political concerns as the environment, human rights abuses, global poverty and famine, nuclear proliferation, and the world AIDS situation—in short, the full spectrum [End Page 114] of issues that splits the world's haves and have-nots, oppressors and the oppressed? Can queers, no matter how economically advantaged, detach themselves from the larger struggle of civil injustice and still claim a designation that purports to be nothing if not inclusively political? As Savran warns, **"Too often, a self-congratulatory queer identification**—the politics of lifestyle—**has functioned as a substitute for a commitment to radical social change. And like the identity politics that it once embraces and problematizes, a queer politics too often**, as Wendy Brown notes, **'may specifically abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely insofar as these identities are established vis-à-vis a bourgeois norm of social acceptance, legal protection and relative material comforts.'"**

#### **Queer Theory Is Founded On Erasing Identity; They Obscure Personal Difference**

Johnson, 2001:

(“Quare” Studies, Or (Almost) Everything I Know About Queer Studies I Learned From My Grandmother. Text and Performance Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 1-25. E. Patrick Johnson, Chair of the Department of Performance Studies At Northwestern University.)

Because much of queer theory critically interrogates notions of selfhood, agency, and experience, it is often unable to accommodate the issues faced by gays and lesbians of color who come from “raced” communities. Gloria Anzaldua explicitly addresses this limitation when she warns that “queer is used as a false unifying umbrella which all ‘queers’ of all races, ethnicities and classes are shored under” (250). While acknowledging that “at times we need this umbrella to solidify our ranks against outsiders,” Anzaldua nevertheless urges that “even when we seek shelter under it [“queer”], we must not forget that it homogenizes, erases our differences” (250).

## Cards for Movements Aff

### General

#### Not Key To Coalitions; The Plan Is The Least Common Denominator

Luce, 2011:

(What Next For The U.S. Living Wage Movement. NOs 65/66. 2011. Stephanie Luce, Associate Professor Of Labor Studies At CUNY)

I argue that there are a number of reasons why the living wage movement has not made more gains in the past 17 years. One major reason is that while the living wage concept is fruitful for building coalitions, it is sometimes a form of “least common denominator” politics. Supporters of the living wage agree that people who work full-time for a living should not live in poverty. Yet they do not necessary agree that unions are good for workers or the economy, or that people who do not have a job should be provided with a safety net. They may draw a distinction between the “deserving poor” and the “undeserving poor.” For example, some of the same cities that passed living wage ordinances were also passing ordinances that criminalize poverty, such as anti-panhandling laws (The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty and The National Coalition for the Homeless, 2009). Consensus on living wages was a way to build new alliances, but to take the next step of building power for working people, the coalitions may need to go into new arenas and push the politics further. This may end up alienating some coalition partners, but also could attract new ones (such as organizations that work on homelessness, welfare rights, or prison issues).

#### No Impact To Coalitions; Multiple Warrants

Nissen, 2000:

(Living Wage Campaigns From A “Social Movement” Perspective: The Miami Case. Bruce Nissen, Center For Labor Research And Studies At Florida International University. Labor Studies Journal/ Fall 2000)

Given the many weaknesses of the Miami CCLW enumerated above, both in effective mobilization of resources and in narrowness of the framing of the issue by some participants, should it be judged a total failure as a social movement? Much depends on the coalition's ability to stay together and build future campaigns or on its ability to stimulate other social movement style organizations and activities. In any case, it was not a total failure. A weak and flawed social movement is an improvement on no social movement whatsoever. This is the first time in many years that the labor movement in Miami has engaged in a coalition like this; flaws and all, it is a beginning. Some union leaders and some progressive non-labor individuals have learned to work together for a common cause. The living wage issue can help the U.S. labor movement build alliances with others in the community for progressive causes. This is because the living wage issue is so naturally congruent with the interests of such a broad cross section of progressive community forces that it is a natural catalyst for uniting them with unions in a struggle for the common good. Despite this potential, it is important to not exaggerate the potential of any one issue or any one movement to single handedly turn organized labor onto the path of social activism. In fact, some have questioned the ability of the U.S. labor movement to transform itself in the direction of a genuine social movement, a point that will be addressed later. The Miami case shows that even successful campaigns may prove to be less fully "social movements" than surface appearances may indicate. While the problems with the Miami effort may be more severe than is the case with a typical effort, this is far from obvious. The South Florida AFL-CIO is considered one of the best, most active, most socially aware central labor bodies in the state and in the nation; it is clearly more socially engaged than most central bodies around the country. Neither is it clear that the community partners in Miami are necessarily inferior to those available elsewhere. In cities with a more established tradition of social activism than Miami, living wage coalitions should have more fertile ground on which to sow a living wage movement. But in the many cities with equally quiescent recent histories, labor and community activists can leam a lot from the failures as well as the successes of the Miami CCLW. A key weakness in Miami is the absence of any large-scale religious involvement; this deprives the overall "coalition" of a truly mass base beyond the one the labor movement is able to provide. A major task for those wishing to extend and develop the CCLW and similar coalitions is to develop better roots within the religious communities. The absence, until recently, of any ongoing community organizing project such as ACORN or the Industrial Areas Foundation groups adds to the lack of roots of the coalition, outside of organized labor. As a result of the living wage campaign, ACORN once again became interested in Miami (it had earlier abandoned a Miami chapter that never got off the ground). Therefore, ACORN organizers are now in Miami, unlike the period described in this article. Even in locations with a stronger religious base than was available in Miami, living wage coalitions will usually find themselves operating in an ad hoc and unprofessional manner unless they are capable of devoting sufficient resources to have a paid staff. This is a major hurdle that can make all the difference in a coalition's ability to systematically organize the necessary support to get member organizations to devote serious time and people power to the cause. This is because the living wage issue is not really the product of a genuine, more spontaneous "organic" social movement. Low wage workers play a very small role (or no role) in most living wage coalitions, and there is not a spontaneous rush toward the issue from the membership of the living wage coalition partners. Building the coalition and a movement is a long, hard organizing process. Given that, there is seldom a substitute for competent, paid staff to organize the work and to get "grassroots leaders" involved in the work. This is not an issue that will grow into a movement simply because "the time is ripe." The ability of this issue (or almost any other) to develop a social movement within and beyond the labor movement depends very heavily on conscious, strategic organizing work, which is very labor intensive and demanding of resources.

#### No Impact To Coalitions; Labor Can’t Be The Foundation Of A Genuine Social Movement

Nissen, 2000:

(Living Wage Campaigns From A “Social Movement” Perspective: The Miami Case. Bruce Nissen, Center For Labor Research And Studies At Florida International University. Labor Studies Journal/ Fall 2000. Note: The author is explaining Heckscher and Palmer’s view.)

Beyond such issues is the larger question of whether the U.S. labor movement really is capable of building genuine coalitions with other social forces to create social movements. Heckscher and Palmer (1993) argue that unions primarily function in only one of two ways: either as established "insider" institutions narrowly focused on collective bargaining and bilateral power relations with employers (the familiar "business union" or "servicing" model of unionism), or as coalition partners demanding dominance in coalitions with a narrow "labor support" focus rather than a broad civil rights or social justice focus. Because of this, they believe that unions are essentially incapable of playing a role as "equal partners" with others in multilateral coalitions for broad social goals (Heckscher and Palmer, 1993). Heckscher and Palmer use the Jobs with Justice (JwJ) movement to illustrate their thesis. They argue that established labor bodies such as central labor councils and unions have resisted JwJ because they fear they cannot control it. Furthermore, they argue that truly effective JwJ local chapters have been those less "under the thumb" of established unions or central bodies, focusing not on narrow "labor support" activities but broader civil rights and labor rights issues. Andrew Banks has noted something similar: Jobs With Justice actions have sprung up in over sixty locations throughout the country. Interestingly enough, the most successful of these efforts have been in locations where labor has not been traditionally strong, and has therefore been more willing to work with others and try new things. (Banks, 1990) Clearly, one case study cannot resolve large questions such as those raised by Heckscher and Palmer. But the Miami living wage case does supply some evidence to support their thesis. On the other hand, it provides some counter-evidence, as does the experience of Jobs with Justice chapters throughout the nation. The relationship between JwJ and unions is by no means one of simple distrust and resistance-in fact JwJ is officially linked with the national AFL-CIO. And the Miami CCLW was not simply a battle between union institutions and sensibilities and community ones, but also an experience of growing sensitivity about differences and how to work together.

#### [Needs Cutting]

Nissen, 2000:

(Living Wage Campaigns From A “Social Movement” Perspective: The Miami Case. Bruce Nissen, Center For Labor Research And Studies At Florida International University. Labor Studies Journal/ Fall 2000)

Given the many weaknesses of the Miami CCLW enumerated above, both in effective mobilization of resources and in narrowness of the framing of the issue by some participants, should it be judged a total failure as a social movement? Much depends on the coalition's ability to stay together and build future campaigns or on its ability to stimulate other social movement style organizations and activities. In any case, it was not a total failure. A weak and flawed social movement is an improvement on no social movement whatsoever. This is the first time in many years that the labor movement in Miami has engaged in a coalition like this; flaws and all, it is a beginning. Some union leaders and some progressive non-labor individuals have learned to work together for a common cause. The living wage issue can help the U.S. labor movement build alliances with others in the community for progressive causes. This is because the living wage issue is so naturally congruent with the interests of such a broad cross section of progressive community forces that it is a natural catalyst for uniting them with unions in a struggle for the common good. Despite this potential, it is important to not exaggerate the potential of any one issue or any one movement to single handedly turn organized labor onto the path of social activism. In fact, some have questioned the ability of the U.S. labor movement to transform itself in the direction of a genuine social movement, a point that will be addressed later. The Miami case shows that even successful campaigns may prove to be less fully "social movements" than surface appearances may indicate. While the problems with the Miami effort may be more severe than is the case with a typical effort, this is far from obvious. The South Florida AFL-CIO is considered one of the best, most active, most socially aware central labor bodies in the state and in the nation; it is clearly more socially engaged than most central bodies around the country. Neither is it clear that the community partners in Miami are necessarily inferior to those available elsewhere. In cities with a more established tradition of social activism than Miami, living wage coalitions should have more fertile ground on which to sow a living wage movement. But in the many cities with equally quiescent recent histories, labor and community activists can leam a lot from the failures as well as the successes of the Miami CCLW. A key weakness in Miami is the absence of any large-scale religious involvement; this deprives the overall "coalition" of a truly mass base beyond the one the labor movement is able to provide. A major task for those wishing to extend and develop the CCLW and similar coalitions is to develop better roots within the religious communities. The absence, until recently, of any ongoing community organizing project such as ACORN or the Industrial Areas Foundation groups adds to the lack of roots of the coalition, outside of organized labor. As a result of the living wage campaign, ACORN once again became interested in Miami (it had earlier abandoned a Miami chapter that never got off the ground). Therefore, ACORN organizers are now in Miami, unlike the period described in this article. Even in locations with a stronger religious base than was available in Miami, living wage coalitions will usually find themselves operating in an ad hoc and unprofessional manner unless they are capable of devoting sufficient resources to have a paid staff. This is a major hurdle that can make all the difference in a coalition's ability to systematically organize the necessary support to get member organizations to devote serious time and people power to the cause. This is because the living wage issue is not really the product of a genuine, more spontaneous "organic" social movement. Low wage workers play a very small role (or no role) in most living wage coalitions, and there is not a spontaneous rush toward the issue from the membership of the living wage coalition partners. Building the coalition and a movement is a long, hard organizing process. Given that, there is seldom a substitute for competent, paid staff to organize the work and to get "grassroots leaders" involved in the work. This is not an issue that will grow into a movement simply because "the time is ripe." The ability of this issue (or almost any other) to develop a social movement within and beyond the labor movement depends very heavily on conscious, strategic organizing work, which is very labor intensive and demanding of resources.

#### No Impact To Movements; Unions Co-Opt

Nissen, 2000:

(Living Wage Campaigns From A “Social Movement” Perspective: The Miami Case. Bruce Nissen, Center For Labor Research And Studies At Florida International University. Labor Studies Journal/ Fall 2000)

The most advanced living wage campaigns that have created an SMO also move their goals beyond simple passage of an ordinance. The two best examples are in Baltimore and Los Angeles, where attempts are being made to unionize the workers who won ordinance-mandated pay increases. This represents a definite maturation of the movement, involving the people benefiting from the wage increases rather than outsiders struggling for other people's benefit. In any case, the ability of a living wage campaign to aggregate enough resources to create more permanent staffed structures is an important indicator of degree of progress made toward a more developed "social movement" status. Coalitions forced to rely entirely on volunteers will almost inevitably be less strategic and less effective. Not all social scientists agree; some have argued that the creation of an SMO tends to signal the end of a genuine movement (see Piven and Cloward). Some labor historians have also noted that union bureaucracies throughout history have stifled rank and file "movement" activities, turning the labor movement toward a conservative "business unionism" and away from movement building (Brecher). But these authors are addressing "organic" movement situations, where an oppressed segment of the population rises up to address their oppression. Examples include the explosion in the labor movement in the 1930s and the civil rights movement in the 1960s. The living wage campaigns are not "organic" movements in this sense. In fact, the workers directly winning pay increases have played a major role in almost none of these campaigns.

### **AT: Success Key**

#### No Follow-On; Success Spurs Backlash And Greater Opposition

Luce, 2011:

(What Next For The U.S. Living Wage Movement. NOs 65/66. 2011. Stephanie Luce, Associate Professor Of Labor Studies At CUNY)

This raises the second point about why the living wage movement has not yet achieved more: the strength of the opposition. Research shows that the fiscal impact of living wage laws is minimal. On average, the cost to raise wages to the living wage amounts to less than 1% of the firm’s operating costs. Despite this, the ideological opposition to wage laws is strong, particularly those sectors that rely most heavily on low-wage labour, such as hotels, restaurants and retail. The living wage has been most successful at the local level where “people power” can compete with corporate influence. As the activists become more bold with their demands, trying to increase wage levels, expand coverage, or attach stronger provisions to give workers power, the opposition increases too. The next level of gains will take a much bigger fight, and may require new tactics.

### AT Bittman

#### Reducing Income Inequality Is Key, Not Living Wage; Their Author

Bittman 14

Mark Bittman, writer for NYT, “Is It Bad Enough Yet?”, The New York Times, SundayReview, 13 Dec 2014,

The root of the anger is inequality, about which statistics are mind-boggling: From 2009 to 2012 (that’s the most recent data), some 95 percent of new income has gone to the top 1 percent; the Walton family (owners of Walmart) have as much wealth as the bottom 42 percent of the country’s people combined; and “income mobility” now describes how the rich get richer while the poor ... actually get poorer. You get it: This is the United States, which, with the incoming Congress, might actually get worse. This in part explains why we’re seeing spontaneous protests nationwide, protests that, in their scale, racial diversity, anger and largely nonviolent nature, are unusual if not unique. I was in four cities recently — New York, Washington, Berkeley and Oakland — and there were actions every night in each of them. Meanwhile, workers walked off the job in 190 cities on Dec. 4.

## Cards for Nigeria Aff (TOC)

### Poverty Adv (Link Turns)

#### **Nigerian Economy Is On The Brink; Plan Is The Key Internal Link To Collapse**

Daily Independent, 2015:

(Nigeria: The Minimum Wage And Matters Arising. March 19, 2015. Editorial Board Of The Daily Independent (Lagos))

The average Nigerian worker today, is four times poorer than he was when Obasanjo introduced the minimum wage As we emphatically stated in our editorial of Wednesday, March 18, 2015, the Nigerian economy is on the brink. This position seems to be rightly confirmed by the new President of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), Dr. Ayuba Wabba, when, in his maiden conference in Abuja, he stated that the N18,000 minimum wage is no longer realistic considering the economic situation in the country; as the impact of falling price of crude oil in the international market makes imperative for the minimum wage to be reviewed. To him, with the devaluation of the Naira by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the purchasing power of the average worker has been reduced. There is no better way to subtly impoverish and, most likely, kill a people than to drastically reduce their purchasing power. This is aptly what the managers of the Nigerian economy are doing right now. As at the dawn of the 21st Century when the administration of former President Olusegun Obasanjo, introduced the N18, 000 minimum w age, which he tagged 'living wage,' the Naira exchanged about N90 to the dollar; which implied that the minimum wage was about $200. With the exchange rate currently at about N225 to the dollar, the minimum wage is now less that $50 per month. The implication of that to the average Nigerian worker, today, is that he is four times poorer than he was when Obasanjo introduced the minimum wage. This seems to be the realization of the new NLC President, Wabba. It is a tricky situation, but it is doubtful if the government realizes the implication of a highly battered and weak currency on the economy and the citizenry. Besides, will the plight of the worker be assuaged with an increased salary package in the face of a badly managed currency, and by extension, the economy? Though Wabba may be asking for wage review as a soothing balm for the immediate problem, what the organized labour and indeed leaders of the various sectors of the economy need do is to seriously engage government on how to tackle the dwindling economic fortunes of the country, with a view to strengthening the Naira. For a country with an import oriented economy, such as Nigeria, the national currency cannot afford to be battered as the CBN has subjected the Naira; the consequences of which now stare us on our faces. With the prevailing economic circumstances, it makes little sense to ask for salary increment when most of the 36 states owe a backlog of salaries and cannot even undertake any major project in infrastructure development. It is obvious that the economy is not functioning well; with or without the falling oil price and the managers of the economy are not endeavouring to make it work. Suffice to say, they are contended with sharing oil proceeds among the three tiers of government. Worried, it seems, the President might have inadvertently accepted the reality of worsening economic situation in the country through the reported cutting of his salary and those of the Ministers by 30%. How far that can go to boost the economy remains to be seen; if it is not meant to achieve cheap political point.

#### Nigeria LW Fails; Multiple Warrants

Idedia, 2011:

(Is A Minimum Wage The Solution For Nigeria? August 1, 2011. Lucky Idedia, Social Analyst And A Research Consultant Based In Lagos)

Lagos, Nigeria: Nigeria is about to implement a new minimum wage bill ratified by President Goodluck Jonathan in March 2011. A delay in implementation prompted organised labour to threaten strike action planned to commence last month, however, the strike was suspended at the last minute after a meeting between the executives of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and the federal government. The new minimum wage is seen as a heavy financial responsibility, especially for state governments which lament their inability to pay the new wage from the meagre revenue allocation they receive from the federal government. This has further angered the organised labour movement. Opinion is divided along conventional ideological lines, but the situation is more complex than meets the eye, and a more pragmatic view might see someone with an instinctively pro-worker view switch sides and oppose the strikes. A tool of the past? Historically organised labour strike actions in Nigeria have been an effective tool for making demands on government. Since the late 1980s, the NLC has intervened at key moments in Nigeria’s political struggle. During this period, the NLC caught the government’s attention and on occasion forced the reversal of unpopular policies. In 1993, organised labour protested the annulled election of MKO Abiola. The Labour union in 1994 stood against Abacha’s brutal reign. Similarly, the union used strike action to resist government plans to hike fuel prices during the Obasanjo administration. These, in part, earned us our democracy. But the days of the unions leading from the front on matters of national significance seem to have passed, and in recent times they only crack the whip when they want the government to increase their salaries. The NLC approach is now reactive rather than proactive. It is this approach that makes work conditions and welfare package measures below what can ideally be described as a living wage. A life of hardship Life in Lagos is expensive: in parts of the city, the cost of living is comparable to that in Western cities. Low income earners have moved to the fringes of the cities and slums like Makoko, a town on stilts where rent for a shabby room is about $13 a month. The story is similar in Abuja, or Port Harcourt. Allegedly, these are the places where the jobs are, yet every year, thousands of graduates find themselves disappointed after trooping to these cities. Many of these jobseekers depend on someone who is employed. The dependency ratio has become very burdensome and every earner’s income is overstretched. With current employment level, dependency ratio in Nigeria reads 84.01 per 100 people of working age population. The picture is uglier in reality. A typical Nigerian family comprises at least four members. In some cases it comprises a seven- to nine-member family unit with an additional five dependents. The plight of a worker earning the N18,000 ($120) minimum wage becomes clearer when you factor in unemployment. In 2010, the official figure was 19.7% but it is not unusual for 600 applicants to apply for one vacancy. Even if the minimum wage was pegged at N50,000, it wouldn’t be enough to meet the needs of the worker and his or her dependents. Profligate spending Unfortunately, this hardship exists alongside profligate spending of public funds. Indeed, the new finance minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala stated that Nigeria’s overhead expenditure is a greater problem than the minimum wage. Her observation corroborates Central Bank Governor Sanusi Lamido’s earlier outcry regarding recurrent costs. Spending on infrastructure gulped billions of Naira but with little to show. Between 1999 and 2007 Nigeria spent over $826.6 million on railway contracts. But the rail system does not work, while electrical blackouts are common. Even without corruption, politicians receive huge allocations. While they live the high life and send their children overseas because Nigerian public schools are substandard, labour reaps little reward. Labour should think of it this way: if an ordinary senator in Nigeria receives N20 million monthly (about $133,000, one-third of their quarterly allowance), it would take a worker on N18,000 (about $120) monthly salary 93 years to earn that same amount. Game of politics This is surely a game of politics: and the politicians have the upper hand. The federal government resolved to pay the new wage to workers on levels one to six while levels seven to seventeen must wait until January 2012. And the N18,000 minimum wage bill was only signed into law in March 2011, just before the elections. One gets a strong impression of an act created in a hurry to appease the growing anger of the labour movement. The situation is even dicier for workers in state government jobs; some governors suspect they might have to take out loans if they must pay the new wage. If this happens, infrastructural development may suffer further neglect. On a broader scale, the dependency ratio worsens as neither the federal nor state government successfully creates jobs to soak up the already swollen jobless population. Citizens will continue to fill in for local government as they provide their own electricity, water, and pay high fees for private schooling, healthcare, communication. Most Nigerian workers watch their bills pile up before the wage arrives. So, if the trade unions are guilty of short-termism, it is doubtful if their strategy will even benefit their members in the short term. Typically, the announcement of an impending labour strike action causes panic-buying while greedy traders take advantage of the situation to hike prices. Because of this, a vicious cycle is created such that the minimum wage is shrunk at the tail of the circle. One economic analyst says the new minimum wage (plus removal of fuel subsidies) will hike inflation in the country. Who wins? Here’s what could happen. To pay the new wage, some states like Lagos will increase taxes or devise new taxes to increase their internally generated revenue. The ripple will hit the informal sector—the biggest employment sector in Nigeria. A market woman in Lagos, struggling to meet her tax responsibility in addition to other inflated costs, has no choice but to increase the price of tomato, fish, or garri. The same goes for commercial bus operators, and landlords. The load eventually falls on consumers, and that includes labour. Right now, it seems labour might lose out in negotiations with state governments; some states are considering pruning the size of their labour force in order to meet the new responsibility. Indeed, with a revenue sharing formula which gives the federal government over half of the nation’s income while the Sates and local governments get approximately a quarter and a fifth respectively, paying the new wage would be a daunting task for states like Gombe or Benue. Living conditions cannot be improved simply by increasing wages. Using the national union, workers should fight the cankerworm that chews holes in the pockets where that wage – however small – ends up. Organized labour has a lot of leverage, and is selling it cheap on the minimum wage issue.

#### Nigeria LW Backfires; The Impact Is Unemployment And High Prices

Folawewo, 2007:

(Macroeconomic Effects Of Minimum Wage In Nigeria: A General Equilibrium Analysis. Presentation At The CSEA Conference 2007: Economic Development In Africa. Abiodun O. Folawewo, Ph.D/ Lecturer In Economics At The University Of The West Indies.)

**Introduction** Income policy is usually used as a principal component of welfare boosting and poverty reduction macroeconomic policy framework in Nigeria. Minimum wage (hereafter MW) legislation is a major income policy readily employed in this regard. Although MW policy has both negative and positive effects on the overall economy, policy makers, especially politicians, have used it more often for political purposes than for socio-economic reasons. MW legislations in the country have been preceded by high inflation rates that erode purchasing power and bring reduction in welfare (Adams, 1987). Consequently, the need for MW legislation, which normally leads to a rise in nominal wage, is justified as a means of adjusting wages and salaries to match with the rise in costs of living. It is, however, notable that wage increase brought about by MW is usually counter-productive. Apart from leading to a rise in general price level, wage increases, are always followed by threat of reduction in government workforce, and in some cases, such threats have resulted into massive laid-off in the civil service (Olaleye, 1974; Owoye, 1994). Also, wage increases in Nigeria do not match up with the rate of increase in prices. As a result, there are always agitations from the labour unions for persistent wages and salaries increase. This regular call for rise in wages is at times based on the wide gap between public sector’s and private sector’s wages. The gap between public sector’s and private sector’s wages has often been given as one reason for the inefficiency and corruption in the public sector. It is argued that public sector workers deserve adequate compensation commensurate with their labour, in other to bring about efficiency (Obasanjo, 1999).

### Boko Haram Adv (Edu Turns)

#### LW Causes Mass Teacher Lay-Offs; The Impact Is Nigerian Education

Ayado, 2013:

(Nigeria: Furore Over Benue’s Planned Sack Of Teachers. June 23, 2013. Solomon Ayado, Journalist For Leadership, Nigeria’s Leading Newspaper)

Barring any last minute change of mind, the Benue state government is set to embark on mass retrenchment of Primary school teachers in the state. It also plans to prune down the number of public Primary schools in the state. The above are the conditions given by the state government to enable it implement the long overdue N18, 000 minimum wage for the Primary school teachers in the state. Though, following a meeting brokered by the National Secretariat of the Nigeria Union of Teachers (NUT), the Benue state wing had suspended its strike action over its demand for the implementation of the N18, 000 minimum wage, the government is insisting that it could not pay the new salary structure unless some teachers are shown the way out of the public service. But the NUT and other stakeholders in the state's education sector have vowed to resist any attempt by the government to reduce the teachers' strength and cut the size of the public schools in the state. The state governor, Gabriel Suswam who had at a stakeholders meeting comprising of the executives of the state wing of the NUT, Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), Parent Teachers Association (PTA), commissioners and head of educational agencies, as well as council chairmen and religious leaders, insisted that a substantive population of employed primary school teachers in the state must be sacked and many primary schools scrapped before the government can implement the new minimum wage of the staff. He maintained that the state government lacks the finances to implement and pay the minimum wage of all workers especially, that of primary school teachers, adding that, "except a substantive number of the teachers is retrenched, would my administration contend with the salaries?"

#### LW Bad For Nigerian Education; Plan Results In Teacher Lay-offs

Teacher Solidarity, 2013:

(Nigerian Teachers Sacked To Enable Minimum Wage. Teacher Solidarity, Independent Website Which Records The Resistance To Neoliberal Education Reform. 2013. Note: Date inferred from articles linked within the text)

Thousands of teachers in the Benue state of Nigeria are to be sacked in order to pay the long promised minimum wage of $112 a month for their colleagues. The state governor says he is planning not only to sack teachers but also to close some primary schools because the state does not have the money to pay the minimum wage. While secondary teachers and other civil servants now receive the minimum wage in the state, primary teachers, who constitute the vast majority of the teaching force, are still not paid this basic amount of money. The chair of the parent teachers association in the state told the All Africa website: "though the reward of teachers is in heaven, it is pertinent to compensate their efforts on earth". It was not until the teachers went on strike earlier this year and stormed examination centres that the state government agreed to pay the minimum wage from this August. Teachers say they will vigorously resist any attempt to make them pay for the increase by teacher sackings and school closings. As we reported last month, Nigeria is the fifth largest exporter of oil and the eleventh largest exporter of natural gas in the world. Yet 10% of the children who are not in school live in Nigeria and teachers have to strike just to get a living wage. Meanwhile the World Bank is investing $1 billion in the country's energy sector, from which the people of Nigeria get almost no financial benefit and much environmental and social harm. This year some students protesting for education have been shot dead by Nigerian security forces. In the latest incident a student was shot dead protesting against high fees at the university of Uyo. Protests are put down violently by police and many students have been detained. Read more details here. The situation in Benue state and for the students points up the cruel economics of the priorities both of the World Bank and the Nigerian government - teachers unable to live on the paltry salaries paid, fewer teachers and fewer schools, students fighting for educational rights brutalised or even killed. The main priority is to ensure that Nigeria's rich mineral resources continue to be exploited. The only forces which can oppose such priorities are the united action of teachers, parents and students to assert a different vision of society.

# Harker

## Teachers 1NC

### Plan Flaw

The United States Federal Government ought to require that districts and private companies pay a living wage to public and private school teachers respectively with variations in amount based on location and social position.

The plan didn’t include a comma between “respectively” and “with”. That fails to separate unessential parts of the sentence.

**Purdue No Date** writes[[93]](#footnote-93)

1. Use commas to separate independent clauses when they are joined by any of these seven coordinating conjunctions: and, but, for, or, nor, so, yet. The game was over, but the crowd refused to leave. The student explained her question, yet the instructor still didn't seem to understand. Yesterday was her brother's birthday, so she took him out to dinner. 2. Use commas after introductory a) clauses, b) phrases, or c) words that come before the main clause. a. Common starter words for introductory clauses that should be followed by a comma include after, although, as, because, if, since, when, while. While I was eating, the cat scratched at the door. Because her alarm clock was broken, she was late for class. If you are ill, you ought to see a doctor. When the snow stops falling, we'll shovel the driveway. However, don't put a comma after the main clause when a dependent (subordinate) clause follows it (except for cases of extreme contrast). INCORRECT: The cat scratched at the door, while I was eating. CORRECT: She was still quite upset, although she had won the Oscar. (This comma use is correct because it is an example of extreme contrast.) b. Common introductory phrases that should be followed by a comma include participial and infinitive phrases, absolute phrases, nonessential appositive phrases, and long prepositional phrases (over four words). Having finished the test, he left the room. To get a seat, you'd better come early. After the test but before lunch, I went jogging. The sun radiating intense heat, we sought shelter in the cafe. c. Common introductory words that should be followed by a comma include yes, however, well. Well, perhaps he meant no harm. Yes, the package should arrive tomorrow morning. However, you may not be satisfied with the results. 3. **Use** a pair of **commas in the middle of a sentence to set off** clauses, phrases, and **words that are not essential to the meaning of the sentence**. Use one comma before to indicate the beginning of the pause and one at the end to indicate the end of the pause. Here are some clues to help you decide whether the sentence element is essential: **If you leave out the** clause, **phrase**, or word, **does the sentence still make sense?** Does the clause, phrase, or word interrupt the flow of words in the original sentence? If you move the element to a different position in the sentence, does the sentence still make sense? **If** you answer **"yes"** to one or more of these questions, then **the element** in question **is nonessential and should be set off with commas**. Here are some **example sentence**s **with nonessential elements:** Clause: **That Tuesday, which happens to be my birthday, is the only day when I am available to meet**. Phrase: This restaurant has an exciting atmosphere. The food, on the other hand, is rather bland. Word: I appreciate your hard work. In this case, however, you seem to have over-exerted yourself. 4. Do not use commas to set off essential elements of the sentence, such as clauses beginning with that (relative clauses). That clauses after nouns are always essential. That clauses following a verb expressing mental action are always essential. That clauses after nouns: The book that I borrowed from you is excellent. The apples that fell out of the basket are bruised. That clauses following a verb expressing mental action: She believes that she will be able to earn an A. He is dreaming that he can fly. I contend that it was wrong to mislead her. They wished that warm weather would finally arrive. Examples of other essential elements (no commas): Students who cheat only harm themselves. The baby wearing a yellow jumpsuit is my niece. The candidate who had the least money lost the election. Examples of nonessential elements (set off by commas): Fred, who often cheats, is just harming himself. My niece, wearing a yellow jumpsuit, is playing in the living room. The Green party candidate, who had the least money, lost the election. Apples, which are my favorite fruit, are the main ingredient in this recipe. Professor Benson, grinning from ear to ear, announced that the exam would be tomorrow. Tom, the captain of the team, was injured in the game. It is up to you, Jane, to finish. She was, however, too tired to make the trip. Two hundred dollars, I think, is sufficient.

Vote neg:

1. The plan doesn’t mean anything, so he’s failed his prima facie burden to present a topical advocacy.

2. Plan does nothing and gets rolled back. Lawyers would challenge it and/or use the error as a loophole to circumvent it. Vote neg on presumption because resolved means “firmly determined to do something” and the plan as written doesn’t do anything.

3. Grammar is an independent voter. It may be fluid, but there are still norms, and they matter.

**Miller no date.** Maureen Miller (South African Freelancers’ Association and the Professional Editors’ Group. Maureen is currently freelance sub-editor of South African Airways’ in-flight magazine, Sawubona, and has sub-edited the Johannesburg Tourism Company magazine, SoJoburg). “The Importance of Grammar.” No date. <http://www.fullstopediting.co.za/contact/item/178-the-importance-of-grammar.html>

The simple answer is that good and **correct grammar**, in whatever language, **shows you the structure and meaning of language, and enables you to communicate** with people from different backgrounds **clearly and concisely.** So often we see errors of punctuation and syntax in newspapers that change the meaning of the sentence; we then need to go back and re-read, perhaps several times, in order to find out what the writer actually meant, a waste of time and effort. If you know and understand how words, phrases, sentences and punctuation interact with each other, your writing is way ahead before you’ve submitted your first piece to an editor. We as writers and editors are communicators, and a knowledge of and, even more importantly, an understanding of grammar and how it works, will improve your writing and speaking skills, allow you to develop your own unique style of writing and communication and express your thoughts and feelings effectively. More, **this** knowledge and understanding of your language **enables you to read** more and **more widely**, and absorb the ideas and techniques of the world’s great thinkers and writers. MAKE MISTAKES ON PURPOSE! In today's world there is no definitively 'correct' way of speaking or writing English – rap music, the Internet and SMSs have taken care of that! **There are,** however, **specific situations in** your **professional life** (and whether you're a writer or not) **where there are clear rules** as to how the language should be used. The office environment is **one such place, universities** are another. Magazines and publishers, obviously (and according to their own unique business models) expect you use the language in a certain way. So, why bother learning the rules when there are so many and everyone always breaks them? Because if you learn how to break them on purpose you can make sure you're serving your best interests. Once you understand what the rules are, you can mould their application to your needs**. Like it or not, you are judged on the way you speak** and how you communicate your thoughts, and inevitably, if you're a writer, on the way you write. 40 years ago, grammar was neglected in schools in favour of what was called “creative writing”; it horrifies me now to read scripts from writers from that era whose ideas are wonderful but whose ability to communicate those ideas is disorganised, badly punctuated and at times incoherent and unreadable. Whether your aim is to write for parenting magazines, newspapers, travel or business publications, correct grammar and spelling are vital. **In business writing, where** it’s possible **there might be legal implications**, clarity of thought and communication through **correct syntax** and punctuation **become even more important.**

Commas in particular are key to communication.

**Nordquist 7**

(End Punctuation: Periods, Questions Marks, And Exclamation Points. 2007. Richard Nordquist, Ph.D. in English, is professor emeritus of rhetoric and English at Armstrong Atlantic State University)

In a Time magazine essay titled "In Praise of the Humble Comma," Pico Iyer nicely illustrated some of the various uses of punctuation marks: Punctuation, one is taught, has a point: to keep up law and order. Punctuation marks are the road signs placed along the highway of our communication--to control speeds, provide directions, and prevent head-on collisions. A period has the unblinking finality of a red light; **the comma is a flashing yellow light that asks us** only **to slow down**; and the semicolon is a stop sign that tells us to ease gradually to a halt, before gradually starting up again Odds are that you probably already recognize the road signs of punctuation, though now and then you might get the signs confused. Probably the best way to understand punctuation is to study the sentence structures that the marks accompany (as we do in the Basic Grammar pages). Here, beginning with the end marks (periods, question marks, and exclamation points), we'll review the conventional uses of punctuation in American English. End Punctuation A sentence may end with a period (.), a question mark (?), or an exclamation point (!). Use a period at the end of a sentence that makes a statement.

### Advantage CP

Counter-plan: The United States federal government should pass the 10,000 Teachers, 10 Million Minds Science and Math Scholarship Act of 2007.

Solves teacher effectiveness—their author

**Gordon 13** writes[[94]](#footnote-94)

**The NAS report** outlines a number of actions to improve the U.S. innovation environment. Its highest-priority recommendation addresses teachers. In particular, the report states that “laying the foundation for a scientifically literate workforce begins with developing outstanding K-12 teachers in science and mathematics.” The report **calls for recruiting 10,000 of the best and brightest** students **into** the **teaching** profession **each year and supporting them with scholarships to obtain bachelor’s degrees** in science, engineering, or mathematics, **with** concurrent **certification as** K12 **science or math**ematics **teachers**. I believe the report was right on target in identifying teachers as the first priority for ensuring a brighter economic future. **To implement the recommendations, I introduced legislation** in the last Congress, which was approved by the House Science and Technology Committee, and have introduced largely similar legislation in the current Congress (**H.R. 362**). The legislation **provides generous scholarship support** to science, mathematics, and engineering majors willing to pursue teaching careers, but even more important, **it provides grants to universities to assist** them **in changing the way they educate science and math**ematics **teachers**. It is not sufficient just to encourage these students to take enough off-the-shelf education courses to enable them to qualify for a teaching certificate. Colleges and universities must foster collaborations between science and education faculties, with the specific goal of developing courses designed to provide students with practical experience in how to teach science and mathematics effectively based on current knowledge of how individuals learn these subjects. In addition to early experience in the classroom, students should receive mentoring by experienced and expert teachers before and after graduation, which can be especially helpful in stemming the current trend in which teachers leave the profession after short tenures. Teachers who emerge from the program would combine deep knowledge of their subject with expertise in the most effective practices for teaching science or mathematics. **This** approach **is modeled on the successful UTEACH program, pioneered by** the University of Texas (**UT**), which features the recruitment of science majors, highly relevant courses focused on teaching science and mathematics, early and intensive field teaching experiences, mentoring by experienced and expert teachers, and paid internships for students in the program. The **UTEACH** program, which began as a pilot effort in 1997 with 28 students, has grown to more than 400 students per year. It **has been successful in attracting top-performing science and math**ematics **majors to teaching careers**. UTEACH students have average SAT scores and grade point averages that exceed the averages for all students in UT’s College of Natural Sciences. Moreover, a high proportion of graduates from the program remain in the classroom. 75% of UTEACH graduates are still teaching five years past graduation, which is well above the national average of 50%. In addition to improving the education of new teachers, my legislation provides professional development opportunities for current teachers to improve their content knowledge and pedagogical skills. The activities authorized include part-time master’s degree programs tailored for in-service teachers and summer teacher institutes and training programs that prepare teachers to teach Advanced Placement and International Baccalaureate courses in science and mathematics.

### Day Care DA

Parents are struggling to afford childcare now; a minimum wage hike risks pricing childcare out of the market for many

**Shapiro 14** writes[[95]](#footnote-95)

Ask Jessie Conta whether child-care workers should be paid more, and the answer is, “Of course!” The Greenwood mom, a genetic counselor at Seattle Children’s, has nothing but admiration for the “endless patience, kindness, and love” shown her baby and toddler at the Interlake Child Care & Learning Center. “Hi, Jessie. How was your day?” they’ll say cheerfully at pick-up time, despite being surrounded by kids inevitably melting down, restless to go home. If the roles were reversed, says Conta, she’d “totally be losing it.” Jessie Conta picks up her kids Isabel (left) and Maceo (middle) from the Interlake Child Care and Learning Center. She knows that Interlake teachers’ average wage—between $13 and $14 an hour, according to executive director Carol Goss—means they can’t afford some of the simple things Conta takes for granted. Yet, when mulling over the powerful Seattle movement to raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour, Conta has some concerns. If tuition rose to cover the increase, she’d be in a tight spot. She and her husband, a housing contractor, already pay $2,200 a month—more than $26,000 a year—for child care. That’s more than their mortgage payments—and their baby goes to the center only two days a week. “I’m lucky that I’m home on Fridays and I have parents nearby,” she says. She knows that other parents pay upward of $3,000 a month. “Some parents pay more for child care than for college,” observes Kristin Rowe-Finkbeiner, the Isssaquah-based CEO of the national advocacy group Moms Rising. “It?s a crisis”—one fueled by **the U**nited **S**tates’ position **as one of the few wealthy Western countries that lacks substantial public subsidies for child care**. Herein lies a potential unintended consequence of the $15-wage movement. Will it exacerbate the excruciating conundrum faced by all but the richest of working parents? “That’s a great question,” says David Rolf, president of SEIU 775 and the co-chair of a minimum-wage advisory committee convened by the mayor. “That’s something we’ll have to take a look at.” Rolf points to another City Hall initiative, centered on universal preschool, that might serendipitously help provide a solution. If so, it’s but a partial one. There is little question that **without a change in the way child care is financed, a wage hike will result in higher fees for parents**. Consider a survey conducted last year by the Child Care Directors Association of Greater Seattle. An unanimous 100 percent said they had at least some teachers who make less than $15 an hour. Twenty-five percent of respondents said all their teachers earn less than that. **Child-care centers** are unlike the wealthy fast-food corporations that the minimum-wage movement rails against. They “**run pretty lean**,” says Johnny Otto, an association board member and executive director of Small Faces Child Development Center in Crown Hill. **Most**, he says, **spend between 85 and 90 percent of their revenue on salaries. If salaries are required to go up,** he says **there would be only two choices: cutting staff or raising tuition**. And **state regulations** regarding staff/child ratios **prevent many centers from cutting staff**. Otto says he and his board do see the benefits of raising the minimum wage. “You’re going to see teachers who stick around longer,” he says. Given the current low wages, turnover in the industry is so high that he says parents will tell you their kids have had “two, three, four teachers in a single year.” Plus, Otto predicts that higher wages will attract better-trained teachers, and give those without degrees the means to go back to school. “It’s going to be great for the quality of preschool and its professionalism,” he says. But he also recognizes that there would be a cost. Running the numbers, he calculates that Small Faces, which charges $1,255 a month for full-time care, would have to raise its fees by 15 percent. That’s less than other centers would, he says, because the center owns its building and derives extra income from renting out surplus space. **Goss**, of Interlake Child Care, **says that if a $15 minimum wage were enacted, she’d have to consider cutting** some of the **benefits** offered her unionized teachers, including health insurance and tuition for community-college classes in early childhood education. Still, she thinks it is likely she would have to raise fees, although she doesn’t know by how much. Recognizing that **the Wallingford center serves parents** who “are **struggling to pay some of the highest bills they’ll ever have**,” and **who in some cases have put off home ownership** to do so**, she worries about pricing the center beyond what the market will bear**. The economics of child-care centers are tricky, adds Otto. When rents went up during the housing boom, a number of centers closed, he says. When the bust came along and rents flattened, parents lost their jobs and took their kids out of child care. More centers closed. Between 2006 and 2013, according to the state Department of Early Learning, Seattle lost 2,600 child-care spots for preschoolers, a 14 percent drop. Hence the waiting lists of more than a year at many centers, making child care not only exorbitantly expensive but also harder than ever to find.

Unaffordability forces families to send their children to sub-standard day care; this turns child development

**D’Arcy 11** writes[[96]](#footnote-96)

Affordable child care tends to be one of those episodic concerns. Many working parents endure the expense, gritting their teeth until their children are ready for public school and, when they are, turn their attention to other worries. (Bigstock) But **a new report suggests that child-care costs in our region have grown so astronomical**, so unaffordable to many who live here **that it’s a city-wide crisis. In D.C., child-care centers for infants cost** an average of $18,200 annually, and **for older children, an average of $14,500**, according to the National Association of Child Care Resource & Referral Agencies (NACCRRA). That’s more than the average of every state in the country. **It’s** also significantly **more than the average tuition and fees for two years at a public college**. Maryland is not far behind with average costs working out to $12,400 for an infant in day care and $8,700 for an older child. In Virginia the average is $8,800 and $6,650 respectively. D.C., of course, is at a disadvantage when measured against states in surveys like this one. It’s a high-cost urban area that has more in common with other cities, not states. Still, when the Arlington-based NACCRRA compared median incomes to child-care costs, the District still came out as one of the least affordable areas for child care. It ranked as the sixth least affordable locale for child-care centers. Association spokeswoman Kristin S. Palmer said that although two-family incomes in the District are often much higher than the national median, single parents have a very low median income, so the cost of child care is far less affordable for single parents. She said the average annual cost of care for an infant in a center represents almost 70 percent of median income for a single mother in D.C. Seventy percent. That leaves very little left for housing, let alone a trip to the grocery store. With the recession, **families of lower, even average, incomes may be forced to pull their children** from license centers **and send them to unlicensed, unregulated centers** or homes. More often than not, **these plan Bs are substandard**. It’s well-established that **the quality of a day-care program can have long-term effects on the development of a child**, especially for children in lower-income families. **The National Institutes of Health** last year **published a study about** the **academic** and behavioral **benefits of high-quality child care**. In other words, the families here who would most benefit from high-quality care are nowhere near being able to afford it. Even if our families are no longer in the day-care years, that’s a problem for us all.

### Deon NC

**Action theory precedes ethics.**

**Anscombe 58** writes[[97]](#footnote-97)

**That I owe the grocer** such-and-such **a sum would be one** of a set of **fact**s **which would be "brute" in relation to** the description **"I am a bilker."** "Bilking" is of course a species of "dishonesty" or "injustice." (Naturally the consideration will not have any effect on my actions unless I want to commit or avoid acts of injustice.) So far, in spite of their strong associations, I conceive "bilking," "injustice" and "dishonesty" in a merely "factual" way. That I can do this for "bilking" is obvious enough; "justice" I have no idea how to define, except that its sphere is that of actions which relate to someone else, but "injustice," its defect, can for the moment be offered as a generic name covering various species. E.g.: "bilking," "theft" (which is relative to whatever property institutions exist), "slander," "adultery," "punishment of the innocent." **In present-day philosophy an explanation is required how an unjust man is a bad man, or an unjust action a bad one**; to give such an explanation belongs to **ethics**; but it **cannot** even **be begun until we are equipped with a sound philosophy of psychology.** For the proof that an unjust man is a bad man would require a positive account of justice as a "virtue." This part of the subject-matter of ethics is, however, completely closed to us until we have an account of what type of characteristic a virtue is-a problem, not of ethics, but of conceptual analysis-and how it relates to the actions in which it is instanced: a matter which I think Aristotle did not succed in really making clear. For this **we** certainly **need an account at least of what a human action is at all, and how its description** as "doing such-and-such" **is affected by** its motive and by the **intention** or intentions in it; and for this an account of such concepts is required.

**The volitional nature of agency mandates that reason be universalized to other persons**

**Korsgaard 6**

Christine Korsgaard (C Kizzle in the Hizzle, where Hizzle means Harvard). “Morality and the Logic of Caring: A Comment on Harry Frankfurt.” Stanford University Press. 2006.

But what, if anything, compels us to view reasons as public and universal in this way?15 In my view, part of the answer lies in the role of universal principles in unifying and therefore constituting the will or the self, the role played in Frankfurt’s view by caring. And **if the self is constituted by volition, it cannot** be assumed to **exist in advance of volition.** When I will to go to the dentist on the day of my appointment, I cannot be willing a law that my future self should go to the dentist, for whether I have a future self depends on whether that law and others like it are obeyed. If that law and others like it are not obeyed, then my body is, in Frankfurt’s terms, not that of a person but that of a wanton without a self, and no person has disobeyed my law. So I must be willing that an agent characterized in some other way—perhaps as the future conscious subject of my body—should go to the dentist. Minimally, this shows that any maxim that I will must universalize over some group more inclusive than my present conscious self, and that the normative force of the reason I legislate should be public and shared between me (my present conscious self ) and the members of that group.16 Perhaps it is only all the future conscious subjects of my body, but we need some reason why that and only that should be the relevant group, and some of the possible answers to that question suggest that the group should be more inclusive still. For instance, one possible answer is that I must interact cooperatively with the future conscious subjects of my body if I am to carry any of my projects out. But of course it may also be argued that **I must interact** cooperatively **with other** rational **agents as well**, for unless others respect my reasons and I respect theirs, we are apt to get in each other’s way.17 So it begins to look as if I must will universally and publicly— that is, will reasons I can share, not only with the future conscious subjects of my body, but with all rational beings, or at least all with whom I must interact. In any case, **I cannot coherently regard my reasons as applying merely to myself.** And there may be the beginnings of a route to morality.

**Thus the standard is respecting others as ends.**

Treating others as ends requires self-ownership

**Powell 13** writes[[98]](#footnote-98)

So what is Nozick’s libertarian position? It begins with natural rights. Quite literally. Here’s the first line of ASU: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).” These rights are natural in that we have them because of what we are and not because they were given to us by someone. But just saying we have rights isn’t the same as giving an argument for why we have them. To do this, **Nozick draws o**n Immanuel **Kant’s** famous **Categorical Imperative**, specifically its second formulation: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” Humans are by nature rational beings possessing dignity. This **dignity prevents us from being used by others**, and hence we have rights against such use. **Our rights function as “side-constraints**,” Nozick says, limiting what others—including the state—may do to us. We can’t trade rights away for benefits. For example, we are prohibited from deciding that a little more happiness or a little more wealth (or a lot more) is sufficient grounds for violating a person’s rights. People “may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent,” Nozick writes. “Individuals are inviolable.” **From this Nozick moves to** a basic principle of **self-ownership. I own myself and thus have a right to do with myself as I please**. You own yourself and have the same right. **I don’t own you and you don’t own me**. This gives each one of us rights not only to ourselves, but also to the fruits of our labor. (Nozick argues for this last point along Lockean lines.) In other words, **Nozick takes our fundamental rights to be** of the **negative** sort. **These are rights to be free from** certain acts by other people (**assault, theft, enslavement, etc.**)**, not rights to be provided with certain goods and services** (a right to healthcare, or a right to education).

Living wage is government coercion that hinders economic freedom—the aff’s interference with private companies is the issue

**Phillips 13** writes[[99]](#footnote-99)

The focus on wages reverses cause and effect. The focus on wages is a focus on consumption—what a worker can buy from his wages. But an individual cannot consume until he produces, unless he wishes to live as a parasite. Government intervention impedes production. Government intervention prevents individuals from starting businesses, creating jobs, developing new products or processes. **Government intervention prevents individuals from acting on their own judgment**. If someone wants to offer a job with a pay of $2 an hour, he should be free to do so. If he cannot attract enough workers at that wage, he will need to offer more or go out of business. If a worker is willing to work for $2 an hour, why should anyone prevent him from doing so? **If the business owner judges that a job is only worth $2 an hour, he should be free to act** on his own judgment**. If a worker judges that** a job paying **$2 an hour is his best opportunity, he should be free to act** on his own judgment. Government intervention in the employer/employee relationship prohibits each from acting as he thinks best for his own life. Like all advocates of government intervention, the **advocates of a “living wage” believe that they know what is best for other** individual**s. They are willing to use government coercion to dictate** how others may live **their lives**. Ironically, and sadly, while advocating a “living wage” they simultaneously seek to prohibit others from actually living.

Economic freedoms are key to self-ownership. We must allow individuals to personally negotiate the terms of their employment.

**Tomasi 12** writes[[100]](#footnote-100)

Consider first the classical liberals and libertarians. All liberals value the civil and political rights of individuals: the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, political participation, personal autonomy, and so on. But the members of this camp are distinct in asserting that the **economic rights of capitalism –** the right **to** start a business, **personally negotiate** the **terms of one’s employment, or decide how to spend** (or save) the income one earns **– are essential parts of freedom** too. Possessing some particular bundle of material goods, according to classical liberals and libertarians, is not nearly as important as possessing those goods because of one’s own actions and choices. **When we are free, we are aware of ourselves as central causes of the lives we lead**. It is not just captains of industry or heroes of Ayn Rand novels who define themselves through their accomplishments in the economic realm. **Many ordinary people become who they are**, and express who they hope to be, **by** the **personal choices they make regarding work**, saving and spending. These are areas in which people earn esteem from others and feel a proper pride for things they themselves do. Like many people around the world, I associate these libertarian ideas with the United States (though we might debate whether Americans affirm these ideas still). Dean Alfange’s 1951 poem ‘An American’s Creed’ includes these lines: ‘I do not wish to be a kept citizen, Humbled and dulled by having the state look after me. I want to take the calculated risk, To dream and to build, To fail and to succeed.’ According to philosophers in this camp, **diminishing personal agency in economic affairs – no matter how lofty the social goal – drains vital blood from a person’s life**. Whatever life they lead, on this ideal, citizens know it is substantially one of their own creation. Why this emphasis on property rights? Well, classical liberals such as Hayek and Richard Epstein are consequentialists: for purposes of political justification, they think of the person as a happiness seeker. They believe that capitalist institutions are efficient and defend market-society for that reason. Their **libertarian campmates, such as Nozick**, slightly differently, **begin** their political discussions **from the** Lockean **idea of persons as self-owners** – beings **who, having natural rights of ownership in themselves, have natural** ownership **rights to** the **fruits of their labour** too. Whether self-owners or individual happiness maximisers, philosophers on this coast claim that respecting persons means respecting property rights. These rights define, and strictly limit, the scope of legitimate state action.

### \*\*\*Case

### Contention

None of their solvency cards are about a government-mandated wage floor; even if high pay is good, the disad proves that forcing it on childcare centers makes them less affordable.

Their Ferguson et al 14 evidence is about paying teachers $125,000/year; that’s definitely more than the annual total from a living wage.

Childcare outweighs teacher effectiveness. It’s key to a child’s long-term development, that’s D’Arcy 11. Their evidence about teacher effectiveness improving student performance likely includes children who previously had quality day care.

### AT State = Util

1. **Only deon explains why to escape the state of nature.**

**Korsgaard 8**

Korsgaard, Christine M (Exceptionally practical reasoner). 2008. Taking the law into our own hands: Kant on the right to revolution. In The Constitution of Agency, 233-262. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, eds. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Why is it permissible for others to force or coerce you to conform to the duties of justice? The Universal Principle of Justice in effect says that the only restriction on freedom is consistency with the freedom of everyone else. Anything that is consistent with universal freedom is just, and you therefore have a right to do it. If someone tries to interfere with that right, he is interfering with your freedom and so violating the Universal Principle of Justice. Violations of the Universal Principle of Justice may be opposed by coercion for the simple reason that anything that hinders a hindrance to freedom is consistent with freedom, and anything that is consistent with universal freedom is just. It follows that rights are coercively enforceable. Indeed, coercive enforceability is not something attached to rights; it is constitutive of their very nature (MPJ 6:232). To have a right just is to have the executive authority to enforce a certain claim. **This** in turn **is the foundation of** the executive or coercive authority of **the political state.** Kant’s political philosophy is a social contract theory, in obvious ways in the tradition of Locke. But the differences are important. In Locke’s view, individuals have rights in the state of nature, and may enforce those rights. But when each person determines and enforces his own rights the result is social disorder. Since this disorder is contrary to our interests, people join together into a political state, transferring our executive authority to a government.

2. Policymakers care about side-constraints. Every state has them, e.g. the Constitution.

3. Util’s not constitutive of the state because no state is an impartial observer. States care more about national self-interest than global utility.

4. Roleplaying isn’t uniquely key to education.

Arguing about current government policy doesn’t require roleplaying.

**Harris 13** writes[[101]](#footnote-101)

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. **This idea** that **debate is about role playing** being a part of the government **puzzles me** greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now **never once have I role played being** part of **the government**. When **I** debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has **formed** many **opinions about what the government** and other institutions **should** or should **not do without** ever role playing **being part of those institutions**. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. **I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about** the **things their government does**. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. **I have no idea** at all **why it would be oppressive** for someone **to form an opinion about** whether or not they think **the government** should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

### Naturalism Turn

**No link and turn – Kant best unifies naturalism with the possibility of value**

**Korsgaard 89**

Korsgaard, Christine (voted most likely to be a reincarnation of Kant by her high school class). 1989. Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 2: 101-132. http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3219881/Korsgaard\_UnityofAgency.pdf?sequence=2

At this point it will be useful to say something about why I take the view which I am advancing to be a Kantian one. Kant believed that as rational beings we may view ourselves from two different standpoints.31 We may regard ourselves as objects of theoretical understanding, natural phenomena whose behavior may be causally explained and predicted like any other. Or we may regard ourselves as agents, as the thinkers of our thoughts, and the originators of our actions. These two standpoints cannot be completely assimilated to each other, and the way we view ourselves when we occupy one can appear incongruous with the way we view ourselves when we occupy the other. As objects of theoretical study, **we see ourselves as** wholly **determined by natural forces**, the mere undergoers of our experiences. Yet as agents, we view ourselves as free and responsible, as the authors of our actions, and the leaders of our lives. **This** incongruity **need not become contradiction**, so long as we keep in mind that the two views of ourselves spring from two different relations in which we stand to our actions. When we look at our actions from the theoretical standpoint our concern is with their explanation and prediction. When we view them from the practical standpoint our concern is with their justification and choice. These two relations to our actions are equally legitimate, inescapable, and governed by reason, but they are separate. Kant does not assert that it is a matter of theoretical fact that we are agents, that we are free, and that we are responsible. Rather, we must view ourselves in these ways when we occupy the standpoint of practical reason - that is, when we are deciding what to do. This follows from the fact that we must regard ourselves as the causes - the first causes - of the things that we will. And this fundamental attitude is forced upon us by the necessity of making choices, regardless of the theoretical or metaphysical facts.32 From the theoretical standpoint, an action may be viewed as just another experience, and the assertion that it has a subject may be, as Parfit says, "because of the way we talk." But from the practical point of view, actions and choices must be viewed as having agents and choosers. This is what makes them, in our eyes, our own actions and choices rather than events that befall us. In fact, it is only from the practical point of view that actions and choices can be distinguished from mere "behavior" determined by biological and psychological laws. This does not mean that our existence as agents is asserted as a further fact, or requires a separately existing entity that should be discernable from the theoretical point of view.33 It is rather that from the practical point of view our relationship to our actions and choices is essentially authorial : from it, we view them as our own. I believe that **when we think about the way** in which **our** own **lives matter to us** personally, **we think of ourselves in this way.** We think of living our lives, and even of having our experiences, as something that we do. And it is this important feature of our sense of our identity that Parfit's account leaves out.34

**Naturalism Irrelevant**

**Naturalism doesn’t preclude moral laws**

**Gordon 89**

David Gordon (Senior Fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute). “In Defense of Rights.” Printed in Man, Economy and Liberty by Walter Block and Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. (The Ludwig von Mises Institute). 1989. pp. 229-235

Rollins's argument seems founded on misunderstanding. First, why is it a condition for a rule of morality to be true that it have some effect in the physical world? It is certainly true that the moral law against theft does not act as an invisible physical barrier impeding thieves. But who ever supposed that moral laws are some sort of physical force like gravitation? Nothing will physically stop one from drawing an invalid conclusion: people do it all the time. Does this show that logical laws are mythical or imaginary? Similarly, why is it a necessary condition for a moral law's being true that those who observe it fare better (in the non-moral sense) than those who do not? There are no bad consequences, so far as I can see, entailed by believing that one can square the circle; nevertheless this belief is logically false.

**The NC doesn’t rely on any metaphysical claims**

**Ripstein 9**

Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto). Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press. 2009.

This formulation of your right to your person as your right to your body neither presupposes nor conflicts with any more general metaphysical claims about the relation between your person and your body. At the level of theoretical metaphysics, your person might be kept track of in other ways– the narrative of your actions, the fluctuations of your bank account, or your own conscious thoughts. As far as your claim against others, and the claims of others against you, however, the starting point must be your person as your body. You are the one to whom various things happened, the one who engaged in various transactions, and every time you did something or something happened to you, your body did it, or it happened to your body. If somebody wrongs you, he typically interferes with one or more aspects of your person; all are wrongs against your person by being wrongs against its aspects. Your person is not just a set of means that are at your disposal, but if another person interferes with your body, he thereby interferes with your ability to set and pursue your own purposes by interfering with the means that you have with which to set them, namely your bodily powers or abilities. Some philosophers have thought that you can keep track of your conscious thoughts without keeping track of your body. Any such possibility is irrelevant to the ways in which you may treat others, or others may treat you, consistent with your respective purposiveness. Your thoughts make no difference to the capacity of others to set and pursue their own purposes unless you act on them. You exercise your purposiveness by choosing, rather than merely wishing.

**Naturalism Bad**

**Ignore naturalism; it’s self-defeating**

**CS Lewis 46** writes[[102]](#footnote-102)

**It would be impossible to accept naturalism** itself **if we** really and consistently **believed naturalism. For naturalism is a system of thought. But for naturalism all thoughts are mere events with irrational causes. It is**, to me at any rate, **impossible to regard** the **thoughts** which make up naturalism **in that way and**, at the same time, to **regard them as a real insight into external reality.** Bradley distinguished idea-event from idea-making,15 but naturalism seems to me committed to regarding ideas simply as events. For meaning is a relation of a wholly new kind, as remote, as mysterious, as opaque to empirical study, as soul itself. Perhaps this may be even more simply put in another way. Every particular thought (whether it is a judgment of fact or a judgment of value) is always and by all men discounted the moment they believe that it can be explained, without remainder, as the result of irrational causes. Whenever you know what the other man is saying is wholly due to his complexes or to a bit of bone pressing on his brain, you cease to attach any importance to it. But if naturalism were true, then all thoughts whatever would be wholly the result of irrational causes. **Therefore, all thoughts would be equally worthless. Therefore, naturalism is worthless. If it is true, then we can know no truths.**

# Harrison

## Prostitution 1NC (In progress)

### Prostitution K

The aff’s criticism of prostitution treats it as inherently evil, precluding a harms reduction approach to sex work

**Weitzer 7** writes[[103]](#footnote-103)

When I mentioned the topic of prostitution to a friend recently, he said, “How disgusting! How could anybody sell themselves?” A few weeks later an acquaintance told me she thought prostitution was a “woman’s choice, and can be empowering.” These opposing views reflect larger cultural perceptions of prostitution, as well as much academic writing on the topic. A growing number of scholars regard prostitution, pornography, and stripping as “sex work” and study it as an occupation. Exploring all dimensions of the work, in different contexts, these studies document substantial variation in the way prostitution is organized and experienced by workers, clients, and managers. These **studies** undermine some deep-rooted myths about prostitution and **challenge writers and activists who depict prostitution monolithically. The most popular monolithic perspective is that prostitution is an unqualified evil.** According to this oppression model, exploitation, abuse, and misery are intrinsic to the sex trade. In this view, most prostitutes were physically or sexually abused as children, which helps to explain their entry into prostitution; most enter the trade as adolescents, around 13–14 years of age; most are tricked or forced into the trade by pimps or sex traffickers; drug addiction is rampant; customer violence against workers is routine and pervasive; working conditions are abysmal; and legalization would only worsen the situation. Some writers go further, characterizing the “essential” nature of prostitution. **Because prostitution is defined as an institution of extreme male domination** over women, these **writers say that violence and exploitation are inherent** and omnipresent**—transcending historical time period, national context, and type of prostitution.** As Sheila Jeffreys writes, “Prostitution constitutes sexual violence against women in and of itself”; and according to Melissa Farley, prostitution is a “vicious institution” that is “intrinsically traumatizing to the person being prostituted.” **Many** writers who subscribe to the oppression model use dramatic language (“sexual slavery,” “paid rape,” “survivors,” and so on) and **describe only the most disturbing cases**, which they present as typical—**rhetorical tricks designed to fuel public indignation**. The **oppression model’s images of victimhood erase workers’ autonomy and agency, and preclude** any possibility of **organizing sex work in order to minimize harm and empower workers.** This model holds that prostitution should be eradicated, not ameliorated. But much research challenges the oppression model as well as some other popular fictions.

Not all prostitution is harmful to women. The alternative is to endorse a polymorphous model of prostitution which recognizes its multi-faceted realities, rather than the aff’s monolithic generalizations

**Weitzer 7** writes[[104]](#footnote-104)

Street prostitution differs sharply from indoor prostitution. **Many** of the **problems associated with “prostitution” are** actually **concentrated in street prostitution** and much less evident in the indoor sector. Certainly many street prostitutes work under abysmal conditions and are involved in “survival sex,” selling sex out of dire necessity or to support a drug habit. **Some are runaway youths** with no other options. **Many use addictive drugs**; risk contracting and transmitting sexual diseases; **are exploited and abused by pimps; are vulnerable to being assaulted**, robbed, **raped, or killed**; and are socially isolated and disconnected from support services. This is the population best characterized by the oppression model. Other street prostitutes are in less desperate straits. Some work independently, without pimps (a Miami study found that only 7 percent had pimps, but the percentage varies greatly by city). Regarding age of entry, the oppression model’s claim of 13–14 years is clearly not the norm. A recent British study by Marianne Hester and Nicole Westmarland found that 20 percent of their sample had begun to sell sex before age 16 while almost half (48 percent) had begun after age 19. Childhood abuse (neglect, violence, incest) is indeed part of the biography of some prostitutes, but studies that compare matched samples of street prostitutes and nonprostitutes show mixed results; some find a statistically significant difference in experience of family abuse, while others find no difference. HIV infection rates are highest among street prostitutes who inject drugs and less common among others. Different writers report very different rates of victimization. Scholar-activists and some “survivor organizations” (Breaking Free, Standing Against Global Exploitation, Council for Prostitution Alternatives) cite high levels of violence against prostitutes (70–100 percent). Samples drawn from the clients of social service agencies or from antiprostitution survivor groups yield a much higher level of victimization (their clients were desperate enough to seek help) than samples drawn from the wider population of street workers. A study by Stephanie Church and colleagues found that 27 percent of a sample of street prostitutes had been assaulted, 37 percent robbed, and 22 percent raped. Criminologists John Lowman and Laura Fraser reported similar results: 39 percent assaulted, 37 percent robbed, and 37 percent sexually assaulted. Since random sampling of this population is impossible, we must approach all victimization figures cautiously, but victimization is apparently not nearly as prevalent, even among street prostitutes, as the oppression model asserts. Unfortunately, much popular discourse and some academic writing extrapolate from (a caricature of) street prostitution to prostitution in general. **What gets less attention is** the hidden world of **indoor prostitution in** venues such as **bars, brothels,** massage parlors, tanning salons, **or** in **services provided by escort agencies** or independent call girls. An estimated 20 percent of all prostitutes work on the streets in the United States. Although this number is hard to substantiate at the national level, some city-level studies support it. Regardless of the exact numbers, indoor sex work clearly accounts for a large share of the market. Less research has been conducted on indoor prostitution, but available s**tudies indicate that, compared to streetwalkers, indoor workers have lower rates of** childhood **abuse**, enter prostitution at an older age, **and have more education. They are less drug-dependent** and more likely to use softer drugs (marijuana instead of crack or heroin). Moreover, they use drugs for different reasons. Street workers consume drugs or alcohol to help them cope with the adversities of the job, whereas indoor workers use them both for coping and as part of their socializing with customers. **Sexually transmitted diseases are fairly rare among** call girls, **escorts**, and women who work **in brothels where condom use is mandatory. Indoor workers** tend to earn more money, are at lower risk of arrest, and are safer at work. They **are in a better position to screen out dangerous customers** (through a referral system for call girls and vetting by gatekeepers in brothels and massage parlors), and they have a higher proportion of low-risk, regular clients. Studies conducted in a variety of countries have found that indoor sex workers are less likely to experience violence from customers than those who work on the streets. For example, Church found that few call girls and sauna workers had experienced violence (only 1 percent had ever been beaten, 2 percent raped, and 10 percent robbed). This and other studies support Lilly Plumridge and Gillian Abel’s conclusion that “street workers are significantly more at risk of more violence and more serious violence than indoor workers.” (Obviously, this does not apply to persons recruited by force or fraud and trafficked into brothels, who are at high risk for subsequent exploitation and abuse.) Research finds that **many indoor workers made conscious decisions to enter the trade; they do not see themselves as oppressed victims** and do not feel that their work is degrading. Consequently, they express greater job satisfaction than their street-level counterparts. And they may differ little from nonprostitutes: A study by psychologist Sarah Romans and colleagues comparing indoor workers and an age-matched sample of nonprostitute women found no differences between the two groups in physical health, self-esteem, mental health, or the quality of their social networks. Some prostitutes feel validated and empowered by their work. In some studies, a large percentage of indoor workers report an increase in self-esteem after they began working in prostitution, state that they are very satisfied with their work, or feel that their lives improved after entering prostitution. Escorts interviewed by sociologist Tanice Foltz took pride in their work and viewed themselves as morally superior to others: “They consider women who are not ‘in the life’ to be throwing away woman’s major source of power and control, while they as prostitutes are using it to their own advantage as well as for the benefit of society.” A study by the Australian government reported that half of the 82 call girls and 101 brothel workers interviewed felt their work was a “major source of satisfaction” in their lives; two-thirds of the brothel workers and seven out of ten call girls said they would “definitely choose this work” if they had it to do over again; and 86 percent in the brothels and 79 percent of call girls said that “my daily work is always varied and interesting.” Ann Lucas’s **interviews with escorts** and call girls **revealed that these women had** the **“financial, social, and emotional wherewithal to** structure their work largely in ways that suited them and provided ... the ability to **maintain healthy self-images**.” Other studies indicate that such control over working conditions greatly enhances overall job satisfaction among these workers. Indoor and street prostitutes also differ in whether they engage in “emotion work” (providing intimacy, emotional support) in addition to sexual services. Emotion work is rare among streetwalkers, whose encounters are limited to quick, mechanical sex. But call girls and escorts (and, to a lesser degree, brothel and massage parlor workers) are often expected to support and counsel clients, and their encounters may resemble dating experiences, including conversation, gifts, hugging, massage, and kissing. Janet Lever and Deanne Dolnick’s comparative study of a large number of street and indoor workers in Los Angeles found striking differences between the two groups in the quantity and quality of their sexual and emotional interactions with clients. Emotion work is not necessarily easy; workers who feign intimacy or emotional support over an extended period of time may find the work quite draining. Many customers are looking for more than sex from indoor workers. Reviews of several websites where customers discuss their preferences and experiences indicate that many seek women who are friendly, conversational, generous with time, and who engage in cuddling and foreplay. This has come to be known as a “girlfriend experience” (GFE), with elements of romance and intimacy in addition to sex. One client writing in the popular Punternet websites said that he had “a gentle GFE that was more lovemaking than sex,” and another stated, “There was intimacy and sweat and grinding and laughter, and those moments that are sexy and funny and warm and leave you with a grin on your face the next day. Girlfriend sex.” Escorts and call girls also contribute to these websites, and their comments make it clear that many do not believe the oppression model applies to them. In sum, **prostitution takes diverse forms** and exists under varying conditions, **a complexity that contradicts** popular myths and **sweeping generalizations**. Plenty of evidence challenges the notion that prostitutes, across the board, are coerced into the sex trade, lead lives of misery, experience high levels of victimization, and want to be rescued. These patterns characterize one segment of the sex trade, but they are not the defining features of prostitution. Sex workers differ markedly in their autonomy, work experiences, job satisfaction, and self-esteem. **It’s time to replace the oppression model with a polymorphous model**—a perspective **that recognizes multiple** structural and **experiential realities.**

Harms reduction/legalization can benefit women. Prefer that to the aff’s idea that prostitution is inherently oppressive and wrong

**Weitzer 7** writes[[105]](#footnote-105)

According to the oppression model, legalization would only institutionalize exploitation and abuse. Antiprostitution groups insist that legalization is a recipe for misery and has a “corrosive effect on society as a whole,” according to the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women. It is difficult to measure something as vague as a “corrosive effect,” but it is possible to evaluate some other dimensions of legalization, including the effects on workers themselves. To address this question, we need to examine cases where prostitution is legal and regulated by the government. **Brothels are legal in a number of places**, including Nevada, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand. Statutory regulations vary by country, but a common objective is harm reduction. **New Zealand’s** 2003 **law**, for instance, **gives workers a litany of rights**, provides for the licensing and taxing of brothels, **and empowers local governments to** determine where they can operate, limit their size, vet the owners, ban offensive signage, and **impose safe-sex and other health requirements. Research suggests that**, under the right conditions, **legal prostitution can be organized in a way that increases** workers’ **health, safety, and job satisfaction. Mandatory condom use and other safe-sex practices are typical** in legal brothels, and the workers face much lower risk of abuse from customers. According to a 2004 report by the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands, **the “vast majority” of workers in Dutch brothels** and window units **report that they “often or always feel safe**.” Nevada’s legal brothels “offer the safest environment available for women to sell consensual sex acts for money,” according to a recent study by sociologists Barbara Brents and Kathryn Hausbeck. And a major evaluation of legal brothels in Queensland, Australia, by the government’s Crime and Misconduct Commission concluded, “There is no doubt that licensed brothels provide the safest working environment for sex workers in Queensland. ... Legal brothels now operating in Queensland provide a sustainable model for a healthy, crime-free, and safe legal licensed brothel industry.” In each of these systems, elaborate safety measures (surveillance, panic buttons, listening devices) allow managers to respond to unruly customers quickly and effectively. These studies suggest that **legal prostitution, while no panacea, is not inherently dangerous and can be structured to minimize risks** and empower workers.

The alternative doesn’t celebrate prostitution. Since it’s polymorphous, it recognizes that celebrations of prostitution are also monolithic

**Weitzer 7** writes[[106]](#footnote-106)

Although the oppression framework dominates today, **there is a diametrically opposed** cultural **representation that romanticizes prostitution**. We see this in some rock and hip-hop songs, films like Pretty Woman and The Best Little Whorehouse in Texas, novels like Tracy Quan’s Diary of a Married Call Girl, television shows like HBO’s Cathouse, and a handful of academic writings. Such representations portray prostitution as enjoyable, empowering, and lucrative work. In my view, **this celebratory model is just as one-dimensional and empirically limited as the oppression model. The alternative**, superior **perspective recognizes that prostitution varies enormously across time, place, and sector—with** important **consequences for** workers’ **health, safety, and job satisfaction.**

# Harvard Westlake

## Uganda 1NC

### T – Ugandan Administrative Districts

The affirmative must only defend national governments, not sub-national entities.

“Governments” represent the whole nation

**Random House no date** writes[[107]](#footnote-107)

4. **a branch or service of the supreme authority of a state or nation,** taken as **representing the whole: “a dam built by the government”**

They violate. The plan’s about “administrative districts.” There are 77 of these sub-national entities in Uganda

**Wikipedia no date** writes[[108]](#footnote-108)

**Uganda is divided into four administrative regions then further into 77 districts. the districts are divided into 146 counties** one city council, and thirteen municipalities. The counties of Uganda are divided into sub-counties The sub-counties are further divided into parishes and villages. Subdivisions in Uganda are officially united and served by the national government body, the Uganda Local Governments Association (ULGA).[1] ISO 3166-2:UG gives three letter codes for the districts.

Reasons to prefer:

1. Real-world. Multi-actor fiat is utopian since all 77 administrative districts of Uganda have probably never acted in unison. This kills education about how policy decisions are actually executed.

This also kills fairness since if multi-district action has never happened, most of the lit won’t address it which hurts my pre-round prep.

Real-world decision making is a voting issue and outweighs fairness and education.

**Strait and Wallace 7** writes[[109]](#footnote-109)

Why debate? Some do it for scholarships, some do it for social purposes, and many just believe it is fun. These are certainly all relevant considerations when making the decision to joining the debate team, but as debate theorists they aren’t the focus of our concern. Our concern in finding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of students with the highest quality of skills, while at the same time preserving competitive equity. The ability to make decisions deriving from discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. **It is the one thing every single one of us will do every day** besides breathing. **Decision making transcends boundaries between categories of learning like “policy education” and “kritik education,**” it makes irrelevant considerations of whether we will eventually be policymakers **and** it transcends questions of **what substantive content a debate round should contain.** The implication for this analysis is that the critical thinking and argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making are comparatively greater than any educational disadvantage weighed against them. It is the skills we learn, not the content of our arguments, that can best improve all of our lives. While **policy comparison** skills are going to be learned through debate in one way or another, those **skills are useless if they are not grounded in the** kind of **logic actually used to make decisions.**

2. Limits. Their interp justifies infinite affs about any single sub-national entity in any just government. My interp ensures that affs are limited to plans about national governments.

Studies prove that research overload kills in-depth education and causes superficiality.

**Chokshi 10** writes[[110]](#footnote-110)

When it comes to focus, turning on the spotlight may not matter as much as our ability to dim the ambient light. Nicholas Carr argued on Saturday in The Wall Street Journal that the Internet is making us dumber and on Monday The New York Times had a front-page feature on the mental price we pay for our multi-tasked lifestyles. If we are indeed losing our ability to think deeply, the key to fighting back may lie in a subtlety: focus may be more about our ability to filter out distractions than our ability to home in on the issue at hand. Carr posed his idea that technology is making us stupid in a 2008 Atlantic cover story and his forthcoming book "The Shallows" is a longer rumination on the theory**. According to professors and research cited in The Times piece "the idea that information overload causes distraction was supported by more and more research." And those distractions**, according to research Carr cites**, are forcing us to change the way we think. Deep thought is losing ground to superficiality.** So, if our multitasking lifestyle causes distraction, and distraction leads to superficial thinking, how do we fight back? Carr offers some advice:

Predictable limits are key to fairness and education because I can’t do in depth prep for the specific aff if there are 100s of affs to prepare for.

Limits are an independent voter. **Harris 13** writes[[111]](#footnote-111)

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. **The limits debate** is an argument that **has real** pragmatic **consequences.** I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, **I could put together a strategy against any random argument** somebody makes employing an energy metaphor **but** the reality is **there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to** actually spend time **play**ing **catch** with my children occasionally or maybe even **read a book or go to a movie** or spend some time with my wife. **A world where there are** an **infinite** number of **affirmatives** is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that **says this community doesn’t care whether** its **participants have a life** or **do well in school or spend time with their families.** I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get **to talk about anything** they want to talk about **without having to debate** against **t**opicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that **might make debate an unending nightmare** and not a very good home in which to live. **Limits**, to me, **are a real impact because I feel their impact** in my **everyday** existence.

Err neg on limits because **(a)** the massive number of philosophies means aff has large limits already **(b)** Massive limits exclude small-school debaters because there is not enough time in the day for one person to cut 145 case negs, and **(c)** this topic is already very large, so we should be skeptical of interps that risk being under-limiting.

The caselist doesn’t solve because **(a)** I still have to prep the whole topic to check back against new unbroken affs, and **(b)** the caselist already has 100s of debaters, some with more than one aff.

4. No aff offense. The topical version of the aff is that “The national government of the Republic of Uganda will require employers in the agricultural estate sub-sector pay a living wage to employees.”

D. Fairness is a voter since it’s a gateway issue to deciding the better debater. Education is a voter since it’s the end-goal of debate; substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational value to discussing it.

Drop the debater—

1. The NC was skewed. I can’t redo it after the 1AR shifts.

2. Key to deterrence. Drop the arg means aff will run abusive cases for the time skew.

3. Jurisdiction. Can’t vote for a nontopical plan.

4. Depth. Reject-the-arg theory forces us to cover theory and substance which leads to shallow theory debates that set worse norms for the activity.

Prefer competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

Aff only gets RVIs if they concede the violation, the voter, and that theory is evaluated through competing interps. 4 reasons.

1. It’s key to reciprocity because I meets, reject the arg, and reasonability make RVIs a nib for the aff which gives the aff a 4 to 1 advantage on theory.

2. Only offense to a counter-interp can trigger an RVI. If the aff doesn’t win that my interp is worse for debate, then it makes no sense to vote aff to deter it.

3. If the aff is going all in on theory with an RVI, they already have a reciprocal source of offense, so I meets and reasonability aren’t key.

4. Double-bind. If the I meet or reject the arg is false, the aff doesn’t need them. If the I meet or reject the arg is true, aff doesn’t need the RVI.

### Anthro K

Civil society is fundamentally opposed to animals. The human-animal divide is the foundation of modern biopolitics.

**Wadiwel 8** writes[[112]](#footnote-112)

**The civil political sphere** – that space where human public politics occurs, where ‘the political is declared,’ often through government, representation, measured participation and the ballot - **has inherent limitations that frustrate** the project of **ending violence towards animals. Animals are** “by nature” **always**, at best, **secondary entities, not due** the **political agency** that is **naturally bestowed** up**on humans**. In this way aperceived fundamental differentiation undermines any claim for equivalent political agency between human and non human, and assures that animals, even if granted consideration, will always be owed a lesser degree of responsibility. These limitations very clearly underpin animal welfare approaches, which seek to minimise animal suffering without necessarily changing the frameworks of violence and power that perpetuate this suffering. For example, the notion that slaughter houses are tolerable once perceived pain is eliminated. **Animal rights approaches** often fare better in this regard by seeking to demonstrate the existence of unjustifiable speciesism in order to guarantee equal protections. One of their principle arguments is that the life that is held by both non human and human animals alike has an intrinsic value. Yet rights approaches themselves face constraints that **reproduce the same fundamental differentiation** – the gap – between human and non human. For instance, in the “life boat case,” Tom Reagan stops short of agreeing that the death of an animal would constitute the same harm as the death of a human (2004: 324). Recent work by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (see 1998, 1999 and 2004) provides an opportunity to consider the place of animals within politics from a different standpoint than other approaches, such as animal rights or animal welfare interventions. Agamben’s focus on the concept of biopolitics, his attention to the relationship of politics to violence and to legitimation and the relation between the human and the non human, make his work worthy of analysis by those interested in the violence perpetrated by humans against non human animal life, even if Agamben’s own conclusions are themselves not aimed at finding solutions to these problems (see Wadiwel, 2003). While this approach differs from animal rights or welfare strategies in that it focuses concern on the nature and meaning of politics itself and its relationship to animality (Agamben understands **the political sphere** as a space that **aims to exclude animal life as its primary activity**), this approach does not seek to promote action within the terms of the civil political space. Rather it challenges the very boundaries of this space itself. Thus, although Agamben is no champion of animal rights or welfare, his philosophy offers a different way to conceptualise “the problem of the animal.” The term “biopolitics” is taken from Michel Foucault’s description of the contemporary focus of power towards biological life, its vicissitudes, its requirements, and its essence. An example of the effect of biopower within contemporary government is the focus upon meeting the broad biological needs of human populations: today government concerns itself with the deployment of resources for education and training, public health, the facilitation of relationships and organisations, fertility and “family” planning, the management of the economy, and the generalised financial well being of populations. Where Foucault treats biopolitics as a relatively modern form of rationality, tied closely with the emergence of government and the disciplines, Agamben suggests that the connection between biopower and the political space is much more significant and enduring. According to Agamben, **biological life is given** both **place** and meaning **within** the domain of **sovereignty through** its position of **vulnerability in relation to sovereign power.** Following Walter Benjamin, Agamben defines the life constituted by exception as “bare life,” which he identifies as the “bearer of the link between life and law” (1998: 65). **Bare life represents life contained within** the “zone of indistinction” or **the sovereign** ban, a life which is neither constituted by law, nor by divine justice, **where it is licit for sovereign power to “kill without committing homicide** and without celebrating a sacrifice**”** (83). It is **for this reason** that Agamben insists in his definition of ‘bare life,’ that **sovereignty constitutes life within the context of** a **power over life and death**: in Agamben’s words “human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed” (85). Biopolitical rationales become inseparable from the exceptional character of sovereign power, since the constitution of the political sphere itself necessarily entails the constitution of life (181). Thus, in so far as political sovereignty in the Western tradition defines itself through the capture of biological life, it is biopolitical in origin. Further, Agamben suggests that this view of political sovereignty assists to resolve the apparent tension between Foucault’s two apparently divergent foci of study: namely, “political techniques” associated with the State and government and “technologies of the self” relating to the disciplines and individuated power (5). In Agamben’s insistence that biopolitics is synonymous with the whole history of politics in the West, he identifies a process that unites the activity of state sovereignty with the evolution of individuated forms of biological control. Agamben remarks: “It can be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception” (6). Not only does **Agamben** identify closely the relation between biology and the political sphere, but he also **identifies this process as constitutive of the human / animal divide.** In The Open: Man and Animal, Agamben states: “In our culture, **the decisive political conflict, which governs every other conflict, is** that **between** the **animality and** the **humanity** of man**. That is to say,** in its origin **Western politics is** also **biopolitics**.” (Agamben, 2004: 80). I should be clear here that is not controversial in itself that Agamben should consider animal life within his understanding of biopolitics. After all, Foucault himself was aware of the long philosophical connection between human life and that of animals that gave shape to biopower: thus Foucault states “modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault, 1998: 143). But what is interesting in relation to Agamben’s understanding is that the contestation between human and animal should figure as defining of biopolitics itself, rather than a mere feature. Biopower (or politics in the West) is, before any thing else, a question of determining the distinction between human and animal. What interests me in Agamben’s pronouncements– if we hold them as true - is the possibility not merely of telling a history of biopolitics as the history of politics in the West, but tracing the genealogy of the relationship between the human, the animal and thus the biopolitical. There is an opportunity to revisit the “primal” scenes of Western public politics in order to draw attention to the curious recurrence of the animal within the development of the human political subject, and highlighting the fact that this subject is mapped by threshold points which although operate to formally exclude animal life, also intersect, and are grounded in, the animal. **It is** after all **no coincidence**, as I shall discuss, **that Aristotle describes “[hu]man” as the political animal;** that entity that finds its home within the polis; **an animal that is** at once **an animal, yet** is **also beyond other animals due to its natural residence within political community. This construction of the** human political **subject illustrates the** necessary **biopolitical connection of the human to** its **animal bare existence** – its biological soul if you like – that speaks and yet does not speak at the same time as the fully formed human subject. The animal arrives as a necessary burden to the human political subject, the connection to biological life it cannot seem to shake, and in many respects, the destiny that it inescapably returns to. Below, I provide three fragments on the animal from the classical age. These fragments are not intended to provide definitive statements on the positions of these thinkers on animals. Rather they intend to highlight the curious positioning of the animal with respect to the human, and the implication of this co-deportment for politics in the Western tradition. Thus, the fragments I look at are in many respects taken for what they are; the question I pose throughout is why they are positioned in the way that they are, and in what way do they illustrate something about the intersection of animal and human life, and its relationship to politics. These intertwinings are significant, as they indicate the historical existence of an active process of dividing between the human and the animal, a process that simultaneously defines the frontiers of the civil political space. And the flow on from this intersection, as I shall discuss in the conclusion to this paper, are the inherent limitation of engaging with the civil political space when this same sphere maintains as a principle of its operation a primary exclusion of non human animal life.

Their focus on liberation requires re-affirmation of a distinction between “human” and “animal.” This re-entrenches speciesism.

**Kim 9** writes[[113]](#footnote-113)

**Dyson gives a** perfunctory **nod to the animal** question and **then turns to focus on** the issue of true moral significance and urgency: **racism**. It is **as if defending the humanity of Black people requires reaffirming the animality of animals, their categorical subordination**. Similarly, feminist Sandra **Kobin asks why Vick was treated more harshly than** professional **athletes who beat their wives** and girlfriends, writing: “Beat a woman? Play on; Beat a dog? You’re gone” (Kobin 2007). Kobin does not critique dog fighting for its promotion of masculinist violence or show any appreciation of the fact that women and animals are both victims of male violence. Instead, she bristles at the idea that dogs might be valued more than women and insists that women are the victims that really matter. **What is troubling** about the racial persecution narrative advanced by Vick’s defenders **is not that it is wrong** per se **but that it** subsumes, **deflects, and** ultimately **denies** the other moral question being raised, **the animal question**. Its response to the interdependency of Blackness and animalness in the white imagination is not to deconstruct both notions but rather to vigorously affirm that Blacks are human and therefore deserving of better treatment than animals. **It** is a narrative that **embraces an ideology of human supremacy in the name of fighting white supremacy** and sees no contradiction in this position. It is as if Dyson and Kobin are saying that people of color and women have the most at stake in reinscribing the impassable line between humans and animals, whereas these groups may in fact have the most at stake in its erasure. Most humans are unaccustomed to thinking about how their politics reinscribe notions of human superiority over all other species, but the notion of species-free space is as improbable as that of race-free space. **Categories of difference saturate our thinking,** our **discourse**, our experience, **and** our **actions.**

Valuations of human labor are tainted by anthropocentric assumptions, such as the idea that humans are the supreme measure and producer of inert things. The impact is oppression of animals, women, and indigenous people.

**Mikulak 7** writes[[114]](#footnote-114)

[Brackets for gendered language or in original] **The current trend in biotech**nology and intellectual property rights **illustrates** some of the **problems with making human labour the sin qua non of value**. In her book Biopiracy, Vandana Shiva states that because biotechnology employs a reductionist paradigm, it reduces life to a series of processes and functions and “wildly exaggerates human power” (1997: 20). Those functions or components which do not fall into the definition — whether they are genes, molecules, or entire cultures — are therefore classified as useless, junk or redundant. By fragmenting the world into its constituent parts, a kind of DNA fatalism emerges that privileges the isolated part above the interrelated whole. In doing so, a reductionist worldview ignores the complicated interaction of organisms with their biotic and abiotic environments. “**Nature is declared** dead, **inert** and valueless,” **and the** scientist, like Marx’s **labourer**, **revivify the empty vessel of nature with** his **genius touch**, all the while denying nature’s self-organizational regeneration by declaring life as “terra nullius” (Shiva 1997: 24, 46). **A mechanistic view of nature** preferences engineering over growing and thus **establishes [hu]man as the measure of all things. This** view **becomes the foundation for the oppression of nature, women, and the developing world**. Because the tropics hold much of the world’s biodiversity, the old paradigm of colonialism is maintained through the patenting of life forms, whereby the **indigenous cultures that rely on** that **biodiversity are robbed of** their **way of life and sustenance**. Even though 75 percent of all plant-based medicine originates in traditional knowledge, and the process of creation is often based on simple extraction and purification, bio-prospecting is seen as adding enough novel value to warrant ownership (Shiva 1997: 74). In an act of astounding human arrogance the insertion of one gene constitutes creation, whereas hundreds of millions of years of evolution are simply background noise we have clarified and improved upon. Moreover, the ownership of life constitutes the colonisation of the internal space of life itself, and thus threatens to open a corporate Pandora’s Box. Stanley Aronowitz suggests that “the transformation of the human gene into an industrial raw material subject to private corporate ownership may signal the last frontier of the global empire” (2003: 186). **Marx**’s notion of homo faber **works within a similar ontology of labour based on anthropocentric transformative agency. He states that labour is** the **living force that takes raw materials and “awaken[s] them from the dead”** (Marx 1990: 289). In doing so **he** wildly **exaggerates humanity’s creative powers by making labour** into **a voodoo magic show of natural wonders** where the earth becomes Sleeping Beauty awaiting the kiss from Prince Proletariat Charming. Thus **he claims that** a spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and **a bee would put many a human architect to shame** by the construction of its honeycomb cells. **But** what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that **the architect builds the cell in his mind** before he constructs it in wax (1990: 284). Neil Evernden points out that a scientific, reductionist mode perpetuates its own assumptions because by “starting with mechanistic assumptions, it can only discover machines” (1985: 21). Because **Marx starts with the premise that animal**’**s do not think**, they of course do not seem to, and thus resemble clever machines rather than life forms capable of agency. An alien visitor to earth might make the same conclusion about humanity, having no knowledge of our language, or a means of translating the perceived activity into a correlative they could understand. This would especially be the case if this alien saw the extent to which we have undermined our own existence by polluting the earth. Consciousness for Marx is based on intent; however, proving intent is difficult enough in a legal setting when all the participants share the same language, form of consciousness, and context. Naturally, it will be even more difficult to do so across species lines, especially when you start with the assumption that only humans can transcend instinct. Neil Evernden points out that “animal is, by convention, the name of a thing, an object, a clever machine. To say one is animal-like is to say that he is thinglike, a mere object, or that he behaves like a machine, with no awareness or initiative” (1985: 77). The notion of unique consciousness, often connected with Descartes famous syllogism cogito ergo sum, delineates a hermetically sealed self whose home is not only outside of nature, it is outside of the body. This radical separation promotes a subjectobject dyad that Neil Evernden suggests is perhaps the “most potent adversary of environmental thought” (1985: 54).

3 impacts.

(a) Speciesism outweighs and turns the case; it spills over to broader structures of oppression

**Deckha 10** writes[[115]](#footnote-115)

While the intersection of race and gender is often acknowledged in understanding the etiology of justificatory narratives for war, the presence of species distinctions and the importance of the subhuman are less appreciated. Yet, the race (and gender) thinking that animates Razack’s argument in normalizing violence for detainees (and others) is also centrally sustained by the subhuman figure. As Charles Patterson notes with respect to multiple forms of exploitation: **Throughout** the **history** of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our **victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern**: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animas and do the same to them. Patterson emphasizes how the human/animal hierarchy and our ideas about animals and animality are foundational for intra-human hierarchies and the violence they promote. The routine violence against beings designated subhuman serves as both a justification and blueprint for violence against humans. **For example, in** discussing the specific dynamics of **the Nazi camps,** Patterson further notes how **techniques to make** the **killing** of detainees **resemble the slaughter of animals were deliberately implemented** in order **to make the killing seem more** palatable and **benign.** That the detainees were made naked and kept crowded in the gas chambers facilitated their animalization and, in turn, their death at the hands of other humans who were already culturally familiar and comfortable with killing animals in this way. Returning to Razack’s exposition of race thinking in contemporary camps, one can see how **subhuman thinking is foundational to race thinking.** One of her primary arguments is that race thinking, which she defines as “the denial of a common bond of humanity between people of European descent and those who are not”, is “a defining feature of the world order” today as in the past. In other words, it is the “species thinking” that helps to create the racial demarcation. As Razack notes with respect to the specific logic infusing the camps, they “are not simply contemporary excesses born of the west’s current quest for security, but instead represent a more ominous, permanent arrangement of who is and is not a part of the human community”. Once placed outside the “human” zone by race thinking, the detainees may be handled lawlessly and thus with violence that is legitimated at all times. Racialization is not enough and does not complete their Othering experience. Rather, **they must be dehumanized for the larger public to accept the violence against them** and the increasing “culture of exception” which sustains these human bodily exclusions. Although nonhumans are not the focus of Razack’s work, **the centrality of the subhuman to** the logic of the camps and **racial and sexual violence** contained therein **is** also **clearly illustrated in** her **specific examples**. In the course of her analysis, to determine the import of race thinking in enabling violence, **Razack quotes a** newspaper **story** that describes the background mentality **of** Private Lynndie England, **the** white female **soldier made notorious by images of her holding** onto imprisoned and **naked Iraqi men with a leash around their necks.** The story itself quotes a resident from England’s hometown who says the following about the sensibilities of individuals from their town: To the country boys here, if you’re a different nationality, a different race, you’re sub-human. That’s the way that girls like Lynndie England are raised. Tormenting Iraqis, in her mind, would be no different from shooting a turkey. Every season here you’re hunting something. Over there they’re hunting Iraqis. Razack extracts this quote to illustrate how “race overdetermined what went on”, but it may also be observed that species “overdetermined what went on”. Race has a formative function, to be sure, but it works in conjunction with species difference to enable the violence at Abu Ghraib and other camps. **Dehumanization promotes racialization, which further entrenches both identities.** It is an intertwined logic of race, sex, culture and species that lays the foundation for the violence.

(b) Anthropocentrism is epistemically suspect. Alternative forms of knowledge production are key.

**Das 14** writes[[116]](#footnote-116)

Parallax describes the apparent change in the direction of a moving object caused by alteration in the observer's position. In the graphic work of M.C. Escher, human faculties are similarly deceived and an impossible reality made plausible. While not strictly a scientific theorem, anthropocentrism, the assessment of reality through an exclusively human perspective, is deeply embedded in science and culture. **Improving knowledge requires abandoning anthro**pocentricity or, at least, acknowledging its existence. **Anthro**pocentrism's limits **derive from** the physical **constraints of human cognition and** specific **psychological attitudes**. Being human entails specific faculties, intrinsic attitudes, values and belief systems that shape enquiry and understanding. The human mind has evolved a specific physical structure and bio-chemistry that shapes thought processes. The human cognitive system determines our reasoning and therefore our knowledge. **Language,** logic, mathematics, abstract thought, **cultural beliefs, history and memories** create a specific human frame of reference, which **may restrict what we can know** or understand. There may be other forms of life and intelligence. The ocean has revealed creatures that live from chemo-synthesis in ecosystems around deep-sea hydrothermal vents, without access to sunlight. Life forms based on materials other than carbon may also be feasible. An entirely radical set of cognitive frameworks and alternative knowledge cannot be discounted. Like a train that can only run on tracks that determine direction and destination, **human knowledge may** ultimately **be constrained by** what **evolution** has made us**. Knowledge was originally driven by the need to master the** natural **environment** to meet basic biological needs—survival and genetic propagation. It was also needed to deal with the unknown and forces beyond human control. Superstition, religion, science and other belief systems evolved to meets these human needs. In the eighteenth century, medieval systems of aristocratic and religious authority were supplanted by a new model of scientific method, rational discourse, personal liberty and individual responsibility. But this did not change the basic underlying drivers. **Knowledge is also influenced by** human factors—**fear** and **greed, ambition,** submission and tribal collusion, **altruism** and jealousy**, as well as** complex **power relationships** and inter-personal group dynamics. **Behavioural science illustrates** the **inherent biases in human thought**. Announcing a boycott of certain "luxury" scientific journals, 2013 Nobel laureate Dr. Randy Schekman argued that to preserve their pre-eminence they acted like "fashion designers who create limited-edition handbags or suits…know[ing] scarcity stokes demand". He argued that science is being distorted by perverse incentives whereby scientists who publish in important journals with a high "impact factor" can expect promotion, pay rises and professional accolades. Understanding operates within these biological and attitudinal constraints. As Friedrich Nietzsche wrote: "**every philosophy hides a philosophy**; every opinion is also a hiding place, every word is a mask". **Understanding of fundamental issues remains limited**. The cosmological nature and origins of the universe are contested. The physical source and nature of matter and energy are debated. The origins and evolution of biological life remain unresolved. Resistance to new ideas frequently restricts the development of knowledge. The history of science is a succession of controversies—a non geo-centric universe, continental drift, theory of evolution, quantum mechanics and climate change. Science, paradoxically, seems to also have inbuilt limits. Like an inexhaustible Russian doll, quantum physics is an endless succession of seemingly infinitely divisible particles. Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle posits that human knowledge about the world is always incomplete, uncertain and highly contingent. Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems of mathematical logic establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems of arithmetic. Experimental methodology and testing is flawed. Model predictions are often unsatisfactory. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb observed: "You can disguise charlatanism under the weight of equations … there is no such thing as a controlled experiment." Challenging anthropocentrism does not mean abandoning science or rational thought. It does not mean reversion to primitive religious dogma, messianic phantasms or obscure mysticism. **Transcending anthro**pocentricity may allow new frames of reference expanding the boundary of human knowledge. It **may allow human beings to think more clearly**, consider different perspectives **and encourage possibilities outside** the **normal** range of **experience and thought**. It may also allow a greater understanding of our existential place within nature and in the order of things. As William Shakespeare's Hamlet cautioned a friend: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy". But fundamental biology may not allow the required change of reference framework. While periodically humbled by the universe, human beings remain enamoured, for the most part, with the proposition that they are the apogee of development. But as Mark Twain observed in Letters from Earth: "He took a pride in man; man was his finest invention; man was his pet, after the housefly." Writing in The Hitchhikers' Guide to the Galaxy, the late English author Douglas Adams speculated that the earth was a powerful computer and human beings were its biological components designed by hyper-intelligent pan-dimensional beings to answer the ultimate questions about the universe and life. To date, science has not produced a conclusive refutation of this whimsical proposition. Whether or not we can go beyond anthropocentrism, it is a reminder of our limits. As Martin Rees, Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, at Cambridge and Astronomer Royal, noted: "Most educated people are aware that we are the outcome of nearly 4 billion years of Darwinian selection, but many tend to think that humans are somehow the culmination. Our sun, however, is less than halfway through its lifespan. It will not be humans who watch the sun's demise, 6 billion years from now. Any creatures that then exist will be as different from us as we are from bacteria or amoebae."

(c)

Anthropocentrism makes everything extinct

**Gottlieb 94** writes[[117]](#footnote-117)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. **Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned** and not just because **we have set up** feedback loops that already lead to mass **starvations**, skyrocketing environmental **disease** rates, **and devastation of natural resources**. The problem with **ecocide** is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also **violates the very ground of our being**, our natural body, our home. **Such violence is done not** simply **to the other – as if the** rainforest, the river, the **atmosphere**, the species made extinct **are** totally **different from ourselves**. Rather, **we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other**, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is **nonhuman nature** is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other **is inside us** as well as outside us. **We prove it with every** breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every **glass of water we drink**. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely **our sense of belonging to nature as** system, as interaction, as **interdependence**, which **can provide the basis for** an **ethics** appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, **we are**, quite simply, **all in it together**. And, although **this new ecological** **Holocaust** -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – **is under way**, it is not yet final. **We have time to step back** **from the brink**, to repair our world. **But only if we see that world not as an other** across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, **but as a part of ourselves** as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; **neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all**.

The alternative is to orient ourselves in a way that is more attuned with nature. This solves extinction and requires we endorse a conception of society that isn’t as focused on labor or production

**Mikulak 7** writes[[118]](#footnote-118)

[Brackets for gendered language] **Given the** profoundly **apocalyptic potential of** the current **global environmental crisis**, we are at a point in history where **we need** the courage **to imagine a new future** by thinking inter-generationally and thus taking the future seriously as a referent. **We need a politics of hope that seeks to articulate** practical, **alternative modes of subjectivity**, society and systems of political-economic organization **that do not rely solely on profit,** instrumentality, **labour, production**, or on ephemeral notions of deep ecology that tend to replicate the very dualisms it rejects. To accomplish such a shift, **we must** begin by reconnecting the earth’s vocal cords and **reconstitut**ing **human society within the metabolism of nature.** Human **freedom, happiness, equality,** individual **agency, truth**, and all those venerable goals of the Enlightenment **may all be attained**, ushering a new renaissance of human history, **but what will they amount to if we cannot drink the water**, safely eat a carrot or potato, **or** even **breathe the air**. Cancer rates are already skyrocketing, childhood asthma is on the increase, and you cannot even enjoy a day in the sun for fear of cancer (Suzuki 2004). While a humanist ontology has been pushing towards the independence of the human mind, even the most abstract human activities nonetheless require calories, air, and water; there is no way to separate the base from the superstructure. Thus, **part of the solution must occur on the level of perception, by reversing** the **wholesale categorization of nature as an object**, and acknowledging that humanity is but one actor in the play that is life. Heidegger’s earlier philosophical discourse does just this by proposing a “nonessentialistic, nonsubjectivistic view of the internal constitution of things” that rejects the “technological disclosure of being as flexible raw material” (Zimmerman 1994: 126). He argues that if we can acknowledge the role of the land as a significant factor in determining our identities, then killing it would be like killing a piece of ourselves. For Heidegger, our alienation from the land can be understood through an ontological speculation about the relationship between subjects and objects. Inauthentic being occurs because we conceive ourselves as stable, self-grounding subject, thus transforming Dasein’s uncanny nothingness into a defendable thing: the ego-subject. Second, since Dasein cannot succeed in turning itself into a fixed entity, inauthentic Dasein continues to experience a sense of existential lack or incompleteness. One way of overcoming this lack is to fill up the self by consuming ever more entities. Death-denying, inauthentic Dasein, then, seeks to protect and to complete itself by dominating other people and by devouring the planet. (Zimmerman 1994: 111) Heidegger concludes that “the **securing of the highest** and unconditioned **self-unfolding of all human capacities to** the **unconditioned dominance over the** whole **Earth**, is the hidden thorn which **drives modern [hu]man**.’ In this process, **nature becomes nothing more than a gas**oline **station for fueling** the drive towards **infinite power**” (Zimmerman 1994: 112). Thus, for Heidegger, **the solution is to dwell authentically and in tune with your surroundings in a way that allows things “to be**,” through a movement towards a more holistic, interdependent model of understanding our relationship with the environment. With a similar impetus as Leopold’s land ethic, the concept of “dwelling” relies heavily on the understanding of nature as an interdependent community of individuals where the highest goal rests in a network of authentically dwelling beings in which each member of the community interacts, but does not unduly interfere with the course of another member’s self actualization. Although this position is quite abstract and offers no suggestions about the method of attaining this state, it does point to the fact that “the reality we occupy depends on the stance we take towards the world” (Evernden 1985: 98).

## Social Contract 1NC

### Util Framework

The standard is **maximizing happiness**.

First, revisionary intuitionism

Revisionary intuitionism is true and leads to util.

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[119]](#footnote-119)

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my **meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless.** And this appears to be a general syndrome - **people do much better when discussing whether torture is** good or **bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level** wherever I possibly can. Occasionally **people object** to any discussion of morality on the grounds **that morality doesn't exist**, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that **"exist" is not the right term to use** here, I generally say, "But **what do you do anyway?**" and **take the discussion back down to the object level.** Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. **I see** the project of **morality as a project of renormalizing intuition.** We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all** the **intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your** specific **intuitions and** refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a** grunting **caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. **Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - **it**'s **just** that modus ponens **still seems like a good idea after being** formalized, **reflected on**, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate** "**util**itarianism", **you run into paradoxes, contradictions**, circular preferences, **and other** things that aren't **symptoms of** moral wrongness so much as **moral incoherence.** After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. **After** the two hundred and eighty-seventh **research** study **showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity** - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could** look at this intuition, and **think it was** revealing **some** kind of **incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could** look at that and **say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't** successfully **multiply** by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. **But it ought to**, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. **When you've read enough** heuristics and **biases research, and enough coherence** and uniqueness **proofs for** Bayesian probabilities and **expected utility**, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, **then you don't see** the **preference reversals** in the Allais Paradox **as** revealing **some** incredibly **deep moral truth** about the intrinsic value of certainty. **It just goes to show that the brain doesn't** goddamn **multiply.** The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that **primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of** symbols standing for **small quantities** - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected** on enough intuitions, **and corrected enough absurdities, you** start to **see a common denominator, a meta-principle** at work, **which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. **And that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

Second, util is the only moral system available to policy-makers.

**Goodin 90** writes[[120]](#footnote-120)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. **Public officials** are obliged to **make** their **choices under uncertainty**, and uncertainty **of a** very **special sort** at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, **[they] are** relatively **poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they** typically **do know are** generalities: **averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people** as a result of their various possible choices, **but that is all. That** is enough to **allow[s]** public **policy-makers to use** the **util**itarian **calculus** – assuming they want to use it at all – to chose general rules or conduct.

And third, universalizability justifies util. **Singer 93**[[121]](#footnote-121)

The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly utilitarian position. My reason for suggesting this is as follows. **In accepting that ethical judgments must be** made from a **universal** point of view, **I am accepting that my own interests cannot,** simply because they are my interests, **count more than the interests of anyone else. Thus my** very natural **concern that my own interests be looked after must**, when I think ethically, **be extended to** the interests of **others.** Now, imagine that I am trying to decide between two possible courses of action – perhaps whether to eat all the fruits I have collected myself, or to share them with others. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethical considerations – I am, we might say, in a pre-ethical stage of thinking. How would I make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant would be how the possible courses of action will affect my interests. Indeed, if we define ‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in their interests (unless it is incompatible with another desire or desires), then it would seem that at this pre-ethical stage, only one’s own interests can be relevant to the decision. Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. **This requires me to weigh** up **all** these **interests and** adopt the course of action most likely to **maximize the interests of those affected.**

Morality must take the form of a universal rule. **Singer 9** writes[[122]](#footnote-122)

**When I prescribe something**, using moral language, **my prescription commits me to a** substantive **moral judgment about all** relevantly **similar cases. This includes hypothetical cases in which I am in a different position from my actual one. So to make a moral judgment, I must put myself** in the position of the other person affected by my proposed action – or to be more precise, **in the position of *all* those affected** by my action. Whether I can accept the judgment – that is, whether I can prescribe it universally – will then depend on whether I could accept it if I had to live the lives of all those affected by the action.

### UE Econ DA

US economic growth is high now because low unemployment is what’s improving consumer confidence

**Payne 1-30** writes[[123]](#footnote-123)

**Fueled by stronger consumer spending, the U.S. economy will grow at a 3.3%** clip **this year** — from 2.4% in 2014 — **and** will **continue to expand** next year. **Consumers are energized by** the **availability of more jobs** and by lower energy prices, which are putting more money into their pockets to shell out for other goods and services. Spending by consumers in the fourth quarter of 2014 grew at the fastest rate in more than eight years. Moreover, **with unemployment on the wane — further boosting perceptions of economic security — consumer confidence is at a seven-year high. With consumers spending more,** more and more **businesses will increase investment** in new production capacity. Housing is in a recovery mode, too, with builders expected to increase the pace of new-home construction this year. Though the Federal Reserve has more or less promised to start raising interest rates this year, most likely in the summer, we expect the hikes to be modest.

**The consensus of studies shows that wage increases cause unemployment, especially among the poor**

**Neumark and Wascher 6**

David Neumark (Professor of Economics at the University of California at Irvine, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Research Fellow at IZA) and William Wascher (Deputy Associate Director in the Division of Research and Statistics at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Review of Evidence from the New Minimum Wage Research.” National Bureau of Economic Research. November 2006. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12663.pdf>

We review the burgeoning literature on the employment effects of minimum wages - in the United States and other countries - that was spurred by the new minimum wage research beginning in the early 1990s. Our review indicates that there is a wide range of existing estimates and, accordingly, a lack of consensus about the overall effects on low-wage employment of an increase in the minimum wage. However, the oft-stated assertion that recent research fails to support the traditional view that the minimum wage reduces the employment of low-wage workers is clearly incorrect. A sizable majority of the studies surveyed in this monograph give a relatively consistent (although not always statistically significant) indication of negative employment effects of minimum wages. In addition, among the papers we view as providing the most credible evidence, almost all point to negative employment effects, both for the United States as well as for many other countries. Two other important conclusions emerge from our review. First, we see very few - if any - studies that provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages, especially from those studies that focus on the broader groups (rather than a narrow industry) for which the competitive model predicts disemployment effects. Second, the studies that focus on the least-skilled groups provide relatively overwhelming evidence of stronger disemployment effects for these groups.

US is key to the global economy.

**Caploe 9** writes[[124]](#footnote-124)

IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.' While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that **the global economy has** in fact **been 'America-centred' for more than 60 years**. Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US. This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity. At the same time, **this deep inter-connection between the US and the rest of the world also explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy** - 'sub-prime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - **has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression**. To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that **there is no other engine for the world economy** - and hasn't been for the last six decades. **If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen**. Thus, US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world. Consequently, it is a matter of global concern that the Obama administration seems to be following Japan's 'model' from the 1990s: allowing major banks to avoid declaring massive losses openly and transparently, and so perpetuating 'zombie' banks - technically alive but in reality dead. As analysts like Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman have pointed out, the administration's unwillingness to confront US banks is the main reason why they are continuing their increasingly inexplicable credit freeze, thus ravaging the American and global economies. Team Obama seems reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which its policies at home are failing not just there but around the world as well. Which raises the question: If the US can't or won't or doesn't want to be the global economic engine, which country will? The obvious answer is China. But that is unrealistic for three reasons. First, **China's economic health is** more **tied to America's** than practically any other country in the world. Indeed, the reason China has so many dollars to invest everywhere - whether in US Treasury bonds or in Africa - is precisely that it has structured its own economy to complement America's. **The only way China can serve as the engine of the global economy is if the US starts pulling it first**. Second, the US-centred system began at a time when its domestic demand far outstripped that of the rest of the world. The fundamental source of its economic power is its ability to act as the global consumer of last resort. China, however, is a poor country, with low per capita income, even though it will soon pass Japan as the world's second largest economy. There are real possibilities for growth in China's domestic demand. But given its structure as an export-oriented economy, it is doubtful if even a successful Chinese stimulus plan can pull the rest of the world along unless and until China can start selling again to the US on a massive scale. Finally, the key 'system' issue for China - or for the European Union - in thinking about becoming the engine of the world economy - is monetary: What are the implications of having your domestic currency become the global reserve currency? This is an extremely complex issue that the US has struggled with, not always successfully, from 1959 to the present. Without going into detail, it can safely be said that though having the US dollar as the world's medium of exchange has given the US some tremendous advantages, it has also created huge problems, both for America and the global economic system. The Chinese leadership is certainly familiar with this history. It will try to avoid the yuan becoming an international medium of exchange until it feels much more confident in its ability to handle the manifold currency problems that the US has grappled with for decades. Given all this, **the US will remain the engine of global economic recovery for the foreseeable future**, even though other countries must certainly help. This crisis began in the US - and it is going to have to be solved there too.

Econ decline causes extinction. **Harris and Burrows 9** writes[[125]](#footnote-125)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include** the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on **the sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the **potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a** constantly **volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that **become** self**-radicalized,** particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed Iran could **lead states** in the region **to** develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and **consider pursuing** their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to** an unintended **escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The **close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also **will produce inherent difficulties in** achieving reliable indications and **warning** of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times**, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may **place** more **focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if **protectionism grows** and **there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the **fiscal stimulus focus** for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious **funding** targets **may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead** to increased tensions, rivalries, and **counterbalancing** moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is likely to be increasingly difficult** both within and between states **in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

Growth turns the social contract.

**Arnason 99** writes[[126]](#footnote-126)

We may take it as axiomatic that **the social objective is to maximize** the common good or, in more modern parlance, **overall social welfare. This** fundamental **axiom** is not arbitrary. It **has deep roots in** social philosophy and ethics. It can for instance be justified on the basis of **social contract theories** in the tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and, more recently, Rawls (see Gough, 1957 and Rawls, 1971). According to these theories the proper social structure is what free and rational people ignorant of their prospective position in society but knowing everything else would agree on. From behind this “veil of ignorance”, so to speak, these people, form a contract  a social contract, specifying the organization of the society in which they and their descendants will live. In a deep sense this social organization is fair and just because this is what free and rational individual with no particular special interests ("the veil of ignorance" serves to eliminate special interests) would agree on. What would be the content of this social contract? Obviously two things: • Society should be organized in such a way that the supply of desirables should be as high as possible. • The distribution of these desirables to individuals should be reasonably equitable. The first stipulation is almost self-evident. Clearly, it doesn't make any sense to reduce the net availability of desirables. The second stipulation warrants some discussion. Let us first consider risk. Obviously every individual would like to have as much for himself as possible. However, when forming the "social contract" from behind the "veil of ignorance" he doesn't know his future place in society. Therefore, depending on the individuals' risk attitudes, they may have preferences over the distribution of desirables. Thus, clearly, perfect risk aversion would call for perfectly equal distribution and vice versa. With risk neutrality, on the other hand, any distribution is as good as the other. Therefore, assuming some risk aversion by individuals, the "social contract" would certainly put a limit on the inequality of distribution. The second consideration concerning the distribution of desirables has to do with their availability. From behind the "veil of ignorance" the individuals forming the "social contract", realize of course that the availability of desirables at each point of time may depend on the distribution of these desirables. Thus, with perennial equal sharing, people's willingness to produce might perhaps be undermined. Hence, it might be a good idea to maintain a system of rewards to induce people to exert themselves for the common good. This, of course, calls for a degree of inequality  an unequal distribution of desirables. It is important to realize, however, that this inequality is earned, so to speak. It is actually a reward for a larger contribution to the common good, just like the payment for labour. Therefore, any requirement regarding the distribution of desirables would first and foremost apply to the initial allocation, which people cannot really control, and not the subsequent accumulation of wealth, which depends largely on individual industry and enterprise. Modern welfare theory, although built on a somewhat different foundation namely utility theory, produces the same result. According to standard results of this theory, more precisely the Pareto criterion (see Ng, 1980), a necessary condition for welfare maximization is that the net production of desirable things be maximized. It is important to realize that it is net production that counts here, i.e. production where the use of all inputs including labour and natural resources has been subtracted. The other necessary condition for welfare maximization is that this production be shared or distributed appropriately amongst the population. So, **in accordance with** both **social contract theory** and utility theory **a natural social objective is to**: • **maximize** the **availability of desirables,** • **effect a fair distribution of** these **desirables**. To make this objective operational we must, however, specify further what we mean by desirables. Basically, desirables are what people regard as valuable. This means that **desirables are anything that people are willing to put a price on** or, equivalently, require a compensation to depart with. Thus, in a perfect market system, where everything is traded, desirables are the same as goods or commodities. **So, in this system the social objective** of maximizing the availability of desirables **is equivalent to maximizing** the gross domestic product (**GDP**). The real world, of course, does not contain perfect market systems. All actual market systems are imperfect to a greater or lesser degree. Therefore, in these economies, the GDP can not be regarded as equivalent to the aggregate availability of desirables. Faced with this practically difficulty, it may nevertheless be reasonable to regard GDP as a first approximation to the availability of desirables, at least in reasonably well functioning market economies. Similarly, the **contribution of production sectors to the common good may be measured by** the **net production of goods in these sectors**. It is sometimes asserted that there is a conflict between the most desirable distribution of goods and their maximum production. Therefore, the argument typically goes, we must relax the requirement of maximum net production in the interest of equity or fairness. This argument, while certainly not vacuous, is often given too much weight. One of the most important results in economic welfare theory, the second welfare theorem (Debreu 1959), is that any distribution of benefits that is desired is compatible with maximum production and, indeed, the market system. So, there is no fundamental conflict between the two objectives. Consequently, even in particular cases, there can be little reason to sacrifice economic efficiency for more fair distribution of the net production. The reason is not that distribution doesn't matter. The reason is that distributional considerations can, at least in principle, be taken care of by the appropriate initial allocation of endowments. Thus, we are apparently on fairly solid ground when assuming that the social purpose of the production sector is to maximize the net production of goods. It follows that we would like to organize the production activity and the surrounding social institutions so as to facilitate this. For this purpose we invent, modify, develop and scrap social institutions in our search for the most effective ones given our current technological knowledge. Obviously the same applies to every individual production activity making up the production sector as a whole and therefore also the fisheries sector. This should clearly be organized and operated so as to maximize the net-production of goods. Anything else will reduce the overall availability of goods and therefore economic opportunities to society as a whole. This raises the question of the appropriate organizational framework for the fisheries activity. To this we now turn.

### UBI CP (Social Contract Shell)

Counterplan: Just governments ought to provide a universal basic income of $11,400/year. Funding is through a 14% value added tax.

UBI solves poverty and income inequality from inevitable automation. It’s also key to the social contract.

**Dvorsky 14** writes[[127]](#footnote-127)

Robots are poised to eliminate millions of jobs over the coming decades. We have to address the coming epidemic of "technological unemployment" if we're to avoid crippling levels of poverty and societal collapse. Here's how a guaranteed basic income will help — and why it's absolutely inevitable. Illustration by Tara Jacoby The idea of a guaranteed basic income, also referred to as unconditional or universal basic income, is starting to gain traction in many parts of the world, both in developed and developing nations. It's actually a very simple idea: Everyone in society receives a single basic income to provide for a comfortable living whether they choose to work or not. Importantly, it's only intended to be enough for a person to survive on. The money for this social welfare scheme could come from the government or some other public institution, in addition to funds or income received from other sources. It could be taxable, or non-taxable, and divvyed up on a continual basis, monthly, or annually. Advocates argue that a **basic income is essential** to a comprehensive strategy **for reducing poverty because it offers extra income with no strings attached**. But looking ahead to the future, we may have little choice but to implement it. Given the ever-increasing concentration of wealth and the frightening prospect of technological unemployment, **it will be required to prevent complete social and economic collapse. It's not a question of if, but how soon.** A BIG Idea Whose Time Has Come As a concept, a basic income guarantee (BIG) has been bantered around for quite some time now. As early as 1795, American revolutionary Thomas Paine called for a Citizen's Dividend to all U.S. citizens for "loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the introduction of the system of landed property." Even Napoleon Bonaparte agreed that "man is entitled by birthright to a share of the Earth's produce sufficient to fill the needs of his existence." In his 1967 speech, "Where Do We Go From Here," Martin Luther King Jr. said: "I am now convinced that the simplest approach will prove to be the most effective — the solution to poverty is to abolish it directly by a now widely discussed measure: the guaranteed income." The idea has also been supported by the esteemed economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, the latter of whom advocated for a minimum guaranteed income via a "negative income tax." A number of countries are currently considering, or even implementing, various basic income schemes, such as Brazil, Switzerland, Canada, and Germany. Even conservatives are on board. A noted by Noah Gorden in The Atlantic, creating a wage floor would be an effective way to fight poverty and to reduce government spending and intrusion. Fewer and Fewer Jobs As we head deeper into the 21st century, it's becoming painfully obvious that there are fewer and fewer jobs available. As noted by Marshall Brain, founder of How Stuff Works and author of Manna, there are more working-age people in the U.S. receiving some form of welfare than there are working-age people who do not. He adds that Another interesting fact about the United States is that **a surprisingly large portion of working age adults are not working**, primarily **because there are too few jobs** to go around. This may not be obvious, because the declared unemployment rate in the United States seems low, at consistently less than 10% over a long period of time. The problem is that the official unemployment rate hides the huge number of working-age Americans who are no longer considered a part of the workforce. Currently, only 63% of working-age adults are actually working. Owing to technologically-induced unemployment, it's a problem that's only set to get worse. As noted in Brain's article, "Robotic Nation," this is a small sampling of what we have to look forward to: **Driverless cars** are improving rapidly, and it is easy to understand that they **will** begin to **eliminate** all the jobs held by **truck drivers**, taxi drivers, etc. That is a million or more jobs that will be lost. **Tablets** and kiosks in restaurants **will** be **eliminat**ing many of the jobs currently held by **waiters and waitresses**. There are currently 3.7 million full-time K-12 teachers in the United States. Yet there is a host of new tools, including MOOCs, apps, computer-aided instruction, etc. that will start eliminating teaching positions in the near future. The pressure to reduce the cost of public education is relentless, and so is the advancement in the technology. Combine those trends with similar trends in factories, the construction industry, retail, etc. Another prominent thinker who has given this considerable thought is James Hughes, a sociologist from Trinity College in Connecticut. "We are now entering the beginning of an era in which technology has started to destroy employment faster than it creates it," he told io9. "The advance of information technology, **a**rtificial **i**ntelligence **and robotics will eventually reduce** the **demand for all** forms of **human labor**, including those dependent on 'human skills' like empathy and creativity." He offers the example of Expedia. The online program may not be as creative at travel planning as an experienced travel agent, but it still displaces travel agents because it's considerably cheaper and more accessible. It's also an example of another impact of information technology, that of cutting out the middle man. "Eventually 3D printing and desktop manufacturing will cut out most of the work between inventors and consumers," says Hughes. "**Alongside growing tech**nological **unemployment, we will** also **be living** much **longer, and** will **need** to figure out **a**nequitable **solution to the growing ratio of retirees to workers** and tax-payers. **Basic income is the logical re-negotiation of the social contract to ensure that we don't spiral into widespread poverty and inequality**."

A 14% value-added tax is a good funding mechanism.

**Walker 14** writes[[128]](#footnote-128)

Many, perhaps most, authors writing on BIG do not suggest an amount for BIG. No doubt there is much wisdom in not attaching a dollar figure, but nevertheless, I am going to stick my neck out and say that it should be at least $10,000 USD per year in the U.S.[7] This meagre amount is below or at the official poverty line for most places in the U.S. In a land of plenty it is far from generous, yet, for many, it would be enough to stave off the worst forms of monetary deprivation. Some may say this is not enough, but the BIG is proposed as a floor rather than a ceiling. I’m all ears to proposals that call for a higher amount. Notice, however, that such proposals are entirely consistent with the claim that BIG should be at least $10,000. To show that BIG is economically feasible, let us first work on calculating its cost. As a first cut, there are 194 million adults 18-64 years of age in the U.S. A BIG of $10,000 equals $1,940 billion or $1.9 trillion for this group (Sheahen, 2012, 87). This represents only a portion of the over 300 million people living in the U.S. The 36 million seniors in the U.S. already have access to something like BIG: Social Security (Sheahen, 2012, 87). In the future, it might make sense to roll Social Security in with BIG, but for the present, we will assume that seniors will either collect their current Social Security or a BIG equivalent, whichever is greater. An additional 40 billion would be required to top up the lowest Social Security recipients to bring them up to the proposed $10,000 BIG (Sheahen, 2012). We will add this to our proposed budget, so we need to find an additional 40 billion to get to the total necessary to finance BIG to $1,980 billion.[8] So, we are looking to finance approximately an expenditure of two trillion dollars. A huge number for sure, but in terms of the size of the total U.S. economy, over 16 trillion (World Bank, 2014), BIG would represent only 12.5% of the U.S. economic pie. Allan Sheahen has looked at how the U.S. federal budget might be amended to pay for a $10,000 BIG (Sheahen, 2012). I am sympathetic with Sheahen’s approach but I want to explore an alternate means to finance BIG through a ‘value added tax’ (VAT). Europeans and many others are familiar with VAT, but for those who are not, VAT is basically a sales tax that would be added to all final goods and services sold in an economy. **A VAT of 14% would generate sufficient monies to pay for a $10,000 BIG**.[9] The VAT would apply to absolutely all final goods and services. So, there would be a 14% tax on food, haircuts, books, medical services and so on. **However, consider those trying to live on $10,000** a year **when the** new **VAT is introduced**. Suddenly, **their income would not go** nearly **as far**. Imagine they spend $200 a month on food. After the 14% VAT is introduced, the same groceries would cost $228 a month. Their share of rent would increase from $300 to $342 a month. To have the same purchasing power as before the new tax, those living on $10,000 a year would need another $1,400 to pay for the VAT. **So** this is what **I propose**: **increasing BIG to $11,400**. As should be clear, this won’t make those living on BIG as the sole source of income any better off, for although they have 14% more money, everything will cost 14% more because of the VAT. Of course this raises a worry: who wants to pay an additional 14% tax on top of existing taxes? Many might say: “Yes, I would like to help the poor but a 14% tax on everything is a huge burden.” In response, I say **most of us should welcome VAT** to pay for BIG **for purely self-interested reasons**. Suppose you have an above average salary of $50,000 per annum. A new tax of 14% would mean $6,100 in additional taxes. Yes, that is a lot out of $50,000, but remember too that you receive $11,400 in yearly BIG payments. So, under the proposal, your new total income is $61,400 (your $50,000 salary plus $11,400 BIG payment). **If you spend your entire income, your contribution to VAT would be $7,540, meaning that you would** actually **earn** $53,859 or **nearly $4,000 more on the proposal**. The following graph illustrates the relationship between income, VAT and BIG. It may help to walk through some of the information. The yellow line represents the proposed BIG payment. It is constant for everyone: BIG is exactly the same for everyone from a homeless veteran to Bill Gates. The purple line represents VAT, which everyone pays. The smallest contribution to VAT is $1,400, which a person living on just BIG would pay. Unlike the current income tax system, the proposed VAT is a “flat tax” meaning that the same percentage is paid no matter what a person’s income. Someone making $10,000 a year pays 14%, as does a person making $100,000 a year, or even $100 million per year. The blue line represents a person’s income in the present system. The red line represents the change in income (after paying VAT). In other words, the red line represents present income plus the BIG payment of $11,400 minus a 14% VAT. As can be seen, the red line crosses over the blue line at about the $81,000 income range. The vast majority would do better under this proposal even though it includes a large new tax: anyone making between $0 and $80,000 a year would be monetarily better off. About 90% of the population has a net personal income that falls below the cross-over point (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2014). So, the vast majority of the population would be better off financially under the 14% VAT and BIG proposal. Even for the higher income earners, the tax is hardly draconian. The top income tax rate for high income earners at present is 39.6%. So, the maximum a higher income earner would pay under this proposal is 53.6% (39.6% income tax plus 14% VAT). While this may seem like a lot, remember too, this is a maximum. The difference between the theoretical maximum and the actual tax paid (the effective tax rate) is enormous. The top 20% in terms of income pay only 20.1% income tax on average, and the top 1% pay a mere 20.6% (New York Times, 2012). In effect then, the difference between the maximum and the actual income tax rate is about half. So, the present proposal for the top 1% would increase the effective tax rate to nearly 35%. Or to put it another way, if all the loopholes were closed and the richest taxpayers actually paid 39.6%, then they would be much worse off. Again, this only applies to the top income earners. Consider how well someone making $100,000 a year would fare under the proposal. Looking at Graph 3, we can see they make less, but the difference is almost imperceptible on the graph. The difference is actually $2,281 in additional taxes. This would only change the effective tax rate by 2.3% for those in this income bracket. The relevance of this is that about half of the 10% of the population negatively affected by the tax earn between $81,000 and $100,000. The additional tax this group would have to pay is very small: at most, 2.3% of their income. It may help to note that historically, the highest rate for top earners was much higher. For most of the twentieth century the top rate was higher, reaching a peak in the Second World War at 91%. I am not trying to defend the suggestion at this point, only to put it in some context. I have assumed that nothing would change in terms of other taxes, but we should briefly consider this simple assumption. **With BIG, there would be** a **greatly reduced need for income tax to support welfare** programs. Conservatively, **federal welfare** programs are estimated to cost $400 billion (Sheahen, 2012).These **monies could be used to pay the additional cost of government services with a 14% VAT, reduce the deficit or offset future increases in income tax**.[10]

### \*\*\*Case

### Bostrom

Adopt a parliamentary model to account for moral uncertainty. This entails minimizing existential risks. **Bostrom 9** writes[[129]](#footnote-129)

It seems people are overconfident about their moral beliefs.  But **how should one** reason and **act if one** acknowledges that one **is uncertain about morality** – not just applied ethics but fundamental moral issues? if you don't know which moral theory is correct?

It doesn't seem **you can[’t] simply plug your uncertainty into expected utility** decision theory and crank the wheel; **because many** moral **theories** state that you **should not** always **maximize** expected **utility.**

Even if we limit consideration to consequentialist theories, it still is hard to see how to combine them in the standard decision theoretic framework.  For example, suppose you give X% probability to total utilitarianism and (100-X)% to average utilitarianism.  Now an action might add 5 utils to total happiness and decrease average happiness by 2 utils.  (This could happen, e.g. if you create a new happy person that is less happy than the people who already existed.)  Now what do you do, for different values of X?

The problem gets even more complicated if we consider not only consequentialist theories but also deontological theories, contractarian theories, virtue ethics, etc.  We might even throw various meta-ethical theories into the stew: error theory, relativism, etc.

I'm working on a paper on this together with my colleague Toby Ord.  We have some arguments against a few possible "solutions" that we think don't work.  On the positive side we have some tricks that work for a few special cases.  But beyond that, the best **we have managed** so far is **a** kind of **metaphor, which** we don't think is literally and exactly correct, and it is a bit under-determined, but it **seems to get things roughly right** and it might point in the right direction:

**The Parliamentary Model.**  Suppose that you have a set of mutually exclusive moral theories, and that you assign each of these some probability.  Now imagine that **each** of these **theorie**s **gets to send** some number of **delegates to The Parliament**.  The number of delegates each theory gets to send is **proportional to the probability of the theory.**  Then the delegates bargain with one another for support on various issues; and the Parliament reaches a decision by the delegates voting.  What you should do is act according to the decisions of this imaginary Parliament.  (Actually, we use an extra trick here: we imagine that the delegates act as if the Parliament's decision were a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A.  This has the effect of eliminating the artificial 50% threshold that otherwise gives a majority bloc absolute power.  Yet – unbeknownst to the delegates – the Parliament always takes whatever action got the most votes: this way we avoid paying the cost of the randomization!)

The idea here is that moral theories get more influence the more probable they are; yet **even a** relatively **weak theory can still get its way on some issues** that the theory think are extremely important **by sacrificing** its influence **on other** i**s**sues that other theories deem more important.  For example, **suppose you assign 10% probability to** total **util**itarianism and 90% to moral egoism (just to illustrate the principle).  Then **the Parliament** would mostly take actions that maximize egoistic satisfaction; however it **would make some concessions to util**itarianism **on** issues that utilitarianism thinks is especially important.  In this example, the person might donate some portion of their income to **existential risks** research and otherwise live completely selfishly.

I think there might be wisdom in **this model**.  It **avoids the** dangerous and **unstable extremism** that would result **from letting one’s current favorite moral theory completely dictate action**, while still allowing the aggressive pursuit of some non-commonsensical high-leverage strategies so long as they don’t infringe too much on what other major moral theories deem centrally important.

### AT Social Contract

1. Social contract commits the naturalistic fallacy. Just because descriptively states are formed by social contract doesn’t mean prescriptively states ought to follow it.

2. Citizenship doesn’t equal consent to the contract because (a) moving to a new state if you don’t consent isn’t economically feasible, and (b) the market of nations is limited. Every state will have some laws that citizens don’t consent to.

3. Hypothetical consent devolves into util because a premoral agent would only consent if it served their self-interest, so the state gains the most consent by maximizing the interest of as many as possible.

4. Extinction comes first even under his framework. You can’t have the consent of the governed if the governed don’t exist.

5. Contracts fail; they beg the question of morality. If we don’t already have a moral system, there’s no reason to follow the contract.

6. Contracts create a contradiction because we could agree to a contract to break contracts.

7. Singer precludes social contract. We have to universalize, so we have to consider even people who weren’t party to the contract.

8. Prefer util. It’s an impartial moral theory.

State boundaries are arbitrary, so true social contract means respecting everyone.

**Pogge 92** writes[[130]](#footnote-130)

“One may think that a shared responsibility for the justice of the social institutions in which we participate cannot plausibly extend beyond **our national institutional scheme**, in which we participate as citizens, and which we can most immediately affect. But such a limitation **is untenable because it treats as** natural or **God-given the existing global** institutional **framework, which is** in fact **imposed by human** beings **who are** collectively quite **capable of changing it. Therefore** at least **we** – privileged citizens of powerful and approximately democratic countries – **share a collective responsibility for the justice of the** existing **global order** and hence also for any contribution it may make to the incidence of human rights violations.”

The social contract applies globally. Drawing the line at citizenship is arbitrary.

**Caney 8** writes[[131]](#footnote-131)

First, the thesis that the borders of some, or all, principles of distributive justice are defined by the borders of the state needs to show why state membership is morally relevant. I argued that two prominent attempts to vindicate this view fail. We can, however, go further than this. For it is hard to see how state membership could have the type of normative significance ascribed to it by the statist views under consideration. Which state someone belongs to is, in very many cases, a matter of luck. **It is a matter of fortune whether someone is born into Berkshire or Bihar and it seems highly perverse to argue that such facts** should affect what people are entitled to. Why, one might ask, should being born into one state have such a tremendous impact on people’s prospects in life? It is hard to see why something so arbitrary – **as arbitrary as one’s class origin or social status or ethnic identity** – **should** be allowed to **have** such **normative implications** (Caney, 2005a, pp. 111ff.; Pogge, 1989, p. 247; 1994, p. 198). Consider in this light the ideal of equality of opportunity. Its aim is to ensure that people’s opportunities should not be shaped by morally arbitrary factors such as one’s ethnicity or regional identity. But given this, why should similarly arbitrary factors such as the country into which one is born be allowed to shape people’s opportunities (Caney, 2001)? Lest this argument is misunderstood two further points should be made. First, note that it is not sufficient to reply to this argument that some versions of the statist vision (like Blake’s) ascribe *some* entitlements to persons *qua* human beings. Such a position is an improvement on the view that principles of distributive justice are *entirely* defined by people’s membership of a state but we still need an argument as to why state membership should have *any* such fundamental moral importance at all. Why should membership of a state be an entitlement generating property? Second, it is important to see that the moral arbitrariness argument, alone, does not refute the *Statist Scope Thesis*. It poses a forceful challenge to any statist view but I can see no way of showing that no argument could in principle meet this objection.21 Any conclusive analysis must consider all the possible arguments one might give for the normative significance of state borders for the scope of distributive justice. This article has considered only two attempts to meet this challenge but, as the first section attests, there are other attempts and so the moral arbitrariness argument is not conclusive. It should therefore be seen as a powerful challenge to any would-be defence of the *Statist* *Scope Thesis* rather than a refutation. That said, it seems to me implausible that any argument can meet this challenge. The members of a state are, in all circumstances, highly heterogeneous in terms of their abilities, willingness to work, neediness, contribution to the social product and so on and it would be remarkable if they all (and they alone) shared some property that was entitlement generating.22 A second, related, concern about the statist approach is its incompleteness and its inherent conservatism. The *Statist Scope Thesis* takes it as a given that there should be a system of states. It then argues that there are distributive principles that apply solely to those included within the state. This line of reasoning is troubling in a number of respects. First, before we accept this kind of argument **we need an argument as to why there should be states in the first place.** Why not, for example, have a system of multi-level governance in which power is shared between global authorities, state-level authorities and sub-state institutions (Caney, 2005a, ch. 5; 2006b; Pogge, 2002, pp. 168–95)? Since such momentous normative implications (are said to) follow from statehood it is incumbent on the proponents of the *Statist Scope Thesis* to provide a defence of the state. Without this their argument is provisional and incomplete (which is not to say that it cannot be completed). Second, and relatedly, one cannot adequately determine whether there should be states or not without also taking into account the kinds of normative implication that Blake and Freeman attribute to them. It would be inappropriate to bracket out this implication, defend the state and then claim that these implications about the scope of justice follow. It is possible that if one knew that the creation of states had this anti-egalitarian implication one would decide partly on this basis that there should not be states. Third, **the statist**’s position is methodologically suspect for it appears to get matters back to front. It **starts with the world as it is and the boundaries that exist. As such it places a great deal of normative weight on the accidents of history and military conquests.** To paraphrase the opening lines of *The Social Contract*, we might say that a properly critical approach takes men and women as they are and laws and institutions as they might be (Rousseau, 1986 [1762], Book I, p. 49).

### Contention

Unemployment turns the case. If people end up without a job, the end result of the aff is that their dignity and autonomy isn’t respected.

Growth solves the aff. It leads to wage increases. North Dakota proves

**Puzder 14** writes[[132]](#footnote-132)

Real economic **growth would** naturally **increase** the **demand for labor-increasing wages without costing jobs**. Perhaps **the best example** of this **is Williston, North Dakota where a vibrant economy is creating** a **strong demand for labor**. Crew-level restaurant employees are already making $11 to $15 an hour and **Wal-Mart is offering starting jobs at $17 an hour. Even without a government mandate, wages will be higher** in any region where economic growth increases the demand for labor. It's really that simple.

**Treating welfare as a corporate subsidy is moral outsourcing which ignores our collective role in poverty**

**Economist 13**

The Economist. “Bad Welfare.” 19 July 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/07/living-wage-laws

THE "living wage" law under consideration in Washington, DC is terrible policy in more than one way. As my colleague points out, the law narrowly targets Walmart, though it does not specifically name Walmart. The majesty of the law resides in its generality. Rules intended to pick out particular individuals or firms are just thuggish. Perhaps it is believed by some members of the DC city council that Walmart, a company fairly notorious for its less than lavish compensation practices, has it coming. It has become a commonplace on the left to maintain that Walmart is "subsidised" by the taxpayer insofar as its employees make use of public assistance. That is to say, the "subsidy" to Walmart is the difference between the market wage and the "living wage", whatever that's determined to be. This idea strikes me as more than a little dotty. As Jason Brennan, a philosopher at Georgetown, puts it, "this presupposes that if you hire someone for, say, 40 hours a week, you owe him enough money for him to lead a decent life". If the value of a worker's labour is less to her employer than the cost of a reasonable standard of living, why should the employer be on the hook for the difference? Subsidising the worker, to bring her up to a certain baseline minimum, counts as a subsidy to the employer only if we think that was the duty of business all along—to pay workers not only a wage commensurate with the market value of their labour, but also sufficient to finance a life of a certain dignity and security. Mr Brennan goes on (using the example of Bob, a McBurger employee): Isn’t it more plausible to think that if there’s some enforceable positive duty to provide Bob with enough stuff to lead a life, that all of us, together share this burdensome duty, rather than just Bob’s employer? Why should Bob’s employer, specifically, be the one that has to bear the burden and lose all this money to keep him alive (at whatever level you consider decent)? This just seems like a kind of **moral outsourcing** to me. Why not instead Bob’s neighbors, parents, friends, or sexual partners? Bob does McBurger a service, and McBurger pays him for that service. Social insurance is an excellent idea. And it ought to be financed broadly. Let businesses seek efficiencies and competitive advantage, tax them (or their owners), and finance a generous safety net with the proceeds of generally robust economic performance.

Minimum wage legislation reduces bargaining power for low-skilled workers

**Boudreaux 14** writes[[133]](#footnote-133)

A worker’s **bargaining power is increased** only if that worker is made more attractive to employers, which means **only if that worker’s skills are made less abundantly available to employers**. This outcome can be achieved in several different ways, some socially productive and some not. For example, worker Jones can master skills that are in shorter supply relative to the demand for those skills; consumer demands for outputs can change in ways that raise employers’ demands for workers with skill sets similar to those of Jones; or artificial restrictions, such as occupational licensing, can be used to reduce the number of workers who compete with Jones for jobs. **What does not increase the bargaining power** of workers **is for government to strip** from them **a bargaining chip -** and such stripping is **exactly what minimum-wage legislation accomplishes for workers with the fewest and least-valuable skills**. Just as these workers’ bargaining power would fall if government prevented them from, say, working after sundown or from working on Wednesdays, **minimum-wage legislation reduces** these workers**’ bargaining power** by preventing them from competing for jobs (or for better non-wage terms of employment) **by offering to work at hourly wages below the minimum**. The minimum wage does nothing at all to make the skills of the lowest-skilled workers less abundantly available to employers while it simultaneously makes these workers less attractive to employers. Some workers’ bargaining power, however, is indeed enhanced by the minimum wage, namely, workers who are somewhat more skilled than the lowest-skilled workers who lose their jobs. By artificially removing the lowest-skilled workers from the ranks of the employable, minimum-wage legislation artificially increases employers’ demand for many higher-skilled (or otherwise more ‘desirable’) workers. For example, employers’ demand for the skills of my private-school educated, upper-middle-class 17-year-old white son is raised by minimum-wage legislation. The reason is that such legislation prevents many teenagers from poorer families – who are denied the bargaining chip of being able to offer to work for wages lower than the minimum - from competing with my son for a job. Is that fair? Is that just? I think not.

## Rawls 1NC

### Util Framework

The standard is **maximizing happiness**.

First, revisionary intuitionism is true and leads to util.

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[134]](#footnote-134)

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my **meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless.** And this appears to be a general syndrome - **people do much better when discussing whether torture is** good or **bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level** wherever I possibly can. Occasionally **people object** to any discussion of morality on the grounds **that morality doesn't exist**, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that **"exist" is not the right term to use** here, I generally say, "But **what do you do anyway?**" and **take the discussion back down to the object level.** Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. **I see** the project of **morality as a project of renormalizing intuition.** We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all** the **intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your** specific **intuitions and** refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a** grunting **caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. **Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - **it**'s **just** that modus ponens **still seems like a good idea after being** formalized, **reflected on**, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate** "**util**itarianism", **you run into paradoxes, contradictions**, circular preferences, **and other** things that aren't **symptoms of** moral wrongness so much as **moral incoherence.** After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. **After** the two hundred and eighty-seventh **research** study **showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity** - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could** look at this intuition, and **think it was** revealing **some** kind of **incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could** look at that and **say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't** successfully **multiply** by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. **But it ought to**, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. **When you've read enough** heuristics and **biases research, and enough coherence** and uniqueness **proofs for** Bayesian probabilities and **expected utility**, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, **then you don't see** the **preference reversals** in the Allais Paradox **as** revealing **some** incredibly **deep moral truth** about the intrinsic value of certainty. **It just goes to show that the brain doesn't** goddamn **multiply.** The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that **primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of** symbols standing for **small quantities** - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected** on enough intuitions, **and corrected enough absurdities, you** start to **see a common denominator, a meta-principle** at work, **which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. **And that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

And second, respect for human worth would justify util. **Cummiskey 90**[[135]](#footnote-135)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends any market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

### UBI CP

Counterplan: Just governments ought to provide a universal basic income equivalent to $11,400/year. Funding is through a 14% value added tax.

UBI solves poverty and income inequality from inevitable displacement of human labor by robots

**Dvorsky 14** writes[[136]](#footnote-136)

Robots are poised to eliminate millions of jobs over the coming decades. We have to address the coming epidemic of "technological unemployment" if we're to avoid crippling levels of poverty and societal collapse. Here's how a guaranteed basic income will help — and why it's absolutely inevitable. Illustration by Tara Jacoby The idea of a guaranteed basic income, also referred to as unconditional or universal basic income, is starting to gain traction in many parts of the world, both in developed and developing nations. It's actually a very simple idea: Everyone in society receives a single basic income to provide for a comfortable living whether they choose to work or not. Importantly, it's only intended to be enough for a person to survive on. The money for this social welfare scheme could come from the government or some other public institution, in addition to funds or income received from other sources. It could be taxable, or non-taxable, and divvyed up on a continual basis, monthly, or annually. Advocates argue that a **basic income is essential** to a comprehensive strategy **for reducing poverty because it offers extra income with no strings attached**. But looking ahead to the future, we may have little choice but to implement it. Given the ever-increasing concentration of wealth and the frightening prospect of technological unemployment, **it will be required to prevent complete social and economic collapse. It's not a question of if, but how soon.** A BIG Idea Whose Time Has Come As a concept, a basic income guarantee (BIG) has been bantered around for quite some time now. As early as 1795, American revolutionary Thomas Paine called for a Citizen's Dividend to all U.S. citizens for "loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the introduction of the system of landed property." Even Napoleon Bonaparte agreed that "man is entitled by birthright to a share of the Earth's produce sufficient to fill the needs of his existence." In his 1967 speech, "Where Do We Go From Here," Martin Luther King Jr. said: "I am now convinced that the simplest approach will prove to be the most effective — the solution to poverty is to abolish it directly by a now widely discussed measure: the guaranteed income." The idea has also been supported by the esteemed economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, the latter of whom advocated for a minimum guaranteed income via a "negative income tax." A number of countries are currently considering, or even implementing, various basic income schemes, such as Brazil, Switzerland, Canada, and Germany. Even conservatives are on board. A noted by Noah Gorden in The Atlantic, creating a wage floor would be an effective way to fight poverty and to reduce government spending and intrusion. Fewer and Fewer Jobs As we head deeper into the 21st century, it's becoming painfully obvious that there are fewer and fewer jobs available. As noted by Marshall Brain, founder of How Stuff Works and author of Manna, there are more working-age people in the U.S. receiving some form of welfare than there are working-age people who do not. He adds that Another interesting fact about the United States is that **a surprisingly large portion of working age adults are not working**, primarily **because there are too few jobs** to go around. This may not be obvious, because the declared unemployment rate in the United States seems low, at consistently less than 10% over a long period of time. The problem is that the official unemployment rate hides the huge number of working-age Americans who are no longer considered a part of the workforce. Currently, only 63% of working-age adults are actually working. Owing to technologically-induced unemployment, it's a problem that's only set to get worse. As noted in Brain's article, "Robotic Nation," this is a small sampling of what we have to look forward to: **Driverless cars** are improving rapidly, and it is easy to understand that they **will** begin to **eliminate** all the jobs held by **truck drivers**, taxi drivers, etc. That is a million or more jobs that will be lost. **Tablets** and kiosks in restaurants **will** be **eliminat**ing many of the jobs currently held by **waiters and waitresses**. There are currently 3.7 million full-time K-12 teachers in the United States. Yet there is a host of new tools, including MOOCs, apps, computer-aided instruction, etc. that will start eliminating teaching positions in the near future. The pressure to reduce the cost of public education is relentless, and so is the advancement in the technology. Combine those trends with similar trends in factories, the construction industry, retail, etc. Another prominent thinker who has given this considerable thought is James Hughes, a sociologist from Trinity College in Connecticut. "We are now entering the beginning of an era in which technology has started to destroy employment faster than it creates it," he told io9. "The advance of information technology, **a**rtificial **i**ntelligence **and robotics will eventually reduce** the **demand for all** forms of **human labor**, including those dependent on 'human skills' like empathy and creativity." He offers the example of Expedia. The online program may not be as creative at travel planning as an experienced travel agent, but it still displaces travel agents because it's considerably cheaper and more accessible. It's also an example of another impact of information technology, that of cutting out the middle man. "Eventually 3D printing and desktop manufacturing will cut out most of the work between inventors and consumers," says Hughes. "**Alongside growing tech**nological **unemployment, we will** also **be living** much **longer, and** will **need** to figure out **a**nequitable **solution to the growing ratio of retirees to workers** and tax-payers. **Basic income is the logical re-negotiation of the social contract to ensure that we don't spiral into widespread poverty and inequality**."

A 14% value-added tax is a good funding mechanism.

**Walker 14** writes[[137]](#footnote-137)

Many, perhaps most, authors writing on BIG do not suggest an amount for BIG. No doubt there is much wisdom in not attaching a dollar figure, but nevertheless, I am going to stick my neck out and say that it should be at least $10,000 USD per year in the U.S.[7] This meagre amount is below or at the official poverty line for most places in the U.S. In a land of plenty it is far from generous, yet, for many, it would be enough to stave off the worst forms of monetary deprivation. Some may say this is not enough, but the BIG is proposed as a floor rather than a ceiling. I’m all ears to proposals that call for a higher amount. Notice, however, that such proposals are entirely consistent with the claim that BIG should be at least $10,000. To show that BIG is economically feasible, let us first work on calculating its cost. As a first cut, there are 194 million adults 18-64 years of age in the U.S. A BIG of $10,000 equals $1,940 billion or $1.9 trillion for this group (Sheahen, 2012, 87). This represents only a portion of the over 300 million people living in the U.S. The 36 million seniors in the U.S. already have access to something like BIG: Social Security (Sheahen, 2012, 87). In the future, it might make sense to roll Social Security in with BIG, but for the present, we will assume that seniors will either collect their current Social Security or a BIG equivalent, whichever is greater. An additional 40 billion would be required to top up the lowest Social Security recipients to bring them up to the proposed $10,000 BIG (Sheahen, 2012). We will add this to our proposed budget, so we need to find an additional 40 billion to get to the total necessary to finance BIG to $1,980 billion.[8] So, we are looking to finance approximately an expenditure of two trillion dollars. A huge number for sure, but in terms of the size of the total U.S. economy, over 16 trillion (World Bank, 2014), BIG would represent only 12.5% of the U.S. economic pie. Allan Sheahen has looked at how the U.S. federal budget might be amended to pay for a $10,000 BIG (Sheahen, 2012). I am sympathetic with Sheahen’s approach but I want to explore an alternate means to finance BIG through a ‘value added tax’ (VAT). Europeans and many others are familiar with VAT, but for those who are not, VAT is basically a sales tax that would be added to all final goods and services sold in an economy. **A VAT of 14% would generate sufficient monies to pay for a $10,000 BIG**.[9] The VAT would apply to absolutely all final goods and services. So, there would be a 14% tax on food, haircuts, books, medical services and so on. **However, consider those trying to live on $10,000** a year **when the** new **VAT is introduced**. Suddenly, **their income would not go** nearly **as far**. Imagine they spend $200 a month on food. After the 14% VAT is introduced, the same groceries would cost $228 a month. Their share of rent would increase from $300 to $342 a month. To have the same purchasing power as before the new tax, those living on $10,000 a year would need another $1,400 to pay for the VAT. **So** this is what **I propose**: **increasing BIG to $11,400**. As should be clear, this won’t make those living on BIG as the sole source of income any better off, for although they have 14% more money, everything will cost 14% more because of the VAT. Of course this raises a worry: who wants to pay an additional 14% tax on top of existing taxes? Many might say: “Yes, I would like to help the poor but a 14% tax on everything is a huge burden.” In response, I say **most of us should welcome VAT** to pay for BIG **for purely self-interested reasons**. Suppose you have an above average salary of $50,000 per annum. A new tax of 14% would mean $6,100 in additional taxes. Yes, that is a lot out of $50,000, but remember too that you receive $11,400 in yearly BIG payments. So, under the proposal, your new total income is $61,400 (your $50,000 salary plus $11,400 BIG payment). **If you spend your entire income, your contribution to VAT would be $7,540, meaning that you would** actually **earn** $53,859 or **nearly $4,000 more on the proposal**. The following graph illustrates the relationship between income, VAT and BIG. It may help to walk through some of the information. The yellow line represents the proposed BIG payment. It is constant for everyone: BIG is exactly the same for everyone from a homeless veteran to Bill Gates. The purple line represents VAT, which everyone pays. The smallest contribution to VAT is $1,400, which a person living on just BIG would pay. Unlike the current income tax system, the proposed VAT is a “flat tax” meaning that the same percentage is paid no matter what a person’s income. Someone making $10,000 a year pays 14%, as does a person making $100,000 a year, or even $100 million per year. The blue line represents a person’s income in the present system. The red line represents the change in income (after paying VAT). In other words, the red line represents present income plus the BIG payment of $11,400 minus a 14% VAT. As can be seen, the red line crosses over the blue line at about the $81,000 income range. The vast majority would do better under this proposal even though it includes a large new tax: anyone making between $0 and $80,000 a year would be monetarily better off. About 90% of the population has a net personal income that falls below the cross-over point (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2014). So, the vast majority of the population would be better off financially under the 14% VAT and BIG proposal. Even for the higher income earners, the tax is hardly draconian. The top income tax rate for high income earners at present is 39.6%. So, the maximum a higher income earner would pay under this proposal is 53.6% (39.6% income tax plus 14% VAT). While this may seem like a lot, remember too, this is a maximum. The difference between the theoretical maximum and the actual tax paid (the effective tax rate) is enormous. The top 20% in terms of income pay only 20.1% income tax on average, and the top 1% pay a mere 20.6% (New York Times, 2012). In effect then, the difference between the maximum and the actual income tax rate is about half. So, the present proposal for the top 1% would increase the effective tax rate to nearly 35%. Or to put it another way, if all the loopholes were closed and the richest taxpayers actually paid 39.6%, then they would be much worse off. Again, this only applies to the top income earners. Consider how well someone making $100,000 a year would fare under the proposal. Looking at Graph 3, we can see they make less, but the difference is almost imperceptible on the graph. The difference is actually $2,281 in additional taxes. This would only change the effective tax rate by 2.3% for those in this income bracket. The relevance of this is that about half of the 10% of the population negatively affected by the tax earn between $81,000 and $100,000. The additional tax this group would have to pay is very small: at most, 2.3% of their income. It may help to note that historically, the highest rate for top earners was much higher. For most of the twentieth century the top rate was higher, reaching a peak in the Second World War at 91%. I am not trying to defend the suggestion at this point, only to put it in some context. I have assumed that nothing would change in terms of other taxes, but we should briefly consider this simple assumption. **With BIG, there would be** a **greatly reduced need for income tax to support welfare** programs. Conservatively, **federal welfare** programs are estimated to cost $400 billion (Sheahen, 2012).These **monies could be used to pay the additional cost of government services with a 14% VAT, reduce the deficit or offset future increases in income tax**.[10]

### UE Econ DA

US economic growth is high now because low unemployment is what’s improving consumer confidence

**Payne 1-30** writes[[138]](#footnote-138)

**Fueled by stronger consumer spending, the U.S. economy will grow at a 3.3%** clip **this year** — from 2.4% in 2014 — **and** will **continue to expand** next year. **Consumers are energized by** the **availability of more jobs** and by lower energy prices, which are putting more money into their pockets to shell out for other goods and services. Spending by consumers in the fourth quarter of 2014 grew at the fastest rate in more than eight years. Moreover, **with unemployment on the wane — further boosting perceptions of economic security — consumer confidence is at a seven-year high. With consumers spending more,** more and more **businesses will increase investment** in new production capacity. Housing is in a recovery mode, too, with builders expected to increase the pace of new-home construction this year. Though the Federal Reserve has more or less promised to start raising interest rates this year, most likely in the summer, we expect the hikes to be modest.

**The consensus of studies shows that wage increases cause unemployment, especially among the poor**

**Neumark and Wascher 6**

David Neumark (Professor of Economics at the University of California at Irvine, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Research Fellow at IZA) and William Wascher (Deputy Associate Director in the Division of Research and Statistics at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Review of Evidence from the New Minimum Wage Research.” National Bureau of Economic Research. November 2006. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12663.pdf>

We review the burgeoning literature on the employment effects of minimum wages - in the United States and other countries - that was spurred by the new minimum wage research beginning in the early 1990s. Our review indicates that there is a wide range of existing estimates and, accordingly, a lack of consensus about the overall effects on low-wage employment of an increase in the minimum wage. However, the oft-stated assertion that recent research fails to support the traditional view that the minimum wage reduces the employment of low-wage workers is clearly incorrect. A sizable majority of the studies surveyed in this monograph give a relatively consistent (although not always statistically significant) indication of negative employment effects of minimum wages. In addition, among the papers we view as providing the most credible evidence, almost all point to negative employment effects, both for the United States as well as for many other countries. Two other important conclusions emerge from our review. First, we see very few - if any - studies that provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages, especially from those studies that focus on the broader groups (rather than a narrow industry) for which the competitive model predicts disemployment effects. Second, the studies that focus on the least-skilled groups provide relatively overwhelming evidence of stronger disemployment effects for these groups.

Econ decline causes extinction. **Harris and Burrows 9** writes[[139]](#footnote-139)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include** the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on **the sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the **potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a** constantly **volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that **become** self**-radicalized,** particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed Iran could **lead states** in the region **to** develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and **consider pursuing** their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to** an unintended **escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The **close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also **will produce inherent difficulties in** achieving reliable indications and **warning** of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times**, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may **place** more **focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if **protectionism grows** and **there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the **fiscal stimulus focus** for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious **funding** targets **may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead** to increased tensions, rivalries, and **counterbalancing** moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is likely to be increasingly difficult** both within and between states **in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

Growth turns the veil of ignorance. **Arnason 99** writes[[140]](#footnote-140)

We may take it as axiomatic that **the social objective is to maximize** the common good or, in more modern parlance, **overall social welfare. This** fundamental **axiom** is not arbitrary. It **has deep roots** in social philosophy and ethics. It can for instance be justified on the basis of social contract theories **in the tradition of** Locke, Rousseau, Kant and, more recently, **Rawls** (see Gough, 1957 and Rawls, 1971). According to these theories the proper social structure is what free and rational people ignorant of their prospective position in society but knowing everything else would agree on. **From behind this “veil of ignorance”**, so to speak, these **people**, **form** a contract  **a social contract**, specifying the organization of the society in which they and their descendants will live. In a deep sense this social organization is fair and just because this is what free and rational individual with no particular special interests ("the veil of ignorance" serves to eliminate special interests) would agree on. **What would be the content** of this social contract**?** Obviously two things: • Society should be organized in such a way that the supply of desirables should be as high as possible. • The distribution of these desirables to individuals should be reasonably equitable. The first stipulation is almost self-evident. Clearly, it doesn't make any sense to reduce the net availability of desirables. The second stipulation warrants some discussion. Let us first consider risk. Obviously every individual would like to have as much for himself as possible. However, when forming the "social contract" from behind the "veil of ignorance" he doesn't know his future place in society. Therefore, depending on the individuals' risk attitudes, they may have preferences over the distribution of desirables. Thus, clearly, perfect risk aversion would call for perfectly equal distribution and vice versa. With risk neutrality, on the other hand, any distribution is as good as the other. Therefore, assuming some risk aversion by individuals, the "social contract" would certainly put a limit on the inequality of distribution. The second consideration concerning the distribution of desirables has to do with their availability. **From behind the "veil** of ignorance**"** the **individuals** forming the "social contract", **realize** of course that the **availability of desirables** at each point of time **may depend on** the **distribution** of these desirables. Thus, with perennial equal sharing, people's willingness to produce might perhaps be undermined. **Hence, it might be a good idea to maintain** a system of **rewards to induce people to exert themselves for the common good**. This, of course, calls for a degree of inequality  an unequal distribution of desirables. It is important to realize, however, that this inequality is earned, so to speak. It is actually a reward for a larger contribution to the common good, just like the payment for labour. Therefore, any requirement regarding the distribution of desirables would first and foremost apply to the initial allocation, which people cannot really control, and not the subsequent accumulation of wealth, which depends largely on individual industry and enterprise. Modern welfare theory, although built on a somewhat different foundation namely utility theory, produces the same result. According to standard results of this theory, more precisely the Pareto criterion (see Ng, 1980), a necessary condition for welfare maximization is that the net production of desirable things be maximized. It is important to realize that it is net production that counts here, i.e. production where the use of all inputs including labour and natural resources has been subtracted. The other necessary condition for welfare maximization is that this production be shared or distributed appropriately amongst the population. So, **in accordance with** both **social contract theory** and utility theory **a natural social objective is to**: • **maximize** the **availability of desirables,** • **effect a fair distribution of** these **desirables**. To make this objective operational we must, however, specify further what we mean by desirables. Basically, desirables are what people regard as valuable. This means that **desirables are anything that people are willing to put a price on** or, equivalently, require a compensation to depart with. Thus, in a perfect market system, where everything is traded, desirables are the same as goods or commodities. **So, in this system the social objective** of maximizing the availability of desirables **is equivalent to maximizing** the gross domestic product (**GDP**). The real world, of course, does not contain perfect market systems. All actual market systems are imperfect to a greater or lesser degree. Therefore, in these economies, the GDP can not be regarded as equivalent to the aggregate availability of desirables. Faced with this practically difficulty, it may nevertheless be reasonable to regard GDP as a first approximation to the availability of desirables, at least in reasonably well functioning market economies. Similarly, the **contribution of production sectors to the common good may be measured by** the **net production of goods in these sectors**. It is sometimes asserted that there is a conflict between the most desirable distribution of goods and their maximum production. Therefore, the argument typically goes, we must relax the requirement of maximum net production in the interest of equity or fairness. This argument, while certainly not vacuous, is often given too much weight. One of the most important results in economic welfare theory, the second welfare theorem (Debreu 1959), is that any distribution of benefits that is desired is compatible with maximum production and, indeed, the market system. So, there is no fundamental conflict between the two objectives. Consequently, even in particular cases, there can be little reason to sacrifice economic efficiency for more fair distribution of the net production. The reason is not that distribution doesn't matter. The reason is that distributional considerations can, at least in principle, be taken care of by the appropriate initial allocation of endowments. Thus, we are apparently on fairly solid ground when assuming that the social purpose of the production sector is to maximize the net production of goods. It follows that we would like to organize the production activity and the surrounding social institutions so as to facilitate this. For this purpose we invent, modify, develop and scrap social institutions in our search for the most effective ones given our current technological knowledge. Obviously the same applies to every individual production activity making up the production sector as a whole and therefore also the fisheries sector. This should clearly be organized and operated so as to maximize the net-production of goods. Anything else will reduce the overall availability of goods and therefore economic opportunities to society as a whole. This raises the question of the appropriate organizational framework for the fisheries activity. To this we now turn.

### \*\*\*Case

### Bostrom

Adopt a parliamentary model to account for moral uncertainty. This entails minimizing existential risks. **Bostrom 9** writes[[141]](#footnote-141)

It seems people are overconfident about their moral beliefs.  But **how should one** reason and **act if one** acknowledges that one **is uncertain about morality** – not just applied ethics but fundamental moral issues? if you don't know which moral theory is correct?

It doesn't seem **you can[’t] simply plug your uncertainty into expected utility** decision theory and crank the wheel; **because many** moral **theories** state that you **should not** always **maximize** expected **utility.**

Even if we limit consideration to consequentialist theories, it still is hard to see how to combine them in the standard decision theoretic framework.  For example, suppose you give X% probability to total utilitarianism and (100-X)% to average utilitarianism.  Now an action might add 5 utils to total happiness and decrease average happiness by 2 utils.  (This could happen, e.g. if you create a new happy person that is less happy than the people who already existed.)  Now what do you do, for different values of X?

The problem gets even more complicated if we consider not only consequentialist theories but also deontological theories, contractarian theories, virtue ethics, etc.  We might even throw various meta-ethical theories into the stew: error theory, relativism, etc.

I'm working on a paper on this together with my colleague Toby Ord.  We have some arguments against a few possible "solutions" that we think don't work.  On the positive side we have some tricks that work for a few special cases.  But beyond that, the best **we have managed** so far is **a** kind of **metaphor, which** we don't think is literally and exactly correct, and it is a bit under-determined, but it **seems to get things roughly right** and it might point in the right direction:

**The Parliamentary Model.**  Suppose that you have a set of mutually exclusive moral theories, and that you assign each of these some probability.  Now imagine that **each** of these **theorie**s **gets to send** some number of **delegates to The Parliament**.  The number of delegates each theory gets to send is **proportional to the probability of the theory.**  Then the delegates bargain with one another for support on various issues; and the Parliament reaches a decision by the delegates voting.  What you should do is act according to the decisions of this imaginary Parliament.  (Actually, we use an extra trick here: we imagine that the delegates act as if the Parliament's decision were a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A.  This has the effect of eliminating the artificial 50% threshold that otherwise gives a majority bloc absolute power.  Yet – unbeknownst to the delegates – the Parliament always takes whatever action got the most votes: this way we avoid paying the cost of the randomization!)

The idea here is that moral theories get more influence the more probable they are; yet **even a** relatively **weak theory can still get its way on some issues** that the theory think are extremely important **by sacrificing** its influence **on other** i**s**sues that other theories deem more important.  For example, **suppose you assign 10% probability to** total **util**itarianism and 90% to moral egoism (just to illustrate the principle).  Then **the Parliament** would mostly take actions that maximize egoistic satisfaction; however it **would make some concessions to util**itarianism **on** issues that utilitarianism thinks is especially important.  In this example, the person might donate some portion of their income to **existential risks** research and otherwise live completely selfishly.

I think there might be wisdom in **this model**.  It **avoids the** dangerous and **unstable extremism** that would result **from letting one’s current favorite moral theory completely dictate action**, while still allowing the aggressive pursuit of some non-commonsensical high-leverage strategies so long as they don’t infringe too much on what other major moral theories deem centrally important.

### Devolves to Util

1. Util controls the link to Rawls. Contractors under the veil of ignorance would agree to maximize utility to increase the chance of their own interests being satisfied.

2. Extinction turns Rawls. It harms the least well-off.

3. Rawls is too idealistic. Util solves. **Bowden 9**[[142]](#footnote-142)

This attack is principally on Bentham‟s greatest good for the greatest number, a position which has already been noted as only partially reflective of Mill. Mills does argue for the greatest amount of happiness altogether (Warnock, p199), but labels the sacrifice of individual happiness for the overall benefit as “absurd”. An allied but stronger argument against utilitarianism that Mill specifically rejects is that minorities will be sacrificed for the wishes of the majority. **Mill** rejects this argument in On Liberty, warning us that tyranny of the majority is “among the evils… society requires to be on its guard”. He **regards utility as the ultimate appeal** on all ethical questions, including the issue of compulsion, but “utility in the largest sense” (Mill, 1859/1929, pp. 5, 13). These statements are **a direct refutation of** the accusations of **Rawls** and Williams, and as it will be seen, to a large extent of Nussbaum‟s. Rawls‟ theories bring up wider issues in the distribution of wealth and opportunity, which Mill tackles only indirectly: “Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly , and therefore are of more absolute obligation , than any other rules for the guidance of life.” There are differences between the two treatments of justice. **Mill is arguing from the need to** strengthen and **improve current societal practices; Rawls wants to create a new world order.** His objectives are far more reaching. Mill builds on the current; Rawls overturns it and creates anew. It is, however, extremely debatable whether they are in conflict as Rawls claims. Where Mill says his views will take many generations to implement, **it is doubtful whether Rawls’ society can be created at all.** The greatest difference between the two, however, is in the ethical decision any outside observer is about to make. **Mill’s response is immediate. We get an answer to a current question. Rawls** however **is remaking society. It is not** at all an **easy** task **to determine if society could** even **adopt Rawls’ theory of justice.**

4. Rawls devolves to util. Otherwise his assumptions about primary goods fail.

**Arneson 2k**[[143]](#footnote-143)

The defender of a Rawlsian primary goods standard might interject a skeptical response at this point: the utility-based conceptions of justice are nonstarters because no satisfactory standard of interpersonal comparison for the purpose can be developed. In a Theory of Justice, Rawls does not emphasize the difficulties about interpersonal comparison, and indicates the superiority of justice as fairness lies along some other dimension. The interpersonal comparison problem is no doubt significant, though in my judgment not insoluble. Here I wish to make a more limited point: **Rawls** has his own unsolved difficulties with interpersonal comparison, so, **living in a glass house,** he **is poorly placed to** be **throw**ing **stones at util**itarian **windows. According to Rawls, there are several primary** social **goods**. Some of these qualify as basic liberties, so are treated within the equal liberty principle, which is accorded strict priority within Rawls’s system. But this leaves several primary goods **other than basic liberties, so** in order **to apply the difference principle**, which requires that the expectations of these primary goods be maximized for the worst off class of persons, **we need an index of these goods**: a way of determining, for any disaparate bundles of these goods, which contain more primary goods overall. If one bundle containing various amounts of various primary goods can be matched with another bundle that contains more of each of these distinct primary goods, then the second bundle dominates the first, and unambiguously contains more primary goods overall. But for the many cases where dominance does not hold, we need an index. **I do not see how** an individual’s bundle of **primary goods can be assessed except in terms of the extent** to which **those goods enable the individual to satisfy her preferences, or** to **fulfill some** given **objective conception of the good**, and neither of these ways of assessment provides a measure that is consistent with Rawls’s strategy of argument and core assumptions. To my knowledge, the only serious discussion of the index problem for primary goods is in John Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice. 2 Roemer asserts that the index problem admits of a solution, but his proposed solution compromises Rawls’s avoidance of utility-based measures, and causes Rawls’s principles to unravel, so this is not a friendly construal of Rawls that could be used to defend his position against a utilitarian critic. Without pressing this issue further, at the very least there is a problem here that the defender of a primary goods standard would need to solve, and has not solved to date, if the primary goods approach to justice comparison issues is to be a viable position.

5. Only util gives a coherent account of priority. Rawls can’t account for disaster. **Arneson 2k**[[144]](#footnote-144)

This characterization invites an objection. Strict lexical priority relations that are supposed to govern the elements in Rawls’s system, so that concern for equal basic liberties trumps concern for all else, and concern for Fair Equality of Opportunity trumps the Difference Principle, and according to the latter principle, achieving a benefit no matter how tiny for the worst off trumps the achievement no matter how large for any other group. All of these lexical priority relations turn out to be implausible when one contemplates them. I have already remarked on the implausibility of the maximin idea that the Difference Principle expresses. To take another example, **we would not judge a society that did worse** than another **on** the score of **basic liberties** even **by a** very **slight amount to be necessarily less just** overall **than the society that does slightly better with** respect to **civil liberties no matter how dreadful its** comparative **record with** respect to **other** justice **values. But the lexical ordering of** Rawls’s principles of justice with **the Equal Basic Liberty principle in first place enforces the contrary judgment.** It is not clear how seriously Rawls expects us to take his stipulated lexical priorities. He offers the idea in a tentative and provisional spirit (p. 45). But he is led to18 tentative assertion of lexically ordered principles because he believes that a fully successful rival to a utilitarian theory of justice must be a genuine theory in the sense of a set of principles that by themselves determine what should be done without the need for further ad hoc moral judgment given any specification of the factual circumstances in which the principles are to be applied. J.S. Mill in his essay on Utilitarianism had asserted this completeness requirement as a condition of adequacy for a candidate moral theory. Mill believed that utilitarianism satisfied this adequacy condition and that this fact gives the utilitarian doctrine a leg up on its competitors.5 One might then hold that if **Rawls**’s lexical priority relations are deemed unacceptable, then his justice as fairness conception minus the lexical priorities does not constitute a genuine theory of justice and **cannot** then **win** the competition **against util**itarianism. After all, it is said that you cannot beat a theory except with another theory.

6. Rawls is a tool. His criticism of util contradicts his own principles of justice.

**Arneson 2k**[[145]](#footnote-145)

Rawls’s general conception of justice holds that the basic structure of society should be arranged so as to maximize the long-run expectation of primary goods for the group of members of society that is worst off in this respect. As noted above, one important aspect of this principle is its use of primary social goods rather than utility to measure the condition of individuals for purposes of social justice. Another crucial aspect of the doctrine is the imperative to maximin, to make the worst position in society as tolerable as possible. A straight maximizing doctrine such as utilitarianism that bids us to arrange society so as to maximize the aggregate sum of benefits enjoyed by persons yields different implications from a maximin principle in situations in which the latter’s strong tilt in favor of the worst off looks attractive. We can imagine a world in which utilitarianism would require taking away large and important benefits from a small number of the very worst off, driving them to the wall as it were, in order to yield trivial benefits for a very large number of persons who are already enjoying an extremely hight level of benefits. We are asked to take the corn from the serfs to add one more layer of frosting to the desserts of the very rich. Here a revulsion against maximizing the aggregate sum of benefits is reasonable. But there are cases and cases. A maximin principle is entirely insensitive to the numbers of the worst off who gain or lose, by comparison with the numbers of the other members of society who might be asked to sacrifice for the benefit of the worst off. Maximin is also utterly insensitive to the amount of benefit that is gained or lost by the worst off, by comparison with the amount that others stand to lose. This means that **maximin would prefer the outcome in which a single worst off person gains a penny**’s worth of benefit **at the cost of** the loss of **thousands of dollars for each of** thousands of **the better off.** A maximin rule introduces a strict lexical priority for the interests of the worst off, however slight, when they conflict with the interests, however great, of the next worst off. Lexical priority relations among moral values are strong medicine, and perhaps are very rarely if ever justifiable if the value give lexically lower priority really has value at all. In the context of the distribution of social benefits as assessed by social justice principles, lexical **priority for the worst off is implausibly extreme. Rawls** has an interesting response to this obvious objection. He **asserts that maximin** is not a good choice rule in general, but **makes sense** in the special context of choice of principles regulating the basic terms of social cooperation. And it makes sense despite yielding implausible implications in some possible cases **because these implausible cases are never actually confronted in this-world**ly distributive justice conflicts. The scenario in which we can gain a penny for a single worst off person at the cost of huge losses for huge numbers of the already better off individuals is simply unrealistic. Hence maximin is acceptable as a this-worldly principle of social justice even if not acceptable as a moral principle to govern all possible worlds.3 This reply invites two further objections. First, it is simply untrue that plausible this-worldly scenarios cannot be imagined in which we could face a choice of very small gains for the worst off at the cost of very large losses for the better off. Consider public education policy viewed as a mechanism for enhancing the job and income prospects of low-skilled persons. We could spend more money on the least skilled and less on the more skilled, and we could continue doing this even if the further gains from further educational resources deployed on the least skilled produced very marginal increments in the labor market and entrepreneurial market prospects of this very disadvantaged group. The least natively skilled, in the absence of special education, may well be very poor transformers of educational resources into enhanced skill levels, and even if there is a range within which extra education for the worst off produces significant gains, maximin require us to keep transferring resources to the worst off until further expenditures produce no extra gains at all. At this point the curve that plots expenditures versus benefits in terms of enhanced skills might be very unfavorably steep. I do not believe that maximin provides a plausible guide to an egalitarian, socially progressive public education norm. One might object that at some point rather than moving more educational resources to the education oif the worst off, we should instead expand the education of the talented, who will then move into productive slots in the economy, and14 the extra productivity their extra education generates can be partly captured for the worst off in the form of tax and transfer policy. But first of all this depends on the tradeoff in an index of primary goods between the good of extra income and the good of enhanced chances of getting hired at better jobs. The latter good is gained by increased education but not by a tax and transfer policy. But more fundamentally, a tax and transfer policy which gives lexical priority to producing gains for the worst off can itself, pushed to the limit as the principle requires it must be, will itself eventually be generating very tiny gains for the worst off that are secured by very large losses suffered by the better off. **Rawls’s criticism of util**itarianism **commits him to a standard of adequacy** for proposed moral principles **that** the **maximin** principle on his own account of its merits **cannot meet.** Recall that **Rawls** had **objected that even if** it turns out that **util**itarianism **in** the **actual circumstances** we face or are likely to face **would** imply policies of **respect** for individual **rights** that we find acceptable, utilitarianism would still be delivering the right answers for the wrong reasons. The utilitarian defense of rights such as the right to freedom of speech does not fit the actual reasons that on reflection we take to be the reasons that underlie our affirmation of such rights. The test of adequacy that utilitarianism cannot meet is agreement with our considered moral convictions including among our convictions our reasons for believing why the policies we support for actual circumstances are right. To put the point another way, utilitarianism as applied to issues of individual rights fails a test of counterfactual stability: Even if utilitarianism delivers plausible answers in actual and likely circumstances, **we can imagine possible** even if improbable **circumstances in which** we would continue to find that our reasons for15 supporting free speech are fully in play even though **util**itarianism **would** recommend the **suppres**sion of **free speech. But** then **by the same token** the **maximin** principle **is unacceptable** as a principle of justice if it yields implications for policy in many possible situations that we would on reflection judge to be unjustifiable even if it yields policy judgments we mostly agree with in actual and likely circumstances. Here the critique of utilitarianism comes to haunt Rawls. The weapons he turns against utilitarianism, to some degree successfully, can be deployed with success against the maximin principle and perhaps other principles he favors.

7. Util solves the Equality Principle. Util doesn’t deny individual rights, but understands their significance as a decision-procedure in certain contexts. **Arneson 2k**[[146]](#footnote-146)

Reply: **In** a **util**itarian moral system**,** individual **rights**, if present at all, **will be derived from** the single fundamental aim of **utility** or welfare maximization**.** Roughly, the idea is that the **recognition** and protection **of** individual **rights better promote** the **util**itarian goal than alternative practices, policies, and acts**. Rights** function to **simplify and coordinate decision making among imperfectly informed individuals** of limited reasoning powers and limited altruism. If we were to eschew rights and directly apply the test of utility on each occasion of acting or implementing social policies, the results would predictably be less successful, from the standpoint of utility maximization, than the results of instituting and promoting the recognition of rights. Recognition of rights involves proclaiming their moral importance and socializing and training individuals to give extra weight to rights that impinge on their practical deliberations than to their own fallible utility calculations when these conflict with rights. In this sense a utilitarian theory can take rights seriously without assigning rights any nonderivative moral significance. 4 The **util**itarian **will also note that** common-sense **agreement that rights are uncontroversially decisive** determinants of what we ought to do **is** in a sense **illusory. Many rights appear uncontroversial when** they are **stated** vaguely and **at** a high level of **abstraction**, so that the practical implications for policy of acceptance of these abstract rights are highly uncertain. Take freedom of expression, for example. **Almost everyone is for free speech, but** this appearance of **unanimity** quickly **dissolves if we ask what a right to free speech is supposed to entail in** a host of **complex circumstances.** It does not follow that there is no way to proceed except by appeal to utility as John Stuart Mill argues, but the appearance that the embrace of utilitarianism would force us to regard what are really simple and obvious moral truths as contingent and uncertain matters is misleading.

### Unemployment Turns the Case

Unemployment turns the case—2 warrants

A. Unemployment proves the aff doesn’t solve poverty.

B. Rawls’ Difference Principle says that inequalities are okay if they benefit the least-well off. Low-wage work benefits the least well-off because their alternative is being laid off.

# Kinkaid TG

## Ableism 1NC

### UBI CP

**Counterplan: Just governments should provide every citizen 18 years of age and older the opportunity to receive a guaranteed basic income adjusted for inflation. Unemployment compensation and food stamps will phase out. Funding is through a reduction in corporate tax loopholes.**

**The counterplan reduces inequality and poverty**

**Gibson 14**

Carl Gibson (co-founder of US Uncut). “The Case for a Basic Guaranteed Income for All.” Huffington Post. May 13th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-gibson/the-case-for-a-basic-guar\_b\_5311330.html

If you have to pay taxes for existing, you should be guaranteed a basic minimum income for surviving. It wouldn't amount to much, but guaranteeing every American citizen 18 and older $1,000 per month, or $12,000 a year, is the most reasonable, practical, and commonsense way to address the inequality crisis that everyone in the country and most of the world is talking about right now. By all, I mean everyone over age 18, regardless of their current job and income situation. It would be optional, so those who already have fulfilling careers or make sufficient enough income to not need the extra $1,000 a month don't have to take it. Ideally, this basic guaranteed income for all would be adjusted for inflation, and would phase in gradually while unemployment compensation and food stamps phase out. Other staples of the safety net, like Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, would still remain. And really, who could argue against this proposal? If we started our welfare spending over from scratch, and just went ahead and guaranteed everyone $1,000 a month, adjusted for inflation, people in poverty would be much better off. Especially given that Republicans in the House of Representatives continue to refuse an extension of unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed (and even refuse to hear stories of struggle from the unemployed), cut billions of dollars from food stamps (in a bipartisan bill), and continue to propose budgets that would rend all social safety nets to pieces in order for larger corporate welfare packages. Or that Senate Republicans who consistently approve "cost-of-living" raises for themselves still don't find it necessary to increase the minimum wage. What does $1,000 a month buy? It can pay for a modest apartment in the $600 to $700 range, a meager amount of groceries, provide enough to pay for a basic phone plan, and leave enough left over for bus/cab fare. It can't pay for high-end cars, flat screen TVs, condominiums, dining out for every meal or a cocaine habit. That amount of money is roughly the same amount of money one would get working a minimum wage job at part-time hours for a large corporation that only sees you as a tool to use for increasing its own profit margin. This means people working at fast food corporations like McDonalds would be able to quit their jobs and have enough to meet the most basic expenses, while looking for more fulfilling work, getting an education, starting their own businesses and otherwise working toward their dreams. Conversely, if someone spends one third of a 24-hour day sleeping, and one third of the day working a job they hate that doesn't pay nearly enough to live on, that only leaves another eight hours for meeting all of their daily obligations, caring for their families, and finding ways to dig themselves out of wage slavery. Until we get a basic guaranteed income for all, a wide majority of Americans who are lucky enough to be employed will serve indefinite sentences of indentured servitude to immensely profitable and profoundly greedy fast food and retail robber barons.

**Reducing corporate tax loopholes is sufficient to fund a guaranteed basic income**

**Gibson 14**

Carl Gibson (co-founder of US Uncut). “The Case for a Basic Guaranteed Income for All.” Huffington Post. May 13th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-gibson/the-case-for-a-basic-guar\_b\_5311330.html

The cost of guaranteeing every adult citizen (approximately 225 million, according to census figures) $12,000 a year is roughly $2.8 trillion. That sounds like a lot, until looking into just one of the least-mentioned sources -- offshore tax havens. Currently, $32 trillion is stashed in offshore accounts in notorious tax havens like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Much of that is profit made in the U.S. by American corporations, but booked overseas to avoid taxes. And as journalist Nicholas Shaxson wrote in "Treasure Islands," much more of it is held in blind trusts operated by oppressive authoritarian regimes, drug cartels, human traffickers, and other unsavory characters. $2.8 trillion isn't even one eighth of that amount. We aren't asking for the whole pie, just a piece. And we'll even save them a bite. A few commonsense loophole closures like getting rid of the "carried interest" loophole, eliminating transfer pricing schemes like the "Dutch Sandwich" and "Double Irish" tax loopholes, and instituting a one percent sales tax on all financial transactions on Wall Street would be more than enough to cover the cost of a universal guaranteed income for all. And we still haven't even discussed other widely-supported, commonsense initiatives like turning wasteful Pentagon spending like the F-35 project into money set aside for a universal basic income, taxing investment income at the same rate as real, actual work, raising the inheritance tax to pre-Bush levels, or creating new tax brackets for millionaires and billionaires. By providing a basic income for all citizens through ending tax loopholes and preferential tax treatments for the super-wealthy, we're directly correcting the ever-growing gap between the few who have more than they could ever spend in multiple lifetimes, and the vast majority fighting over crumbs. More importantly, we're also giving the poorest Americans a fighting chance at fulfilling their dreams, rather than spending their best years slaving away for a corporate giant that doesn't respect basic human needs. We can't call ourselves a free country until working Americans are freed from poverty wages and dead-end jobs

#### Minimum wage hikes are historically racist

**Sowell 13** writes[[147]](#footnote-147)

Minimum-wage laws can even affect the level of racial discrimination. In an earlier era, when racial discrimination was both legally and socially accepted, **minimum-wage laws were often used openly to price minorities out of the** job **market**. In 1925, a minimum-wage law was passed in the Canadian province of British Columbia, with the intent and effect of pricing Japanese immigrants out of jobs in the lumbering industry. A Harvard professor of that era referred approvingly to Australia’s minimum wage law as a means to “protect the white Australian’s standard of living from the invidious competition of the colored races, particularly of the Chinese” who were willing to work for less. **In South Africa during** the era of **apartheid, white labor unions urged that a minimum-wage law be applied** to all races, **to keep black workers from taking jobs** away from white unionized workers by working for less than the union pay scale. Some **supporters of the first federal minimum-wage** law **in the U**nited **S**tates — the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 — **used** exactly **the same rationale**, citing the fact that Southern construction companies, using non-union black workers, were able to come north and underbid construction companies using unionized white labor. These supporters of minimum-wage laws understood long ago something that today’s supporters of such laws seem not to have bothered to think through. People whose wages are raised by law do not necessarily benefit, because they are often less likely to be hired at the imposed minimum-wage rate. Labor unions have been supporters of minimum-wage laws in countries around the world, since these laws price nonunion workers out of jobs, leaving more jobs for union members. **People** who are **content to advocate policies that sound good,** whether for political reasons or just to feel good about themselves, often **do not bother to think through the consequences** beforehand or to check the results afterwards.

#### Living wage is patriarchal

**Grover 5** writes[[148]](#footnote-148)

Second, the idea of need is problematic in living wages because of its close association with the concept of the family wage. This issue is recognized in sections of the living wage movement (Brenner, 2002), but has yet to be overcome. This means that **living wages are premised upon an androcentric view** of wage structures: **that a male breadwinner should be able to earn the majority of income for his** spouse and **dependent** children. **This is the case in living wages, because**, as we have seen, **there is an expectation that there will be a full time worker in households**. While there is care in living wage literature not to assign this role to men, it is difficult to see how the assumptions of living wages will break from the male breadwinner model. What this means in practice is that living wages can only meet the needs of workers and their families if they conform to the male breadwinner model. Hence, the difficulties demonstrated in Table 1 with delivering higher than the ‘making work pay’ strategy incomes to lone-mother-headed households. If wages were related as closely to need as it is sometimes portrayed in arguments for living wages, those people with dependent children, those working part time and those in families with only one earner would be paid a higher hourly wage compared to those families without dependent children, those with full time earners and those with multiple earners. In other words, **those workers who do not conform to the male breadwinner model have potentially the most to gain financially from living wages, but under current proposals they** would actually **gain the least.**

#### UBI solves

**Pateman 4** writes[[149]](#footnote-149)

The second consequence, and a crucial difference between basic income and stakeholding, is **that a basic income would give citizens the freedom not to be employed**. Both a basic income, if set at the appropriate level, and a capital grant would provide enlarged opportunities for individuals, but the opportunities provided by a basic income would be far wider than those offered by a stake, since the new opportunities would not be confined to the competitive market. A basic income, like a stake, would make it possible for anyone (at any point in their life, not merely while they are young) to go back to school, to retrain for a new occupation, or to open a business. But a basic income providing a modest but decent standard of living would do much more. In The Constitution of Liberty, Friedrich von Hayek—like G. D. H. Cole from a very different point on the political spectrum—argued that employment fostered an outlook among employees that was an impediment to freedom. The employed, he wrote, are “in many respects . . . alien and often inimical to much that consti- tutes the driving force of a free society.”20 His solution was that there should be as many gentlemen of private means as possible to counteract the deleterious effect of employment. In effect, such gentlemen have large basic incomes, albeit not provided by a government. At a very much lower level of resources a basic income democratizes the freedom open to a gentlemen of private means to spend time in scholarly pursuits, good works, writing poetry, cultivating friendships, hunting, or being a drone or a wastrel. A basic income would allow individuals at any time to do voluntary or politicalwork, for example, to learn to surf, to write or paint, to devote themselves to family life, or to have a quiet period of self-reassessment or contemplation. By opening up this range of opportunities and uncoupling income and standard of life from employment, a basic income has the potential both to encourage critical reassessment of the mutually reinforcing structures of marriage, employment, and citizenship and to open the possibility that these institutions could be remade in a new, more democratic form. A capital grant given to young people with the aim of assisting individual economic success lacks the same potential. In The Stakeholder Society, Ackerman and Alstott argue that a stake encourages individuals, in away that a basic income cannot, to reflect upon what they want to do with their lives, and appraise their situation. “Civic reflection” and attention to “the fate of the nation” become possible when economic anxieties are lifted.21 A “purer form of patriotism” will arise out of the “simple gratitude to the nation” that citizens will feel as they think about their capital grant and the debt that they owe to their country for the economic citizenship that comes with stakeholding.22 Patriotism and gratitude, however, have only a tenuous connection to individual freedom. Provision of a one-time capital grant will no doubt encourage individuals to consider what courses of action are open to them, and might even foster reflection on the debt they owe to their country. But it seems implausible that it would help promote reflection on the political implications of the structural connections between marriage, employment, and citizenship. Both the wide variety of opportunities made possible **when employment becomes** truly **voluntary** and the fact that **women’s freedom would be** greatly **enhanced** mean that, unlike a stake, a basic income has the potential to open the door to institutional change— providing that democratization is at the forefront of discussion and that feminist arguments are taken seriously. The freedom not to be employed runs counter to the direction of much recent public policy and political rhetoric (especially in Anglo-American countries, though the policies are international), and this makes stakeholding more palatable than basic income in the current political climate. The effect of such policies and rhetoric is to draw even tighter the long-standing link between employment and citizenship, at the very time when a reassessment has been made possible by changing circumstances. The institution of employment is a barrier to democratic freedom and citizenship in two ways. First, economic enterprises have an undemocratic structure, a point that I shall not pursue here.23 Second, as feminist scholars have demonstrated, the **relationship between** the **institutions of marriage**, employment, and citizenship has **meant that** the **standing of wives as citizens has always been**, and remains, **problematic**. The Anglo-American social insurance system was constructed on the assumption that wives not only were their husbands’ economic dependents but lesser citizens whose entitlement to benefits depended on their private status, not on their citizenship. **Male “breadwinners,”** who made a contribution from their earnings to “insure” that they received benefits in the event of unemployment or sickness, and in their old age, **were the primary citizens**. Their employment was treated as the contribution that a citizen could make to the well-being of the community. Ackerman and Alstott acknowledge this in their criticism of “workplace justice,” 24 and their recognition that unconditional retirement pensions would be particularly important for the many older women whose benefits still largely derive from their husbands’ employment record.25 That is to say, only paid employment has been seen as “work,” as involving the tasks that are the mark of a productive citizen and contributor to the polity. Other contributions, notably all the work required to reproduce and maintain a healthy population and care for infants, the elderly, the sick, and infirm—the **caring tasks,** most of which are not paid for and are undertaken by women—**have been seen as irrelevant to citizenship.**

#### The aff’s valorization of wage labor perpetuates an ableist notion of productivity

**Gulli 10** writes[[150]](#footnote-150)

In his book on queerness and disability, McRuer offers a critique of **productivity as compulsory able-bodiedness,** “which in a sense **produces disability**” (McRuer 2006: 2). **The alternative to able- bodied dogmas is that “a disabled world is possible and desirable”** (p. 71). The idea that a better world is a disabled world is very provocative, but it is the necessary outcome of a critique of productivity. Of course, what this means is that disability must stop being “the raw material against which the imagined future world is formed” (p. 72)— an idea, McRuer says, typical of liberationist models. Whenever able-bodiedness is the goal, perhaps unwanted, the specters of normalization, in dependence, productivity, and sovereignty also linger. For McRuer, the construction of able-bodiedness is linked to the construction of hetero sexuality: “The **institutions in our culture** that produce and secure a heterosexual identity also **work to secure an able- bodied identity**” (p. 151). These normalizing identities, essential to the logic of the same, are not differences among differences, nor do they open up the realm of the universal. They are not differences because they have closed the gap between the norm they have established and the moments of anxiety that brought them to establish the norm. Indeed, they are not different from that anxiety, as in having moved away from it. Rather, that anxiety no longer exists, and it has never existed. They are what they have always been; what they will always be. Difference to them is a matter of indifference. Yet, they are not universals because they are incapable of the leap into what they are not, incapable of reaching into the univocal and neutral structure that connects the one to the other, the structure of otherness as such. They have lost their contingency, no longer able not to be. McRuer speaks of “those [desirable] disabled/queer moments” as of “temporary or contingent universalization” (p. 157; emphasis added), that is, moments in which, as I understand it, we are what we have not been and would not be, able not to be what we are, and thus, able to reach into the other. However, it is not the idealized other that we encounter, nor ourselves as and in the other; rather, we encounter our own otherness, which is the same with what is different from us, for it is difference itself— not merely what- is, but what- could- be. The universalizing potentiality present in this, that is, in **the “dis-” of disability**, just as in the “ab-” of the abnormal (the abyss surrounding the norm), **subverts the logic of the contract** and of a multitude **united under the sovereign sign**. The disunited multitude feared by Hobbes (1994: XVIII) the multitude that commits injustice, reaches, through the “dis-” of

#### UBI’s key to freedom from wage labor and democratic re-thinking of employment institutions

**Pateman 4** writes[[151]](#footnote-151)

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At a very much lower level of resources a basic income democratizes the freedom open to a gentlemen of private means to spend time in scholarly pursuits, good works, writing poetry, cultivating friendships, hunting, or being a drone or a wastrel. **A basic income would allow individuals at any time to do voluntary or political work**, for example, to learn to surf, to write or paint, to devote themselves to family life, or to have a quiet period of self-reassessment or contemplation. **By** opening up this range of opportunities and **uncoupling** income and **standard of life from employment, a basic income has** the **potential** both **to encourage critical reassessment of** the mutually reinforcing structures of marriage, **employment, and citizenship and** to **open the possibility that these institutions could be remade in a new**, more **democratic form**. A capital grant given to young people with the aim of assisting individual economic success lacks the same potential. 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Male “breadwinners,” who made a contribution from their earnings to “insure” that they received benefits in the event of unemployment or sickness, and in their old age, were the primary citizens. Their employment was treated as the contribution that a citizen could make to the well-being of the community. Ackerman and Alstott acknowledge this in their criticism of “workplace justice,” 24 and their recognition that unconditional retirement pensions would be particularly important for the many older women whose benefits still largely derive from their husbands’ employment record.25 That is to say, only paid employment has been seen as “work,” as involving the tasks that are the mark of a productive citizen and contributor to the polity. Other contributions, notably all the work required to reproduce and maintain a healthy population and care for infants, the elderly, the sick, and infirm—the caring tasks, most of which are not paid for and are undertaken by women—have been seen as irrelevant to citizenship.

**Living wage raises food prices, which disproportionately harms the poor**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

However, negative employment effects are not the only consequence of raising the minimum wage. Employers often cannot fully absorb the costs of an increased mandated wage rate by cutting their workforce because they need that labor to successfully run their businesses. Employers are forced to turn to other methods to protect their bottom line and stay in business. The costs of a minimum wage hike are often passed on to consumers in what economist Daniel Aaronson calls “price pass-through.” In a study of prices in the restaurant and fast food industry—an industry that heavily employs and serves low-wage earners—Aaronson, French and MacDonald found an increase in the minimum wage also increases the prices of food items.24 Using data from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 1995 to 1997, the economists examined 7,500 food items (usually a complete meal) from 1,000 different establishments in 88 different geographic areas. They found the increase in menu prices affected limited service restaurants the hardest. These are restaurants where most diners pay at the counter and take their food home with them. These restaurants are also more likely to employ low-wage workers and thus more likely to have their business costs rise as a result of a minimum wage increase. The study found that in these instances, almost 100 percent of the increase in labor costs is passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.25 These results are consistent with most of the economic literature on the subject. Sara Lemos of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) looked at more than 20 papers on the subject and found that most studies predicted a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would result in a 4 percent increase in food prices and a 0.4 percent increase in prices overall.26 Unfortunately, the businesses hit hardest by an increase to the minimum wage are not only the types of places where low-income people are employed, but also businesses frequented by low-income consumers. Food prices are of particular importance to people living near or below the poverty line as they tend to spend a greater percentage of their family budget on food. The low-wage employees who experience an increase to their wages due to a minimum wage increase will have the benefit of higher wages largely offset by higher prices. Additionally, non-minimum wage earners will face higher prices without the corresponding increase in wages. Thus, they will likely cut back spending to compensate. These cutbacks in spending may also result in substitutions toward cheaper, lower quality goods.

### UE DA (Disability)

#### A large consensus of studies confirms minimum wage hikes cause unemployment

**Neumark 14** writes[[152]](#footnote-152)

**An extensive review of** this **new**er wave of **evidence looked at more than 100 studies** of the employment effects of minimum wages, assessing the quality of each study and focusing on those that are most reliable [2], [3]. **Studies focusing on the least skilled were highlighted**, as the predicted job destruction effects of minimum wages were expected to be more evident in those studies. Reflecting the greater variety of methods and sources of variation in minimum wage effects used since 1982, this review documents a wider range of estimates of the employment effects of the minimum wage than does the review of the first wave of studies [1]. **Nearly two-thirds of the studies** reviewed **estimated that** the **minimum wage had negative** (although not always statistically significant) **effects on employment**. Only eight found positive employment effects. **Of the 33 studies judged** the **most credible,** 28, or **85%**, **pointed to negative employment effects**. These included research on Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Portugal, the UK, and the US. In particular, the studies focusing on the least-skilled workers find stronger evidence of disemployment effects, with effects near or larger than the consensus range in the US data. In contrast, few—if any—studies provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages.

**Turns the case; disability reforms won’t happen during high unemployment**

**Greve 9**

Bent Greve (Professor, University of Roskilde, Denmark) “The labour market situation of disabled people in European countries and implementation of employment policies: a summary of evidence from country reports and research studies.” Report prepared for the Academic Network of European Disability experts (ANED). April 2009. http://www.disability-europe.net/content/aned/media/ANED%20Task%206%20final%20report%20-%20final%20version%2017-04-09.pdf

This report is based on evidence submitted in national reports produced by members of the Academic Network of European Disability experts (ANED) representing the EU Member States (except Luxembourg) plus Norway and Iceland. It is supplemented with evidence from existing studies with a focus on disabled people’s access to integration and retention in the labour market, and recommendations to enhance the current position. Action on the employment situation of disabled people in European countries should be considered in the context of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, the Lisbon Agenda and European Employment Strategy, the Employment Directive 2000/78/EC, and the European Disability Action Plan. Labour market activation and inclusion for disabled people are easier to address in periods of increasing labour demand and lower levels of unemployment than in times of recession. The current economic downturn raises substantial challenges to the goals and actions proposed in recent periods of policy development. It will be important to review national developments in light of this situation.

#### Specifically, the aff kills employment at non-profit disabled workshops.

**Riley 14** writes[[153]](#footnote-153)

If you want to understand the harm that proponents of **raising** the **minimum wage** are willing to impose on people at the bottom of the labor market, look no further than a recent article in Bloomberg News by Lorraine Woellert. As of January 1, federal contractors will be required to pay workers no less than $10.10 per hour. As Woellert notes, The rule **applies to** hundreds of **non-profit contractors that provide jobs to adults with disabilities**. Many of those workers will get a raise, but others might be unemployed as companies make hard choices about who they can afford to keep on the payroll. Indeed, **as many nonprofits** are already **operat**ing **on shoestring budgets,** the question of **whether they can afford to keep on a disabled worker who might** sweep floors or **do** other **menial tasks will be** a **difficult** one. Woellert writes about a young man named **Luke Grossman** who does laundry at the local YMCA in Norfolk, VA. He **has Down Syndrome and**, as his father notes, “**Luke’s life looks a** whole **lot different if he loses his job**. . . . Anything which is going to have more people with disabilities sitting at home with nothing to do can’t be good.” The company that employs Luke does laundry for the U.S. military and other organizations. It employs about 1,000 disabled workers, some at below minimum wage. Things will not be able to stay the same under the new rule, according to the CEO. But proponents of it, including Labor Secretary Thomas Perez, insist that the disabled are being exploited when they are paid less than minimum wage. The head of the National Disability Rights Network, which filed the lawsuit that resulted in the new federal rule, acknowledged that disabled people might lose their jobs as a result but he explained, “It’s dying with your rights on.” **Obviously we don’t want the disabled exploited but the** vast **majority of disabled people are not employed** at all and since the recession hit their employment has been curtailed even further. For many **businesses** and nonprofits, hiring people for these low-end jobs—whether they are disabled, young, inexperienced or down on their luck—is as much a business decision as it is a philanthropic one. Theydo **want to give people a chance to work for a living**, to become part of a team, to integrate themselves into the community. **But there is always the bottom line**. And **to the extent that** the **government makes these decisions harder** for a boss to make, **they are making life worse for a lot of people.** As Larry Grossman says, It’s not like I’m opposed to [Luke] getting a raise, [but] you have to look at the intangible things that people get from the workplace. Luke really loves going to work. It gives him a sense of purpose.

**Disabled people are fighting for subminimum wage work. Sheltered workshops are a key safe space, but funding concerns mean minimum wage laws would undermine them.**

**Sommerstein 4-14**

David Sommerstein (Reporter for NPR). “Advocates Fight To Keep Sheltered Workshops For Workers With Disabilities.” NPR. 14 April 2015. http://www.npr.org/2015/04/14/395287097/advocates-fight-to-keep-sheltered-workshops-for-disabled-workers

**Subminimum Wages For The Disabled**: Godsend Or Exploitation? Those words are long overdue for disability advocates who have fought for inclusion in the workplace for decades. In 1987, Michael Callahan wrote a book arguing that outside jobs are achievable for almost everyone if the job is customized for the individual and a company's needs, rather than wedging a person with a disability into an existing job. "So bring me a person who's in a coma and let's agree right now until they get out of the coma we won't try to get them a job," he says. "But anyone else, let's work on it. And what I can say to you is employers are not pushing back." Tom Golden, with the Employment and Disability Institute at Cornell, says that employers are actually ahead of the curve and that they're hungry for new labor markets as baby boomers retire. "They're talking about how they're ready to manage populations in the past that have been marginalized," he says. In sheltered workshops, people with disabilities are paid according to how quickly they're able to complete tasks. Usually, they make well **below minimum wage**. At Production Unlimited, they make office supplies, safety equipment and binders for the U.S. Army.i In sheltered workshops, people with disabilities are paid according to how quickly they're able to complete tasks. Usually, they make well below minimum wage. At Production Unlimited, they make office supplies, safety equipment and binders for the U.S. Army. David Sommerstein/North Country Public Radio But local experts fear it's another story in sluggish economies like Watertown. And they worry the state won't provide enough funding for support and training for those new models to work. About 300,000 people work in sheltered workshops nationwide. Daphne Pickert, who runs St. Lawrence NYSARC, another disability services provider, says ending them removes an option for people who may never be ready for an outside job. "For some people, because of their actual diagnosis and disability, they need the support of the workshop," she says, "And **they literally cannot perform in a competitive setting**." David Schneider, a longtime employee at the Watertown workshop, says he's afraid of being made fun of in the nondisabled world, or of getting yelled at, or of **going jobless.** "Who's going to trust us?" he asks. "And if we screw up, think of how the customers would feel. And who's going to get blamed for it? We will, probably." It's a risk for workers to leave Production Unlimited. And for anyone, it's hard to take a risk when your job is on the line.

**Sheltered workshops are key to jobs training; disabled people will get taken advantage of in the broader workforce.**

**CAMPBELL 14**

New federal rules could close sheltered workshops for people with disabilities BY MATT THE KANSAS CITY STAR 08/25/20 8:19 PM 08/25/2014 8:36 PM

“But for some people, I feel a workshop is the best place for them to maybe gain some work skills,” Liz Muleski said. “Sara was so naive and and so susceptible to someone taking advantage of her right out of high school.” About 450,000 people nationwide work in sheltered workshops or participate in segregated day programs. About 60 sheltered workshops operate in Kansas, employing about 5,000 people. About 90 workshops in Missouri employ roughly about 7,500 people. Nearly 800 people work in five sheltered workshops in Jackson County. Three workshops in the county have closed in recent years. The Supreme Court ruling, known as the Olmstead decision, was based on the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Justice Department in 2009 launched an aggressive effort to enforce compliance. The point of the law is “to abolish the low expectations that have kept people with disabilities out of their communities for decades,” Jocelyn Samuels, an acting assistant attorney general in the Civil Rights Division, said in April in announcing the push. But many parents and guardians of people with disabilities fear that without sheltered workshops, their loved ones will languish. They will have nothing to do and fewer social interactions.

**Sheltered workshops are key to peer relationships among the disabled; that outweighs broader social inclusion – prefer studies on this issue.**

**Cox 2**

Jamie E. Cox. “A COMPARISON STUDY OF SHELTERED WORK VERSUS SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT WITHIN COMMUNITY-BASED REHABILITATION FACILITIES.” The Graduate School University of Wisconsin-Stout August, 2002.

Another alternative explanation for the results may involve the changing face of sheltered employment facilities. There is evidence that sheltered workshops are contracting better jobs and greater job variety than in the past, hence providing quality work with the added supports many client-workers, parents, and guardians feel are needed. It should also be taken into consideration that, although inclusion into the community is extremely important and desirable, relationships among ones peer group is also a major component that can be met at a sheltered facility. The facility **[It] is able to provide an environment where many client-workers are on the** 34 **same social and intellectual level** as one another **enabling strong friendships** to form that are often different than those in the working community where coworkers often act more as “mentors” than friends. **The impact of** **conducting a study** such as this one **is very significant** when looking at the field of rehabilitation as a whole. First, when focusing the survey on a specific type of rehabilitation facility, it becomes increasingly evident just how many different types of services are provided for individuals with disabilities and the numerous ways these facilities all operate to achieve a common goal of increasingly an individual’s independence, quality of living, vocational skills, and self-worth. With this information, however, it also makes it increasing clear why it is so difficult to devise one survey, system, or instrument to study one specific aspect of rehabilitation when so many different techniques are being utilized.

### \*\*\*Case

### Eugenics Turn

#### Living wage is a eugenic tool that perpetuates ableism

**Leonard 5** writes[[154]](#footnote-154)

During the second half of the Progressive Era, beginning roughly in 1908, progressive economists and their reform allies achieved many statutory victories, including state laws that regulated working conditions, banned child labor, instituted “mothers’ pensions,” capped working hours and, the sine qua non, fixed minimum wages. In **using eugenics to justify exclusionary** immigration **legislation**, the race-suicide **theorists offered a model to economists** advocating labor reforms, notably those affiliated with the American Association for Labor Legislation, the organization of academic economists that Orloff and Skocpol (1984, p. 726) call the “leading association of U.S. social reform advocates in the Progressive Era.” Progressive economists, like their neoclassical critics, believed that binding minimum wages would cause job losses. However, the progressive **economists** also **believed** that the **job loss induced by minimum wages was a social benefit, as it performed the eugenic service ridding the labor force of the** “**unemployable**.” Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1897 [1920], p. 785) put it plainly: “With regard to certain sections of the population [the “unemployable”], this unemployment is not a mark of social disease, but actually of social health.” “[O]f all ways of dealing with these unfortunate parasites,” Sidney Webb (1912, p. 992) opined in the Journal of Political Economy, “the most ruinous to the community is to allow them to unrestrainedly compete as wage earners.” **A minimum wage was seen to operate eugenically** through two channels: **by deterring** prospective **immigrants** (Henderson, 1900) and also by removing from employment the “unemployable,” who, thus identified, could be, for example, segregated in rural communities or sterilized. The notion that minimum-wage induced disemployment is a social benefit distinguishes its progressive proponents from their neoclassical critics, such as Alfred Marshall (1897), Philip Wicksteed (1913), A. C. Pigou (1913) and John Bates Clark (1913), who regarded job loss as a social cost of minimum wages, not as a putative social benefit (Leonard, 2000). Columbia’s Henry Rogers Seager, a leading progressive economist who served as president of the AEA in 1922, provides an example. **Worthy wage-earners, Seager** (1913a, p. 12) **argued, need protection from the** “wearing **competition of the** casual worker and the drifter” and from the other “**unemployable**” **who** unfairly **drag down** the **wages** of more deserving workers (1913b, pp. 82–83). The minimum wage protects deserving workers from the competition of the unfit by making it illegal to work for less. Seager (1913a, p. 9) wrote: “The operation of **the minimum wage** requirement **would** merely **extend the definition of defectives to embrace all individuals**, **who** even after having received special training, **remain incapable of** adequate **self-support**.” Seager (p. 10) made clear what should happen to those who, even after remedial training, could not earn the legal minimum: “**If we are to maintain a race** that is to be made of up **of capable, efficient and independent individuals** and family groups **we must** courageously **cut off lines of heredity that** have been proved to be undesirable by isolation or sterilization . . . .” The unemployable were thus those workers who **earned less than** some measure of an adequate standard of living, a standard the British called a “decent maintenance” and Americans referred to as **a** “**living wage**.” For labor reformers, firms that paid workers less than **the living wage** to which they were entitled were deemed parasitic, as were the workers who accepted such wages—on grounds that someone (charity, state, other members of the household) would need to make up the difference. For progressives, a legal minimum wage had the useful property of **sort**ing **the unfit, who would lose their jobs, from the deserving** workers, who would retain their jobs. Royal Meeker, a Princeton economist who served as Woodrow Wilson’s U.S. Commissioner of Labor, opposed a proposal to subsidize the wages of poor workers for this reason. Meeker preferred a wage floor because it would disemploy unfit workers and thereby enable their culling from the work force. “It is much better to enact a minimum-wage law even if it deprives these unfortunates of work,” argued Meeker (1910, p. 554). “Better that the state should support the inefficient wholly and prevent the multiplication of the breed than subsidize incompetence and unthrift, enabling them to bring forth more of their kind.” A. B. Wolfe (1917, p. 278), an American progressive economist who would later become president of the AEA in 1943, also argued for the eugenic virtues of removing from employment those who “are a burden on society.” In his Principles of Economics, Frank Taussig (1921, pp. 332–333) asked rhetorically, “how to deal with the unemployable?” Taussig identified two classes of unemployable worker, distinguishing the aged, infirm and disabled from the “feebleminded . . . those saturated with alcohol or tainted with hereditary disease . . . [and] the irretrievable criminals and tramps. . . .” The latter class, Taussig proposed, “should simply be stamped out.” “We have not reached the stage,” Taussig allowed, “where we can proceed to chloroform them once and for all; but at least **they can be segregated**, shut up in refuges and asylums, **and prevented from propagating their kind.**”5 The progressive idea that the unemployable could not earn a living wage was bound up with the progressive view of wage determination. Unlike the economists who pioneered the still-novel marginal productivity theory, most progressives agreed that wages should be determined by the amount that was necessary to provide a reasonable standard of living, not by productivity, and that the cost of this entitlement should fall on firms.6

### Social Mobility Turn

#### Minimum wage hikes prevent more unskilled workers from entering the job market, killing their social mobility

**Kersey 4** writes

Over the longer term, **minimum-wage** or near-minimum wage **work can serve as a springboard to better jobs. Unskilled workers may gain** new **skills**, **or** gain **a record of reliability**, that allows them to move on to better-paying positions. Low-wage earners frequently see their wages rise quickly: **Researchers** at two universities, Florida State and Miami of Ohio, **found that full-time workers hired at** the **minimum wage received a median pay increase of 13 percent within their first year**, which shows that low-wage employees are able to work through minimum wage jobs into better ones.[3] The schedule of increases currently under consideration, first to $5.90 then $6.65 an hour a year later, is not all that much greater than the pay raises that occur naturally. **Simply finding full-time work**, including jobs at or near the minimum wage, **provides the poor with** the **means to escape poverty**. Research by the Employment Policy Institute shows 47 percent of families living below the poverty line in 1997 managed to make it over the poverty line in 1998. The authors of that study concluded that "earnings from minimum wage work and the Earned Income Tax Credit both significantly reduced the number of working poor in the 1990s."[4] **Artificially raising wages will cut off this difficult but direct path to greater prosperity for many** poor families, and will delay the entry of other workers, including youth, into paid work **by needlessly increasing the cost of unskilled labor**. Employers will not be able to afford to hire as many unskilled workers, and will respond by cutting back services or replacing workers with machinery.

#### Empirics confirm

**Clemens and Wither 14** writes[[155]](#footnote-155)

5.6 Transitions from Low-Wage Work into Middle Class Earnings We next analyze income growth through the lens of economic mobility, a topic of significant recent interest (Kopczuk, Saez, and Song, 2010; Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez, 2014; Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez, and Turner, 2014). Concern regarding the minimum wage’s effects on upward mobility has a long history (Feldstein, 1973). A potential mechanism for such effects, namely the availability of on-the-job training, has received some attention in the literature (Hashimoto, 1982; Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan, 2004). We are not aware, however, of direct evidence of the minimum wage’s effects on individuals’ transitions into employment at higher wages and earnings levels. Because we observe individuals for four years, we are able to track transitions of lowwage workers into middle and lower middle class earnings. The data reveal that initially low-wage workers spend non-trivial numbers of months with earnings exceeding those of a full time, minimum wage worker. Consider earnings above $1500, which could be generated by full time work at $8.80 per hour. During the first year of our sample, 30workers with average baseline wages less than $7.50 earn more than $1500 in 8 percent of months. By the sample’s last two years this rises, adjusting for inflation, to 18 percent. We investigate the minimum wage’s effects on the likelihood of reaching such earnings. Table 6 reports the results. **We find significant declines in economic mobility**, in particular **for transitions into lower middle class earnings**. For the full sample with average baseline wages less than $7.50, the difference-in-differences estimate implies that **binding minimum wage increases reduced** the **probability of reaching earnings above $1500 by 4.9 percent**age points. This represents a 24 percent reduction relative to the control group’s medium-run probability of attaining such earnings. As with previous results, this finding cannot readily be explained by cross-state differences in economic conditions. Netting out the experience of individuals with baseline wages between $8.50 and $10.00 moderately increases the point estimate to 5.4 percentage points (26 percent). The **estimated reductions** in the probability of reaching lower middle class earnings levels **are particularly meaningful for low-skilled workers with no college education**. In the difference-in-differences specification, the estimated decline in this group’s probability of earning more than $1500 per month is 4.9 percentage points (see column 2). In the triple-difference specification the estimate is 8.2 percentage points. Declines of these magnitudes represent 32 and 54 percent declines relative to the control group’s probability of reaching such earnings. For those with at least some college education, the estimated declines average a more moderate 4 percentage points, equivalent to 17 percent of the control group’s probability of reaching such earnings. Figure 8 presents the raw data underlying these results, and Appendix Table A10 reports the robustness of the estimated effects to the same set of specifications checks as the outcomes previously analyzed. We next examine the probability of reaching the middle-income threshold of $3000 per month. For the full sample, we estimate that binding minimum wage increases 31reduced this probability by 1.8 percentage points. In the difference-in-differences specification, this estimate is statistically distinguishable from 0 at the 10 percent level; in the triple-difference specification this is not the case, although the point estimate is essentially unchanged. Though our sub-sample analysis has little precision, the average medium-run effect appears to be driven primarily by those with at least some college education. The full sample decline of 1.7 percentage points is a non-trivial 26 percent of the control group’s medium-run probability of reaching such earnings. We interpret the evidence as implying that binding minimum wage increases reduced the medium-run class mobility of low-skilled workers. Such workers became significantly less likely to rise to the lower middle class earnings threshold of $1500 per month. The reduction was particularly large for low-skilled workers with relatively little education. The dynamics of our estimated employment and class mobility results are suggestive of the underlying mechanisms. Our employment results emerge largely during the first year following the increase in the federal minimum wage. By construction, our mobility outcomes are not outcomes that can be affected by the loss of a full time minimum wage job. **Effects on mobility** into lower middle class earnings only **emerge over subsequent years**. It appears that **binding minimum wage increases blunted** these **workers’ prospects for medium-run economic mobility by reducing** their **short-run access to opportunities for accumulating experience and developing skills**. This period’s minimum wage increases may thus have made the first rung on the earnings ladder more difficult for low-skilled workers to reach.

### Work Hours Turn

#### Minimum wage hikes force employers to reduce hours

**Perry 14** writes[[156]](#footnote-156)

Posts on CD about the minimum wage always generate a higher than average number of comments, and Friday’s CD post (“Do Demand Curves Slope Down or Not?”) was no exception – there have been 46 comments so far. Most of the minimum wage debate centers on the issue of whether minimum wage increases have any effects on employment levels. Specifically, does the empirical evidence point to any significantly negative effects on employment levels following minimum wage hikes, as clearly predicted by economy theory? Some empirical evidence like the much-cited 1994 study by Card and Krueger found “no indication that the rise in the minimum wage reduced employment” at fast-food restaurants in New Jersey following a minimum wage increase to $5.05 per hour compared to nearby fast-food restaurants in Pennsylvania where the minimum wage remained constant at $4.25. Let me attempt to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between: a) economic theory, which clearly predicts a negative relationship between the minimum wage and the quantity of unskilled workers demanded by employers, and b) some of the empirical evidence that finds no negative employment effects following minimum wage hikes. Here’s the key point: The negative relationship predicted by economic theory is not: a) between minimum wage hikes and the number of unskilled workers employed, but b) between minimum wage hikes and the number of unskilled work hours demanded by employers. The two charts above help to illustrate that difference: In the top chart, **we see a negative relationship between** an **increase in the minimum wage and** the number of **hours of unskilled work** demanded by employers in the 12-month period following the increase in the hourly price of unskilled labor (to capture the effects on future hiring). **Like an increase in** the **cost of** any other **labor** input or other input like food, energy, raw materials, machinery, equipment rental, or building rent, **employers** facing a 39% increase in the cost of unskilled labor (from $7.25 to $10.10 an hour) **would have no other choice** than to reduce the number of unskilled work hours – **it would** simply **be a necessary strategy for survival**. As I pointed out recently, a minimum wage increase to $10.10 per hour would be the equivalent to an annual tax of more than $6,000 per full-time worker earning the minimum wage. The various strategies employers might use to reduce their demand for unskilled work hours over the 12-month period following a 39% minimum wage hike might include: a) reducing the number of hours worked per week by entry-level unskilled workers, e.g. cutting their hours from 40 to 30 per week, or from 30 to 20, etc., b) reducing the number of unskilled workers currently employed through layoffs, c) reducing the number of unskilled workers that employers might have previously been planning on adding to staffing levels in the future, d) substituting skilled workers for the now relatively more expensive unskilled workers, and e) investing in technologies that would substitute automation, mechanization, robotics, and self-serve options for unskilled workers. **Although the effect** of a 39% minimum wage hike **on employment levels might be uncertain, the negative effect on** the **number of hours of unskilled labor demanded by employers would be** much **more certain** and predictable according to the Law of Demand. The bottom chart shows graphically how it would be possible that an increase in the minimum wage might not adversely affect the number of unskilled workers employed by looking at the relationship between the average weekly compensation for unskilled workers (and not the hourly monetary wage) and the number of unskilled workers.

# Lexington

## $10.10 1NC

### Topicality

“Living wage” is $15/hour

**Reich 14** writes[[157]](#footnote-157)

**By raising its minimum wage to $15, Seattle is leading a long-overdue movement toward a living wage. Most minimum wage workers are**n’t teenagers these days. They’re **major breadwinners who need a higher minimum wage** in order **to keep** their **families out of poverty**. Across America, the ranks of the working poor are growing. While low-paying industries such as retail and food preparation accounted for 22 percent of the jobs lost in the Great Recession, they’ve generated 44 percent of the jobs added since then, according to a recent report from the National Employment Law Project. Last February, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that raising the national minimum wage from $7.25 to $10.10 would lift 900,000 people out of poverty. Seattle estimates almost a fourth of its workers now earn below $15 an hour. That translates into about $31,000 a year for a full-time worker. In a high-cost city like Seattle, that’s barely enough to support a family.

They violate—the aff is $10.10.

Reasons to prefer:

1. It’s core of the topic. $15/hour is demanded by protesters who want a living wage

**Winter et al 14** writes[[158]](#footnote-158)

Marking the second year of a campaign to boost the minimum wage, **thousands of low-paid workers** and their supporters **marched in 190 cities across the nation** Thursday, **calling for $15 an hour**. The protests have focused on fast-food and retail chains, but workers in other low-paying jobs joined the action in 35 states, organizers said. Joining the walkouts, picket lines and demonstrations were retail employees at dollar and convenience stores, home health care aides and airport workers who handle baggage, push wheelchairs or clean planes. An unknown number of non-union workers walked off their jobs beginning Wednesday night, organizers said. It was not immediately known if any were fired. Several cities in the Fight for $15 campaign, which is supported by unions and social justice organizations, saw their first fast-food strikes, including Jackson, Miss.; Knoxville, Tenn.; and Buffalo. In the nation's capital, about 650 federal contract workers walked off fast-food jobs at landmarks like the National Zoo, organizers said. Job actions were also planned at airports in New York, New Jersey, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston, Minneapolis, Oakland, Fort Lauderdale, Seattle and Atlanta. **The "living wage" campaign began two years ago when workers walked off their jobs at McDonald's and Burger King in New York**. Business groups say raising the minimum wage will hurt profits and small franchisees, prompting layoffs or reduced hours.

The protests are what’s raised recent awareness of the living wage issue, so their demand should be the heart of the debate

**Panzar 14** writes[[159]](#footnote-159)

Around 200 **Wal-Mart workers and** their **supporters marched** outside a Long Beach store Friday **in support of $15-an-hour pay, part of** a **nationwide** day of **demonstrations to push for better wages** and working conditions at the retailer. Organizers said rallies and marches were expected at 1,600 Wal-Mart locations on Friday in what they said would be the largest protests ever against the nation's biggest retailer. Although demonstrations were mounted at many Wal-Mart stores in major cities, it was not known if all 1,600 stores were involved. Backing the demonstrations is Our Wal-Mart, the union-supported group of employees that has been pushing for a wage of $15 an hour and more full-time positions. A protest on Nov. 7 at a Wal-Mart in Pico Rivera ended with the arrest of 23 people on charges of unlawful assembly and failure to disperse. Protesters near the Wal-Mart in Long Beach chanted, "We can't take it no more!" as shoppers taking advantage of Black Friday discounts streamed in and out of the store. Many demonstrating also carried signs that read, "Stop silencing workers who speak out." Rhonda Gooden, 54, has worked as a cashier for four years at the Wal-Mart on Crenshaw Boulevard in Los Angeles. She said she makes $10.80 an hour and her work schedule can fluctuate wildly from 12 hours one week to 30 the next. "I cannot pay my bills on that, I have to borrow money from my mother to pay rent," she said. "Sometimes I just have to cry." Wal-Mart spokeswoman Brooke Buchanan said many of the protesters participating in Friday's demonstrations were being paid by unions to show up. "We have seen this story before about the protesters and unions threatening to protest in a large amount of stores," she said. "What it turns out to be is a handful of stores with a handful of associates." Some shoppers said they sympathized with the workers but counted on the cheap goods at Wal-Mart to stay within their budgets. Nicole Bredeson of Long Beach was leaving Wal-Mart with a toy castle for her daughter that she got half off for $30. The graduate student said she makes only $16,000 a year teaching. "It's not right. The Waltons can afford to pay them better. But it's not going to keep me from shopping here," she said, referring to the chain's founding family. "This is the only way I can afford Christmas for my kids." If large demonstrations materialize, they could be a damper on the shopping bonanza that is Black Friday. The day after Thanksgiving traditionally kicks off the holiday season, when retailers can make 40% of their annual sales. **The fight for a living wage** and higher pay **has gained steam** this year **as rallies**, sit-ins and strikes **raise awareness of the issue.**

2. Ground.

Most employers support the aff compared to $15, so $15 is more controversial

**Perkins 14** writes[[160]](#footnote-160)

CLEVELAND, Ohio -- **More than half of employers say** the hourly **minimum wage should be raised to** at least **$10, though few support** the **$15 level** many low-wage worker advocates are demanding, **according to a Harris Poll** released today. Fifty-five percent of the nearly 2,200 human resource managers interviewed, for their employers, say the minimum wage should be at least $10, but only seven percent say it should be $15 or more. When it comes to raising the federal minimum wage above the current $7.25, 62 percent of the managers said the minimum wage should be increased. Ohio's minimum wage is $7.95. Those on opposite sides of the debate about whether the minimum wage should be increased, viewed the poll results differently. Keith Lake, vice president of government affairs for the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, which is against an increase, said he disagreed with the survey results. While the survey finds that employers in Ohio support a raise, they tend to be in favor of smaller increases. "I am not suggesting that the poll results are inaccurate, but when we've spoken to our members about the possibility of a minimum wage increase, we've gotten a lot of concern," he said. "What employers would do as a result of the spike in the minimum wage would (negatively) impact their hiring and the prices they charge their customers." Amy Hanauer, founder and executive director of Policy Matters Ohio, which favors raising the minimum wage, found the poll results encouraging. "I would say that I agree with the more than 55 percent of hiring mangers, who say the minimum wage should be at least $10 an hour," she said. "It still doesn't keep pace with what it has been at some points in our history, but it is somewhere we could go that would still be beneficial for workers." The debate about whether to raise the minimum, and by how much, is an issue that has been gaining in prominence for about two years. A bill is before Congress to raise the federal minimum to $10.10, but for now it is stalled. In the meantime, an increasing number of state and city governments have increased the minimum wage. Many hikes have been in the $10 to $11 range; but some places - including Seattle - have opted for $15. That higher amount has been the subject of one-day fast-food strikes that have periodically been held throughout the country since the first one took place in New York City in November 2012. In Cleveland, fast-food workers haven't walked-off the job, but solidarity protests have been held. The last one was Sept. 4, in which home health care workers marched in front of a McDonald's on St. Clair Ave., demanding a $15 minimum wage for the fast-food workers as well as themselves. Jasmin Almodovar of Cleveland, a home health care worker, was among those rallying at 6 a.m. in front of the McDonald's in the city's Glenville neighborhood. She makes $9.50 an hour, and was concerned that more employers in the survey didn't support a $15 minimum. "That's bad," she said. "More need to support us. I understand that they are trying to meet us halfway, but that is not going to work for us. Many of us already make $10, and we are barely getting by." During the last year, several polls have been done showing public support for raising the minimum wage. This poll is significant because it is one of only a few that sought the viewpoints of employers. Perhaps it is the only national survey offering such detail about these opinions. Harris Poll did the survey for CareerBuilder, a global employment and human resource company. The poll finds support for raising the minimum wage among all major industries. This includes employers in retail and hospitality, which have frequently been cited by supporters of minimum wage increases, because these sectors have so many low-wage workers. In fact, while 27 percent of all employers surveyed said they are hiring minimum wage workers this year, 51 percent of retailers said they are hiring such workers and 58 percent of employers in leisure and hospitality. Forty-five percent of employers with minimum wage workers said they are hiring more of them today than they did before the recession began in December 2007. The poll found 70 percent of employers currently hiring minimum wage workers supported an increase. Only 59 percent of their counterparts without minimum wage workers supported the raise. But as the poll showed, raising the wage means different things to different people. While close to two-thirds of employers support a minimum wage increase, **they differ about just how much it should be:**

$7.25: 8 percent

$8.00 or $9.00: 29 percent

**$10.00: 29 percent**

$11.00 to $14.00 : 19 percent

**$15.00 or more: 7 percent**

No set minimum wage: 9 percent

The poll also includes numbers for Ohio, but CareerBuilder said they are probably not as reliable as the national figures because the sample is small.

Employer disagreement is the litmus test for core neg ground. If most employers agree with the aff, very few businesspeople would write about why it’s a bad idea and aff evidence will always be better.

D. Fairness is a voter since it’s a gateway issue to deciding the better debater. Education is a voter since it’s the end-goal of debate; substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational benefit to discussing it.

Drop the debater

1. The NC was skewed. I can’t redo it after the 1AR shifts.

2. Key to deterrence. Drop the arg means aff will run abusive cases for the time skew.

3. Jurisdiction. Can’t vote for a nontopical plan.

4. Depth. Reject-the-arg theory forces us to cover theory and substance which leads to shallow theory debates that set worse norms for the activity.

Prefer competing interpretations because reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

### Keystone Ptx DA

**\*\*\*[Outdated, Replace before round!]**

Keystone XL authorization passed but there aren’t enough votes for a veto override. Supports will attach different legislation to it to sway votes

**Capiello 2-11** writes[[161]](#footnote-161)

WASHINGTON (AP) — **The Republican**-controlled **Congress cleared a bill Wednesday to construct** the **Keystone** XL oil pipeline**, setting up** a **confrontation with** President Barack **Obama, who** has **threatened to veto** the measure. The House passed the bill on a 270-152 vote, endorsing changes made by the Senate that stated climate change was real and not a hoax, and oil sands should no longer be exempt from a tax used to cleanup oil spills. Only one Republican, Michigan Rep. Justin Amash, voted against the measure, while 29 Democrats backed it. But **neither the House nor** the **Senate has enough votes to overcome a veto**, the first of many skirmishes between the Democratic White House and Congress on energy and environmental policy. **Supporters were** already **strategizing on how to secure** the **pipeline**'s **approval using other legislative means**. "The evidence is in. The case ought to be closed," said Rep. Fred Upton, R-Mich., chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Sen. John Hoeven of North Dakota, the chief Republican sponsor of the bill, said in a statement "**we will** continue to **press for approval by attaching an approval measure to another bill**, perhaps an energy bill or must-pass appropriations legislation." Obama "needs to work with Congress in a bipartisan way and approve the Keystone XL pipeline project for the American people," he said.

Living wage will be attached to Keystone authorization to get it to pass

**Bolson 14** writes[[162]](#footnote-162)

Outgoing Sen. Mary Landrieu (La.), the lead Democratic sponsor of legislation approving Keystone, predicts it will pass next year but get vetoed by President Obama. “It most certainly is going to pass. The problem is the president will likely veto it and Republicans still don’t have a veto-proof majority,” she said. **Senate Republicans** will control 54 seats in 2015; they **need 67 votes to overturn a veto. Landrieu said Republicans need to pair Keystone authorization with an important Democratic priority to give Obama incentive to sign it** into law. **“I would strongly recommend that it get paired with something** that the president would not want to veto, **like an increase in the minimum wage** or potentially a strong bipartisan energy efficiency piece,” she said.

Keystone XL causes climate change. This is the most serious existential risk.

**Atkins 14** writes[[163]](#footnote-163)

One of the frustrations of being a climate activist is that far too many people simply do not understand the stakes. Climate issues are often forced through an "environmentalist" lens, wherein issues that should rightly be discussed as a matter of planetary survival are instead talked about as a matter of public health. So the Keystone pipeline becomes about potential spills and wildlife impacts. Fracking becomes about earthquakes and groundwater pollution. That's a frustrating tragedy. Let's be very clear: **if the human race continues** to burn **fossil fuels for the next 30 years at the rate we've been burning them** up to now**, our species** (as well as most other species on the planet) **may not survive.** Most people either cannot emotionally grasp that statement, or refuse to believe it's true. But it's true. **If all** of **the oil in the Canadian tar sands is extracted** and burnt**, it's game over for the planet. That's what the fight over** **Keystone XL is really about**. If all of the oil in the California shale is extracted and burnt, it's game over for the planet. That's what the fight over fracking is really about. Industrial spills, toxic leeching, groundwater pollution--none of it will matter. If tens of millions of Americans die early of cancer because of the toxins involved, that would still be a molehill compared to the mountain that is climate change. Human beings are empathetic creatures. We have a hard time with large patterns and dissociated effects. It's much easier to care about kids getting poisoned by toxic ground water. But as long as the arguments are all about toxicity, they get scuttled into an "environmentalist" wastebasket, drowned out by the lure of corporate profits and increased tax revenues. The fight isn't about whether one or two generations of Americans get cancer early or not. The fight is about the very survival of life on Earth as we know it. (More below the squiggle...) A lot of politicians get upset with how "angry" and "unreasonable" climate activists are. That's the wrong way of looking at it. **The proper lens is to look at how** many **charlatan** and deluded **politicians talk about** the deficit and/or **national security in apocalyptic terms**. It's to look at how much inconvenience, exploitation and suffering we allow ourselves to be subjected to by devastating social safety net cuts in order to curb the deficit. **It's to look at** the **outrageous expenses, unnecessary wars and violations of privacy** by the Pentagon, NSA, TSA and others **in the name of national security**. Then to imagine that you know and understand that **those are mostly phantom issues that don't constitute a real threat** at all, when the real threat to humanity is one that almost no one will talk about, and that no one will do anything about if it means even a minor increase in taxes or reduction in corporate profits. Imagine how frustrating that would feel. Imagine how angry you would become. Well, all those frustrated and angry people are right, and the conventional wisdom on these issues is wrong. Just as the conventional wisdom was wrong on slavery in 1850, just as the conventional wisdom on labor rights was wrong in 1920, just as the conventional wisdom on civil rights was wrong in 1950, just as the conventional wisdom on deregulation was wrong in 1990, and the conventional wisdom on war in the Middle East was wrong in 2003. The conventional wisdom on the comparative danger and need to act on deficits versus climate change is just as wrong today. As with so much else, the reality of the situation will eventually prove the climate activists out. Today's climate Cassandras will be tomorrows forward-thinking heroes. But unlike with past injustices where the suffering of one generation can be corrected with policies that protect the next, by the time the world figures out that climate, not deficits or terrorism are the real apocalyptic threat to life on Earth, it will simply be too late. The damage will already have been done. There will be no way to protect the next generation. By the time all the Canadian pipeline-driven tar sand oil and fracked California coastal shale have been burnt so people can drive from their soul-deadening jobs to their overpriced homes in order to uselessly fatten record corporate profits and bloated asset prices, it will already have been far too late.

Climate change causes extinction and turns poverty

**Childress 14** writes[[164]](#footnote-164)

**Warming temperatures, sea-level rise and unpredictable shifts in weather are** already **cutting into food production and** will **have long-term impacts on human survival, according to** the latest report on climate change from **the UN**. The UN releases periodic reports on the impact of climate change. The last one, released in October 2013, found that climate change is happening faster than ever, and will only get worse. Why has the U.S. been reluctant to address climate change? Watch Climate of Doubt, FRONTLINE’s exploration of the massive shift in public opinion on climate change. The latest report describes the impact that change will have on human survival. It starts with a drop in food production. Climate change has already reduced wheat and maize yields in tropical and temperate regions, along with some rice and soybean crops, according to the UN. “**All aspects of food security are potentially affected by climate change**, including food access, utilization, and price stability,” the report noted. That’s expected to worsen as climate change continues, it said. **Limited food means rising prices** for basic staples**, leaving the poor malnourished and** more **vulnerable to disease. It also raises** the **risk of conflict as groups clash over dwindling resources, and others migrate to new areas,** either **because they’ve been displaced by extreme weather** or decided to move in search of better living conditions. The report found one bright spot: Some communities have taken steps to adapt to climate change, the UN said. Local communities in Manila, for example, are building more bridges to combat flooding, it said. Japan is upgrading “coastal protection structures” to guard against sea-level rise. And a number of cities in the U.S. have programs to encourage homeowners to redirect rainwater runoff into a storage tank or nearby wetlands, the report said. But most of these efforts so far are highly localized and targeted to a single event. And, according to the report, they won’t be enough to withstand anticipated economic shocks. By 2020, poorer countries will need an estimated $100 billion per year to help adapt and mitigate the impact of climate change, the report said. But already, wealthier countries, including the U.S., have balked at the price tag: At their request, that figure was removed from the summary report that will be given to world leaders, according to The New York Times.

### TOGAs CP

Counterplan: The National Conference of State Legislatures and the National Governors Association should require employers pay a living wage adjusted for cost of living.

States are becoming more independent now. The federal government should keep that going by letting the states address minimum wage increases.

**Matthews 14** writes[[165]](#footnote-165)

However, the negative impact varies for different employers, different industries, different states and even cities. **What employers can** and will **pay** for workers **in California**, and especially high-cost San Francisco, **may be** much **more than** a similar employer will pay **in Mississippi**. And what an employer will pay for engineers in the low-unemployment tech industry will be higher than want a small hamburger-stand owner will pay for counter help. So why have a national minimum wage that imposes the same price floor on every state and region? If there is going to be a minimum wage, **why not let states decide?** In fact, the states are already doing just that. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 21 states have set the minimum wage higher than the federal law. Eleven of those states’ minimum wage is somewhere below $8.00 an hour; 8 place their wage between $8.00 and $9.00, and Washington state and now Oregon are above $9.00. Even cities are jumping on the bandwagon. The most recent is the small Washington town of SeaTac, near the Seattle airport, which raised the minimum wage to $15.00 an hour for specified service-based companies. Albuquerque passed an increase to $8.50 in 2012. Last year the District of Columbia passed a minimum wage increase to $11.50, to begin in 2016. And two Maryland countries passed the same increase, to being in 2017. The irony is that a nationwide minimum wage is likely to be either ineffective or very damaging, depending on where a person lives and the job being sought. **A federal minimum** wage **set high enough to help people in high-cost states would** be so high that it would **have a** big **negative impact on low-skilled workers in** the **low-cost states**. Conversely, a minimum wage set low enough to not be detrimental to workers in low-cost states would do little for those in the high-cost states, because so many already make that much or more. **States are reasserting their** power and **independence in** a number of areas such as **gay marriage, abortion, physician-assisted suicide,** the sale and use of **marijuana, and tort reform. Congress should stay out of the minimum wage fight** and let the states decide if they want to make that move.

The counterplan ensures few people are potentially harmed by minimum wage increases

**Carroll 14** writes[[166]](#footnote-166)

One of the few life preservers Democrats are grasping for in the midst of this 2014 Republican wave, is that voters across the country voted for a higher minimum wage. And it is true, voters in four states, red states no less, passed minimum wage hikes Tuesday, as did three cities in deep blue California. But what liberals leave out when they trumpet these minimum wage hikes, is that each state and locality raised their minimum wage if not to a different level, then at least on a different schedule. **South Dakota and Arkansas**, for example, both **hiked their minimum wage** to $8.50. **But South Dakota will make the leap in** just **one year** (2015), **while Arkansas will give businesses three years** to adjust (2017). Nebraska, meanwhile, will raise its wage to $9.00 by 2016 and Alaska will raise theirs to $9.75, also by 2016. And in California, Eureka will hike its minimum wage to $12 by 2015, Oakland will go to $12.25 by 2015, and San Francisco will go to $15 by 2018. Raising the minimum wage is never the free lunch liberals claim it is. For example, when SeaTac raised its minimum wage to $15, some restaurants closed, other businesses tacked on a "living wage surcharge," while other businesses cut back on advertising. But whatever the harms and benefits of each minimum wage hike are, **it is pretty clear that a one-size fits all minimum wage makes no sense**. The **cost of living, and** the cost of **running a business, is** just far **higher in San Francisco than** it is in **Eureka**, or South Dakota. There simply is no justification for raising the national minimum wage. **Let the states,** or even better the cities, **decide if their minimum wage needs raising. That way, if the policy is a mistake, it will be** that much **easier to undo and far fewer people will be harmed.**

The counterplan creates collective state action and sends a global federalist signal

**Resnick 8** writes[[167]](#footnote-167)

Having sketched some of the continuities over the centuries that localities have played in U.S. lawmaking, I turn to newer iterations of what I have termed “federalism(s)”—to capture the variations within the construct of “federalism.” Above, I cited a policy on climate change that was adopted by an entity called the U.S. Conference of Mayors. That organization, founded in 1933, 50 is one of several organizations of local and state officials. 51 Others on that list include the National League of Cities (NLC, founded in 1964), 52 **the National Conference of State Legislatures** (NCSL, founded in 1975), 53 **the National Governors Association** (NGA, founded in 1908), 54 the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG, founded in 1907), 55 the National Association of Counties (NACo, founded in 1935), 56 the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ, founded in 1949), 57 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL, founded in 1889), 58 the International City/County Management Association (ICMA, founded in 1914), 59 theNational Association of Towns and Townships (NATaT, founded in 1963), 60 and the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI, founded in 1944). 61 Some coordination among these groups is provided by a group called the Council of State Governments (CSG, founded in 1933). 62 As their names describe, these various organizations are generally organized not by an interest (such as climate control or women’s rights) but by the political units of this federation—by the level of jurisdiction (federal, state, county, city) or the kind of office (governor, attorney general, legislator, mayor). **These entities**, which **mirror the** tiered **structure of American federalism**(s), 63 are voluntary organizations of government officials that gain political legitimacy because they “represent” (in some fashion) facets of governmental institutions. These organizations take positions **and generate** some **collective actions by state officials**. But they are not exactly “GOs”—governmental organizations—in that they are voluntary and in some sense “private” organizations that speak for such entities but do not bind the government units from which their officials come. Nor does the nomenclature of “NGOs”—nongovernmental organizations—capture them, for it is the persona of their members as “governmental” that generates the political capital for the group. Moreover, these organizations are public and private in a financial sense as well, in that their resources include support ranging from taxpayer moneys to private grants and corporate sponsorships. As one scholar of municipal associations put it, they are “part interest groups, part associations, part institutions of government.” 64 Hence, my acronym **“TOGAs”—translocal organizations of government officials**—to capture both that they are distinct from NGOs and GOs and come cloaked in a form of state-based authority These governmental “interest groups” were formed during the twentieth century to protect localities from national encroachments, to forward municipal agendas in Washington, and to engender contacts for similarly situated individuals. With the nationalization and globalization of the economy, TOGAs **have broadened their horizons**, entering into accords and **forging links with other subnational entities around the world** in a fashion that one commentator argued went beyond the ability of the national government to “control, supervise, or even monitor.” 65 As a group of researchers assessing state legislation in 2001 and 2002 put it, **state governments are “taking on the world” by considering** hundreds of **bills related to** globalization, **trade**, immigration, **climate** control, **and human rights.** 66 What these researchers also found was that “legislative **policy activists** often **belong to networks** and organizations **that link legislatures across state boundaries and** that **aid in** the **diffusion of** policy **ideas from state to state**.” 67 TOGAs typically define themselves as bi-partisan, as they broker information. 68 In this respect, they are both clearinghouses and repositories, as well as sometimes research and educational institutions. Through the information they collect, the conferences they run, and the services that they provide, these organizations can create norms for office holders and shape policy preferences. And, as I have shown, TOGAs are conduits for border crossings, state to state, state to federal, and internationally. 69 Moreover, U.S. TOGAs are also part of alliances forging ties with their counterparts in other countries, 70 such as cities or province-state relationships focused on climate change. 71 The content of those ties, the agendas, and the political valences vary. Above, I cited examples of local policies on toxic toys, CEDAW, and global warming, all of which could be termed progressive or liberal. But the political stances of TOGAs ought not to be assumed to be inherently stable or necessarily tilted toward one direction of the political spectrum. 72 An example comes from contemporary immigration law. While I live in New Haven, a “sanctuary city,” other localities have implemented anti-immigrant initiatives. 73 Diversity of viewpoints, in the name of subnational entities, can also be found in virtually all of the Supreme Court’s major federalism cases; state-based actors can be found filing amici briefs on opposite sides, arguing that a particular provision was or was not appropriate in light of federalism(s) commitments. 74 These translocal institutions are legally and politically intriguing for the United States because they are national but not part of the federal government. **They are also deeply federalist in** the sense **that these entities are** themselves **artifacts of U.S.-style federalism**(s), **and** they **obtain** both **their identity and** some of their **import from** the fact of **federalism**(s). Moreover, many of the policies that they help to disseminate— like those involving green house gas emissions or investment divestiture—end up in court through challenges arguing that they poach on the prerogatives of the nation and that, therefore, those forms of lawmaking are preempted. While TOGAs are artifacts of the federal structure of the United States and sometimes bump up against it, they also require reconsideration of some of the stock precepts of legal federalism—prompting my nomenclature of “federalism(s).” Many law-based discussions posit each state to function as a single, isolated actor, always to be treated on an equal footing with other states and sometimes in competition with another state through races to the bottom and now, with climate control, races to the top. Less attention is paid to the many joint actions undertaken by states, either at the formal level of the Constitution’s “Compact Clause” requiring congressional approval 75 or more frequently through coordinated initiatives, such as multistate executive orders and other informal administrative agreements more flexible than compacts. The term “horizontal federalism”—state-to-state interaction—has recently gathered some attention within the legal academy, 76 but more of the focus is on single state-to-state exchanges (such as issues related to the Full Faith and Credit Clause) and less is on the role played by local officials working in concert. Turning to the “vertical dimensions,” one finds discussions of “cooperative federalism,” by which is meant national programs with state or city-based implementation or shared regulatory authority. 77 One also can find some interest in regional efforts. 78 **Translocal action**, that crosses both vertical and horizontal dimensions at the same time, making diagonal marks on a federal grid, **requires reappraisal of** the propriety of always **conceiving of states in the singular rather than** appreciating their role **as a collective national force**. Instead of models of exclusive areas of competencies and categorical classifications, the focus should shift to the interdependencies and interaction. 79 And, rather than federalism(s) being proffered as a barrier to the “foreign,” federalist processes through these organizations serve as mechanisms by which to domesticate the “foreign.”

Federalism mitigates separatism

**Reynolds 12** writes[[168]](#footnote-168)

But people also talk about secession for more serious reasons. They feel that the central government doesn't respect them, forces them to live under laws they find repugnant and takes their money away to pay off its own supporters. You see **secession movements** based on these principles in places like Scotland, Catalonia, Northern Italy, and elsewhere **around the world**. Some might succeed; others are less likely to. But in every case they **represent unhappiness with the s**tatus **quo**. America has an unfortunate history with secession, which led to the bloodiest war in our history and divisions that persist to this day. But, **in general, the causes** of secession **are pretty standard** around the world: **Too much power in the central government**, too much resentment in the unhappy provinces. (Think Hunger Games). **So what's a solution?** Let the central government do the things that only central governments can do -- national defense, regulation of trade to keep the provinces from engaging in economic warfare with one another, protection of basic civil rights -- and then **let the provinces go their own way in most** other **issues**. Don't like the way things are run where you are? Move to a province that's more to your taste. Meanwhile, **approaches that work** in individual provinces **can, after** some **experimentation, be adopted by the central gov**ernment, thus **lowering the risk of** adopting **untested policies** at the national level. You get the benefits of secession without seceding. Sound good? It should. It's called federalism, and it's the approach chosen by the United States when it adopted the Constitution in 1789. As James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 45, "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."

The impact is World War III. Only reassertion of decentralized federalism solves

**Valaskakis 14** writes[[169]](#footnote-169)

Like modern marriages, half of which end in divorce, **there is a new and ominous** global **threat: the break-up of previously stable** political **entities through separatism**. Crimea wants to leave Ukraine. Scotland has scheduled an independence referendum from Britain in September 2014 and Britain is considering one to possibly leave Europe in 2015. Catalonia's referendum to secede from Spain is in November 2014, and Quebec may possibly organize its own in the next couple of years. Wallonie, Corsica, North Italy, Bretagne etc. may one day follow suit. There is even talk of splitting California in two! Why are these centrifugal forces emerging now? There seems to be four leading reasons. The first is a knee jerk reaction against excessive and unregulated globalization which leaves the ordinary citizen lost and with no identity. He therefore seeks a new sense of belongingness in a small, newly independent country, favoring localism over globalism. The second is the fact that most **so called 'nation' states are** actually multinational and **diverse**. The ethnic minorities which feel oppressed in such states, are tempted to seek a divorce, set up their own nation, where they are will then be the majority -- and perhaps, in the process, exact revenge on their former tormentors, now in the minority. The third is the worldwide failure of national governments, who seem to be chronically unable to deliver on their electoral promises. One response is to 'throw the rascals out', which explains why governments of the left, right and center are regularly kicked out of office at the next election. In the U.S., an irate electorate consistently punishes the governing parry at the mid-terms regardless of its ideology. **An alternative** response to ineffective governance **is to seek independence, whenever there is a** geographical **concentration of like minded opponents** to a central regime. This was what the U.S. Civil War was all about and is what many contemporary ethnic struggles are leading towards. Fourth and finally, there is simple self interest. Rich provinces, in a country, whose constitution obliges them to help poorer ones, (like Canada) may want to end these subsidies and keep all the money to themselves. Under this logic it should be Alberta rather than Quebec considering secession. When all is said and done, is all this good or bad news ? At first blush, by invoking the principle of self-determination, the virtues of decentralization and more responsible local government, we might be tempted to welcome these **centrifugal forces**. But upon reflection and careful analysis we should instead fear them because they will **exacerbate** the present **mismanagement** of our planet. The **separatists often believe** that **they can repeal globalization by** a simple **declaration** of sovereignty, the adoption of a new flag and national anthem and by being awarded a seat in the United Nations. This, unfortunately is a delusion. Globalization is fueled by international capital, labor and technology movements, the internet, global finance and powerful worldwide networks -- some visible, others covert. Multinational corporations are going to remain global, and so are mafias, narco-cartels, organized crime, jihadists etc. If all the separatist movements in the world were to succeed, we could move from a present world of under 200 countries to one of over 1,000 -- all with an equal seat at the UN. **Can you imagine how difficult it would be** to decide on anything **in a 1,000 strong UN** general assembly? **Think, also, of** the **balance of power**: 1,000 fragmented small countries, plus their subnational governments, competing for the favors of a dozen huge unregulated global conglomerates. It would be an embarrassment of riches for the footloose conglomerates. **It would** also **be Eldorado for organized crime,** jihadists, tax evaders and assorted criminals **vaulting** from **jurisdiction** to jurisdiction. The sociologist, Daniel Bell once remarked,in the 1970s, that the nation state had become too big for the small problems and too small for the big ones. His words were prophetic but they cut both ways. National governments can no longer cope with pandemics, global warming, international terrorism, unregulated global finance -- unless they act in unison in intergovernmental organizations. But, by the same token, Lilliputian micro states, emerging from the global separatist wave, would be even be less capable to deal with these problems. Global governance would then be completely controlled by the remaining, still international, private networks. A scary scenario to be sure. Does that mean we must stay put and freeze present borders in perpetuity. No, obviously not. Re-arrangements and restructuring are necessary. But **the more sustainable answer may be** in **new forms of federalism** rather than in the pure multiplication of sovereignties. In today's interdependent world, sovereignty is an illusion except if you are a superpower. The problems are too big while the means available to the new so-called 'sovereign' government are too small. The **'balkanization'** of Eastern and Southern Europe **after the First World War, led to the Second** World War. The balkanization of the world through **wide-spread separatism could increase the probability of a third one**. Not an inspiring scenario.

### \*\*\*Case

### Poverty/UE Turns

**Living wage causes poverty; consensus of economists**

**Quigley 1**

William Quigley, Law Professor-Loyola University New Orleans, 2001, "Full Time Workers Should Not Be Poor: The Living Wage Movement," Mississippi Law Journal, Spring, 70 Miss. J.J. 889, p. 935-6

Opponents of living wages argue that these ordinances could potentially increase the local poverty rate and cost too much. A survey of over 300 economists conducted in 2000 for the Employment Policies Institute, a nonprofit research organization generally opposed to raises in both the minimum wage and the enactment of living wage ordinances, found that nearly eight in ten of the labor economists surveyed thought living wage ordinances would result in employers hiring higher skilled workers, and over 70% said the laws could potentially reduce the number of entry-level jobs and thus increase the local poverty rate. [n180](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n180) The opposition also suggests that living wage ordinances increase the cost of governmental contracts. Pasadena, California, estimated their living wage ordinance cost to be about $ 200,000 for the year 2000; Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimated its cost at $ 300,000; Madison, Wisconsin, estimated its cost at $ 47,000. [n181](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n181) While there is certainly some cost associated with living wages, this article will not join in the aforementioned melee of economists. Others disagree. [n182](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n182)

Prefer expert consensus. My evidence is most likely to be true.

**LaBossiere 14** writes[[170]](#footnote-170)

3. The claims made by the expert are consistent with the views of the majority of qualified experts in the field. This is perhaps the most important factor. **As a general rule, a claim** that is **held as correct by the majority of qualified experts in the field is** the **most plausible** claim. The basic idea is that **the majority of experts are more likely to be right than those who disagree** with the majority. It is important to keep in mind that no field has complete agreement, so some degree of dispute is acceptable. How much is acceptable is, of course, a matter of serious debate. It is also important to be aware that the majority could turn out to be wrong. That said, the reason it is still reasonable for non-experts to go with the majority opinion is that non-experts are, by definition, not experts. After all, **if I am not an expert** in a field**, I would be hard pressed to justify picking the expert I happen to** like or **agree with against the view of the majority** of experts.

**Most people who would benefit from living wage are not poor**

**CBO 14**

Congressional Budget Office. “The Effects of a Minimum-Wage Increase on Employment and Family Income.” 18 February 2014. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/44995

The increased earnings for low-wage workers resulting from the higher minimum wage would total $31 billion, by CBO’s estimate. However, those earnings would not go only to low-income families, because many low-wage workers are not members of low-income families. Just 19 percent of the $31 billion would accrue to families with earnings below the poverty threshold, whereas 29 percent would accrue to families earning more than three times the poverty threshold, CBO estimates.

**The consensus of studies shows that wage increases cause unemployment, especially among the poor**

**Neumark and Wascher 6**

David Neumark (Professor of Economics at the University of California at Irvine, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Research Fellow at IZA) and William Wascher (Deputy Associate Director in the Division of Research and Statistics at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Review of Evidence from the New Minimum Wage Research.” National Bureau of Economic Research. November 2006. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12663.pdf>

We review the burgeoning literature on the employment effects of minimum wages - in the United States and other countries - that was spurred by the new minimum wage research beginning in the early 1990s. Our review indicates that there is a wide range of existing estimates and, accordingly, a lack of consensus about the overall effects on low-wage employment of an increase in the minimum wage. However, the oft-stated assertion that recent research fails to support the traditional view that the minimum wage reduces the employment of low-wage workers is clearly incorrect. A sizable majority of the studies surveyed in this monograph give a relatively consistent (although not always statistically significant) indication of negative employment effects of minimum wages. In addition, among the papers we view as providing the most credible evidence, almost all point to negative employment effects, both for the United States as well as for many other countries. Two other important conclusions emerge from our review. First, we see very few - if any - studies that provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages, especially from those studies that focus on the broader groups (rather than a narrow industry) for which the competitive model predicts disemployment effects. Second, the studies that focus on the least-skilled groups provide relatively overwhelming evidence of stronger disemployment effects for these groups.

Prefer Neumark and Wascher

**Berman 11** writes[[171]](#footnote-171)

The Economic Policy Institute is not alone in this strategy: The liberal Center for American Progress just released a report on “living wage” laws, and one of its authors has a bachelor’s degree in philosophy and was previously co-director of a living wage advocacy group. On the flip side, **a comprehensive survey of two decades of** minimum wage **research by** Drs. David **Neumark and** William **Wascher** (of the University of California, Irvine, and the Federal Reserve Board, respectively) **found** that **85% of the best studies** on the impact of government-ordered wage hikes **pointed to employment losses** following an increase in the minimum wage. Unlike those described above, **Neumark and Wascher have no partisan axe to grind** in the minimum wage fight, and they’re pushing no agendas. Rather, **they are respected labor economists chronicling economic research on the minimum wage** — the overwhelming majority of which shows a higher minimum wage reduces employment. **The Joint Economic Committee during** President **Clinton’s tenure came to the same conclusion**. Even the very first secretary of labor under Franklin Delano Roosevelt noted that job losses were connected to the minimum wage. You can believe decades of consensus. Or you can choose to believe the 665 “experts” who say that the minimum wage has no impact on employment. As the White Queen said to Alice, “Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”

**Prefer literature review to meta-analysis**

**Neumark and Wascher 6**

David Neumark (Professor of Economics at the University of California at Irvine, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Research Fellow at IZA) and William Wascher (Deputy Associate Director in the Division of Research and Statistics at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Review of Evidence from the New Minimum Wage Research.” National Bureau of Economic Research. November 2006. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12663.pdf>

In putting together this review, we have intentionally foregone a formal meta-analysis in favor of a traditional narrative review that attempts to provide a sense of the quality of the research and tries to highlight and synthesize the findings that we regard as more credible. Given the many different types of employment effects estimated in the literature, and the considerable variation in approaches and in the quality of the research, lumping the studies into one meta-analysis does not seem the best way to make sense of the literature. And meta-analysis is even less useful when the underlying theory does not provide uniform predictions about the effects of the minimum wage in every study. Thus, while we recognize that a narrative review introduces an element of subjectivity into the discussion, we felt that it would be more useful to present our arguments and assessments of the evidence, and invite readers to form their own opinions based on them. To assist in digesting what is a very lengthy review of the evidence, we have collected nearly all of the studies we summarize into a set of four tables covering different types of studies, including a brief summary of the minimum wage change variation and the group studied, the data used, the results, and what we regard as the most important criticisms. In these tables, we highlight the studies that we regard as providing the most convincing evidence on the employment effects of minimum wages.

**Unemployment is worse for the poor than low wages**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

The problem plaguing America’s poor is not low wages, but rather a shortage of jobs.34 At a time when the nation’s workforce participation is only 62.8 percent, policymakers must avoid policies that destroy job opportunities.35 Increasing the minimum wage does nothing to help the unemployed poor. In fact, as discussed above, it hurts individuals looking for employment as it decreases available job opportunities. So, who is helped by an increase to the minimum wage? According to a 2012 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, although workers under age 25 represented only 20 percent of hourly wage earners, they made up just over half (50.6 percent) of all minimum wage earners.36 The average household income of these young minimum wage earners was $65,900.37 Among adults 25 and older earning the minimum wage, 75 percent live well above the poverty line of $22,350 for a family of four, with an average annual income of $42,500.38 This is possible because more than half of older minimum wage earners work part-time and many are not the sole earners in their households.39 In fact, 83.5 percent of employees whose wages would rise due to a minimum wage increase either live with parents or another relative, live alone, or are part of a dual-earner couple.40 Only 16.5 percent of individuals who would benefit from an increase to the minimum wage are sole earners in families with children.41 With national unemployment still hovering around 7 percent, national, state, and local demands for an increased minimum wage could not be more ill-timed.42 Increasing the minimum wage would make it more difficult for emerging businesses to expand payrolls and for existing businesses to maintain employees. Further, a higher wage rate would make it more difficult for individuals with less education and experience to find work. Raising the minimum wage favors those who already have jobs at the expense of the unemployed. Public policy would be more beneficial if it lowered barriers to entry for employment and increased economic opportunities. Raising the minimum wage may be a politically attractive policy option, but it is harmful to the very people policymakers intend it to help.

### Innovation (in progress)

Their link card is about labor-saving technology, not about the clean energy tech the Norris and Jenkins 9 ev says is key.

Disad turns warming

## Cap 1NC (Cap Bad Version)

### Revolution DA

High income inequality makes revolution against the super-rich inevitable.

**Hanauer 14** writes[[172]](#footnote-172)

But let’s speak frankly to each other. I’m not the smartest guy you’ve ever met, or the hardest-working. I was a mediocre student. I’m not technical at all—I can’t write a word of code. What sets me apart, I think, is a tolerance for risk and an intuition about what will happen in the future. Seeing where things are headed is the essence of entrepreneurship. And what do I see in our future now? I see pitchforks. At the same time that people like you and me are thriving beyond the dreams of any plutocrats in history, the rest of the country—**the 99**.99 **percent**—**is lagging** far **behind**. The divide between the haves and have-nots is getting worse really, really fast. In 1980, the top 1 percent controlled about 8 percent of U.S. national income. The bottom 50 percent shared about 18 percent. Today the top 1 percent share about 20 percent; the bottom 50 percent, just 12 percent. But the problem isn’t that we have inequality. Some inequality is intrinsic to any high-functioning capitalist economy. The problem is that **inequality is at historically high levels and getting worse** every day. Our country is rapidly becoming less a capitalist society and more a feudal society. Unless our policies change dramatically, the middle class will disappear, and we will be back to late 18th-century France. Before the revolution. And so I have a message for my fellow filthy rich, for all of us who live in our gated bubble worlds: Wake up, people. It won’t last. **If we don’t** do something to **fix the glaring inequities in this economy, the pitchforks are going to come for us. No society can sustain** this kind of **rising inequality.** In fact, **there is no example in** human **history where wealth accumulated like this and the pitchforks didn’t eventually come out**. You show me a highly unequal society, and I will show you a police state. Or an uprising. There are no counterexamples. None. **It’s not if, it’s when**. Many of us think we’re special because “this is America.” We think we’re immune to the same forces that started the Arab Spring—or the French and Russian revolutions, for that matter. I know you fellow .01%ers tend to dismiss this kind of argument; I’ve had many of you tell me to my face I’m completely bonkers. And yes, I know there are many of you who are convinced that because you saw a poor kid with an iPhone that one time, inequality is a fiction. Here’s what I say to you: You’re living in a dream world. What everyone wants to believe is that when things reach a tipping point and go from being merely crappy for the masses to dangerous and socially destabilizing, that we’re somehow going to know about that shift ahead of time. Any student of history knows that’s not the way it happens. **Revolutions, like bankruptcies, come gradually, and then suddenly**. One day, somebody sets himself on fire, then thousands of people are in the streets, and before you know it, the country is burning. And then there’s no time for us to get to the airport and jump on our Gulfstream Vs and fly to New Zealand. That’s the way it always happens. If inequality keeps rising as it has been, eventually it will happen. We will not be able to predict when, and it will be terrible—for everybody. But especially for us.

The revolution will challenge capitalism itself. Minimum wage increases stabilize capitalism and shut down anti-capitalist social movements

**Hanauer 14** writes[[173]](#footnote-173)

One thing we can agree on—I’m sure of this—is that the change isn’t going to start in Washington. Thinking is stale, arguments even more so. On both sides. But the way I see it, that’s all right. **Most major social movements have seen** their **earli**est **victories at** the **state and municipal levels**. The fight over the eight-hour workday, which ended in Washington, D.C., in 1938, began in places like Illinois and Massachusetts in the late 1800s. The movement for social security began in California in the 1930s. Even the Affordable Health Care Act—Obamacare—would have been hard to imagine without Mitt Romney’s model in Massachusetts to lead the way. Sadly, **no Republicans and few Democrats get this**. President **Obama doesn’t** seem to **either**, though his heart is in the right place. In his State of the Union speech this year, **he mentioned** the **need for a higher minimum wage but failed to make the case that less inequality** and a renewed middle class **would promote faster** economic **growth**. Instead, the arguments we hear from most Democrats are the same old social-justice claims. The only reason to help workers is because we feel sorry for them. These fairness arguments feed right into every stereotype of Obama and the Democrats as bleeding hearts. Republicans say growth. Democrats say fairness—and lose every time. But just because the two parties in Washington haven’t figured it out yet doesn’t mean we rich folks can just keep going. The conversation is already changing, even if the billionaires aren’t onto it. I know what you think: **You think that Occupy** Wall Street and all the other capitalism-is-the-problem protesters **disappeared without a trace. But that’s not true**. Of course, it’s hard to get people to sleep in a park in the cause of social justice. But the protests we had in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis really did help to change the debate in this country from death panels and debt ceilings to inequality. It’s just that so many of you plutocrats didn’t get the message. **Dear 1%ers, many of our fellow citizens are starting to believe that capitalism itself is the problem. I disagree, and I’m sure you do too**. Capitalism, when well managed, is the greatest social technology ever invented to create prosperity in human societies. **But capitalism left unchecked tends toward concentration and collapse**. **It can be managed** either **to benefit** the few in the near term or **the many in the long term**. The work of democracies is to bend it to the latter. That is why investments in the middle class work. And tax breaks for rich people like us don’t. Balancing the power of workers and billionaires by **raising the minimum wage isn’t bad for capitalism. It’s an indispensable tool smart capitalists use to make capitalism stable** and sustainable. And no one has a bigger stake in that than zillionaires like us. The oldest and most important conflict in human societies is the battle over the concentration of wealth and power. The folks like us at the top have always told those at the bottom that our respective positions are righteous and good for all. Historically, we called that divine right. Today we have trickle-down economics. What nonsense this is. Am I really such a superior person? Do I belong at the center of the moral as well as economic universe? Do you? My family, the Hanauers, started in Germany selling feathers and pillows. They got chased out of Germany by Hitler and ended up in Seattle owning another pillow company. Three generations later, I benefited from that. Then I got as lucky as a person could possibly get in the Internet age by having a buddy in Seattle named Bezos. I look at the average Joe on the street, and I say, “There but for the grace of Jeff go I.” Even the best of us, in the worst of circumstances, are barefoot, standing by a dirt road, selling fruit. We should never forget that, or forget that the United States of America and its middle class made us, rather than the other way around. **Or we could** sit back, **do nothing**, enjoy our yachts. **And wait for the pitchforks.**

**Minor reforms to capitalism are doomed to failure. Only bottom-up revolution has any chance of lasting change; Venezuela and Cuba prove**

**Sethness 13**

Javier Sethness (Writer and rights advocate; his articles have appeared in Climate and Capitalism, Counterpunch, Dissident Voice, MRZine, Countercurrents, and Perspectives on Anarchist Theory), “The Structural Genocide That Is Capitalism”, Truthout 2013, <http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/16887-the-structural-genocide-that-is-capitalism>

Leech closes this volume with a plea for socialism as an alternative to capitalist genocide. Given the development of his argument in preceding chapters, he declares that any means of attempting to overcome the extreme violence of capital cannot serve merely as a "band-aid" to the metaphorical "appendage severed by the brutality of capitalism." The system itself must be overthrown, dismantled; the point is not simply to apply anemic reforms that might slightly attenuate capital's genocidal logic, but to abolish the genocidal system altogether. For Leech, the most appropriate political alternative is that of a socialism marked by participatory decision-making and social control of the means of production; crucially, as well, this project should include concern for nature - hence, "eco-socialism" - as much of the historical experience of socialism clearly has not. Following from assertions made earlier in the book, Leech sees the peoples of the global South as playing a seminal role in presenting anticapitalist alternatives in the present day. Indeed, he endorses Marx's late assertions on the possibilities for noncapitalist societies to simply skip the capitalist stage and enter full communism in accordance with pre-existing communal, socialistic values. In this sense, Leech ends with an appraisal of contemporary experiments in socialism, as in Venezuela and Cuba. While he recognizes that the late Hugo Chávez implemented a vision closer to social democracy than socialism, Leech remains enthusiastic about the various Bolivarian social programs, the thousands of worker-run cooperatives that flowered under Chávez, and the progress taken in the country toward the implementation of popular control of government, not to mention Chávez's famous internationalism. On Cuba, Leech praises the Castro regime's well-known successes in the fields of education and medicine - with the latter including the founding in 1990 of the Tarara Clinic, which treats Ukrainian children suffering from the ill-effects of radiation exposure after the Chernobyl disaster without cost - and celebrates the island-country's near-abolition of child malnutrition, as attested to by [the] UN Special Rapporteur Jean Ziegler, in addition to the World Wildlife Fund's 2006 declaration that Cuba is the only country in the world to have achieved sustainable development. Tellingly, Leech asserts that Cuba's main export is health care, while that of its imperialist northern neighbor is weapons!

### Robots DA

Living wage will encourage displacement of human laborers by robots.

**Worley-Lopez 14** writes[[174]](#footnote-174)

Puerto Rico, like many other US jurisdictions, is toying with the idea of raising the minimum wage to US$15 per hour — part of the so called living-wage movement. This latest socialist “workers-rights” craze, like so many before it, simply ignores reality. It also ignores math. The best way to guarantee a better life for minimum-wage workers is to lower the minimum wage while lowering taxes and easing regulations. Raising the minimum wage, however, is merely an attractive campaign slogan. It will not go away, even if the politicians promising it have been briefed on how it negatively affects the economy and minimum-wage workers. But reality is about to rear its ugly head in a way never seen before in human history: **we are on the verge of a** **robot revolution**. Akin to the early days of the internet, we are in the first stages of vast and sweeping changes in robot technology. In a period of just 15 years, the internet — barely noticed and used in the early 1990s — became the powerhouse of business, finance, and politics by the mid-2000s. Today, we can hardly imagine our lives without social media and the other trappings of the wired world. The same is now happening in robot technology. From robot toys to Amazon’s proposed drone-delivery system and robots on the battlefield, robots are popping up everywhere. Given the common use of vending machines, at what point do robots outperform humans in the service sector? Perhaps the real question is **at what wage do robots outperform humans?** Technology-consulting firm Gartner estimates that one in three jobs will go to robots in the next 10 years. One need not run the numbers to know that **a $15 minimum wage will make fewer people employable, and robot replacement more viable**. That should give politicians pause before they start proposing another increase in the minimum wage. It won’t be long before some young kid tinkering in his garage with robots will start a new company designed explicitly to offer low-cost robots to replace most minimum-wage employees. Many lawmakers may simply try to ban the robots to “protect jobs.” While that might limit them for a while, it would only work if everyone were to apply it. If one country chooses technology over socialism, all other countries will have no choice but to follow suit or fall behind. **As nation after nation goes robotic, millions of minimum-wage workers will find themselves** unemployed and **unemployable** in a new robot-dominated world. Those **countries** or jurisdictions **that refuse to make the transition will simply decline unless they are paying** their **workers far less than it costs to replace them with robots**. There is a way that Puerto Rico can benefit from this paradigm shift. Education officials could make robotics a core class beginning in grade school. It should be continued throughout high school and be required for graduation. Understanding how robots work and are programmed and maintained will give Puerto Rican school children and young adults a leg up in the new robotic world order. The world is once again entering a major change in the way business is done, and far too many politicians are either shortsighted or just pretending not to see.

Low-wage jobs are very susceptible to future automation if minimum wage increases

**Flowers 14** writes[[175]](#footnote-175)

It’s become commonplace for computers to replace American workers — think about those on an assembly line and in toll booths — but two University of Oxford professors have come to a surprising conclusion: Waitresses, fast-food workers and others earning at or near the minimum wage should also be on alert. President **Obama’s proposal to increase** the federal **minimum wage** from $7.25 to $10.10 per hour **could make it worthwhile for employers to adopt emerging tech**nologies to do the work of their low-wage workers. But can a robot really do a janitor’s job? Can software fully replace a fast-food worker? Economists have long considered these low-skilled, non-routine jobs as less vulnerable to technological replacement, but until now, quantitative estimates of a job’s vulnerability have been missing from the debate. **Based on a 2013 paper by** Carl Benedikt **Frey and** Michael A. **Osborne of Oxford, occupations in the U.S. that pay at or near** the **minimum wage** — that’s about one of every six workers in the U.S. — **are** much **more susceptible to** “computerization,” or as defined by the authors, “job **automation** by means of computer-controlled equipment.” The researchers considered a time frame of 20 years, and **they measured whether such jobs could be computerized, not whether these jobs will be computerized.** The latter involves assumptions about economic feasibility and social acceptance that go beyond mere technology. The minimum-wage occupations that Frey and Osborne think are most vulnerable include, not surprisingly, telemarketers, sales clerks and cashiers. But also **included are occupations that employ a large share of the low-wage workforce, such as waiters and waitresses, food-prep**aration **workers and cooks**. If the computerization of these low-wage jobs becomes feasible, and if employers find it economical to invest in such labor-saving technology, **there will be huge implications for the U.S. labor force**. First, when we discuss minimum-wage jobs, what types of jobs are we talking about? The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has a system for classifying jobs: The Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), which was last updated in 2010. Combined with hourly wage data, also from the BLS and dating to May 2012, we can specify the occupations most affected by a minimum-wage increase. The table below shows 10 low-wage occupations, ordered by total employment, along with the median hourly wage and the 25th-percentile hourly wage (the wage 25 percent of workers earn below). Filtered out are occupations for which the 25th-percentile hourly wage is above Obama’s proposed minimum wage. Table1 The top occupations — retail salespeople, cashiers and fast-food servers — confirm the common perception of a minimum-wage job. These 10 occupations represent over half of all employment for which at least 25 percent of workers earn less than $10.10 per hour. But two data caveats are in order. 1. Because Obama’s proposal would not raise the federal minimum wage until 2016, and given this BLS data is from 2010 and 2012, it is an overly inclusive tally of jobs falling under the $10.10 threshold, because inflation and/or real-wage increases through 2016 could alter these occupations’ earnings. 2. Surely the jobs earning just over $10.10 per hour will also be affected by an increase, right? Yes, but raising the wage threshold to $12 per hour, for example, filters to largely the same list of occupations. The big exceptions are “office clerks” and “customer service representatives.” These occupations employ about 5 million workers who could be affected by a minimum-wage increase, but likely to a lesser degree than the ones presented in the table above.1 Second, how susceptible are these minimum-wage jobs to computerization? Late last year, Republican Sen. Rob Portman of Ohio, an opponent of raising the minimum wage, gave the following anecdote on the potential consequences: “And you go into these fast-food places now, often there’s a drink dispenser, so you have one fewer person.” Could this happen on a broader scale? A drink dispenser is one thing, but could all jobs in fast-food restaurants be computerized? The likelihood of technology replacing workers is hard to quantify, but Frey and Osborne attempt to do just that in their 2013 paper. **Using detailed job descriptions for more than 700 occupations**, the Oxford researchers evaluate each occupation in three areas: “Perception and Manipulation,” such as coordinated, dexterous hand movements, or working in cramped spaces; “Creative Intelligence,” such as composing a musical score; and “Social Intelligence,” such as negotiating with and persuading other people. **Frey and Osborne then calculate the probabilities whether, within 20 years, such work could be computerized**. Again, they’re not predicting whether these jobs will be computerized. On the low end, the researchers’ estimates included choreographers (0.4 percent), clergy (0.8 percent) and chief executives (1.5 percent), whose work is highly unlikely to be replaced by technology. The most vulnerable occupations included tire builders (94 percent), telephone operators (97 percent) and tax preparers (99 percent). Where do minimum-wage jobs fall on this spectrum? **For** those **jobs in which at least 25 percent of workers earn** an hourly wage **below $10.10, the median Frey-Osborne probability is 82 percent**. When we weight each occupation by its total employment — for example, there are a lot more cashiers than sewers, and they have different likelihoods of computerization — the median probability is even higher at 91 percent. Here are the three occupations employing the most minimum-wage workers and their probabilities of computerization within 20 years: retail salespersons (92 percent), cashiers (97 percent), and waiters and waitresses (94 percent). Because the median probability of computerization for all occupations is 64 percent, and 74 percent when weighted by employment, it is clear that low-wage workers are more vulnerable to computerization.

Automation is used by capitalists to suppress working class agency.

**Mueller 13** writes[[176]](#footnote-176)

But I’m just not sure how we get there, beyond a nebulous gesture to “after the revolution, comrades.” Maybe I’m just impatient, but from where I’m standing, in full-bore capitalism preparing some supersized austerity cuts for everyone, it looks like **automation is** actually a huge problem, a very real threat to workers, who, with the help of machines, are being casualized, laid off, and made obsolete. If it’s **disempowering workers** and strengthening capital, then **it’s not making socialism** any more **achievable**. Despite having written more than a century ago, Karl **Marx** has a lot of pertinent observations on the introduction of machines into the labor process. In spite of a few positive remarks about bourgeois productive forces in his early years, he **was no techno-utopian — for him,** the relationship between labor and machines was one of “direct antagonism.” The machine was “a power inimical” to the worker, created “for the sole purpose of supplying capital with weapons against the revolts of the working class” — and here Marx singles out the self-acting mule, an early example of automation. His pronouncement is clear: “the instrument of labor becomes the means of enslaving, exploiting, and impoverishing the laborer; the social combination and organization of labor-processes is turned into an organized mode of crushing out the workman’s individual vitality, freedom, and independence.” Years later, Harry Braverman, in Labor and Monopoly Capital, undertook a comprehensive updating of Marx’s analysis of the labor process, taking into account a century of development. This meant a careful examination of technology; as Braverman was at pains to point out, technological development was shaped by capitalist social relations. **Automation is** not a neutral process; it’s a **part of capitalist strategy against working-class power**. Braverman sketches out how this strategy unfolds. **Before automation, craft workers are responsible for** both the **conceptual and** the **manual labor** required to produce a commodity. **The skill resulting from this** unity makes craft workers hard to replace, and thus **gives them power to demand concessions from capitalists**. Even more than that, workers have control over the labor process, which derives from the advanced knowledge they acquire in the course of the job. In the early days of capitalism, the bosses didn’t even know how commodities were made; they just owned the means of production. This put them in a rather precarious position themselves, as anyone who’s watched the fourth season of Breaking Bad knows. It’s dangerous if your workers know more about making the product than you do. For Frederick Taylor, the godfather of “scientific management,” this monopoly of knowledge was where management had to start if it wanted to take control and raise productivity while reducing wages. **Taylor devised a process** to that end. First, set up an array of surveillance monitors to intensively study the labor process, down to the individual bodily movements of workers. Then use the data to restructure the work process, creating a division between conceptual work (management) and manual work (labor). Then the process **of mechanization** can begin, **in which manual work is replaced with machines, deskilling** the **labor** required in the production process. Taylor was adamant that workers should be given as little agency as possible — the science of management demanded it. **It doesn’t stop with manual labor**, though. With the advent of computers, **even management** tasks **can be farmed out to machines**: work processes can be broken down into component tasks, and machines introduced wherever possible. Braverman relentlessly criticizes the assumption that clerical workers are somehow more skilled than “blue collar” workers, when they are just as deskilled as people working the shop floor, if not more. The fragmentation of administrative tasks leaves even educated clerks bereft of any coherent concept of what they do, provoking the kind of anomie portrayed in Office Space and making it harder for workers to see the contours of shared struggle. Braverman’s overall point is that **machines aren’t used to make work easier. They are used**, and designed to be used, **to maintain capitalist control** over work processes, especially when the workers start getting organized. **They are weapons against** potential **revolt. It’s no coincidence that** the **disciplinary** mechanism of **surveillance is** such **a crucial component** in automation. Today, this process continues to intensify: online supermarket Tesco is experimenting with high-tech monitoring bracelets that force its workers into productivity contests — “gamifying” work just as Taylor did to his subjects shoveling pig iron. It is insufficient to respond by pointing to productivity gains to justify automation — that’s a management trick. Automation’s prime function is to destroy the ability of workers to control the pace of work. The results are bloody. As Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin document in Detroit, I Do Mind Dying, while management attributed productivity gains in the auto industry to automation, black workers credited “niggermation”: the practice of forcing them to work at high speeds on dangerous machinery. Such shocking terminology underscores a crucial truth. Robots weren’t responsible for those cars; rather, it was brutalized black bodies. A 1973 study estimated that sixty-five auto workers died per day from work-related injuries, a higher casualty rate than that of American soldiers in Vietnam. Those who survived often suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. This bloodbath is directly attributable to the disempowering effects of automation. Had workers retained control, they wouldn’t have worked at such a deadly pace.

### UBI CP

Counterplan: The United States ought to provide a universal basic income of $11,400/year. Funding is through a 14% value added tax.

Universal basic income is a non-reformist reform. It challenges wage labor itself so it’s key to radical transformations of capitalism

**Frase 10** writes[[177]](#footnote-177)

Rather than trying to draw up a detailed blueprint of a socialist economy, I prefer to think in terms of what Andre Gorz called **“non-reformist reforms”**: changes to the system that **can be implemented under capitalism, but** which **set the stage for** further **radical transformations**. And I want to highlight one particular such reform that’s associated with Gorz, and which commenter R. Burke brings up in the comments of Jason’s recent post: the guaranteed minimum income, or “**U**niversal **B**asic **I**ncome” as it’s sometimes called. This is just what it sounds like, an income that every citizen would be entitled to, independent of work. And I find it compelling because it **directly addresses one of the most fundamental objectionable things about capitalism,** namely the fact **that it makes almost everyone dependent on** performing **wage labor** in order **to survive**. This is despite the fact that we live in a society that is more physically productive than any other that has ever existed. Eighty years ago, John Maynard Keynes was predicting that the greatest problem his grandchildren would face was what to do with their abundant leisure time. Instead, we are all working more than ever. **A guaranteed income could** begin to reverse this state of affairs by **giv**ing **people the option of opting out of the labor market**, which today is only possible for a wealthy few. It would therefore address a goal that Pat Devine mentions in a passage Jason quoted: reducing the amount of unpleasant labor that people are forced to perform. As I already noted, I think this goal is of such paramount importance that I’m baffled by any theory of a socialist economy that doesn’t make it absolutely central. Which brings me to one thing I found quite unappealing about the vision David Schweickart presents. His description of economic life seems to assume that the ideal way to live is to have some job that you go off to for 40 hours a week for the rest of your life. If labor is unpleasant, the solution is to give workers more control, rather than giving them the option of opting out of work–“voice” rather than “exit”, to use Albert Hirschman’s lovely phrase. Now maybe this makes sense to people who grew up in the mid-20th century, when the labor market was less volatile and careers were more stable. But it doesn’t make any sense to me. Even if full employment is possible, why would it be desirable? If there’s not enough work to go around, why would you go and create more? And maybe it’s true that if we make the workplace democratic, then work will be fulfilling and people won’t mind it. But in that case, why force them? It’s at this point that you’re supposed to start talking about “material incentives”, to take Schweickart’s choice of jargon. It usually starts with some troll objecting that socialism is impossible because nobody will do any work without the fear of starvation. The socialist then comes back with some argument about how socialism is going to motivate everyone to go out there and work hard. For Schweickart’s system, the answer is that “one’s income is directly tied to the success of one’s firm”, and so you work hard for the material reward. Jason doesn’t explicitly address this issue, but I’m sure he could come up with a response. But approaching the problem this way gets the whole issue backwards, by proposing solutions before we have understood what the actual problem is. If you just talk in general terms about giving people “incentives to work”, you’re neglecting the reality that **while some work would have to get done** in any kind of desirable society, **other kinds of work should** actually **be dis-incentivized**. Broadly, I’d say that paid work in capitalism falls into at least the following categories: Things that people want done, but which nobody particularly wants to do. Things that people would do voluntarily provided they have enough time, even if they weren’t paid. Things that are useless or destructive, and happen only because they facilitate capital accumulation and people need jobs. Things that people may want done and/or may want to do, but which have destructive effects on other people or the environment. The discussions about material incentives are relevant to things in category 1. But much of the labor in modern capitalist societies falls into the other categories–more of it than we think, I suspect. I’d argue that a lot of artistic and knowledge work falls into category 2. So does child care, although just who does it voluntarily is another matter, which is why feminism is a core part of socialist analysis. Financial engineering, telemarketing, and basically anything that happens at a private health insurance company fall into category 3. So does much of the estimated 25% of U.S. employment that’s taken up by what economists Sam Bowles and Arjun Jayadev call “guard labor”: supervising workers, running the prison-industrial complex, providing private security, and other stuff that is mostly about preserving current power relations and maintaining inequality, rather than making anything useful. Driving a car or burning coal for electricity may fall into category 4. Even though I can sketch out examples like this, in general it’s pretty hard to differentiate these different kinds of labor in capitalism. That’s because **capitalism creates a situation where all work is “good” because it provides jobs**, which **people need** in order **to survive**. However, these different kinds of labor wouldn’t get differentiated in Schweickart’s version of market socialism either, since he still assumes that everyone is forced to work–moreover, the idea of government as “employer of last resort” implies that we’d be actively creating useless category 3 work for people. Devine’s alternative, meanwhile, would attempt to use a convoluted planning process to differentiate between desirable and undesirable uses of labor. That may be necessary in some cases, but I don’t think it should be our first solution–attempting to comprehensively micromanage every aspect of production strikes me as undesirably bureaucratic. More importantly, I don’t think it’s necessary to go down this road at all. Rather than starting with these complicated issues of economic planning, we should start with the thing that’s actually most desirable: making people less dependent on wage labor. Social Democracy has already gone part of the way in this direction, by removing things like health care and education from the market. But to really attack wage labor at its root, you need something like the guaranteed minimum income–perhaps in combination with reductions in the length of the work-week. At this point we get back to the incentives business again, with the critics screaming “but nobody would do any work!” At one level, I think this is just silly. For one thing, at least in the short run, most people would want to make more than the guaranteed minimum, and so would continue to work. For another thing, it’s clear that people do various jobs for lots of different reasons that don’t have to do with money, and some kinds of work would get more popular if people didn’t have to worry about having the money to meet their basic needs. Some jobs really are enjoyable, in other words, and people would do them for free if they could. Other kinds of work give their returns by conferring status–for example, for all but the most famous artists, making art is more about gaining recognition than making money. One appealing aspect of a **basic income** is that it **would** start to **sort out** the **distinctions between** the **different kinds of labor** outlined above. If some jobs start being things people do as hobbies, then great! **If some jobs disappear, and we don’t miss them,** then **great!** If you have to pay people more to make them take crappy jobs, great! Which isn’t to say that basic income is a one-shot magic solution to all the problems of capitalism (although for the argument that it could be, check out a weird and provocative article called “The Capitalist Road to Communism”). Indeed, he best thing about a guaranteed income is that **it stands a** pretty **good chance of provoking major economic disruption and social crisis–that’s what makes it a “non-reformist reform.”** In a world **with** a **guaranteed income, it could very well turn out that** there are **some things** that just **aren’t getting done**. It’s not clear that you’d be able to find enough people to clean office bathrooms or work the night shift at 7-11 if they had access to a basic income, no matter what you paid them. Some people invoke the above scenario as an argument against the basic income, but let me emphasize that this is a problem I would love to have. **Once it becomes clear what** kind of **work is** both **desired and undersupplied, we can have** a **political struggle about how that work will get done**. By offering special rewards (i.e. “material incentives”)? By creating some kind of national service requirement in exchange for the basic income (you have to go clean toilets or work the night shift once a month, say)? By finding clever new ways to automate these jobs? Or by deciding we can really do without some things we thought we “needed”?

A 14% value-added tax is a good funding mechanism.

**Walker 14** writes[[178]](#footnote-178)

Many, perhaps most, authors writing on BIG do not suggest an amount for BIG. No doubt there is much wisdom in not attaching a dollar figure, but nevertheless, I am going to stick my neck out and say that it should be at least $10,000 USD per year in the U.S.[7] This meagre amount is below or at the official poverty line for most places in the U.S. In a land of plenty it is far from generous, yet, for many, it would be enough to stave off the worst forms of monetary deprivation. Some may say this is not enough, but the BIG is proposed as a floor rather than a ceiling. I’m all ears to proposals that call for a higher amount. Notice, however, that such proposals are entirely consistent with the claim that BIG should be at least $10,000. To show that BIG is economically feasible, let us first work on calculating its cost. As a first cut, there are 194 million adults 18-64 years of age in the U.S. A BIG of $10,000 equals $1,940 billion or $1.9 trillion for this group (Sheahen, 2012, 87). This represents only a portion of the over 300 million people living in the U.S. The 36 million seniors in the U.S. already have access to something like BIG: Social Security (Sheahen, 2012, 87). In the future, it might make sense to roll Social Security in with BIG, but for the present, we will assume that seniors will either collect their current Social Security or a BIG equivalent, whichever is greater. An additional 40 billion would be required to top up the lowest Social Security recipients to bring them up to the proposed $10,000 BIG (Sheahen, 2012). We will add this to our proposed budget, so we need to find an additional 40 billion to get to the total necessary to finance BIG to $1,980 billion.[8] So, we are looking to finance approximately an expenditure of two trillion dollars. A huge number for sure, but in terms of the size of the total U.S. economy, over 16 trillion (World Bank, 2014), BIG would represent only 12.5% of the U.S. economic pie. Allan Sheahen has looked at how the U.S. federal budget might be amended to pay for a $10,000 BIG (Sheahen, 2012). I am sympathetic with Sheahen’s approach but I want to explore an alternate means to finance BIG through a ‘value added tax’ (VAT). Europeans and many others are familiar with VAT, but for those who are not, VAT is basically a sales tax that would be added to all final goods and services sold in an economy. **A VAT of 14% would generate sufficient monies to pay for a $10,000 BIG**.[9] The VAT would apply to absolutely all final goods and services. So, there would be a 14% tax on food, haircuts, books, medical services and so on. **However, consider those trying to live on $10,000** a year **when the** new **VAT is introduced**. Suddenly, **their income would not go** nearly **as far**. Imagine they spend $200 a month on food. After the 14% VAT is introduced, the same groceries would cost $228 a month. Their share of rent would increase from $300 to $342 a month. To have the same purchasing power as before the new tax, those living on $10,000 a year would need another $1,400 to pay for the VAT. **So** this is what **I propose**: **increasing BIG to $11,400**. As should be clear, this won’t make those living on BIG as the sole source of income any better off, for although they have 14% more money, everything will cost 14% more because of the VAT. Of course this raises a worry: who wants to pay an additional 14% tax on top of existing taxes? Many might say: “Yes, I would like to help the poor but a 14% tax on everything is a huge burden.” In response, I say **most of us should welcome VAT** to pay for BIG **for purely self-interested reasons**. Suppose you have an above average salary of $50,000 per annum. A new tax of 14% would mean $6,100 in additional taxes. Yes, that is a lot out of $50,000, but remember too that you receive $11,400 in yearly BIG payments. So, under the proposal, your new total income is $61,400 (your $50,000 salary plus $11,400 BIG payment). **If you spend your entire income, your contribution to VAT would be $7,540, meaning that you would** actually **earn** $53,859 or **nearly $4,000 more on the proposal**. The following graph illustrates the relationship between income, VAT and BIG. It may help to walk through some of the information. The yellow line represents the proposed BIG payment. It is constant for everyone: BIG is exactly the same for everyone from a homeless veteran to Bill Gates. The purple line represents VAT, which everyone pays. The smallest contribution to VAT is $1,400, which a person living on just BIG would pay. Unlike the current income tax system, the proposed VAT is a “flat tax” meaning that the same percentage is paid no matter what a person’s income. Someone making $10,000 a year pays 14%, as does a person making $100,000 a year, or even $100 million per year. The blue line represents a person’s income in the present system. The red line represents the change in income (after paying VAT). In other words, the red line represents present income plus the BIG payment of $11,400 minus a 14% VAT. As can be seen, the red line crosses over the blue line at about the $81,000 income range. The vast majority would do better under this proposal even though it includes a large new tax: anyone making between $0 and $80,000 a year would be monetarily better off. About 90% of the population has a net personal income that falls below the cross-over point (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2014). So, the vast majority of the population would be better off financially under the 14% VAT and BIG proposal. Even for the higher income earners, the tax is hardly draconian. The top income tax rate for high income earners at present is 39.6%. So, the maximum a higher income earner would pay under this proposal is 53.6% (39.6% income tax plus 14% VAT). While this may seem like a lot, remember too, this is a maximum. The difference between the theoretical maximum and the actual tax paid (the effective tax rate) is enormous. The top 20% in terms of income pay only 20.1% income tax on average, and the top 1% pay a mere 20.6% (New York Times, 2012). In effect then, the difference between the maximum and the actual income tax rate is about half. So, the present proposal for the top 1% would increase the effective tax rate to nearly 35%. Or to put it another way, if all the loopholes were closed and the richest taxpayers actually paid 39.6%, then they would be much worse off. Again, this only applies to the top income earners. Consider how well someone making $100,000 a year would fare under the proposal. Looking at Graph 3, we can see they make less, but the difference is almost imperceptible on the graph. The difference is actually $2,281 in additional taxes. This would only change the effective tax rate by 2.3% for those in this income bracket. The relevance of this is that about half of the 10% of the population negatively affected by the tax earn between $81,000 and $100,000. The additional tax this group would have to pay is very small: at most, 2.3% of their income. It may help to note that historically, the highest rate for top earners was much higher. For most of the twentieth century the top rate was higher, reaching a peak in the Second World War at 91%. I am not trying to defend the suggestion at this point, only to put it in some context. I have assumed that nothing would change in terms of other taxes, but we should briefly consider this simple assumption. **With BIG, there would be** a **greatly reduced need for income tax to support welfare** programs. Conservatively, **federal welfare** programs are estimated to cost $400 billion (Sheahen, 2012).These **monies could be used to pay the additional cost of government services with a 14% VAT, reduce the deficit or offset future increases in income tax**.[10]

### Case

Wage labor is inherently exploitative—aff can’t solve

**Wolff 6** Rick Wolff (member of the editorial board of several academic journals including Rethinking Marxism) “Anti-Slavery and Anti-Capitalism” Logos Winter 2006 http://www.logosjournal.com/issue\_5.1/wolff.htm

When Marx likened wage-workers to slaves, he brought the lessons of oppositions to slavery to the emerging movements against capitalism. Put bluntly, **Marx argued against** **forms of anti-capitalism that limited themselves to improving** workers’ **living conditions**. Fast-forwarding to today, **Marx would criticize** movements such as those for **“a living wage”** or “pension reform” or “welfare increases” or “saving social security” and so on. A Marxist opposition to capitalism is rather one focused on its abolition as a system. Marxists, he might say, are to capitalism what abolitionists were to slavery. For Marx, the crux of the issue is that capitalism entails exploitation. **A large part of the population** (productive laborers) **produces a surplus** that is appropriated and **distributed by a small part of the population** (capitalists). In capitalist enterprises, **workers are hired only if the value that their labor adds** (to the raw materials, tools, and equipment their work uses up) **exceeds the value paid to them as wages** for doing that labor. That excess value – the surplus – belongs to the capitalists since they own the outputs of production, sell them in markets, and thereby realize the surplus value in them. In the preferred language of capitalism, that **surplus value comprises** the “**profits**” of the capitalists, their “private property” to dispense in their own interests. The less wages that capitalists must pay to workers, the more surplus they get for themselves. Exploitation thus situates tension, hostility, and conflict in the heart of production. **Capitalists and workers are set into oppositional struggles**. Moreover, those struggles ramify and provoke competitive struggles among capitalists and among workers. Alongside the outputs of capitalist production yielding impressive incomes and accumulating wealth, there are also the countless, ramifying social costs of the conflicts and competitions. By excluding them from the surplus, exploitation also excludes workers from the tasks, skills, and rewards of organizing, managing, and directing production. Workers and capitalists thus become systemically unequal in ability, competence, and confidence. The inequalities anchored in capitalist production usually carry over to make the politics and cultures of capitalist societies similarly unequal. The absence of democracy in production undermines efforts to establish it in politics. Capitalist exploitation would be difficult to sustain if it had to be imposed on workers resentful of their exploitation and its social effects. Hence, as with all other exploitative systems (e.g., feudalism and slavery), theories are advanced and disseminated by capitalism’s organic intellectuals that make exploitation invisible and so function to deny its existence. Such theories parallel their counterparts in slavery and feudalism where it was argued that slaves and serfs were not exploited but were rather protected (saved from despair, poverty, and death), loved like children, culturally uplifted, and so on by their lords and masters.

The notion of a “living wage” discursively masks the power relations underlying capitalist globalization and forecloses anti-work politics

**Barchiesi 12** writes[[179]](#footnote-179)

The policy centrality of job creation operates as a device that disciplines popular values and conducts while fusing the imperatives of accumulation and governance. It makes the precarious multitudes generated by the systemic violence of globalized corporate capital governable by recoding desire around production and displacing it from a critique of that very violence. Should such a critique express itself, it might conversely lead to claims for a decent life, sustained by adequate forms of redistribution and decommodification, regardless to one’s employment status. The idealization of employment as the cornerstone of inclusive citizenship is premised on a combination of moral and socio-scientific reasoning – the praise of self-reliance and responsibility blended with purportedly self-evident considerations of social and fiscal sustainability – that for Margaret Somers and Fred Block (2005) defines its “epistemic privilege” as impervious to empirical counterevidence. It is on these premises that, despite the unrewarding, insecure, and fretful reality accompanying for the precariat the job-seeking imperative, “decent work” has acquired center stage in the imagination of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and many self- defined progressive governments as a sensible, practical policy option. Yet, as Peter Waterman (2005) argues, the “decent work” agenda is a purely normative and prescriptive assertion, bankrolled by trade unions and left-liberal technocrats in the desperate quest for policy relevance after having been overwhelmed by the ruthlessness of economic liberalization. It consists of the protestation that a return to a mythical, universalized protected labor force with benefits and rights can indeed square the circle of enhancing human dignity, enabling growth, building communities, and equipping workers with tools to compete in unforgivingly flexible labor markets. One can indeed doubt, Waterman continues, the historical plausibility of this working-class mythology as its ostensible protagonists were often instead, in practical terms, male and white producers of imperial societies that imposed unfree labor to colonized peoples and unpaid women in the household. Instead of taking stock of this problematic genealogy, Waterman concludes, **the “decent work” idea projects** into the future **its assumptive logic according to which it is** in **the nature of capitalist globalization to** obviously **evolve**, **in** conditions of liberal democracy, **in a** gender-sensitive, **worker-friendly**, environmentally sustainable **direction**. At the same time, precisely **because it draws its legitimacy from the** purely **imaginative premise of** a **capitalism with** a human face and **a moral conscience, “decent work” disallows** an **understanding** of the **power relations underpinning** actually existing **liberalization and** the reasons **why it makes work indecent for** so **many. It** therefore **forecloses other discursive virtualities– such as the idea that a decent life can be autonomous from labor** and work ethics **altogether** – as it dispatches the liberation “from” and not only “of” work to the ranks of utopian reasoning. “Decent work” is thus a typical example of a “feeling, analysis, or relationship that has been rendered thinglike and frozen”, the “mournful attachment” to which constitutes for Wendy Brown the stuff of progressive melancholia. In more practical terms, the glorification of work in the decline of neoliberalism maintains a sturdy allegiance to old narratives of modernity as the unlimited development of the forces of production, whereas a crisis of employment is essentially defined by joblessness and measured through the unemployment rate. It is, conversely, hard for this modality of thought to locate employment crises in the predicament of the working poor and the unyielding policy- determined compulsion to rely on poverty wages as the primary means of survival. It is even harder for the left, as long as it confines itself in such policy and discursive strictures, to differentiate its demands for work from a mainstream rationality and commonsense exalting low wages as a path from poverty to personal responsibility and empowerment. It is precisely in such a conundrum that **ideas of “decent work”** show their practical and political limitations as they **are** constantly **expected to recede in front of what conservative opinion calls the** more **realistic alternative between any job, at any condition, or no job** at all.

The aff’s insistence on “better work” strengthens capitalist notions of productivity in the end

**Frase 12** writes[[180]](#footnote-180)

The furious **passion for work is not a constant of human nature but** rather something that **must be** constantly **reinforced**, and successive versions of the work ethic have been used to stoke that passion. At the dawn of capitalism, the call to work was a call to salvation, as Weeks explains in her reading of Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. She recognizes that, far from providing an idealist alternative to Marx’s account of the rise of capitalism, Weber complements historical materialism by describing the construction of a working class ideology. The word is used in Althusser’s sense: “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” The Protestant ethic allowed workers to imagine that when they worked for the profit of the boss, they were really working for their salvation, and for the glory of God. By the twentieth century, however, the calling had become a material one: hard work would ensure broad-based prosperity. Each of the century’s twin projects of industrial modernity developed this calling in its own way. Soviet authorities promoted the Stakhanovite movement, which glorified exceptional contributions to the productivity of the socialist economy. In Detroit, meanwhile, the social democratic union leader Walter Reuther denounced advocates of shorter hours for undermining the US economy in the struggle against Communism. In neither case was the quality of industrial work called into question; it was simply a matter of who was in control and who reaped the spoils. The industrial work ethic ran aground on the alienating nature of industrial labor. Workers who still remembered the Great Depression might have been willing to subordinate themselves to the assembly line in return for a steady paycheck, but their children were emboldened to ask for more. As Jefferson Cowie recounts in his history Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class, **the** 19**70s were characterized by pervasive labor unrest** and what was popularly called the “blue collar blues,” as “workers were harnessed to union pay but longed to run free of the deadening nature of the work itself.” In the realm of left theory, **this** development **was reflected in** the vogue for **“humanist” critiques of work**, rooted in the young Marx’s theory of alienation. Weeks highlights the Freudian-Marxist Erich Fromm, who argued that “the self realization of man . . . is inextricably linked to the activity of work,” which will again become authentic and fulfilling once it is freed from capitalist control. In recognizing the limitations of demanding more work, the **humanists** instead **called for better work. But this** critique proved to be doubly unsatisfying: it **either points backwards to austere primitivism or forward to another iteration of capitalism**. In the hands of feminists like Maria Mies, the critique of alienated work becomes a call to produce only for immediate use, rather than for exchange; this, Weeks notes, is “a prescription for worldy asceticism of the first order.” If the productivist form of Marxism trafficked in the illusion that capitalism’s forces of production could be upheld and preserved independent of the class-based relations of production, then the romantic call for a return to small-scale or craft labor attempts to split apart another of Marx’s dialectics, that between exchange value and use value. But use value, like productivity, is ultimately a category internal to capitalism; **the demand that** what **we** produce **be “useful” is inseparable from the work ethic** itself. The most influential line of argument against industrial labor, however, has not been the ascetic one but instead what the sociologists Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello call the “artistic critique.” Under this critique, **industrial labor is condemned** not because it separates exchange and use, but **because it restricts** the **autonomy**, freedom, and creativity of the worker. The solution is not to reconnect work to earthy craft labor, but to elevate workers into flexible, autonomous, self-fashioning individuals, truly able to realize themselves in their work. But **this** position quickly **curdled into apologia for** the precarious world of **post-1970s capitalism, in which individuals were encouraged to celebrate unstable jobs and** uncertain **income as forms of freedom** rather than insecurity. Intangible benefits were offered as an alternative to a share in rising productivity, which became decoupled from wages. Thus we arrive at a third iteration of the work ethic in the post-industrial era, where work is now represented neither as a path to salvation nor as a road to riches, but as a source of personal identity and fulfillment. This ethic is exemplified by hip Silicon Valley firms like Apple, which reportedly told employees, in response to their wage demands, that “Money shouldn’t be an issue when you’re employed at Apple. Working at Apple should be viewed as an experience.” In these circumstances, Weeks argues, **calls for “better work”** are not only inadequate, they **tend to reproduce** and extend a form of **capitalism that attempts to colonize the lives** and personalities **of its workers**. Hence “worker empowerment can boost efficiency, flexibility can serve as a way to cut costs, and participation can produce commitment to the organization .&nbsp.&nbsp. quality becomes quantity as the call for better work is translated into a requirement for more work.” **Any attempt to reconstruct** the meaning of **work in a non-alienating way must begin**, then, **by rejecting work altogether**. Yet the manipulative invocation of the autonomy of labor is only possible because the artistic critique did address real desires. Given the shortcomings of the old industrial labor paradigm, it hardly seems possible or desirable to return to an older proletarian ideal of long-term, protected employment with a single firm. Yet some are still attempting to resurrect the idea of better work. In The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class, economist Guy Standing identifies the new mass of insecure workers as a “precariat” rather than a proletariat, one which desires “control over life, a revival of social solidarity and a sustainable autonomy, while rejecting old labourist forms of security and state paternalism.” Like Weeks, Standing is a proponent of an unconditional basic income — a regular payment provided to every individual regardless of whether or how much they work — as a way of providing income security without locking people into jobs. Yet he still grounds his appeal on the concept of work, now expanded beyond the boundaries of wage labor. “The fact that there is an aversion to the jobs on offer does not mean that .&nbsp.&nbsp. people do not want to work,” he argues, for in fact “almost everybody wants to work.” Subsequently, however, he speaks of “rescuing” work from its association with wage labor: “All forms of work should be treated with equal respect, and there should be no presumption that someone not in a job is not working or that someone not working today is an idle scrounger.” This evokes the notion of a social factory in which we contribute various kinds of productive activity that is not directly remunerated, ranging from raising children to coding open source software. But **no amount of redefinition can escape** the **association of work with** the **capitalist** ethos of productivism and **efficiency**. The **contrast between work and “idle scrounging” implies that we can measure whether** any given **activity is productive** or useful, by translating it into a common measure. **Capitalism has** such **a measure, monetary value**: whatever has value in the market is, by definition, productive. If the **critique of capitalism** is to get beyond this, it **must get beyond the idea that** our **activities can be subordinated to a single measure of value**. Indeed, **to demand that time** outside of work **be truly free is to reject the call to justify its usefulness**. This is a central insight of Weeks’ consistent anti-asceticism, which resists any effort to replace the work ethic with some equally homogenizing code that externally validates the organization of our time. Time beyond work should not be for exchange or for use, but for itself. The point, as Weeks puts it, is to “get a life,” as we find ways “to sustain the social worlds necessary for, among other things, production.”

## Cap 1NC (Cap Good Version)

### Cap K

**The Aff Is Profoundly Dangerous; It Spills Over To Government Policies That Stifle The Creativity At The Center Of Capitalism**

**Allison, 2013:**

(The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure. 2013. John A. Allison, Chairman and CEO BB&T Corporation. p. 7-8)

**5. The deeper causes of our financial challenges are philosophical**, not economic. **All of the destructive government policies are based on philosophical ideas taught in our elite universities to future leftist leaders**. These ideas are inconsistent with the founding principles that made America great. They are also inconsistent with individual rights, especially property rights. At a deeper level, **these ideas are inconsistent with humans’ fundamental nature as thinking beings who must make independent judgments that are based on the fact and that use their ability to reason**. Academics purport to defend academic freedom. They are right to do so. However, **when put in government policy positions, the same academics somehow believe that businesspeople can continue to innovate and create wealth despite the ball and chain of government regulations. In reality, government regulations prevent businesspeople from being innovative and from thinking creatively.** In my career, I have seen a number of significant opportunities to add products and services that would unquestionably benefit our clients, and yet some law made this impossible. **All human progress is, by definition, based on creativity, because anything that is better is different. Creativity is possible only for an independent thinker.** Someone who is not creative, who cannot innovate, cannot contribute to human progress. **Government policies often provide incentives for destructive activities and prevent productive innovations.** In a broader context, **our lives ultimately depend on our individual ability to make independent judgments based on our assessments of the consequences of our actions for us.** These regulatory policies are typically based on a fundamental misunderstanding of human nature, the means of human survival, and the nature of the production process. Ideas have consequences. **We need to ensure that our future leaders are taught ideas consistent with the laws of nature and human nature, which are the foundation for a successful society and individual happiness.**

#### Collectivism is the root cause of exclusionary ideologies. Only free market individualism solves.

**Binswanger, 2013:**

(Selfish Greed Wipes Out Racism. 12/26/2013. Harry Binswanger, Contributor To Forbes, Senior Contributor At RealClearMarkets and PhD. In The Philosophy Of Biology. Note: This evidence has been gender-modified. )

By “selfish” I mean: exclusive concern with one’s own self-interest, never sacrificing to others. Think of a Warren Buffett with no interest in philanthropy. It’s beside the point whether you evaluate selfishness as noble, as I do, or as depraved, as most people do. Why selfishness is sacred is a topic for another column. What we’re going to see here is that an exclusive concern with making all the money one can rules out acting as a racist. So, what is racism? By the term’s constant appearance in the media and in public discussion, you would think it well understood. But no. The Left, in particular, can’t afford to look too closely at what racism is. That’s because racism is a form of collectivism. “**Racism,” means racial collectivism. The theory of racism holds that the autonomous individual is a myth: what you are is determined by your race**, your “blood.” **The practice that results is racial discrimination: judging a person by reference to his [her] race rather than his individual attributes.** We don’t have to be too fussy about whether the bigotry is directed at a literal race or a nationality or a religious or ethnic group. **It’s the same kind of evil whether a bigoted employer says “No blacks” or “No Irish” or “No Jews.” All these are forms of discriminating against an individual on the basis of some group, some collective**, to which he belongs. **The group (racial, national, religious, or whatever) is all, the individual nothing. The alternative is individualism: the autonomous individual is all, the group is only a number of individuals. Individualism in practice means judging the individual for what he is as an individual, regardless of accidental, irrelevant facts about his physiology or where he was born, or the religious tradition in which he was raised.** Now, what about a racist bigot who is also selfish and greedy? He’s caught in a dilemma. As greedy, he craves his profit. Money is supposed to be the only thing he cares about. But as a racist, he has to care about something unrelated to money: race. What to do? You see the problem for him is one simple fact: racism is irrational. **The rational way to make hiring decisions is not by skin color but by expected performance. Selfish greed says: hire those who will contribute the most to the bottom line.** Racism says: don’t look at that, look at race. There’s another problem for the bigot. What if men of the race he hates, who are equally qualified, are willing to work for less? Say the employer is anti-black. Is he going to refuse to hire blacks who are asking lower wages than whites are getting? How much is he willing to pay to indulge his racism? And if he does indulge it, how will he compete with other employers who hire strictly by ability? Just yesterday, my iPhone music happened to bring up Joan Baez singing “Lowlands.” I was struck by the line: “Five dollars a day is white man’s pay. Mine’s a dollar and a half a day.” What an opportunity for a greedy man! **Absent Jim Crow laws, selfish greed would cause employers to swoop in to hire cheap black labor, bidding up their wage-rates.** That process would continue until wage rates were color-blind. Money has no color. Selfish greed eliminates racism. You’re skeptical? Then why is there outsourcing? Why have hordes of American companies flocked to hire Chinese labor? Because they’re cheaper. Only a failure to understand the meaning of the concepts one uses allows such contradictory thoughts as: “Greedy bigots won’t hire minorities” and “Greedy business owners are replacing American workers with cheaper Asian workers.” **Racial discrimination cannot last long when [wo]men are free to be greedy–i.e., when there is laissez-faire capitalism. Making economic decisions based on race is irrational, costly, and puts one at a competitive disadvantage**. **The same is true of any form of irrational discrimination–whether based on race, nationality, gender, age, or sexual preference.** The only way to argue the contrary would be to stand up and proclaim: “No, people in these groups really are less competent and don’t add as much to a company’s bottom line.” I don’t think anti-capitalists want to go there. But that’s what their position implies. Many timid people on the Right try to defend capitalism as “consumer sovereignty.” It isn’t that. **Capitalism is the sovereignty of reason. In reason, productive ability not race is what counts. When men are free to act on selfish greed, the more rational tend to succeed and the more irrational tend to fail. That’s why selfish greed wipes out racism.**

**The Alternative Is To Retake Academic Spaces From The Left; The aff’s Criticism Makes Statism Inevitable While Destroying Free Markets**

**Allison, 2013:**

(The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure. 2013. John A. Allison, Chairman and CEO BB&T Corporation. p.230-233)

However, **ideas ultimately determine outcomes. The great ideas that are the foundation of Western civilization and especially modern market economies are under attack in our most important educational institutions.** **Rome fell when the principles that had made it successful were abandoned** and replaced by mysticism, debased currency, authoritarianism, and the “circus.” Western civilization went into decline for almost 1,000 years. The Egyptian dynasties experienced long periods (hundreds of years) of decline and then semirevival over ideas. The same pattern can be observed in Chinese history. Cultures are very intangible. **Human progress is not one straight upward spiral; rather, there are many long periods of significant decline.** It is clearly a two steps forward, one step back process. There is evidence that Egyptian technology was more advanced in 5000 BC than in 2000 BC. What happened to the Mayans? **Progress has to be earned based on the right ideas. Even if the long, long term is positive, there could a hundred or a thousand years of decline.** The Founding Fathers of the United States grasped, at least implicitly, the principles underlying a successful social system—a recognition of reason as a means of knowledge, rational self-interest as a motivaor, and individual rights as the condition necessary for optimal human well-being. Fortunately, the American sense of life still captures these ideas. As defined by Ayn Rand, “A sense of life is an emotional, subconsciously integrated appraisal of man and of existence. It sets the nature of a man’s emotional response and his basic character.” The American sense of life is individualistic, self-responsible, hardworking, “can do,” and benevolent. The Tea Party movement, despite its flaws, is driven by the American sense of life. Americans are skeptical of big government and skeptical of elitists. They value freedom and common sense. These are great protectors. The American sense of life is very different from the dominant sense of life in Western Europe and most of the rest of the world. Our sense of life is my greatest source of optimism that we will ultimately face our challenges and return to the principles that made us great. However, a sense of life is subconscious and intangible, and it can be led in a destructive direction when it is not consciously held and fully integrated. **The objective reality is that the most likely for the United States is a long-term and significant decline into statism.** The reason for this trend is not economic policy but philosophy. **As long as both liberals and religious conservatives defined altruism and attack rational self-interest, our decline is inevitable**. On the other hand, I am at heart an optimist. While the most likely scenario is negative, there is still hope. That is why I bothered to write this book. **If the ideas that made America great can be rediscovered and combined with knowledge on people’s productive nature gained since the Industrial Revolution (as expressed by Ayn Rand), the United States can be returned to greatness.** Our children and grandchildren can have wonderful lives. **The long-term key to success is to recapture the elite universities from the Left. It is critical that we restore meaningful academic freedom in which there is honest and open debate about important ideas.** In relation to this issue, there is a very interesting question regarding about how the United States moved from ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (that is, limited government, individual rights, and free markets) to the “redistributive state” (big government, statism, collectivism, and a highly regulated economy). These trends have been in motion at least since Woodrow Wilson. **The answer is that by the power of philosophical ideas, the Left took over our universities, and therefore the education of future leaders.** In the late 1800s, college professors in the United States were still defenders of the Founding Fathers’ principles. Twenty years later, the culture in universities had changed radically. At the same time, the United States was rising as a world economic power, and our colleges wanted to become world-class universities. To become universities, they needed to have PhD program, but since they did not have PhD faulty members, they could educated PhDs. To solve this problem, the American colleges hired a large numbers of PhDs from Europe beginning in the late 100s (and American students went to German universities to earn their PhDs). The strategy was a huge success in the hard sciences. The U.S. colleges and universities attracted world-class scientists, propelling our economic development. Unfortunately, the strategy was a disaster in the liberal arts, especially philosophy. The students (who were now PhDs themselves) of the German philosophers (such as Kant and Hegel) who had laid the intellectual foundations for collectivism and statism in Europe were attracted to the United States. In Europe, these ideas ultimately led to Nazism and Communism. In the United States, the ideas were partly moderated by the American sense of life, but they led ot the New Deal and the ideology of the current administration. Of course, the universities educate the teachers. Therefore, the Left took over the K-12 educational system by indoctrinating schoolteachers. Because the professors determine which new PhD graduates will get tenure at the university, the system is closed. This is particularly true in the liberal arts, where evaluating accomplishments is highly subjective. **If you are in significant disagreement with your professors over fundamental issues, you are unlikely to get a PhD, get a tenure-track job, get published in the “best” journals, or get tenure.** Numerous studies have documented that the faculties at the vast majority of universities are far to the left of the American mainstream. **It is a closed self-reinforcing system that educates elitists** who at a deep level believe that they are smarter than the rest of us, and that their ideas are more insightful. Of course, there are some high-quality, thoughtful, honest people in academia. But **even the best often operate with subconscious premises that drive their thinking—premises that are inconsistent with a free and “messy” society that is not ordered and directed by the “best and the brightest,” the elite who know what is good for you and have only your welfare as their goal.** Even though history is littered with multiple failures of elitist-driven culture, the Left always attributes to poor execution—errors that will not be made in the future. Despite the fact that communism killed hundreds of millions of people, there are many defenders of communism on university campuses.

### Case

#### Capitalism Is Key To Global Peace; Solves Multiple Scenarios For Conflict.

**Dowd, 2014:**

(July 9, 2014. Capitalizing On the Capitalist Peace. Alan W. Dowd, Senior Fellow Fellow At The Fraser Institute)

If Americans have learned anything from their well-intentioned, costly efforts in the unforgiving lands of Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s that democratic elections do not ensure freedom. Nor do democratic elections necessarily promote stability, as the post-Arab Spring chaos reminds us. But a new Fraser Institute [study](http://www.fraserinstitute.org/research-news/news/display.aspx?id=21538) helps quantify how building up free-market institutions and promoting economic freedom can strengthen societies by increasing social trust and reducing the risk of war. Starting from the premise that “adequate finance is a key ingredient for organizing violence against a state,” Indra de Soysa and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati argue that “**economic repression** and market distortions create conditions that **make armed conflict feasible**.” These factors “supply the means, motive and opportunity for groups to challenge states because economic distortions spawn underground economies that form the organizational bases of insurgency.” The expansion of **free markets and** free economic **exchange**, on the other hand, “**marginalizes violence because it binds people** meaningfully **in a way suited to addressing** the collective dilemmas stemming from **violence.”** “With economic freedom, people gain when they produce goods and services others desire in mutually beneficial exchange,” the report concludes. “**People from other groups become customers,** employees, employers, **suppliers.**” Together, they lay the building blocks for social trust and become essential ingredients in economic expansion — rather than enemies in a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources. In other words, **economic freedom raises the costs of violence — and helps remove** the incentives and **benefits of civil disorder.** Of course, others have pointed out the limitations of democracy in promoting stability and prosperity — and even the dangers of prematurely opening up a society to democratic governance. For instance, Robert Kaplan observed in his 2000 book The Coming Anarchy that “Democracies do not always make societies more civil — but they do always mercilessly expose the health of the societies in which they operate … If a society is not in reasonable health, democracy can be not only risky but disastrous.” He wrote those words two years before America began its nation-building project in Afghanistan, four years before Iraq’s postwar war, and more than a decade before Egypt descended into its spiral of re-revolution. “Democracy,” Kaplan noted, “emerges only as a capstone to other social and economic achievements.” These include the rule of law, stable institutions, economic freedom, and a civil society that protects minority rights as much as it respects majority rule. There is also an application here for international relations. Just as the spread of economic freedom creates incentives for cooperation within nation-states and disincentives for conflict between sub-state groups, it lessens the likelihood of war between nation-states by raising the costs of war. As political scientist Erik Gartzke noted in 2005, “**For six decades, developed nations have not fought each other.”** This “capitalist peace” is historically unusual given that “powerful nations are the most war prone.” However, nations that embrace economic freedom — even those with different approaches to governance, politics, and religion — are learning to “capitalize on the capitalist peace … through expanding markets, development, and a common sense of international purpose.” Thus, the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China would seem to be lower than it was between the United States and the Soviet Union. After all, China needs the U.S. market, and the United States needs China’s cash — and wants China’s goods. Beijing owns $1.3 trillion in U.S. government debt. Annual U.S.-China trade is $562 billion. There was no such connective tissue between the United States and the USSR. Of course, there is no is failsafe inoculation against conflict. Nation-states, like individuals, are unpredictable and sometimes irrational. Miscalculations and misunderstandings can touch off unexpected, unintended conflict. Even strong commercial ties cannot always overcome this — something we should keep in mind 100 years after the cascade of calamities that triggered World War I. It pays to recall that European nations enjoyed deep commercial connections before the war. Britain accounted for more than 14 percent of Germany’s exports in 1913 — then came the summer of 1914. “The United States and China,” the Brookings Institution’s Robert Kagan cautions, “are no more dependent on each other’s economies today than were Great Britain and Germany before World War I.” Even so, **the** vast **economic** and commercial **ties between China and the U**nited **S**tates do help to **mitigate** the possibility of **war.** If such economic linkages are something less than an inoculation against conflict, perhaps we can think of them — along with transparent (rather than secret) treaty commitments and credible expressions of deterrence — as preventive medicine. **The solution to** the problems posed by **the rise of strong states** like China **and the instability of failing states like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is** not to shrink U.S. foreign policy back to some 19th-century version of itself, or to have “less soldiers stationed overseas” (from Germany, Japan, and Jordan to Korea, Kuwait, and Kosovo, the presence of U.S. troops solves far more problems than it creates) or “to focus on nation-building here at home” (a phrase devoid of much meaning, aside from trying to repackage isolationism). Americans may like the sound of those applause lines, but they don’t like the consequences. Perhaps that’s because we feel compelled to do more than simply defend narrow self-interest. This is not a new phenomenon. As Kagan observes in Dangerous Nation, by the end of the 19th century, “The fact that many [Americans] believed they could do something to aid the Cubans helped convince them they should do something, that intervention was the only honorable course.” At least part of the solution to these new/old problems is to spend more time and energy nurturing free-market institutions that encourage commerce between nations and planting **free-market institutions that address the root cause of conflict within nations.** So, the next time the United States is compelled to try to rescue and rehabilitate a broken nation — and it seems likely there will be a next time — Washington needs to pay as much attention to building free markets as to holding free elections.

#### Markets are the best thing since sliced bread; the neg is ahistorical in the extreme

Ames and Forbes, 2012:

(Freedom Manifesto: Why Free Markets Are Moral And Big Government Isn’t. Steve Forbes, Publishing Executive. Elizabeth Ames, Former Member of The Texas House Of Representatives. 2012 104-107)

Today we have scant appreciation for just how harsh conditions were just two centuries ago. As noted author and theologian Michael Novak has described them: Famines ravaged the civilized world on average once a generation . Plagues seized scores of thousands. In the 1780s, four fifths of French families devoted 90 percent of their incomes simply to buying **bread**—only bread—to stay alive. Life expectancy in 1795 in France was 27.3 years for women and 23.4 for men. In the year 1800, in the whole of Germany fewer than a thousand people had incomes as high as $1,000 [in today’s dollars]. Liberty of religion and speech was rare. In most cultures, absolute rulersreigned simultaneously over political, economy, and moral-cultural matters. In such a world, in most places, traditional Christianity and Judaism lived under severe constraints. The development of the market economy in Britain and the United States, Novak writes, changed everything. “After five millennia of blundering, human beings finally figured out how wealth may be produced in a sustained, systematic way.” Economic freedom gave rise to an era of innovation that dramatically improved living conditions. People were able to look beyond the necessities of survival. They gained a greater “liberty of personal choice” and advantages like “a varied diet, new beverages, new skills, new vocations.” Philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s famed description of life as “nasty, brutish and short” has become less true with each generation. In the bestselling, influential *The Rational Optimist,* British journalist Matthew Ridley describes in powerful detail how free markets have uplifted mankind: [T]he vast majority of people [today] are much better fed, much better sheltered, much better entertained much better protected against disease and much more likely to live to old age than their ancestors have ever been. Even allowing for the hundreds of millions who still live in abject poverty, disease and want, this generation of human beings has access to more calories, watts, lumen-hours, square feet, gigabytes, megahertz, light-years, nano-meters, bushels per acre, miles per gallon, food miles, air miles and of course dollars than any what went before. They have more Velcro, vaccines, vitamins, shoes, singers, soap operas, mango slicers, sexual partners, tennis rackets, guided missiles and anything else they could even imagine needing. By one estimate, the number of different products that you can buy in New York or London tops ten billion. Even in poor countries, Ridley tells us, people are living longer. “**The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton** did **in 1955**. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955.” Food, clothing, fuel, and shelter over decades has grown steadily cheaper:[S]urprising as it may seem, the average family house probably costs slightly less today than it did in 1900 or even 1700, despite including far more modern conveniences like electricity, telephone and plumbing. We also get far more for our labor, he notes, than we ever did: An hour of work today earns you 300 days’ worth of reading light; an hour of work in 1800 earned you ten minutes.” (This achievement may dim considerably if Big Government ends up making consumers buy those expensive bulbs.) Entrepreneurial creativity has been the foremost force for good that society has ever known. Entrepreneur and free enterprise evangelist Michael Strong believes that ‘the creation of new enterprises is the most powerful way to make positive change in the world. If all the energy that is currently invested in zero-sum political conflict was gradually transferred to the committed creation of sustainable enterprises, the cumulative impact on behalf of good would be extraordinary.”

#### Anti-capitalist efforts devolves into authoritarian atrocities

**Meltzer, 2009:**

(There Is No Better Alternative Than Capitalism. Dr. Allan H. Meltzer, Professor of Political Economy At Carnegie Mellon. 2009)

Critics of capitalism emphasize their dislike of greed and self-interest. They talk a great deal about social justice and fairness, but they do not propose an acceptable alternative to achieve their ends. The alternatives that have been tried are types of Socialism or Communism or other types of authoritarian rule. **Anti-capitalist proposals** suffer from two crippling drawbacks. First, they ignore the Kantian principle about human imperfection. Second, they **ignore individual differences**. **In place of individual choice under capitalism**, **they substitute rigid direction** done to achieve some proclaimed end such as equality, fairness, or justice. These ends are not precise and, most important, individuals differ about what is fair and just. **In practice, the rulers’ choices are enforced,** often **using fear, terror, prison, or** other **punishment.** The history of the twentieth century illustrates how enforcement of promised ends became the justification for deplorable means. And the ends were not realized. Transferring resource allocation decisions to government bureaus does not eliminate crime, greed, self-dealing, conflict of interest, and corruption. Experience tells us these problems remain. The form may change, but as Kant recognized, the problems continue. Ludwig von Mises recognized in the 1920s that fixing prices and planning resource use omitted an essential part of the allocation problem. Capitalism allocates by letting relative prices adjust to equal the tradeoffs expressed by buyers’ demands. Fixing prices eliminates the possibility of efficient allocation and replaces consumer choice with official decisions. Some gain, but others lose; the losers want to make choices other than those that are dictated to them. Not all Socialist societies have been brutal. In the nineteenth century, followers of Robert Owen, **the Amana** people, and many others **chose a Socialist system**. **Israeli pioneers chose a collectivist system**, the kibbutz. None of these arrangements produced sustainable growth. **None survived**. All faced the problem of imposing allocative decisions that satisfied the decision-making group, sometimes a majority, often not. Capitalism recognizes that where individual wants differ, the market responds to the mass; minorities are free to develop their favored outcome. Walk down the aisles of a modern supermarket. There are products that satisfy many different tastes or beliefs. Theodor Adorno was a leading critic of postwar capitalism as it developed in his native Germany, in Europe, and in the United States. He found the popular culture vulgar, and he distrusted the workers’ choices. He wanted a Socialism that he hoped would uphold the values he shared with other intellectuals. Capitalism, he said, valued work too highly and true leisure too little. He disliked jazz, so he was not opposed to Hitler’s ban in the 1930s. But Adorno offered no way of achieving the culture he desired other than to impose his tastes on others and ban all choices he disliked. This appealed to people who shared his view. Many preferred American pop culture whenever they had the right to choose. Capitalism permits choices and the freedom to make them. Some radio stations play jazz, some offer opera and symphonies, and many play pop music. Under capitalism, advertisers choose what they sponsor, and they sponsor programs that people choose to hear or watch. Under Socialism, the public watches and hears what someone chooses for them. The public had little choice. In Western Europe change did not come until boats outside territorial limits offered choice. The Templeton Foundation recently ran an advertisement reporting the answers several prominent intellectuals gave to the question: “Does the free market corrode moral character?” Several respondents recognized that free markets operate within a political system, a legal framework, and the rule of law. The slave trade and slavery became illegal in the nineteenth century. Before this a majority enslaved a minority. This is a major blot on the morality of democratic choice that public opinion and the law eventually removed. In the United States those who benefitted did not abandon slave owning until forced by a war. Most respondents to the Templeton question took a mixed stand. The philosopher John Gray recognized that greed and envy are driving forces under capitalism, but they often produce growth and raise living standards so that many benefit. But greed leads to outcomes like Enron and WorldCom that critics take as a characteristic of the system rather than as a characteristic of some individuals that remains under Socialism. Michael Walzer recognized that political activity also corrodes moral character, but he claimed it was regulated more effectively. One of the respondents discussed whether capitalism was more or less likely to foster or sustain moral abuses than other social arrangements. Bernard-Henri Levy maintained that alternatives to the market such as fascism and Communism were far worse. None of the respondents mentioned Kant’s view that mankind includes a range of individuals who differ in their moral character. Institutional and social arrangements like democracy and capitalism influence the moral choices individuals make or reject. **No democratic capitalist country produced** any **crimes comparable to** the murders committed by **Hitler’s Germany, Mao’s China, or** Lenin and **Stalin’s Soviet Union**.

#### Free markets check exploitation. History proves self-regulation.

**Ames and Forbes, 2012:**

(Freedom Manifesto: Why Free Markets Are Moral And Big Government Isn’t. Steve Forbes, Publishing Executive. Elizabeth Ames, Former Member of The Texas House Of Representatives. 2012 p. 86-88)

In other words**, the fact that people freely choose to enter into open market exchange works to encourage cooperation and moral behavior.** It’s true that sometimes one side may violate the terms of a voluntary transaction—for example, you buy a car tat’s a lemon. That’s why a free market requires a fair and impartial legal system—to enforce the terms of contracts and mediate disputes. The competition and openness of free market societies also help to curtail too much power and “greed”. **Free markets allow newcomers to rise up and challenge major players. The flow of information in an open market society through institutions like a free press provides additional checks and balances.** **The self-regulating power of self-interest is demonstrated by historic examples of truly free markets.** Some have functioned for years without interference from government. What happened? People did just fine. William Anderson, economics professor at Frostburg State University and a scholar at the Mises Institute, recounts, “For about a century after the founding of the United States, business activity faced little or no government regulation, especially compared with the situation in modern times.” America in the nineteenth century is not the only example of a self-regulating market. In their book, Money, Markets & Sovereignty, Benn Steil and Manuel Hinds write that **much of today’s codified commercial law was not developed by lawmakers but comes from lex mercatoria—“merchant law—which arose spontaneously** in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The laws of lex mercatoria evolved **from the customs and practices of merchants who needed common rules of the road to conduct business beyond their borders.** “Even outside the realm of common law systems, commercial practice has throughout history driven the codification of systems of law, and not vice versa.” Lex mercatoria included principles such as requiring that both parties act according to “good faith” and a general standard of “fair dealings,” in addition to fundamental property rights. **These rules were enforced by a system of merchant courts called Pie Powder courts at merchant fairs along trade routes that were separate from local legal systems.** Bruce L. Benson, economics professr at Florida State University, not that **lex mercatoria is but one illustration of the spontaneous regulation that takes place in free markets.** He explains: “Merchant [law] evolves whenever commerce in medieval Europe were replayed in colonial America, and they are being replayed in Eastern Europe, Eastern Asia, Latin America, and cyberspace. **Like the markets of medieval times, the Internet is today still a largely unregulated market. Yet what Benson calls “markets for trust” have sprung up to aid consumers and businesses attempting to establish trust in first-time transactions.** He give the example of VeriSign, which provides a “trustmark” that Internet businesses can display, assuring customers that their personal data is secure. But that’s far from the only example.

#### Free markets are key to equality. Don’t believe their offense.

**Sirico, 2012:**

(The Moral Case For A Free Economy: An Interview With Father Robert Sirico. August 6, 2012. Reverend Robert Sirco, President Of The Action Institute. Note: This evidence has been gender-modified)

You write at length about the dangers of making an idol out of equality. In pursuing equality, what should Christians be wary of? How do we pursue proper equality properly? Perhaps a better word here is “equity” over equality. **There are a number of very dangerous errors to avoid in the quest for equality. The most fundamental is the belief that material equality is the end-all and be-all of human existence, and thus that material inequality is intrinsically unjust.** Aquinas recognized that it may be in accord with justice for one man to be richer than another. **Justice is each man having what [s]he deserves, and what each man deserves should be commensurate with what [s]he has worked to earn, given the nature of private property. A second mistake,** and one almost as fundamental as the first, **is the belief that there is and always has been a fixed amount of wealth in the world, so that the only way for the poor to become prosperous is for governments to give them the wealth of others.** What many people don’t realize is that wealth is not inert. **People grow wealth through entrepreneurship and innovation. Proof of this, and something that no one would deny, is that the world is far richer today than it was thousands of years ago, or even fifty years ago.** That should make people realize that **wealth is increased over time, and that with the right conditions, those who are currently mired in poverty can also improve their standards through work.** **The right understanding of equality pertains to opportunity, wherein all people have equal access to better themselves, which in an economic sense means markets and the means of improving their own situations. The reason so many in the world are stuck in seemingly endless poverty is not because the United States or Western Europe is rich; it’s because the poor live under governments that do not ensure the fundamentals of the market structure, by discouraging or not permitting enterprise to function the way it would naturally.**

**Capitalism Is Ultimate Freedom; The Alternative Is Collectivist Totalitariansm**

**Ebelling, 2014:**

(Richard M. Ebeling, Professor of Economics At Northwood University. Formerly President Of The Foundation For Economic Education. Free Market Capitalism vs. Crony Capitalism. July 14, 2014. Note: This evidence has been gender-modified.)

In the minds of many people around the world, including in the United States, the term “capitalism” carries the idea of unfairness, exploitation, undeserved privilege and power, and immoral profit making. What is often difficult to get people to understand is that this misplaced conception of “capitalism” has nothing to do with real free markets and economic liberty, and laissez-faire capitalism, rightly understood. During the dark days of Nazi collectivism in Europe, the German economist, Wilhelm Röpke(1899-1966), used the haven of neutral Switzerland to write and lecture on the moral and economic principles of the free society. **“Collectivism,” he warned, “was the fundamental and moral danger of the West.” The triumph of collectivism meant, “nothing less than political and economic tyranny, regimentation, centralization of every department of life, the destruction of personality, totalitarianism and the rigid mechanization of human society.”** **If the Western world were to be saved, Röpke said, it would require a “renaissance of [classical] liberalism” springing “from an elementary longing for freedom and for the resuscitation of human individuality.”** **What is the Meaning of Capitalism?** At the same time, such a renaissance was inseparable from the establishing of a capitalist economy. But what is capitalism? “Now here at once we are faced with a difficulty,” Röpke lamented, because, “capitalism contains so many ambiguities that it becoming every less adapted for an honest spiritual currency.” As a solution, Röpke suggested that we “make a sharp distinction between the principle of a market economy as such . . . and the actual development which during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has led to the historical foundation of market economy.” Röpke went on, “If the word ‘Capitalism’ is to be used at all this should be with due reserve and then at most only to designate the historical form of market economy . . . Only in this way are we safe from the danger . . . of making the principle of the market economy responsible for things which are to be attributed to the whole historical combination . . . of economic, social, legal, moral and cultural elements . . . in which it [capitalism] appeared in the nineteenth century.” In more recent times it has become common to use the term “crony capitalism,” implying a “capitalism” that is used, abused, and manipulated by those in political power to benefit and serve well connected special interest groups desiring to obtain wealth, revenues and “market share” that they could successfully acquire on an open, free and competitive market by offering better and less expense goods and services to consumers than their rivals. **Corrupted Capitalism vs. Free Market Capitalism** This facet of a corrupted capitalism is, unfortunately, not new. Even as the classical liberal philosophy of political freedom and economic liberty was growing in influence in Europe and America in the nineteenth century, many of the reforms moving society in that freer direction happened within a set of ideas, institutions, and policies that undermined the establishment of a truly free society. Thus, the historical development of modern capitalism was “deformed” in certain essential aspects virtually from the start. Before all the implications and requirements of a free-market economy could be fully appreciated and implemented in the nineteenth century, it was being opposed and subverted by the residues of feudal privilege and mercantilist ideology. Even as many of the proponents of free market capitalism and individualist liberalism were proclaiming their victory over oppressive and intrusive government in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, new forces of collectivist reaction were arising in the form of nationalism and socialism. Three ideas in particular undermined the establishment of the true principles of the free market economy, and as a result, historical capitalism contained elements totally inconsistent with ideal of laissez-faire capitalism – a free competitive capitalism completely severed from the collectivist and power-lusting state. **The Ideas of “National Interest” and “Public Policy.”** In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the emergence of the modern nation-state in Western Europe produced the idea of a “national interest” superior to the interests of the individual and to which he should be subservient. The purpose of “public policy” was to define what served the interests of the state, and to confine and direct the actions of individuals into those channels and forms that would serve and advance this presumed “national interest.” In spite of the demise of the notion of the divine right of kings and the rise of the idea of the rights of (individual) man, and in spite of the refutation of mercantilism by the free-market economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, democratic governments continued to retain the conception of a “national interest.” Instead of being defined as serving the interests of the king, it was now postulated as serving the interests of “the people” of the nation as a whole. In the twentieth century, public policy came to be assigned the tasks of government guaranteed “full employment,” targeted levels of economic growth, “fair” wages and “reasonable” profits for “labor” and “management,” and the politically influenced direction of investment and resource uses into those activities considered to foster the economic development viewed as advantageous to “the nation” in the eyes of those designing and implementing “public policy.” Capitalism, therefore, was considered to be compatible with and indeed even requiring activist government. In nineteenth century America it often took the form of what were then called “internal improvements” – the government funded and subsidized “public works” projects to build, roads, canals, and railways, all which transferred taxpayers’ money into the hands of business interests interested in getting the government’s business rather than that of consumers in the marketplace. It also manifested itself through trade protectionism meant to artificially foster “infant industries” behind high tariff walls. Selected businesses ran to the government insisting that they could never grow and prosper unless they were protected from foreign competition, at the expense, of course, of the consumers who would then have fewer choices at higher prices. Today, it still includes public works projects, but also manipulation of investment patterns through fiscal policies designed to target “start-up” companies considered environmentally desirable or essential to “national security.” It also takes the form of pervasive economic regulation that controls and dictates methods of manufacturing, types and degrees of competition, and the associations and relationships that are permitted in the arena of commerce and exchange both domestically and in international trade. In the misplaced use of the phrase “American free market capitalism” there is little that occurs in any corner of society that does not include the long arm of the highly interventionist state, and all with the intended purpose and resulting unintended consequences of political power being applied to benefit some at the expense of many others. Perversely, the interventionist state in the evolution of historical capitalism has come to mean in too many people’s eyes the inescapable prerequisite for the maintenance of the market economy in the service of an ever-changing meaning of the “national interest.” **Central Banking as Monetary Central Planning** Whether in Europe or the United States, the application and practice of the principles of a free market economy were compromised from the start with the existence of monetary central planning in the form of central banking. First seen as a device for assuring a steady flow of cheap money to finance the operations of government in excess of what those governments could extract from their subjects and citizens directly through taxation, monopolistic central banks were soon rationalized as the essential monetary institution for economic stability. But the German economist, Gustav Stopler, clearly explained many decades ago in his book, *This Age of Fable* (1942), the government’s control of money undermines the very notion of a real free market economy: “Hardly ever do the advocates of free capitalism realize how utterly their ideal was frustrated at the moment the state assumed control of the monetary system . . . A ‘free’ capitalism with governmental responsibility for money and credit has lost its innocence. From that point on it is no longer a matter of principle but one of expediency how far one wishes or permits governmental interference to go. Money control is the supreme and most comprehensive of all governmental controls short of expropriation.” Once government controls the supply of money, it has the capacity to redistribute wealth, create inflations and cause economic depressions and recessions; distort the structure of relative prices and wages so they no longer reflect the values and choices of the buyers and sellers in the market; and generate misallocations of labor and capital throughout the economy that brings about imbalances of resource uses inconsistent with a market-based pattern of consumer demands for alternative goods and services. Then, in the face of the market instabilities and distortions caused by the government’s mismanagement of the money supply and the banking system, the political authorities rationalize even more government intervention to “fix” the consequences of the boom-bust cycles their own earlier monetary central panning policies created. **The “Cruelty” of Capitalism and the Welfare State** The privileged classes of the pre-capitalist society hated the market. The individual was freed from subservience and obedience to the nobility, the aristocracy, and the landed interests. For these privileged groups, a free market meant the loss of cheap labor, the disappearance of “proper respect” from their “inferiors,” and the economic uncertainty of changing market-generated circumstances. For the socialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, capitalism was viewed as the source of exploitation and economic insecurity for “the working class” who were considered dependent for their livelihood upon the apparent whims of the “capitalist class.” The welfare state became the “solution” to capitalism’s supposed cruelty, a solution that created a vast and bloated welfare bureaucracy, made tens of millions of people perpetual wards of a paternalistic state, and drained society of the idea that freedom meant self-responsibility and mutual help through voluntary association and human benevolence. A “capitalist” system with a welfare state is no longer a free society. It penalizes the industrious and the productive for their very success by punishing them through taxes and other redistributive burdens under the rationale of the “victimhood” of others in society who are claimed to have not received their “fair” due. It weakens and then threatens to destroy the spirit and the reality of individual accomplishment, and spreads a mentality of “entitlement” to what others have honestly produced. And it restores the fearful idea that the state should not be the protector of each citizens individual rights but the compulsory arbiter who determines through force what each one is considered to “rightfully” deserve. Peaceful and harmonious free market competition in the pursuit of excellence and creative improvement is replaced by the coerced game of mutual political plunder as individuals and groups in society attempt to grab what others have through a redistributive system of government force. **Free Market Capitalism was Hampered and Distorted** The ideal and the principle of the free market economy, of capitalism rightly understood were never fulfilled. What is called “capitalism” today is a distorted, twisted and deformed system of increasingly limited market relationships, as well as market processes hampered and repressed by state controls and regulations. And overlaying the entire system of interventionist “crony” capitalism are the ideologies of eighteenth century mercantilism, nineteenth century socialism and nationalism, and twentieth century paternalistic welfare statism. In this warped development and evolution of “historical capitalism,” as Wilhelm Röpke called it, the institutions for a truly free-market economy have either been undermined or prevented from emerging. As the same time, the principles and actual meaning of a free-market economy have become increasingly misunderstood and lost. But it is the principles and the meaning of a free-market economy that must be rediscovered if liberty is to be saved and the burden of “historical capitalism” is to be overcome. The socialists and “progressives” twisted and stole the good and worthy concept of liberalism as a political philosophy of individual rights and freedom, respect and protection of honestly acquired private property, and peaceful and voluntary industry, production and trade. It was usurped and made into the “modern” notion of liberalism as paternalistic Big Bother government controlling every aspect of life in the name of the “social good.” **Restoring the Ideal of Free Market Capitalism** The word **“capitalism**” was used as a term of abuse by the socialists almost from the beginning. But it also **meant a system of creative and productive enterprise and industry by free and self-guiding individuals, each pursuing their peaceful self-interests through honest work, saving, and investment.** The “self-made” man of capitalism was an ideal and model for the youth of America. **The [wo]man who was motivated by his [her] own independent self-responsible vision, who built something, new, better, and greater as a reflection of the potential of the reasoning and acting human being who sets his [her] mind to work.** His wealth, if successfully accumulated, was honorably earned in the marketplace of ideas and industry, not plundered and stolen by force and political power. No individual is robbed or exploited on the truly free market, since all trade is voluntary and no man could be forced into an exchange or association not to his liking and consent. Free competition sees to it that everyone tends to receive and earn a wage that reflects the estimation of his productive worth to others in society. Each individual is free to improve his talents and abilities to make his services more valuable to others over time, and earn the commensurate higher wages from possessing more marketable skills. Wealth accumulated enables investment and capital formation for the production of new, better and more goods and services wanted by the consuming public, the majority of whom are the very wage-earning workers employed in the production and manufacture of those goods under the market-determined guiding hands of successful businessmen and entrepreneurs. Free Market capitalism makes the consumer “king” of the marketplace who determines whether businessmen earn profits or suffer losses, base on what they decide to buy and how much they are willing to pay. **It is free market capitalism that helps make each man and woman a “captain” of their own fate, with the freedom about what work and employment to pursue, and the liberty to spend the income they earn in their own personal, desiring way to live the life they value and want, and that gives meaning and purpose to their own life.** No person need put up with humiliation, abuse or disrespect from a bureaucrat or political official who has control over their fate through the power of government planning, regulation and redistribution. Free market capitalism offers people opportunities and choices as consumers, workers and producers, with the liberty to change course whenever the benefits from doing so seem to outweigh the costs in the eyes of the individual. **Free market, or laissez-faire, capitalism makes this all possible because it rests on a deeper political philosophical foundation based on the idea and ideal of the right of the individual to his [her] own life, to be lived as he desires and chooses, as long as he respects the equal right of others to do the same.** Free market capitalism insists that there is no higher “national interest” above the individual interests of the separate citizens of a free society. In a system of free market capitalism government should no more control money and the banking system than a limited government should control the production and sale of shoes, soap, or salami. And free market capitalism calls for each individual’s peacefully earned property and income to be respected and protected from plunder and theft, and that includes any created rationale and attempted justification to rob Peter to redistribute to Paul through the coercive power of government. The good name of “capitalism” has to be recaptured and restored, just as the good name and concept of “liberalism,” rightly understood, should be returned to the advocates of individual liberty and free enterprise. But this task requires friends of freedom to explain and make clear to others that what we live under today is not “capitalism” as it could be, should be and properly really means. The reality of that “historical capitalism,” about which Wilhelm Röpke spoke, is the “crony capitalism” that must be rejected and opposed so that free men may some day live under and benefit from **the truly free market capitalism that is the only economic system consist with a society of human liberty.**

**Free Markets Are Key To Adapt To Warming; Government Solutions Fail**

**O’Neil, 2014:**

(Free Market Offers Best Solutions For Environmental Policy. August 2014. Tyler O’Neil, Journalist And Graduate Of Hillsdale College)

**The free market is increasingly shifting toward more “green” options on its own. Consumers are increasingly drawn to products that market themselves as environmentally friendly**—cars such as the Toyota Prius and other hybrids, along with companies such as New Belgium Brewing, maker of Fat Tire Amber Ale, which reuses or composts over 75 percent of its manufacturing waste. One need not resort to the strong arm of government when **the general population itself can choose—and increasingly will choose—the cleaner options.** 4. The Free Market Adapts Finally, **despite the best efforts of some activists, some degree of warming may have already spread across the globe.** Alder suggests **market-oriented steps that can improve our ability to adapt**. Back when wood was the primary source of fuel, many feared the world would run out of wood. **Now, many fear that oil and other fossil fuels will dry up, but hundreds of companies are investing in new technologies to move beyond those sources as well**. **Free markets adapt to changing conditions because individuals and companies have incentives to change how they do business, and are not constrained by the government from seeking new ways of doing so.** **If people truly desire more freedom and more ability to prevent global warming and to adapt to a warmer planet, they should promote free market reforms, where each person can contribute to a solution, rather than top-down government policies, where one man—or a bureaucracy—dictates how we should act.**

#### The immorality of warming is de-emphasized as a result of cognitive bias. Warming harms the poor in developing countries, so wealthy countries like the US have a moral obligation to mitigate it

**Hance 11** writes[[181]](#footnote-181)

Thomas, who writes frequently about climate adaptation and justice, says that some governments—local and national—are beginning to act on adapting to a new, warmer, and more unpredictable world. However, many are not moving quickly enough. "A great many coastal towns and cities are acting as if they have centuries to do with sea level rise. **Because the impacts feel** like they are **a long way off, most** people **are procrastinating. It's a cognitive problem** we face **because of the** very **long-term nature of climate change impacts**. The risks are grave, the impacts are here, but the problem doesn't feel urgent," he told mongabay.com in an interview. Brian Thomas. Brian Thomas. Although Thomas says the reality of climate change is hitting certain sectors of society, such as the insurance sector, the **'well-funded'** climate change **industry is continuing to halt progress on** both **mitigating** and adapting to **climate change**. But **the damage may be greatest when it comes to the moral dimension of climate change, especially since those hit** the **hardest** by climate impacts (**the poor in developing nations**) **are the least responsible** for the problem. "The persistent downplaying of the moral dimensions of climate change is one of the most damaging effects of the climate change denial industry," Thomas says. "The **wealthy countries that have prospered from** many decades of **emissions have a moral obligation to help those** who are **suffering the consequences in the developing world**. The United States, despite its self-perception, is quite stingy with foreign aid, especially if you eliminate the military portion of the aid to Israel, Egypt, and other arrangements. Much more needs to be done to help developing countries.'

#### Contesting the significance of complicity in warming is also cognitively biased

**Markowitz and Shariff 12** write[[182]](#footnote-182)

The blamelessness of unintentional action. Further inhibiting moral intuitions, climate change lacks the features of an intentional moral transgression20: no one wants climate change to occur or is purposefully trying to make it happen. **Although climate change is the direct result of intentional, goal-directed behaviour** (for example, the use of energy to provide all the trappings of modern life), **it is** probably **perceived** by many individuals **as an unintentional**, if unfortunate, **side effect** of such actions (although further research exploring the beliefs of individuals about climate change and intentionality is needed to confirm whether this is the case). Studies suggest that **unintentionally caused harms are judged less harshly** than equally severe but intentionally caused ones21. Recognizing a harmful event as the product of an intentional agent, on the other hand, is a highly motivating cue for corrective action22. Indeed, children as young as three behave differently in response to otherwise identical intentional and non-intentional harmful acts23. Moreover, **neuroscientific evidence suggests that the human** moral **judgement system is particularly sensitive to info**rmation **about** the **intentions** of others to cause harm24. In sum, intentional acts provoke powerful emotional responses. Thus, understanding climate change as an unintentional phenomenon with no single villain may decrease motivation to right past wrongs, and perceiving no human role in the phenomenon at all, as many US citizens do3 , is likely to depress moral judgements even further. **Guilty bias**. Though few people are blamed for intending to cause climate change, many are exposed to messages that hold them accountable for causing environmental damage as an unintended side effect of their behaviour and lifestyle. Such messages probably provoke feelings of guilt (and other negative emotions such as fear)9 . **To allay negative recriminations, individuals** often **engage in biased cognitive processes to minimize perceptions of their own complicity.** These biases are even more likely when individuals and communities feel incapable of meaningfully responding behaviourally. **Such** motivated moral **reasoning occurs through** a variety of processes, including derogating evidence of one’s role in causing the problem and **challenging the significance of the issue**. For example, **research** with Swiss participants **shows that individuals actively** work to **avoid feelings of responsibility** in part by blaming inaction on others and increasing focus on the costs of mitigation26. The ultimate consequence of these reactions to perceived blame is that those responsible for the greatest share of harmful effects, whose behavioural changes would be most beneficial, are the people most motivated to deny their complicity and resist change.

#### Our duty of nonmaleficence entails a moral obligation to mitigate warming

**Traxler 2** writes[[183]](#footnote-183)

The stronger argument for saying that at least some of the present generation has a moral duty to deal with predicted climate change is the first, responsibility-based argument: we, the present human generation (or parts thereof), owe assistance to future humans for presently and knowingly violating our duties of non-maleficence toward future human beings. **Duties of non-maleficence are duties to not bring about (**whether **by act or omission**) **bad results to others**, unless our ignorance of doing so is non-culpable. These are duties to not bring about a worsening of the condition of others. Duties of non-maleficence range in moral stringency from the most stringent duties not to bring about physical harm or damage to others to the less stringent duty not to cause mere displeasure to others. **The duty not to bring about physical** harm or **damage to others**, I assume, **is among our most stringent moral duties.** So violating this duty is among the worst things we can do, morally speaking, to future human generations (among others). This means that, other things being equal, when we violate this duty, our subsequent duties to make amends for our violation are also among our most stringent duties. That is why **this is the strongest** or most compelling **moral argument for having duties to deal with** climate change from global warming. This duty of **non-maleficence is**, moreover, **a universal duty, which means that distance**, whether spatial or temporal, **does not directly affect** the **stringency of the duty**. (Of course, even though this duty of non-maleficence is equally stringent for all, we may have other moral obligations that may counterbalance or outweigh it, so that the all-things-considered stringency of our duty to not harm particular people may be correspondingly weakened.) Rectificatory or compensatory duties arising from a violation of nonmaleficence, however, are not universal--they invest only those responsible for the violation.

# Lynbrook

## Buddhism 1NC

### Cap Good K

Living wage relies on the mindset that the state knows what’s best for individuals in a free market. Government intervention in the market undermines freedom.

**Phillips 13** writes[[184]](#footnote-184)

The focus on wages reverses cause and effect. The focus on wages is a focus on consumption—what a worker can buy from his wages. But an individual cannot consume until he produces, unless he wishes to live as a parasite. Government intervention impedes production. Government intervention prevents individuals from starting businesses, creating jobs, developing new products or processes. **Government intervention prevents individuals from acting on their own judgment**. If someone wants to offer a job with a pay of $2 an hour, he should be free to do so. If he cannot attract enough workers at that wage, he will need to offer more or go out of business. If a worker is willing to work for $2 an hour, why should anyone prevent him from doing so? **If the business owner judges that a job is only worth $2 an hour, he should be free to act** on his own judgment**. If a worker judges that** a job paying **$2 an hour is his best opportunity, he should be free to act** on his own judgment. Government intervention in the employer/employee relationship prohibits each from acting as he thinks best for his own life. Like all advocates of government intervention, the **advocates of a “living wage” believe that they know what is best for other** individual**s. They are willing to use government coercion to dictate** how others may live **their lives**. Ironically, and sadly, while advocating a “living wage” they simultaneously seek to prohibit others from actually living.

The aff’s embrace of other-affirming spirituality is in lockstep with a Marxist agenda

**Brentlinger 2k** writes[[185]](#footnote-185)

Efforts toward **dialog between Marxists and religiously identified progressives are** certainly **essential,** and might lead **to a common social agenda.** But I want to argue for more. My deeper concern is that, lim­ited by enlightenment rationalism, Marxists and secular leftists have failed to see or respect the value of spirituality, as the positive source of their own religious traditions and much progressive politics. **Spiri­tuality constitutes a broad basis for unity among all progressives,** in spite of ideological differences, and needs to become a necessary component of a transformative politics.

I have argued elsewhere that spirituality and the sacred can be plausibly defined within a materialist framework (Brentlinger, 1995, 347-364). Spirituality, in broad, inclusive terms, is the capacity to feel deeply bonded with all beings on this earth; to acknowledge the deep, ultimate value of life and community, among ourselves and with nature. It is expressed by love and a sense of responsibility for oth­ers. A spiritual perspective values all beings as intrinsically good and acknowledges and respects the parts they play — positively or unfor­tunately negatively — in the same creative, evolutionary process of life and liberation.

Two points about this conception of spirituality need to be under­lined. Theoretically, it is compatible with both materialism and other­worldly idealism. These alternative ideologies conceptualize the range of spiritual relationships differently, but both arise from a common basis of what might be called a sense of deep connectedness and an affirmation of being. This basis unites believers and non-believers in spite of ideological or metaphysical differences. Practically, a similar contrast applies: spirituality can take apolitical or progressive forms. It can be self-centered and naive, rigidly reactionary, or even fascis- tic; or it can express itself with great fullness when guided by a pro­gressive political vision. A third point, for which we have only too much evidence: socialism without spirituality can be as empty and cruel as capitalism.

The worldwide expansion of capitalism has undermined the his­torical foundations of spirituality by scattering families, destroying es­tablished communities, replacing traditions with consumerism, and alienating our relationship to nature. **Marxists need to take seriously the de-spiritualization of society, and themselves, under capitalism**. **Marxists have theorized the** devastating **spiritual effects of capi­talism, through the secular concept of alienation, defined as discon­nection from self, others, and nature** (see especially Oilman, 1976). **But within Marxist theory there is presently no** corresponding **posi­tive concept; we have only** the doubly negative conception of **“non­alienated relationships.”** One might try to communicate the concept of a “non-alienated relationship” to a non-Marxist public; to a people with strong religious traditions, among whom presendy in the United States, after 300 years of Enlightenment-inspired science, 69% are members of religious congregations, and 43% — almost half the population — attend services weekly (USBC, 1997, 70). The theoreti­cal aspect of religious belief and its anti-scientific leanings may have diminished in influence with us, yet the social and political role of religion, and its importance in community, family, and personal life, look to be greater than ever. We Marxists can explain better than anyone the main sources of social and psychological disfunction in this society; we can offer real options on the level of political economy; we must also acknowledge the need to restore the foundations of spiritual relationships, in families, communities, traditions, and with nature. To do this we must join with, and learn from, communities of faith. This is not to advocate a theoretical cop-out for political expedi­ency. Quite the contrary, it needs to be remembered that Marxism came into the world with a new definition of materialism, one that incorporated the conception of creative activity. Marx redefined, or relocated, the hitherto idealist notion of creative potential as a natu­ral fact. In the first “Thesis on Feuerbach” **Marx wrote: The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism ... is that reality ... is conceived only in the form of object.. . not as human** sensuous activity, prac­tice, not **subjectively.** Hence it happened that the active side, in contradis­tinction to materialism, was developed by idealism — but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such . . (Marx, 1845b, 143.)As this statement shows, Marxian materialism is not opposed to ide­alism as classical materialisms are: rather, it takes the core idea or reality which idealism recognizes, creative activity, Hegel’s concept of spirit (geist), and gives it its true status as natural “sensuous” activity. **My argument** concerning spirituality **is analogous: to grasp the core meaning of a spiritual relation, prominent in religious** and non­religious **struggles for a good society, and to acknowledge its pres­ence** and importance in real life activity, values, and goals. So con­ceived, spirituality does not imply a supreme spirit, a spiritual realm separate from the real world, oppose our human nature, or lead to a self-concerned feel-better lifestyle: **on the contrary, it is a phenom­enon of nature**, of the behavior of animals and people, **manifest in activities that are other-affirming**, and so highly valued that people throughout history have described a spiritual attitude as “above this world.”

Focus on the common good and economic inequality sacrifices the individual in the name of the collective while making financial crisis inevitable. Only the alt, not the perm, gives value to life while solving totalitarianism.

**Allison 13** writes[[186]](#footnote-186)

[Brackets for gendered language] The deepest cause of the financial crisis is not economic policy. The fundamental cause is philosophical. The **financial crisis is a** **result of** the philosophical **ideas** that have been **taught in** the liberal arts departments of the most prestigious **universities** in America for more than 50 years. The fundamental cause of the financial crisis is a combination of altruism and pragmatism. **Altruism** does not mean kindness toward others; it literally **means “other-ism.”** Altruism is defined as selflessness, that is, believing everyone else is more important than you are. The good of the individual is irrelevant. It is only the good of “others” that matters, and this is interpreted by liberals as being the good of “society.” This assumes that society is a living entity ad that the effect on actual individuals does not matter. In reality, however, there are only individuals. There is no such entity as society. The “common good” (or the “public interest”\_ is an indefinable concept. There is no such thing as the public. The public is only a number of individual people. **When the common** **good** of a society **is** regarded a something apart from and **superior to** the **individual good** of its members, **the good of some** people **takes precedence over** the good of **other people, with those** others **consigned to the status of sacrificial animals**. Altruism should not be confused with benevolence. Altruism means that other people (society or the tribe) are more important than you are. **Altruism** is an unquestioning duty to others. It is not about being nice to people. It **is** about **self-sacrifice**. A classic economic error made by liberals is to assume that good intentions produce good outcomes. Economic theory unquestionably demonstrates that so-called good intentions often produce very bad outcomes. This is the “law of unintended consequences” that is so relevant to policy makers and others who not only fail to achieve their aims, but also cause results that are directly opposed to their aims—as when central banks and regulators seek to ensure “safe and sound” banking, but instead make banks and the system more dangerous and precarious. However, if you are an altruist, **moral good is defined by** your **intentions** to help others, **not** by the actual **outcome.** In fact, altruism often serves as an excuse for bad behavior (and bad intentions). **Where did** the idea of “**affordable housing”** (that is, **subprime** home **finance) come from? Everyone has a right to a house.** Provided by whom? My right to free medical care is my right to imprison a doctor to make him [her] provide that care or to force someone else to pay for the doctor. This is exactly the opposite of the American concept of rights. America’s Founding Fathers believed that each of us has the right to what we produce and what we create, not to what someone else has created. **Altruism leads to a redistribution** from the productive **to the non-productive**. In fact, it implies that **no one has a right to her own life. Everyone is everyone else’s property. This is a rejection of** the concept of **rights.** In business, altruism is combined with pragmatism. A business cannot survive in a globally competitive economy if it is actually altruistic. While businesspeople may be altruistic in their individual lives, if they attempt to be seriously altruistic in their business, they will go out of business. Bill Gates has chosen to personally become an altruist. However, anyone who competes (or does business) with Microsoft knows that Microsoft is a tough competitor. The company is not altruistic. The backup philosophy for business is pragmatism. In fact, pragmatism is systematically taught in business school Many business leaders are proud to be called pragmatists Pragmatists do “what works.” They are “practical.” However, actually being practical requires that we act on principle. Nothing is less practical than doing what works in the short term. The pragmatic philosophy is based on the concept that there is no permanent truth—that truth is what works today. The validity of a truth is based on its consequences this afternoon, not on any fundamental principles. According to pragmatists, nothing can be known with certainty. Meaning and truth are determined by the short-term practical consequences. Unfortunately, many things work very effectively in the short term but are extremely destructive in the long term. Negative-amortization mortgages (pick-a-payment mortgages) were “successful” for more than 10 years and then did tremendous economic damage. Subprime lending was “successful” for a number of years and then resulted in a massive destruction of wealth. A pragmatist cannot be rational. Rationality requires a long-term perspective. It is a virtue that is based on fundamental truths consistent with the pursuit of long-term goals. A rational person acts in a way that is consistent with this principles and moves him toward long-term success and happiness. A pragmatist cannot have integrity. Integrity is acting in a way that is consistent with ones principles. If you do not have clearly defined principles, you cannot act “on principle.” It is not surprising that so many business leaders lack integrity. They are proud to be pragmatists. Because they are pragmatists, they do not have principles. They do what “works.” Many commentators have raised the issue of why more business leaders did not see the future economic consequences of their risky housing investments. However, if you goals in decision making is to do what works (that is, if you are a pragmatist), you will keep doing what you are doing as long as it works. Pick-a-payment mortgages appeared to be working until the market crashed and burned. Charlie Prince, the CEO of Citigroup, was famously quoted as implying that he knew Citigroup was taking huge economic risks but that the company would keep “dancing” as long as the band was playing. Of course, he was fired a few months later, and Citi subsequently collapsed. The combination of altruism and pragmatism leads to the “free lunch” mentality. **Despite** the **huge deficits in social security** and Medicare, in the current presidential election **neither candidate** has **proposed a** meaningful **solution** to these deficits, and if either did make a meaningful proposal that required some sacrifice, he would not be elected. **The free lunch** **mentality leads to a lack of personal responsibility which is** ultimately **the death of democracies**. The Founding Fathers were very concerned with the potential **for the “tyranny of the majority.”** They were primarily focused on the protection of individual rights: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, property rights, and so on. However, they realized that when 51 percent of the people can vote a free lunch from 49 percent, fairly soon the party will be over. Because then 60 percent will want a free lunch from 40 percent. And then, 70 percent will want a free lunch from 30 percent. And, finally, the 30 percent will quit. A lot of the intensity of the Tea Party movements and conservatives in general is over the issue of whether **the U**nited **S**tates **has gone over the** 51 percent **line.** Are **there so many** voters **who receive free lunch** from the government **that we are headed toward a** statist or **totalitarian society**? **It is important not to underestimate the power of a moral code.** Altruists would far prefer that everyone be equally poor rather than having everyone be wealthier, but with substantial differences in wealth. Altruists will support economic policies (such as raising taxes on high-income households in the middle of a recession where there is overwhelming evidence that the policy will result in less economic growth if they believe that the policy will result in a more even distribution of income. Their view of justice is based on equal outcomes, not equal opportunities**. The** fundamental **battle for a free society is over ethics,** and, specifically personal responsibility. Just as the cause of the financial crisis is philosophical, so is the cure. **The cure is the restoration of** the principles that made America great in the first place: “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”; **each individual’s moral right to [her]** his own **life; and each** **individual’s moral right to** the product of his **[her] own labor,** which includes the righ t earn great wealth if you produce a great deal and the right to give away as much of your wealth as you like to whomever you want for whatever reason.

3 impacts.

(a) Ethics—Your own life is the source of values

**Smith 2k** writes[[187]](#footnote-187)

Rand describes morality as "a code of values to guide man's choices and actions—the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life."2 This describes what myriad moral systems—ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, religious and secular, deontological and utilitarian—attempt to provide. Reference to the Ten Commandments, Kant's categorical imperative, the principle of utility, or the Golden Rule, for instance, is intended to steer an individual's decisions about concrete actions. **A value is "that which one acts to gain** and/or keep."3 People act to gain or keep material possessions as well as such things as relationships with others, professional positions, knowledge, opportunities, beliefs, and outlooks. Thus, a house, a friend, a job, or self-esteem could all be values. Insofar as morality is intended to guide a person, however, it seeks to identify those objects that human beings should pursue. **Values in this** positive **sense—**things that a person truly should act to acquire—**are united by the fact that they are good for a person**. They bring beneficial effects, minor or major, on a person's life.4 This raises a further distinction, one between values and benefits. Not all benefits result from the beneficiary's action. Certain salutary events can occur without the beneficiary's having done anything to bring them about. I might benefit from rainfall insofar as it spares me the time and expense of watering my garden, but I have not done anything to precipitate the precipitation. A baby benefits from being fed or clothed, just as a man may benefit from mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but in neither case does the person's action trigger these benefits. Other benefits, by contrast, can be obtained only by the individual's own exertion of effort. Normally, a person must take some action to produce food or shelter, to find good friends or good books, or to achieve a rewarding career or a rewarding marriage. Thus, a value is that which one acts to attain. "Benefits" designate the broader class of advantageous events.5 This difference carries direct implications for morality. If some benefits are beyond a person's control, he can only hope for them. If the attainment of others depends on a person's conduct, however, he can act for them. Thus, a rational morality attempts to guide a person's actions toward beneficial ends. It identifies proper values and provides direction for how to achieve them.6 The nature of value can be fully appreciated only by understanding what gives rise to value. **Values are not self-evident. One cannot spot a value** as a value **in the same way that one can recognize a tree as a tree**, a chair as a chair, or blades of grass as blades of grass. A beverage might look harmless but actually be toxic; **a person might look menacing but be** completely **harmless**. Something's being a value depends on facts about it that are not necessarily readily apparent. **Thus, it is crucial to understand what renders something valuable.** Rand observes that **life gives rise to** thevery concept of **value**. The alternative of life or death is what allows and what necessitates the pursuit of values. The **quest for life** makes the idea of value intelligible and **imposes the need to identify values and** to **act to achieve them**. Thus, it is life that mandates human beings' adherence to a moral code. **Life** is the end of value and establishes the standard of value. As such, it **is the source of moral obligations**, which are prescriptions for how to achieve that end. Obviously, this is a vast claim. It will be best understood if I explain separately its major components.

This means self-interest is an ethical priority; because altruism is self-sacrifice it can never be a basis for ethics

**Smith 2k** writes[[188]](#footnote-188)

**Because values are** the means and **the substance of a person's flourishing, to surrender one's values to others** solely **on the basis of their need would** be to **abandon that end**. Another person's well-being is not more important than his own. Bill's well-being may be more important to him than it is to Tom there is no reason why Tom should treat it as more important to Tom .The idea that another person's need in and o f itself constitutes a more compelling claim on a person's resources reflects **the altruistic doctrine that self-sacrifice is our moral duty**. This **is** exactly **what Rand**'s thought **rejects**. Another person's need does not trump the propriety of pursuing one's own happiness. A rational dedication to achieving that end allot 11- no basis for such an obligation to serve others . ' 7 That said, **egoism** is not opposed to good will or to acting on good will. "The fact that a man has no claim on others (i.e., that it is not their moral duty to help him and that he cannot demand their help as his right ) , " Rand observes, "does not preclude or prohibit good will among men and **does not make it immoral to offer** or to accept **voluntary, not-sacrificial assistance**.'"8 Helping others in need need not be a betrayal of self-interest. It is not a positive virtue, however; it is not an activity that a person should adopt as his regular, standing policy. Giving to every panhandler - or to every tenth panhandler or to every innocent victim of a natural disaster - would drain a person's resources and weaken his ability to achieve happiness. Rand addresses the issue in an interview: "My views on charity are very simple. I do not consider it a major virtue and, above all, I do not consider it a moral duty. There is nothing wrong in helping other people, if and when they are worthy of help and you can afford to help them. I regard charity as a marginal issue. What I am fighting is the idea that charity is a moral duty and a primary virtue." In referring to charity as a marginal issue, **Rand is not denying the reality** or the impact **of poverty. Her point is that helping others is not what** a person's **life or** what **morality is about**."0 Under altruism, by contrast, charity is central, since some individuals' needs create other individuals' duties, as morality revolves around serving others. (Thus the accolades for Mother Teresa.) Wrenching as others' suffering can be, however, emotions do not dictate virtue and vice. **Rational self-interest is the proper measure of our actions. And by this standard, charity is not a virtue** . 2 1 **The idea that it is inherently right to give to the needy** or that charity is a policy to be practiced whenever possible **contradicts Rand's conviction that an individual's** own **well-being should be** his **[their] highest end.** Not only is charity not a necessary means of furthering that end; often, it would directly undercut it by siphoning a person's means of furthering his happiness to others who do not warrant it. Treating one's own happiness as one's highest moral purpose does not entail indifference toward others, as egoism's opponents are eager to charge.\*2 It does entail, however, that a person not subordinate any part of his own happiness to theirs."3 As Rand indicates in the passage cited, assisting a person in need can he consistent with egoism, under appropriate conditions. If one person cares about another who is in distress - as lover, friend, or fellow human being - it can be in his interest to offer help. A person can care about others without caring about all equally and without caring about another as much as about himself. Nonetheless, genuine concern is often manifested in action. Values, remember, are those things that one acts to gain or keep. Accordingly, "the practical implementation of friendship, affection and love," Rand writes, "consists of incorporating the welfare (the rational welfare) of the person involved into one's own hierarchy of values, then acting accordingly.""'4 Even aid to strangers can sometimes be rational for an egoist, since strangers represent potential value, as experience abundantly teaches."5 We have commented i n previous chapters on the vast riches of knowledge and trade that a person can gain from other people. Beyond the myriad material and spiritual ways in which anonymous individuals can add such value to one's life - through their large and small inventions, discoveries, artistic creations, skills, inspiring traits of character, and so on - others' very existence can offer value. Knowing the endless variety of specific values that other persons make possible and their capacity to experience in all the ways that we do, we sometimes derive a welcome sense of camaraderie from the sheer awareness of similar beings' existence.

(b) Collectivism is the root cause of exclusionary ideologies. Only free market individualism solves.

**Binswanger 13** writes[[189]](#footnote-189)

[Brackets for gendered language] By “selfish” I mean: exclusive concern with one’s own self-interest, never sacrificing to others. Think of a Warren Buffett with no interest in philanthropy. It’s beside the point whether you evaluate selfishness as noble, as I do, or as depraved, as most people do. Why selfishness is sacred is a topic for another column. What we’re going to see here is that an exclusive concern with making all the money one can rules out acting as a racist. So, what is racism? By the term’s constant appearance in the media and in public discussion, you would think it well understood. But no. The Left, in particular, can’t afford to look too closely at what racism is. That’s because racism is a form of collectivism. “Racism,” means racial collectivism. The theory of **racism holds** that **the** autonomous **individual is a myth:** what **you are** is **determined by your race**, your “blood.” **The** practice that **results is racial discrimination: judging a person by** reference to his **[her] race rather than** his **individual attributes.** We don’t have to be too fussy about whether the bigotry is directed at a literal race or a nationality or a religious or ethnic group. **It’s the same** kind of **evil whether a** bigoted **employer says “No blacks”** or “No Irish” **or “No Jews.”** All these are forms of discriminating against an individual on the basis of some group, some collective, to which he belongs. **The group (racial,** national, religious, **or whatever) is all, the individual nothing**. **The alternative is individualism**: the autonomous individual is all, the group is only a number of individuals. Individualism in practice means **judging the individual** for what he is as an individual, **regardless** **of** accidental, irrelevant facts about his **physiology** or where he was born, **or** the **religious tradition** in which he was raised. Now, what about a racist bigot who is also selfish and greedy? He’s caught in a dilemma. As greedy, he craves his profit. Money is supposed to be the only thing he cares about. But as a racist, he has to care about something unrelated to money: race. What to do? You see the problem for him is one simple fact: racism is irrational. The rational way to make hiring decisions is not by skin color but by expected performance. Selfish greed says: hire those who will contribute the most to the bottom line. Racism says: don’t look at that, look at race. There’s another problem for the bigot. What if men of the race he hates, who are equally qualified, are willing to work for less? Say the employer is anti-black. Is he going to refuse to hire blacks who are asking lower wages than whites are getting? How much is he willing to pay to indulge his racism? And if he does indulge it, how will he compete with other employers who hire strictly by ability? Just yesterday, my iPhone music happened to bring up Joan Baez singing “Lowlands.” I was struck by the line: “Five dollars a day is white man’s pay. Mine’s a dollar and a half a day.” What an opportunity for a greedy man! Absent Jim Crow laws, selfish greed would cause employers to swoop in to hire cheap black labor, bidding up their wage-rates. That process would continue until wage rates were color-blind. Money has no color. Selfish greed eliminates racism. You’re skeptical? Then why is there outsourcing? Why have hordes of American companies flocked to hire Chinese labor? Because they’re cheaper. Only a failure to understand the meaning of the concepts one uses allows such contradictory thoughts as: “Greedy bigots won’t hire minorities” and “Greedy business owners are replacing American workers with cheaper Asian workers.” **Racial discrimination cannot last** long **when** [wo]men are free to be greedy–i.e., when **there is laissez-faire capitalism. Making** economic **decisions based on race** is irrational, costly, and **puts one at a competitive disadvantage**. **The same is true of any** form of **irrational discrimination**–whether based on race, nationality, gender, age, or sexual preference. The only way to argue the contrary would be to stand up and proclaim: “No, people in these groups really are less competent and don’t add as much to a company’s bottom line.” I don’t think anti-capitalists want to go there. But that’s what their position implies. Many timid people on the Right try to defend capitalism as “consumer sovereignty.” It isn’t that. Capitalism is the sovereignty of reason. In reason, **productive ability not race is what counts**. When men are free to act on selfish greed, the more rational tend to succeed and the more irrational tend to fail. **That’s why** selfish **greed wipes out racism.**

(c) Free markets solve poverty. Every indicator goes neg.

**MacKenzie 14** writes[[190]](#footnote-190)

I have no doubt that Pope Francis has seen many poor people with his own eyes. But, our comprehension of the root causes of poverty requires both data on economic conditions and theoretical knowledge of economic systems. What does rational analysis of evidence tell us about global poverty? It is an obvious fact that **severe poverty has disappeared in** the **most industrialized countries**. **Nations** like the US, UK, Switzerland, and Japan **industrialized within** what were predominantly laissez-faire **free-market conditions**. Even the so-called social democracies, like Sweden and Germany, developed in free-market conditions, and adopted extensive state welfare and regulatory programs only after achieving high levels of economic development and industrialization. World Bank data shows that there is inequality, but this inequality is between the free-market nations and the crony-capitalist and socialistic nations.[1] The idea that domestic laissez-faire causes poverty is unfounded. It is a historical fact that India, China, and Kenya never tried capitalism, so this system was never given a chance to work. Furthermore, **China and India have realized** some **progress in abating poverty since they moved in the direction of capitalism.** Of course, China and India adopted regulated crony capitalism, but this is still better than their old socialist systems. One could argue that global capitalism allows a few people in some nations to exploit the masses of other nations. Marxists have attempted to make this case since Lenin. Lenin revised Marx because even in his day it had become obvious that Marx’s prediction that capitalists would exploit domestic workers was refuted by evidence. We now know that Lenin’s attempt to blame poverty on global markets is wrong. As previously mentioned, economic conditions in China and India improved after switching from socialism to crony capitalism. China and India have also expanded trade in global markets. There have been **significant improvements in living conditions** around the world over the past thirty years. The largest improvements in the poorest nations **took place during the wave of globalization** that took place twenty years ago, after the fall of the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened the door to unprecedented globalization of industry. What does real data tell us about poverty during this period? Per Capita GDP rose dramatically: **Thirty years ago half** (50 percent) **the people in** the **poorer nations** of the world **lived in extreme poverty**. **In 2012, 21 percent** of people in the poorer nations of the world **live in extreme poverty. Development** of global markets **has greatly lessened poverty around the world.** This is a very important fact. Movement from being in the lowest global income bracket, to lower middle income to middle income means moving from average life expectancy in the low forties to life expectancy of fifty or sixty, respectively. Cardinal Maradiaga is wrong: this economy does not kill; it has extended the lives of the poorest people in the world. A superficial examination of the world today reveals that there is poverty, that this poverty has real consequences for living-standards and life-expectancies, and that we do have global markets and capitalism in most of the world. Careful analysis shows that **capitalism has truly lessened the severity of poverty over time, and** that **the main problem** with capitalism in most nations **is** that it has too many elements of **government regulation** and cronyism. Pope Francis and Cardinal Maradiaga have good intentions, but their anti-capitalistic beliefs are unfounded. Their campaign against global capitalism endangers the poorest people of the world.

The alternative is to embrace free market individualism in debate as an academic space. The aff’s anti-free market ideas make statism inevitable.

**Allison 13** writes[[191]](#footnote-191)

However, **ideas** ultimately **determine outcomes.** The great ideas that are **the foundation of** Western civilization and especially modern **market economies are under attack in** our most **important** **educational institutions.** Rome fell when the principles that had made it successful were abandoned and replaced by mysticism, debased currency, authoritarianism, and the “circus.” Western civilization went into decline for almost 1,000 years. The Egyptian dynasties experienced long periods (hundreds of years) of decline and then semirevival over ideas. The same pattern can be observed in Chinese history. Cultures are very intangible. Human progress is not one straight upward spiral; rather, there are many long periods of significant decline. It is clearly a two steps forward, one step back process. There is evidence that Egyptian technology was more advanced in 5000 BC than in 2000 BC. What happened to the Mayans? Progress has to be earned based on the right ideas. Even if the long, long term is positive, there could a hundred or a thousand years of decline. The Founding Fathers of the United States grasped, at least implicitly, the principles underlying a successful social system—a recognition of reason as a means of knowledge, rational self-interest as a motivaor, and individual rights as the condition necessary for optimal human well-being. Fortunately, the American sense of life still captures these ideas. As defined by Ayn Rand, “A sense of life is an emotional, subconsciously integrated appraisal of man and of existence. It sets the nature of a man’s emotional response and his basic character.” The American sense of life is individualistic, self-responsible, hardworking, “can do,” and benevolent. The Tea Party movement, despite its flaws, is driven by the American sense of life. Americans are skeptical of big government and skeptical of elitists. They value freedom and common sense. These are great protectors. The American sense of life is very different from the dominant sense of life in Western Europe and most of the rest of the world. Our sense of life is my greatest source of optimism that we will ultimately face our challenges and return to the principles that made us great. However, a sense of life is subconscious and intangible, and it can be led in a destructive direction when it is not consciously held and fully integrated. **The** objective reality is that the **most likely for the U**nited **S**tates **is a long-term** and significant **decline into statism.** The reason for this trend is not economic policy but philosophy. **As long as** both **liberals and** religious **conservatives** defined altruism and **attack rational self-interest, our decline is inevitable**. On the other hand, I am at heart an optimist. While the most likely scenario is negative, there is still hope. That is why I bothered to write this book. **If the ideas that made America great can be rediscovered and combined with knowledge on people’s productive nature** gained since the Industrial Revolution (as **expressed by** Ayn **Rand**), **the U**nited **S**tates **can be returned to greatness.** Our children and grandchildren can have wonderful lives. The long-term key to success is to recapture the elite universities from the Left. **It is critical that we restore meaningful academic freedom** in which there is honest and open debate about important ideas. In relation to this issue, there is a very interesting question regarding about how the United States moved from ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (that is, limited government, individual rights, and free markets) to the “redistributive state” (big government, statism, collectivism, and a highly regulated economy). These trends have been in motion at least since Woodrow Wilson. The answer is that **by the power of** philosophical **ideas, the Left took over our universities, and** therefore **the education of future leaders**. In the late 1800s, college professors in the United States were still defenders of the Founding Fathers’ principles. Twenty years later, the culture in universities had changed radically. At the same time, the United States was rising as a world economic power, and our colleges wanted to become world-class universities. To become universities, they needed to have PhD program, but since they did not have PhD faulty members, they could educated PhDs. To solve this problem, the American colleges hired a large numbers of PhDs from Europe beginning in the late 100s (and American students went to German universities to earn their PhDs). The strategy was a huge success in the hard sciences. The U.S. colleges and universities attracted world-class scientists, propelling our economic development. Unfortunately, the strategy was a disaster in the liberal arts, especially philosophy. The students (who were now PhDs themselves) of the German philosophers (such as Kant and Hegel) who had laid the intellectual foundations for collectivism and statism in Europe were attracted to the United States. In Europe, these ideas ultimately led to Nazism and Communism. In the United States, the ideas were partly moderated by the American sense of life, but they led ot the New Deal and the ideology of the current administration. Of course, the universities educate the teachers. Therefore, the Left took over the K-12 educational system by indoctrinating schoolteachers. Because the professors determine which new PhD graduates will get tenure at the university, the system is closed. This is particularly true in the liberal arts, where evaluating accomplishments is highly subjective. **If you are in significant disagreement** with your professors over fundamental issues, **you are unlikely to get a PhD**, get a tenure-track job, **get published** in the “best” journals, **or get tenure**. Numerous studies have documented that the faculties at the vast majority of universities are far to the left of the American mainstream. **It is a closed self-reinforcing system that educates elitists** who at a deep level believe that they are smarter than the rest of us, and that their ideas are more insightful. Of course, there are some high-quality, thoughtful, honest people in academia. But **even the best** often **operate with subconscious premises** that drive their thinking—premises **that are inconsistent with a free** and “messy” **society that is not ordered** and directed **by the** “best and the brightest,” the **elite who know what is good for you** and have only your welfare as their goal. Even though history is littered with multiple failures of elitist-driven culture, the Left always attributes to poor execution—errors that will not be made in the future. Despite the fact that communism killed hundreds of millions of people, there are many defenders of communism on university campuses.

### Voluntary Accreditation CP

Counterplan: Just governments ought to set a living wage rate annually adjusted to cost of living. Employers are eligible to be accredited as living wage employers and if they choose to participate must report what percentage of their contracts pay a living wage.

It’s mutually exclusive because the counterplan is voluntary

**LWF no date** writes[[192]](#footnote-192)

**What is it? An hourly rate** set independently and **updated annually** The Living Wage is **calculated according to** the **basic cost of living in the UK** The current UK Living Wage is £7.85 an hour The current London Living Wage is £9.15 an hour **Employers choose to pay the Living Wage on a voluntary basis** The Living Wage enjoys cross party support, with public backing from the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition Paying the Living Wage is good for business, good for the individual and good for society **The Living Wage Employer** Mark and Service Provider **Recognition Scheme provide an ethical badge for responsible pay**

A majority of businesses will participate in a voluntary living wage program

**BCC 14** writes[[193]](#footnote-193)

John Longworth comments on the National Living Wage rise and the increase in the number of firms adopting the Living Wage **57% of businesses pay all their staff at least the Living Wage** An additional 22% of businesses pay most of their staff (over 75%) at least the Living Wage Commenting on the National Living Wage rise and the increase in the number of firms adopting the Living Wage, John **Longworth, Director** General **of the British Chamber**s **of Commerce said:** "A healthy majority of businesses already pay all of their staff at or above the Living Wage, and many more are on a journey to do the same. **We applaud** the work done by the Living Wage Foundation and **others to broaden** and deepen **the voluntary** take-up of the **Living Wage, which remains the best way to bring additional companies on board**. This is particularly important in sectors such as catering and leisure, which remain least likely to be able to take up the Living Wage. "After some extremely tough times, **many companies** - and particularly small and medium-sized ones - **are finally in a position to push ahead with wage rises**. This is good news for business, for employees, and ultimately for take up of the Living Wage. Britain must aspire to be a high-wage, high-skill economy - for the sake of our prosperity and that of generations to come." Ends Notes to editors: **Evidence is** taken **from the BCC Workforce Survey** conducted **in July 2014** which received 2,885 responses. Further evidence is taken from the BCC Quarterly Economic Survey for Q3 2014, conducted in September 2014. The Workforce Survey Factsheet includes key stats from the survey along with BCC recommendations. The factsheet can be viewed here.

Employers will commit to being living wage-certified because it’s good for business

**Coleman 13** writes[[194]](#footnote-194)

[Brackets in original] Thank you, Asheville City Council, for passing the final phase of the Living Wage Campaign at the June 25 City Council meeting. As safety nets for the working poor are continuing to be reduced by our state Legislature, it is critically important for our local leaders to continue to support workers. One of the best ways to support workers and build a more just and sustainable local economy is to promote living wages. There is something fundamentally wrong with our economy when full-time workers struggle to put a roof over their heads and food on their tables without help. When workers are making a living wage, fewer people are reliant on eroding public assistance programs to meet their basic needs. **Living wages are good for business**, too, reducing costs for recruitment and retention. **Recent reports from Costco, a national employer paying living wages, shows** [its] **profits** have continued to **increase without raising prices in contrast to** [its] competitor **Wal-Mart**/Sam’s Club, notorious for … low wages. As a founding member of the Asheville-Buncombe Living Wage Campaign championed by local nonprofit Just Economics, I am thankful for Asheville City Council’s leadership over the past several years around local living-wage policy. Additionally, **Just Economics has more than 325** Western **North Carolina employers** who have **committed to paying living wages through the voluntary Living Wage Employer Certification program. This** local **commitment** to living wages **gives me hope** for a better local economic community.

The **net benefit** is free market individualism. (A) Charitable acts must be voluntary. Self-sacrificing altruism must be rejected, that’s Smith 2k. (B) The counterplan doesn’t rely on the mindset that governments know best for businesspeople because it gives them the option to participate. The aff is the opposite of this, that’s Phillips 2k.

### \*\*\*Case

### Contention

Only the counter-plan solves. Forcing a living wage on employers isn’t conducive to them genuinely valuing their employees; if they truly did, they’d do so voluntarily.

K turns the case. The aff’s socialist ideology perpetuates exclusion which means people won’t be seen as interconnected, that’s Binswanger 13.

### Buddha Bad

Buddhism leads to nihilism and patriarchy

**Horgan 11** writes[[195]](#footnote-195)

I also felt an overwhelming sense of life’s preciousness, but others may have very different reactions. Like an astronaut gazing at the earth through the window of his spacecraft, **the mystic sees** our **existence against the backdrop of** infinity and **eternity. This** perspective **may not translate into** compassion and **empathy for others**. Far from it. Human **suffering and death may appear** laughably **trivial**. Instead of becoming a saint-like Bodhisattva, brimming with love for all things, **the mystic may become a sociopathic nihilist**. I suspect some bad gurus have fallen prey to mystical nihilism. They may also have been corrupted by that most insidious of all Buddhist propositions, **the myth of total enlightenment**. This is the notion that some rare souls achieve mystical self-transcendence so complete that they become morally infallible—like the Pope! Belief in this myth **can turn spiritual teachers into tyrants and** their **students into mindless slaves**, who excuse even their teachers’ most abusive behavior as “crazy wisdom.” I have one final misgiving about Buddhism—or rather, about **Buddha** himself. His path to enlightenment **began with** his **abandonment of** his **wife and child**. Even today, **Tibetan Buddhism**—again, like Catholicism—**upholds male monasticism** as the epitome of spirituality. **To me, “spiritual” means life-embracing, and so a path that turns away from aspects of life as essential as sexual love and parenthood is** not spiritual but **anti-spiritual**. Buddhists often respond to my carping by saying, “You didn’t give Buddhism enough time! If you truly understood it, you wouldn’t say such stupid things!” And so on. String theorists and Freudian psychoanalysts employ this same tactic against their critics. I can’t fault these supposed solutions to existence until I have devoted as much time to them as true believers. Sorry, life’s too short. Some of my best friends are Buddhists, and I enjoy reading and talking to Buddhist and quasi-Buddhist intellectuals, including all those I’ve mentioned above. I admire the open-mindedness and pacifism of the Dalai Lama. I sometimes drag visitors to my hometown to a nearby Buddhist monastery, which features a 40-foot statue of Buddha surrounded by thousands of mini-Buddha statuettes. A porcelain Buddha smiles at me from atop a bookcase in my living room. I like to think he’d grok my take on the religion that he founded. Remember the old Zen aphorism: If you meet the Buddha in the road, kill him.

The self isn’t an illusion

**Horgan 11** writes[[196]](#footnote-196)

Blackmore looks favorably, however, upon **the Buddhist** doctrine of anatta, which **holds that the self is an illusion**. “Where, exactly, is your self?” Buddha asked. “Of what components and properties does your self consist?” Since no answer to these questions suffices, the self must be in some sense illusory. Meme theory, Blackmore contends in The Meme Machine (Oxford University Press, 2000), leads to the same conclusion; if you pluck all the memes out of a mind, you will have nothing left. She even rejects the concept of free will, holding that there is no self to act freely. Actually, modern **science**—**and meditative introspection—have merely discovered that the self is an emergent phenomenon, difficult to explain in terms of its parts**. The world abounds in emergent phenomena. **The school where I teach can’t be defined in strictly reductionist terms either**. You can’t point to a person or classroom or lab and say, “Here is Stevens Institute.” **But does that mean my school doesn’t exist?**

### Egoism Good

Egoism isn’t predatory. It doesn’t justify sacrificing other people to benefit yourself.

**Smith 2k** writes[[197]](#footnote-197)

[Brackets for gendered language] A final distinctive feature of Rand's **egoism** is that it **isn't predatory.** Rand does not view human relations as adversarial and she does not advocate unjust exploitation of other people to advance one's own good. **Rational egoism is not about besting others, but** about **making one's own life as rewarding as possible.** Indeed, egoism is not essentially a social policy, as the fundamental mandate for morality stems not from the existence of other people but from the basic requirements of living (which a person would face regardless of the presence of other people). Altruism calls for the sacrifice of self to others. This has been the standard conception since Comte coined the term - which literally means "other-ism" - in the mid-nineteenth century.4 9 E.J. Bond characterizes altruism as the policy of "always denying oneself for the sake of others."5 0 Burton Porter presents altruism as "the position that one should always act for the welfare of others."5 ' While recognizing that the term can be used more and less strictly, Lawrence Blum observes that in its most prevalent usage, altruism refers to placing the interests of others ahead of one's o w n . 5 2 This is clearly how Rand understands altruism. She describes it as the thesis that self-sacrifice is a person's highest moral duty.5 3 Peikoff stresses that altruism is not a synonym for kindness, generosity, or good will , but the "doctrine that man should place others above self as the fundamental rule o f life . " 5 4 A sacrifice must not be confused with an investment, in which a person foregoes a nearer reward in expectation of a greater one later. A sacrifice is the surrender o f a greater value for a lesser one or for something that one does not value at all . 5 5 Because altruism calls for the sacrifice of self to others, **people** frequently **assume** that **egoism must call for** the **sacrifice of others to oneself.** 5 6 Rand explicitly rejects this view. She does so, in part, on grounds of consistency. In an oral question period, Rand said: "If [a person] decides to follow his own self-interest but to respect nobody else's, he is no longer an objective moral base, but on a hedonistic, whim-worshiping one. If so, he has disqualified himself; he is claiming a contradiction. **If** he **[she] wants to** maintain rationally his own self-interest, and **claim he has a** case for his **right to self-interest**, then he **[she] must concede** that the ground on which he claims the right to **self-interest also applies to every other human being.**" More fundamentally, Rand rejects predation on the egoistic grounds that such a policy would not truly serve a person's interest

Justifying why we should care about morality is a gateway issue. This question can’t be separated from the ends we pursue, so self-interest comes first

**Smith 2k** writes[[198]](#footnote-198)

*Rationalism's Collapse* What has this excursion into the nature and authority of reason taught us about the tenability of Rationalism? Since Rationalism's basic contention is that we should be moral because rationality requires it, Rationalism must have a compelling answer to the natural follow-up question: Why be rational? It does not. And as long as it preaches allegiance to reason devoid of empirical elements or "unsullied" by ends, it will be incapable of providing one. By considering the basic nature of a rational action, we saw that any action's rationality is dependent on its ends. The **justification of** an **action cannot be detached from** the issue of **motivation. Without reference to purposes, assessments of rationality are impossible.** Indeed, without identifying one's own purposes, the practice of rationality is impossible. Yet this is what the Rationalist refuses to recognize. He insists that reason is somehow compelling in its own right. **The actual source of reason's claim on us is the fact that reality requires rationality for success in attaining any of our ends.** Rationality *is* essential for human beings. Since Rationalists employ an impoverished conception of reason, however, nothing that I have said in defense of reason bolsters the Rationalist account of morality. In effect, Rationalists preach reason as a matter of faith. They do so, I suspect, because they essentially accept the skeptics' portrait. That is, Rationalists seem to fear that if we reach "outside" reason to provide reasons for reason, we will find what skeptics allege: subjective foundations that render all rational processes arbitrary. Rather than reject reason as inadequately grounded. however, Rationalists assert its inherent authority. Correspondingly, they conceive morality to be inherently obligatory. Rationality requires morality—for no reason. Yet for reason's authority to be self-contained would mean that it is based on . . . nothing. Working through a Rationalist's defense of morality, people often have the sense that **Rationalism misses the nerve of "Why be moral?" Answers in terms of self-contradiction or "pure" reason do not speak to the genuine concerns of someone raising the question.** By now, we can appreciate the explanation of this: Rationalism's impoverished notion of reason. What initially seems a straightforward answer to "Why be moral?"—reason demands it—crumbles on inspection. Because Rationalism severs reason from its roots in reality, it provides no good reason to be moral. It misses the nerve of the issue of moral authority because it misses reality. In fact, we have seen, the rational justification of an action depends on rational ends. Thus, appeals to "rationality" detached from all ends could not provide a genuine reason for anything, let alone furnish the basis of morality's authority. Our inquiry into the nature of reason thus reveals how feeble the Rationalist account of moral obligation is. Its thesis that reason demands morality is based on a grave misrepresentation of reason. This also undermines its four original elements of appeal, as we can now readily observe. Rationalism's purported logic is cosmetic. Since nothing can be truly rational apart from its relationship to ends, no reason to be moral can be found without such ends. Rationalists refuse to provide them, however, protesting that ends would taint reason.72 It is important to realize that the weakness in Rationalism is not mere incompleteness. My conclusion is not that Rationalists have shown that the moral is the rational but that they simply need to supplement their account with some purpose. Rather, Rationalism has *not* shown that the *moral is* the rational, for we cannot determine whether anything is rational without reference to ends. The introduction of ends is not a later addition to an account of a rational procedure. It is essential to the determination of an action's rationality. Correspondingly, Rationalism's alleged firmness and wide reach, obligating all rational agents without exception, are completely groundless. They are based on the assertion of a rationally dictated moral obligation that has not been demonstrated (and could not be, using the Rationalist's hollow conception of reason). We cannot determine an obligation's rigor until we have first secured that it is, indeed, an obligation. Similarly, the breadth of morality's authority is an extension of its authority over any individual; one can only claim that everyone is unequivocally bound by morality by the same grounds that bind any single person. Yet Rationalism has not demonstrated the grounds of *anyone's* obligation since it has not provided the ends that moral action serves and that would render moral action rational. While the aspiration to an account of unyielding, universal moral obligations may be admirable, Rationalism's reliance on an emaciated conception of rationality could never deliver it. Finally, Rationalism's neutrality is illusory. If Rationalism instructs us to be moral for the sake of no purpose—for no good reason—it simply fails to show the grounds of moral obligation. The only way it can generate substantive prescriptions and a compelling justification is by abandoning its professed neutrality and smuggling in some values, as objectors to its formalism have long maintained. Interestingly, the absence of neutrality is not necessarily a weakness in a moral theory. Neutrality's propriety depends on what a theory is neutral about. Here, it is the wish to be agnostic about the question of ends that actually renders Rationalism impotent. **Since we cannot assess** the **rationality** of an action **apart from** its **ends, in refusing to embrace ends, Rationalists disavow the very thing that could allow them to identify a moral course as rational.** In the final analysis, **Rationalism offers a pointless morality. Kant acknowledges as** **much,** admittedly less explicitly, **when he insists that morality is an end in itself and urges duty for its own sake.** A pointless morality, however, could never furnish an adequate explanation of why we should be moral.73 While we have not conducted an exhaustive inventory of possible explanations of the grounds of morality, we have inspected the essence of the historically major positions. From doing so, the only lesson we can draw is that these have not provided satisfactory answers to "Why be moral?" The question "Why be moral?" is undoubtedly a difficult one. **Yet** it is, logically, the first question of ethics. **It makes no sense to propose how human beings should live until we know why the guidance of a moral code is wanted.** How to live properly depends on what we seek to accomplish. As long as that remains unknown, whatever elaborate explanations of morality's demands one constructs—Kantian, Hobbesian, Butlerian, or any other—are as precarious as a house a cards. In the face of these failures, one can take either of two courses: cling to certain moral tenets despite the lack of grounds for them, belittling the question of morality's authority, or press on in search of a sound basis for morality. To take the former route is to jettison reason from the realm of ethics. For those not ready to take that course, we will see in the next chapter a different approach to grounding morality.

### Rational Choice Theory

**Homo Economicus Is An Accurate Model; Independently Key To Policymaking**

**Kim, 2014:**

(Meet Homo Economicus. Oliver W. Kim, Economic Concentrator At Harvard University. September 19, 2014)

With these outlandish assumptions, you can probably see why critiques of Homo economicus come from all angles. Economists since Keynes have argued that total rationality and complete knowledge are poor assumptions: real people have limited time to process information and make optimal choices; in most situations, a rough guess is good enough. Psychologists and behavioral economists criticize Homo economicus’s selfish motivations: laboratory experiments have shown that people care about fairness and occasionally even act altruistically. All of these criticisms have their merits. But here’s a confession: **Homo economicus is at most a useful fiction—in economic jargon, a model. Human beings do not actually think like Scrooge McDuck, but, in approximation and in aggregate, we often behave like we do.** Just as maps simplify the terrain, **economic models shed extraneous detail to focus on the features that are analytically relevant. This simplification makes complex problems tractable.** Consider the humble swai fish sitting on your dining hall plate. **The chain of economic relationships** necessary that takes this fish from Vietnamese farmers on the Mekong to the HUDS cooks who prepare it **is an immense feat of social organization**. Starting our analysis by invoking altruism or the behavioral idiosyncrasies of Vietnamese farmers quickly gets us lost in the theoretical weeds. **But make the simple assumption of rational self-interest, and the toil and effort that goes into producing those little beige fillets make sense** (at least for those who don’t have to eat it). To borrow a phrase, it is not from the benevolence of the swai farmer, the truck driver, or the HUDS dining hall worker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. **The utility of Homo economicus is not limited to money and product markets.** **One of the major contributions** of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker, who died earlier this year, **was to apply the logic of Homo economicus to the phenomenon of crime.** As Becker points out**, people commit crimes not necessarily because they are morally deficient, but simply because the benefits of crime outweigh the costs. Society can modulate the level of crime by altering the incentives; for instance, as the probability of conviction increases,** Becker’s model predicts that crime will fall. Though simplistic, this model is far superior to the categorical view that all criminals are moral failures. **In fact, this analytical tool so often accused of being dehumanizing can serve as a conduit for empathy.** It turns out that there may be a bit of Scrooge McDuck in all of us. The trick with Homo economicus is distinguishing the map from the terrain. **Homo economicus is a tool for specific situations, just one page in our analytical guidebook. Invoking her requires a curious mix of both ambition and humility. We must be bold enough to use this imperfect tool to attempt to describe our world, but we must also acknowledge that what we are describing is at best a crude approximation.**

**Homo Economicus Is Key To Understand Individual Economic Behavior**

**Krugman, 2007:**

(Who Was Milton Friedman, Paul Krugman. February 15, 2007 Issue Of The New York Review Of Books.)

But let’s hold off on the questionable material for a moment, and talk about Friedman the economic theorist. For most of the past two centuries, economic thinking has been dominated by the concept of Homo economicus. The hypothetical Economic Man knows what he wants; his preferences can be expressed mathematically in terms of a “utility function.” And his choices are driven by rational calculations about how to maximize that function: whether consumers are deciding between corn flakes or shredded wheat, or investors are deciding between stocks and bonds, those decisions are assumed to be based on comparisons of the “marginal utility,” or the added benefit the buyer would get from acquiring a small amount of the alternatives available. It’s easy to make fun of this story. Nobody, not even Nobel-winning economists, really makes decisions that way. But **most economists—myself included—nonetheless find Economic Man useful, with the understanding that he’s an idealized representation of what we really think is going on.** People do have preferences, even if those preferences can’t really be expressed by a precise utility function; they usually make sensible decisions, even if they don’t literally maximize utility. You might ask, why not represent people the way they really are? The answer is that **abstraction, strategic simplification, is the only way we can impose some intellectual order on the complexity of economic life. And the assumption of rational behavior has been a particularly fruitful simplification.** The question, however, is how far to push it. Keynes didn’t make an all-out assault on Economic Man, but he often resorted to plausible psychological theorizing rather than careful analysis of what a rational decision-maker would do. Business decisions were driven by “animal spirits,” consumer decisions by a psychological tendency to spend some but not all of any increase in income, wage settlements by a sense of fairness, and so on. But was it really a good idea to diminish the role of Economic Man that much? No, said Friedman, who argued in his 1953 essay “The Methodology of Positive Economics” that **economic theories should be judged not by their psychological realism but by their ability to predict behavior. And Friedman’s** two greatest **triumphs as an economic theorist came from applying the hypothesis of rational behavior to questions other economists had thought beyond its reach.** In his 1957 book A Theory of the Consumption Function—not exactly a crowd-pleasing title, but an important topic—Friedman argued that **the best way to make sense of saving and spending was** not, as Keynes had done, to resort to loose psychological theorizing, but **rather to think of individuals as making rational plans about how to spend their wealth over their lifetimes.** This wasn’t necessarily an anti-Keynesian idea—in fact, the great Keynesian economist Franco Modigliani simultaneously and independently made a similar case, with even more care in thinking about rational behavior, in work with Albert Ando. But it did mark a return to classical ways of thinking—and it worked. The details are a bit technical, but **Friedman’s “permanent income hypothesis” and the Ando-Modigliani “life cycle model” resolved several apparent paradoxes about the relationship between income and spending, and remain the foundations of how economists think about spending and saving to this day**.

### Another Link

The aff’s insistence on altruism as justified beyond question and de-emphasis on economic consequences harms the poor and leads us to ignore reality. Altruism must be rejected in favor of free market freedoms. **Brook 14** writes[[199]](#footnote-199)

The economic case against the minimum wage is easy to grasp. **When the government artificially raises** the **price** of something, the **demand** for it **goes down. Raising** the **minimum wage decreases** the **demand for unskilled labor** (usually the young). It raises the unemployment among this group and accelerates the adoption of technology replacing even more low-skilled workers. (For an excellent, but not exhaustive, economic analysis, see John Cochrane’s writings here.) So why, then, does Paul Krugman advocate the minimum wage in the pages of the New York Times? **Why do** so **many** of his colleagues **on the left overlook** the **economic harm** to those they allegedly want to help**? The answer is** simple: **they don’t care about economic harm**. They don’t care about the teenager who will lose his job and the opportunity to gain new skills, and they don’t care about the immigrant trying to feed his family. The left supports the minimum wage, but not because it allegedly has some favorable impact on anyone. They know it has no favorable impact, but they don’t care. The left supports the minimum wage because they can sell it as “good” and “noble” by lying and evading its economic consequences. Most people care about doing what they think is right. Most of us have, unfortunately, been thoroughly marinated in the ethics of altruism; **we have been taught that unselfishly sacrificing ourselves** for others, especially the “poor and needy,” **is the** very **essence of morality**. That caring about the “poor” above all is a requirement of being a good person. **We have been taught not to oppose any plan aimed at helping the poor — not to question it**, not to think too deeply about it. That would be too selfish and uncaring. The left capitalizes on our altruistic morality, on our unwillingness to question their motivation to sell us a program that makes them look like good guys — makes them look moral. Note that Obama doesn’t say that “America deserves a raise” because low-wage workers have suddenly become more productive and, therefore, more valuable to their employers. No, he says that they deserve it because “nobody who works full time should have to live in poverty.” **What about the consequences of the minimum wage? Consequences be damned!** What about the businessman who must make ends meet and can only pay a wage for unskilled labor that is lower than the minimum wage? Businessmen be damned! What about the workers who are willing to work for lower than minimum wage, but will be laid off or replaced by automated teller machines and other automatic processes? Workers be damned! The minimum wage is right! **It makes us feel moral!** Reality be damned! Raising the minimum wage feels good because it appeals to the prevailing altruism in the culture. And anyone who accepts altruism and really wants to practice it will ultimately choose that morality over economic consequences, and, as we can see from the rise of collectivism in the 20th century, over reality itself. So what if some people have to sacrifice their jobs? Sacrifice is the essence of altruism. So what if you have to lie about the economics? Altruism requires us to ignore the way the world really works, so a “noble lie” every now and then is not only necessary, it is good. Many people understand that the minimum wage defies economic reality. What we need are more people to understand that **the morality of altruism defies reality.** **Human life and happiness require** freedom, including the **freedom to compete on the labor market with lower wages** — yet this is the very reality the altruists want us to ignore in the name of the “poor.” That’s why it’s impractical — and any policy based on it will be destructive. **To move toward freedom** — to defeat the senseless and immoral absurdity that the minimum wage represents — it is **altruism** that **must be defeated.**

# Newark

## Reparations 1NC

[Omitted]

## Curry 1NC

### Cap K

The notion of a “living wage” discursively masks the power relations underlying capitalist globalization and forecloses anti-work politics

**Barchiesi 12** writes[[200]](#footnote-200)

The policy centrality of job creation operates as a device that disciplines popular values and conducts while fusing the imperatives of accumulation and governance. It makes the precarious multitudes generated by the systemic violence of globalized corporate capital governable by recoding desire around production and displacing it from a critique of that very violence. Should such a critique express itself, it might conversely lead to claims for a decent life, sustained by adequate forms of redistribution and decommodification, regardless to one’s employment status. The idealization of employment as the cornerstone of inclusive citizenship is premised on a combination of moral and socio-scientific reasoning – the praise of self-reliance and responsibility blended with purportedly self-evident considerations of social and fiscal sustainability – that for Margaret Somers and Fred Block (2005) defines its “epistemic privilege” as impervious to empirical counterevidence. It is on these premises that, despite the unrewarding, insecure, and fretful reality accompanying for the precariat the job-seeking imperative, “decent work” has acquired center stage in the imagination of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and many self- defined progressive governments as a sensible, practical policy option. Yet, as Peter Waterman (2005) argues, the “decent work” agenda is a purely normative and prescriptive assertion, bankrolled by trade unions and left-liberal technocrats in the desperate quest for policy relevance after having been overwhelmed by the ruthlessness of economic liberalization. It consists of the protestation that a return to a mythical, universalized protected labor force with benefits and rights can indeed square the circle of enhancing human dignity, enabling growth, building communities, and equipping workers with tools to compete in unforgivingly flexible labor markets. One can indeed doubt, Waterman continues, the historical plausibility of this working-class mythology as its ostensible protagonists were often instead, in practical terms, male and white producers of imperial societies that imposed unfree labor to colonized peoples and unpaid women in the household. Instead of taking stock of this problematic genealogy, Waterman concludes, **the “decent work” idea projects** into the future **its assumptive logic according to which it is** in **the nature of capitalist globalization to** obviously **evolve**, **in** conditions of liberal democracy, **in a** gender-sensitive, **worker-friendly**, environmentally sustainable **direction**. At the same time, precisely **because it draws its legitimacy from the** purely **imaginative premise of** a **capitalism with** a human face and **a moral conscience, “decent work” disallows** an **understanding** of the **power relations underpinning** actually existing **liberalization and** the reasons **why it makes work indecent for** so **many. It** therefore **forecloses other discursive virtualities– such as the idea that a decent life can be autonomous from labor** and work ethics **altogether** – as it dispatches the liberation “from” and not only “of” work to the ranks of utopian reasoning. “Decent work” is thus a typical example of a “feeling, analysis, or relationship that has been rendered thinglike and frozen”, the “mournful attachment” to which constitutes for Wendy Brown the stuff of progressive melancholia. In more practical terms, the glorification of work in the decline of neoliberalism maintains a sturdy allegiance to old narratives of modernity as the unlimited development of the forces of production, whereas a crisis of employment is essentially defined by joblessness and measured through the unemployment rate. It is, conversely, hard for this modality of thought to locate employment crises in the predicament of the working poor and the unyielding policy- determined compulsion to rely on poverty wages as the primary means of survival. It is even harder for the left, as long as it confines itself in such policy and discursive strictures, to differentiate its demands for work from a mainstream rationality and commonsense exalting low wages as a path from poverty to personal responsibility and empowerment. It is precisely in such a conundrum that **ideas of “decent work”** show their practical and political limitations as they **are** constantly **expected to recede in front of what conservative opinion calls the** more **realistic alternative between any job, at any condition, or no job** at all.

The aff’s insistence on “better work” strengthens capitalist notions of productivity in the end. The only way to challenge capitalism is to reject work itself

**Frase 12** writes[[201]](#footnote-201)

The furious **passion for work is not a constant of human nature but** rather something that **must be** constantly **reinforced**, and successive versions of the work ethic have been used to stoke that passion. At the dawn of capitalism, the call to work was a call to salvation, as Weeks explains in her reading of Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. She recognizes that, far from providing an idealist alternative to Marx’s account of the rise of capitalism, Weber complements historical materialism by describing the construction of a working class ideology. The word is used in Althusser’s sense: “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” The Protestant ethic allowed workers to imagine that when they worked for the profit of the boss, they were really working for their salvation, and for the glory of God. By the twentieth century, however, the calling had become a material one: hard work would ensure broad-based prosperity. Each of the century’s twin projects of industrial modernity developed this calling in its own way. Soviet authorities promoted the Stakhanovite movement, which glorified exceptional contributions to the productivity of the socialist economy. In Detroit, meanwhile, the social democratic union leader Walter Reuther denounced advocates of shorter hours for undermining the US economy in the struggle against Communism. In neither case was the quality of industrial work called into question; it was simply a matter of who was in control and who reaped the spoils. The industrial work ethic ran aground on the alienating nature of industrial labor. Workers who still remembered the Great Depression might have been willing to subordinate themselves to the assembly line in return for a steady paycheck, but their children were emboldened to ask for more. As Jefferson Cowie recounts in his history Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class, **the** 19**70s were characterized by pervasive labor unrest** and what was popularly called the “blue collar blues,” as “workers were harnessed to union pay but longed to run free of the deadening nature of the work itself.” In the realm of left theory, **this** development **was reflected in** the vogue for **“humanist” critiques of work**, rooted in the young Marx’s theory of alienation. Weeks highlights the Freudian-Marxist Erich Fromm, who argued that “the self realization of man . . . is inextricably linked to the activity of work,” which will again become authentic and fulfilling once it is freed from capitalist control. In recognizing the limitations of demanding more work, the **humanists** instead **called for better work. But this** critique proved to be doubly unsatisfying: it **either points backwards to austere primitivism or forward to another iteration of capitalism**. In the hands of feminists like Maria Mies, the critique of alienated work becomes a call to produce only for immediate use, rather than for exchange; this, Weeks notes, is “a prescription for worldy asceticism of the first order.” If the productivist form of Marxism trafficked in the illusion that capitalism’s forces of production could be upheld and preserved independent of the class-based relations of production, then the romantic call for a return to small-scale or craft labor attempts to split apart another of Marx’s dialectics, that between exchange value and use value. But use value, like productivity, is ultimately a category internal to capitalism; **the demand that** what **we** produce **be “useful” is inseparable from the work ethic** itself. The most influential line of argument against industrial labor, however, has not been the ascetic one but instead what the sociologists Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello call the “artistic critique.” Under this critique, **industrial labor is condemned** not because it separates exchange and use, but **because it restricts** the **autonomy**, freedom, and creativity of the worker. The solution is not to reconnect work to earthy craft labor, but to elevate workers into flexible, autonomous, self-fashioning individuals, truly able to realize themselves in their work. But **this** position quickly **curdled into apologia for** the precarious world of **post-1970s capitalism, in which individuals were encouraged to celebrate unstable jobs and** uncertain **income as forms of freedom** rather than insecurity. Intangible benefits were offered as an alternative to a share in rising productivity, which became decoupled from wages. Thus we arrive at a third iteration of the work ethic in the post-industrial era, where work is now represented neither as a path to salvation nor as a road to riches, but as a source of personal identity and fulfillment. This ethic is exemplified by hip Silicon Valley firms like Apple, which reportedly told employees, in response to their wage demands, that “Money shouldn’t be an issue when you’re employed at Apple. Working at Apple should be viewed as an experience.” In these circumstances, Weeks argues, **calls for “better work”** are not only inadequate, they **tend to reproduce** and extend a form of **capitalism that attempts to colonize the lives** and personalities **of its workers**. Hence “worker empowerment can boost efficiency, flexibility can serve as a way to cut costs, and participation can produce commitment to the organization .&nbsp.&nbsp. quality becomes quantity as the call for better work is translated into a requirement for more work.” **Any attempt to reconstruct** the meaning of **work in a non-alienating way must begin**, then, **by rejecting work altogether**. Yet the manipulative invocation of the autonomy of labor is only possible because the artistic critique did address real desires. Given the shortcomings of the old industrial labor paradigm, it hardly seems possible or desirable to return to an older proletarian ideal of long-term, protected employment with a single firm. Yet some are still attempting to resurrect the idea of better work. In The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class, economist Guy Standing identifies the new mass of insecure workers as a “precariat” rather than a proletariat, one which desires “control over life, a revival of social solidarity and a sustainable autonomy, while rejecting old labourist forms of security and state paternalism.” Like Weeks, Standing is a proponent of an unconditional basic income — a regular payment provided to every individual regardless of whether or how much they work — as a way of providing income security without locking people into jobs. Yet he still grounds his appeal on the concept of work, now expanded beyond the boundaries of wage labor. “The fact that there is an aversion to the jobs on offer does not mean that .&nbsp.&nbsp. people do not want to work,” he argues, for in fact “almost everybody wants to work.” Subsequently, however, he speaks of “rescuing” work from its association with wage labor: “All forms of work should be treated with equal respect, and there should be no presumption that someone not in a job is not working or that someone not working today is an idle scrounger.” This evokes the notion of a social factory in which we contribute various kinds of productive activity that is not directly remunerated, ranging from raising children to coding open source software. But **no amount of redefinition can escape** the **association of work with** the **capitalist** ethos of productivism and **efficiency**. The **contrast between work and “idle scrounging” implies that we can measure whether** any given **activity is productive** or useful, by translating it into a common measure. **Capitalism has** such **a measure, monetary value**: whatever has value in the market is, by definition, productive. If the **critique of capitalism** is to get beyond this, it **must get beyond the idea that** our **activities can be subordinated to a single measure of value**. Indeed, **to demand that time** outside of work **be truly free is to reject the call to justify its usefulness**. This is a central insight of Weeks’ consistent anti-asceticism, which resists any effort to replace the work ethic with some equally homogenizing code that externally validates the organization of our time. Time beyond work should not be for exchange or for use, but for itself. The point, as Weeks puts it, is to “get a life,” as we find ways “to sustain the social worlds necessary for, among other things, production.”

Capitalism is the root cause of the aff’s impacts—2 warrants

a. Under capitalism everything is thingified, including persons.

**Morgaridge 98** writes[[202]](#footnote-202)

Now none of these philosophers are naive: none of them thinks that sympathy, love, or caring determines all, or even most, human behavior. The 20th century proves otherwise.

What they do offer, though, is the hope that human beings have the capacity to want the best for each other. So now we must ask, What forces are at work in our world to block or cripple the ethical response? This question, of course, brings me back to capitalism. But before I go there, I want to acknowledge that capitalism is not the only thing that blocks our ability to care. Exploitation and cruelty were around long before the economic system of capitalism came to be, and the temptation to use and abuse others will probably survive in any future society that might supersede capitalism. Nevertheless, I want to claim, the putting the world at the disposal of those with capital has done more damage to the ethical life than anything else. To put it in religious terms, capital is the devil. To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. **Under capitalism**, Marx writes, everything in nature and **everything that human beings are and can do becomes an object: a resource for, or** an **obstacle, to** the expansion of production, the development of technology, the growth of **markets**, **and** the circulation of **money**. For those who manage and live from capital, nothing has value of its own. **Mountain streams, clean air, human lives** -- **all mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only** if they can be used **to turn a profit**.[1] If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it sees there only eyes through which brand names and advertising can enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, if the needs are incompatible with the growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be unrepresented or silenced. Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. Capital profits from the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of life. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. If we care about life, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to want all the things capital does to be governed by that care, to be directed by the ethical concern for life. But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. **Therefore ethics**, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, **is left out of deliberations about what** the heavyweight **institutions of** our **society are going to do**. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable. People no longer say, "You can't stop progress," but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority ("idealists") can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. Only when the end of capitalism is on the table will ethics have a seat at the table.

b. Capitalism is the root cause of racism.

**IBT 93** writes[[203]](#footnote-203)

The absence of any scientific basis for distinguishing one "race" from another makes the whole concept meaningless. Yet biological refutation does not affect the social reality. As Richard Fraser, a veteran American Trotskyist, pointed out in "The Negro Struggle and the Proletarian Revolution," a document written in the 1950s and recently republished, race remains "a reality in spite of the fact that science reveals that it does not exist." Fraser wrote that: "The concept of race has now been overthrown in biological science. But *race*as the keystone of exploitation remains. Race is a social relation and has only a social reality." **Racism is rooted in** the historical development of **cap**italism as a world system**.** It has proved through several centuries to be a useful and flexible tool for the possessing classes. It justified the brutal wars of conquest and genocide, which established the European colonial empires. It rationalized **the slave trade**, which **produced** the primitive accumulation of **capital necessary for the industrial revolution.** Today racism in its various guises remains an important ideological mainstay for the capitalist elites, providing a rationale for the barbaric oppression of minorities. **Racism "explains,"** for example, **why black people in America fail to get a piece of the "American Dream" one generation after another.** It can be used to "explain" why Japanese capitalism has been much more successful than its European and North American rivals. The arguments offered by **racists**, whether the psychotic ravings of a lumpenized skinhead or the "objective," pseudo-scientific scholarship of a Harvard professor, **seek to direct popular anger away from** the workings of an irrational and decaying **cap**italist system **to** some group of **"outsiders." Racism** has proved integral and necessary for the proper functioning of capitalist society for a variety of reasons. In the first place, it **provides one of the essential axes along which the working class can be divided against itself, encouraging one segment of the proletariat to identify with the exploiters. This impedes** the development of **class consciousness and undermines** the **unity necessary to challenge cap**italist rule**.** The working class of every imperialist country has been so poisoned with chauvinism and racism (also promoted by pro-capitalist misleaderships within the workers' movement) that in "normal" periods, workers often identify their interests with those of their "own" oppressors and exploiters rather than with those of workers in other countries. Secondly, racism, in common with other forms of biological determinism, has an essential ideological function. **The bourgeoisie rose** to ascendancy **under the banner of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." Yet for** hundreds of **millions** of people **daily reality in** the world **cap**italist order **is** misery, **oppression and poverty.** Even in the so-called advanced capitalist countries there is a growing cynicism about the electoral process, with most adults recognizing that the "equality" of the ballot box is no different from the "equality of the market place—every dollar is equal, and big money takes all. **Racists** are not burdened with the obligation to prove that capitalist society is egalitarian. Instead, they openly **claim that** the **inequalities of class society are based on natural distinctions.**

The alternative is to endorse an anti-work politics. An anti-work politics challenges the stigma associated with not being a worker; this is a key starting point for a future without capitalism

**Frase 12** writes[[204]](#footnote-204)

The rejection of work has a rich history in left theory, but a more intermittent presence in mass politics. It crops up sporadically, from the nineteenth century ten hour day movement to the Italian Hot Autumn of 1969. One great difficulty is that by jettisoning the work ethic, **anti-work politics** simultaneously **takes up the cause of wage laborers while undermining their identity as wage laborers**. It insists that their liberation must entail the simultaneous abolition of their self-conception as workers. This is in contrast to the more traditional Marxist vision, in which the working class first realizes itself in the metaphorical “dictatorship of the proletariat” before ultimately dissolving itself into a totally classless society. Yet even as orthodox a Marxist as Georg Lukacs observed in History and Class Consciousness that “the proletariat only perfects itself by annihilating and transcending itself.” Its ultimate destiny is to be not just a class for-itself but “against itself.” This is not a problem unique to the struggle against capitalism, and it is perhaps inherent in any truly radical politics. It is always easier to pose demands on the terms of the enemy than it is to reject those terms altogether, whether that means racial minorities demanding assimilation to white society or gays and lesbians demanding admission to the institution of bourgeois marriage. By asking workers to give up not just their chains but their identities as workers, anti-work theorists relinquish the forms of working class pride and solidarity that have been the glue for many left movements. They dream of a workers’ movement against work. **But this requires some new conception of who we are and what we are to become**, if we are to throw off the label of “worker.” Writers in the anti-work tradition have often sought these new identities in the outlooks and practices of figures who are marginal to the production process and outside the working class. Lafargue lapsed into noble savagery, comparing the deluded proletariat to “the Spaniard, in whom the primitive animal has not been atrophied,” and who therefore recognized that “work is the worst sort of slavery.” For Oscar Wilde, the artist showed us the future of life after our liberation from work and property, when everyone could finally develop a “true, beautiful, healthy Individualism.” Labor was, for him, not the source of a meaningful life but its antithesis, and the promise of modernity was that it could be overcome for the many as it was once overcome for the few: The fact is, that civilisation requires slaves. The Greeks were quite right there. Unless there are slaves to do the ugly, horrible, uninteresting work, culture and contemplation become almost impossible. Human slavery is wrong, insecure, and demoralising. On mechanical slavery, on the slavery of the machine, the future of the world depends. And when scientific men are no longer called upon to go down to a depressing East End and distribute bad cocoa and worse blankets to starving people, they will have delightful leisure in which to devise wonderful and marvellous things for their own joy and the joy of everyone else. Lafargue and Wilde’s arguments have Nietzchean overtones, with the defense of work portrayed as a form of ressentiment and the work ethic as a detestable slave morality. Weeks makes this connection as well in her final chapter, joining Nietzsche to the iconoclastic Marxist Ernst Bloch as a theorist of utopian politics. To give up ressentiment, Weeks suggests, means to ask, “Can we want, and are we willing to create, a new world that would no longer be ‘our’ world’, a social form that would not produce subjects like us?” This brings about the difficulty raised above, as it pertains to the politics of rejecting work: “its mandate to embrace the present and affirm the self and, at the same time, to will their overcoming; its prescription for self-affirmation but not self-preservation or self-aggrandizement.” Elsewhere, Weeks remarks that **we should not underestimate** just **how much hesitation about anti-work positions is rooted in fear. Fear of idleness, fear of hedonism —** or to borrow a phrase from Erich Fromm, **fear of freedom. It is** relatively **easy to say that in the future I will be** what I am now — **a worker**, just perhaps with more money or more job security or more control over my work. **It is something else to imagine ourselves as different kinds of people** altogether. **That,** perhaps, **is the unappreciated value of Occupy Wall Street encampments** and similar attempts to carve out alternative ways of living within the interstices of capitalist society. **It may be**, as critics often point out, **that they cannot** really **build an alternative society so long as capitalism’s institutional impediments** to such a society **remain in place. But** perhaps **they can help remove** the **fear of what we might become if those impediments were lifted**, and we were able to make our exodus from the world of work to the world of freedom.

### UBI CP

Counterplan text: The United States should abolish minimum wage laws and institute a universal basic income.

Minimum wage laws increase unemployment and outsourcing. This discriminates against the poorest. The CP solves.

**Aziz 13** writes[[205]](#footnote-205)

The minimum wage is a factor in creating unemployment. Despite what's often said to the contrary, it's true: **Countries with no minimum wage tend to have much lower unemployment**. Right now, America is suffering a serious deficit of jobs, with over three jobseekers for every available job. We need all the jobs we can get. So how does the minimum wage create unemployment? **Minimum wage laws are a price control**. They dictate the minimum level that a company can pay a worker. If the minimum wage is $10, and a company wants to take on a new employee that they determine will be worth $8 an hour, they have a choice — either pay $10 an hour, or not hire the employee. **Sometimes, the company will accept a hit to their profit margin**, and pay the employee $10 an hour. **Sometimes they will just not hire a new employee** at all. **Or**, increasingly, sometimes they will **go overseas and hire** an employee **elsewhere** — like China — where wages are far lower. **This** is a particularly cruel scenario because it **discriminates most against the poorest** and youngest workers in society. Empirically, the minimum wage has failed to reach its goal of ensuring a fair wage for low wage workers. Worker productivity in America has risen and risen, yet the minimum wage has not. As this chart via Dean Baker shows, it has severely stagnated: [ cepr.net ] **I propose abolishing the minimum wage, and replacing it with a basic income** policy , a version of which was first advocated in America by Thomas Paine . Individuals would be able to work for whatever wage they can secure, meaning that low-skilled individuals — especially the young, who currently face a particularly high rate of employment — would have an easier time finding work. And the level of basic income could be tied to the level of productivity, to reduce inequality. There are two kinds of basic income policy. The first is a negative income tax — if an individual’s income level falls beneath a certain threshold (say, $1,500 a month) the government makes up the difference. Funds for this could be accessed by consolidating existing welfare programs like state-run pension schemes and unemployment benefits, and by closing tax loopholes and raising taxes on corporate profits and high-income earners. Germany has enacted a similar policy — called the "Kurzabeit" — and it's been credited with shielding the German labor force from the worst of the recession and keeping their unemployment rate low since. The second is a universal income policy, where everyone receives a payment irrespective of their income. This would obviously require more funds — meaning higher taxes — but in a future where corporations are making larger and larger profits while requiring fewer and fewer workers due to automation, such policies may become increasingly feasible. There are already very serious proposals to initiate such a scheme in Switzerland .

The K’s a net benefit.

Universal basic income challenges wage labor itself so it’s key to radical transformations of capitalism

**Frase 10** writes[[206]](#footnote-206)

Rather than trying to draw up a detailed blueprint of a socialist economy, I prefer to think in terms of what Andre Gorz called **“non-reformist reforms”**: changes to the system that **can be implemented under capitalism, but** which **set the stage for** further **radical transformations**. And I want to highlight one particular such reform that’s associated with Gorz, and which commenter R. Burke brings up in the comments of Jason’s recent post: the guaranteed minimum income, or “**U**niversal **B**asic **I**ncome” as it’s sometimes called. This is just what it sounds like, an income that every citizen would be entitled to, independent of work. And I find it compelling because it **directly addresses one of the most fundamental objectionable things about capitalism,** namely the fact **that it makes almost everyone dependent on** performing **wage labor** in order **to survive**. This is despite the fact that we live in a society that is more physically productive than any other that has ever existed. Eighty years ago, John Maynard Keynes was predicting that the greatest problem his grandchildren would face was what to do with their abundant leisure time. Instead, we are all working more than ever. **A guaranteed income could** begin to reverse this state of affairs by **giv**ing **people the option of opting out of the labor market**, which today is only possible for a wealthy few. It would therefore address a goal that Pat Devine mentions in a passage Jason quoted: reducing the amount of unpleasant labor that people are forced to perform. As I already noted, I think this goal is of such paramount importance that I’m baffled by any theory of a socialist economy that doesn’t make it absolutely central. Which brings me to one thing I found quite unappealing about the vision David Schweickart presents. His description of economic life seems to assume that the ideal way to live is to have some job that you go off to for 40 hours a week for the rest of your life. If labor is unpleasant, the solution is to give workers more control, rather than giving them the option of opting out of work–“voice” rather than “exit”, to use Albert Hirschman’s lovely phrase. Now maybe this makes sense to people who grew up in the mid-20th century, when the labor market was less volatile and careers were more stable. But it doesn’t make any sense to me. Even if full employment is possible, why would it be desirable? If there’s not enough work to go around, why would you go and create more? And maybe it’s true that if we make the workplace democratic, then work will be fulfilling and people won’t mind it. But in that case, why force them? It’s at this point that you’re supposed to start talking about “material incentives”, to take Schweickart’s choice of jargon. It usually starts with some troll objecting that socialism is impossible because nobody will do any work without the fear of starvation. The socialist then comes back with some argument about how socialism is going to motivate everyone to go out there and work hard. For Schweickart’s system, the answer is that “one’s income is directly tied to the success of one’s firm”, and so you work hard for the material reward. Jason doesn’t explicitly address this issue, but I’m sure he could come up with a response. But approaching the problem this way gets the whole issue backwards, by proposing solutions before we have understood what the actual problem is. If you just talk in general terms about giving people “incentives to work”, you’re neglecting the reality that **while some work would have to get done** in any kind of desirable society, **other kinds of work should** actually **be dis-incentivized**. Broadly, I’d say that paid work in capitalism falls into at least the following categories: Things that people want done, but which nobody particularly wants to do. Things that people would do voluntarily provided they have enough time, even if they weren’t paid. Things that are useless or destructive, and happen only because they facilitate capital accumulation and people need jobs. Things that people may want done and/or may want to do, but which have destructive effects on other people or the environment. The discussions about material incentives are relevant to things in category 1. But much of the labor in modern capitalist societies falls into the other categories–more of it than we think, I suspect. I’d argue that a lot of artistic and knowledge work falls into category 2. So does child care, although just who does it voluntarily is another matter, which is why feminism is a core part of socialist analysis. Financial engineering, telemarketing, and basically anything that happens at a private health insurance company fall into category 3. So does much of the estimated 25% of U.S. employment that’s taken up by what economists Sam Bowles and Arjun Jayadev call “guard labor”: supervising workers, running the prison-industrial complex, providing private security, and other stuff that is mostly about preserving current power relations and maintaining inequality, rather than making anything useful. Driving a car or burning coal for electricity may fall into category 4. Even though I can sketch out examples like this, in general it’s pretty hard to differentiate these different kinds of labor in capitalism. That’s because **capitalism creates a situation where all work is “good” because it provides jobs**, which **people need** in order **to survive**. However, these different kinds of labor wouldn’t get differentiated in Schweickart’s version of market socialism either, since he still assumes that everyone is forced to work–moreover, the idea of government as “employer of last resort” implies that we’d be actively creating useless category 3 work for people. Devine’s alternative, meanwhile, would attempt to use a convoluted planning process to differentiate between desirable and undesirable uses of labor. That may be necessary in some cases, but I don’t think it should be our first solution–attempting to comprehensively micromanage every aspect of production strikes me as undesirably bureaucratic. More importantly, I don’t think it’s necessary to go down this road at all. Rather than starting with these complicated issues of economic planning, we should start with the thing that’s actually most desirable: making people less dependent on wage labor. Social Democracy has already gone part of the way in this direction, by removing things like health care and education from the market. But to really attack wage labor at its root, you need something like the guaranteed minimum income–perhaps in combination with reductions in the length of the work-week. At this point we get back to the incentives business again, with the critics screaming “but nobody would do any work!” At one level, I think this is just silly. For one thing, at least in the short run, most people would want to make more than the guaranteed minimum, and so would continue to work. For another thing, it’s clear that people do various jobs for lots of different reasons that don’t have to do with money, and some kinds of work would get more popular if people didn’t have to worry about having the money to meet their basic needs. Some jobs really are enjoyable, in other words, and people would do them for free if they could. Other kinds of work give their returns by conferring status–for example, for all but the most famous artists, making art is more about gaining recognition than making money. One appealing aspect of a **basic income** is that it **would** start to **sort out** the **distinctions between** the **different kinds of labor** outlined above. If some jobs start being things people do as hobbies, then great! **If some jobs disappear, and we don’t miss them,** then **great!** If you have to pay people more to make them take crappy jobs, great! Which isn’t to say that basic income is a one-shot magic solution to all the problems of capitalism (although for the argument that it could be, check out a weird and provocative article called “The Capitalist Road to Communism”). Indeed, he best thing about a guaranteed income is that **it stands a** pretty **good chance of provoking major economic disruption and social crisis–that’s what makes it a “non-reformist reform.”** In a world **with** a **guaranteed income, it could very well turn out that** there are **some things** that just **aren’t getting done**. It’s not clear that you’d be able to find enough people to clean office bathrooms or work the night shift at 7-11 if they had access to a basic income, no matter what you paid them. Some people invoke the above scenario as an argument against the basic income, but let me emphasize that this is a problem I would love to have. **Once it becomes clear what** kind of **work is** both **desired and undersupplied, we can have** a **political struggle about how that work will get done**. By offering special rewards (i.e. “material incentives”)? By creating some kind of national service requirement in exchange for the basic income (you have to go clean toilets or work the night shift once a month, say)? By finding clever new ways to automate these jobs? Or by deciding we can really do without some things we thought we “needed”?

### Case

Capitalism has the best explanatory power of racism. Focus on capitalism does not entail ignoring racism or “slave master ontology”

**McLaren 4** writes[[207]](#footnote-207)

Another caveat. In making such a claim, we are not renouncing the concept of experience. On the contrary, we believe it is imperative to retain the category of lived experience as a reference point in light of misguided post-Marxist critiques which imply that all forms of Marxian class analysis are dismissive of subjectivity. We are not, however, advocating the uncritical fetishization of ‘experience’ that tends to assume that experience somehow guarantees the authenticity of knowledge and which often treats experience as self-explanatory, transparent, and solely individual. Rather, we advance a framework that seeks to make connections between seemingly isolated situations and/or particular experiences by exploring how they are constituted in, and circumscribed by, broader historical and social circumstances. Experiential understandings, in and of themselves, are suspect because, dialectically, they constitute a unity of opposites—they are at once unique, speciﬁc, and personal, but also thoroughly partial, social, and the products of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing (Gimenez, 2001). In this sense, a rich description of immediate experience in terms of consciousness of a particular form of oppression (racial or otherwise) can be an appropriate and indispensable point of departure. Such an understanding, however, can easily become an isolated ‘difference’ prison unless it transcends the immediate perceived point of oppression, confronts the social system in which it is rooted, and expands into a complex and multifaceted analysis (of forms of social mediation) that is capable of mapping out the general organization of social relations. That, however, requires a broad class-based approach.—¶ Having a concept of **class helps us** to **see** the network of social relations constituting an **overall social organization** **which** both implicates and **cuts through racialization**/ethnicization **and gender**… [a] radical political economy [class] perspective emphasizing exploitation, dispossession and survival takes the issues of … diversity [and difference] beyond questions of conscious identity such as culture and ideology, or of a paradigm of homogeneity and heterogeneity … or of ethical imperatives with respect to the ‘other’. (Bannerji, 2000, pp. 7, 19)¶ A radical political economy framework is crucial since various ‘culturalist’ perspectives seem to diminish the role of political economy and class forces in shaping the ediﬁce of ‘the social’—including the shifting constellations and meanings of ‘difference.’ Furthermore, none of the ‘differences’ valorized in culturalist narratives alone, and certainly not ‘race’ by itself can explain the massive transformation of the structure of capitalism in recent years. We agree with Meyerson (2000) that ‘race’ is not an adequate explanatory category on its own and that the use of **‘race’ as a descriptive or analytical category** has serious consequences for the way in which social life is presumed to be constituted and organized. The category of ‘race’—the conceptual framework that the oppressed often employ to interpret their experiences of inequality **‘often clouds the concrete reality of class, and blurs the** actual **structure of power** and privilege.’ In this regard, ‘race’ is all too often a ‘barrier to understanding the central role of class in shaping personal and collective outcomes within a capitalist society’ (Marable, 1995, pp. 8, 226). In many ways, the use of ‘race’ has become an analytical trap precisely when it has been employed in antiseptic isolation from the messy terrain of historical and material relations. **This**, of course, **does not imply that we ignore racism** and racial oppression; rather, an analytical shift from ‘race’ to a plural conceptualization of ‘racisms’ and their historical articulations is necessary (cf. McLaren & Torres, 1999). However, it is important to note that ‘**race’ doesn’t explain racism** and forms of racial oppression. **Those relations are best understood within** the context of **class** rule, as Bannerji, Kovel, Marable and Meyerson imply—but **that compels us** to forge **a conceptual shift in theorizing, which entails** (among other things) **moving beyond** the ideology of ‘difference’ and ‘**race’ as the** dominant **prism**s **for understanding** exploitation and oppression. We are aware of some potential implications for white Marxist criticalists to unwittingly support racist practices in their criticisms of ‘race-ﬁrst’ positions articulated in the social sciences. In those instances, white criticalists wrongly go on ‘high alert’ in placing theorists of color under special surveillance for downplaying an analysis of capitalism and class. These activities on the part of white criticalists must be condemned, as must be efforts to stress class analysis primarily as a means of creating a white vanguard position in the struggle against capitalism. **Our position** is one that attempts to **link** practices of **racial oppression to the** **central, totalizing dynamics of capitalist society** in order **to resist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy more fully**.7¶ We have argued that it is virtually impossible to conceptualize class without attending to the forms and contents of difference, but we insist that this does not imply that class struggle is now outdated by the politics of difference. As Jameson (1998, p. 136) notes, we are now in the midst of returning to the ‘most fundamental form of class struggle’ in light of current global conditions. Today’s climate suggests that class struggle is ‘not yet a thing of the past’ and that those who seek to undermine its centrality are not only ‘morally callous’ and ‘seriously out of touch with reality’ but also largely blind to the ‘needs of the large mass of people who are barely surviving capital’s newly-honed mechanisms of globalized greed’ (Harvey, 1998, pp. 7–9). In our view, a more comprehensive and politically useful understanding of the contemporary historical juncture necessitates foregrounding class analysis and the primacy of the working class as the fundamental agent of change.8¶ This does not render as ‘secondary’ the concerns of those marginalized by race, ethnicity, etc. as is routinely charged by post-Marxists. **It is** often **assumed that foregrounding capitalist** social **relations** necessarily undermines the importance of attending to ‘difference’ and/or **trivializes** struggles against **racism**, etc., **in favor of** an **abstract**ly deﬁned **class**-based **politics** typically **identiﬁed as ‘white.’** **Yet, such** formulations rest on a **bizarre but** generally **unspoken logic** that **assumes that racial** and ethnic ‘**minorities’ are only conjuncturally related to the working class. This** stance **is** patently **absurd** since the concept of the ‘working class’ is undoubtedly comprised of men and women of different races, ethnicities, etc. (Mitter, 1997). A good deal of post-Marxist **critique** is subtly racist (not to mention essentialist) insofar as it implies **that ‘people of color’ could not** possibly **be concerned with issues beyond** those related to their **‘racial’** or ‘ethnic’ ‘**difference.’** This **posits ‘people of color’ as single-minded**, one-dimensional **caricatures** and assumes that their working lives are less crucial to their self-understanding (and survival) than is the case with their ‘white male’ counterparts.9 It also ignores ‘the fact that class is an ineradicable dimension of everybody’s lives’ (Gimenez, 2001, p. 2) and that social oppression is much more than tangentially linked to class background and the exploitative relations of production. On this topic, Meyerson (2000) is worth quoting at length: ¶ Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One of course is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent—a primacy which does not render women and people of color ‘secondary.’ This view assumes that ‘working class’ means white—this division between a white working class and all the others, whose identity (along with a corresponding social theory to explain that identity) is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid … [T]he primacy of class means … that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement so that the primacy of class puts the ﬁght against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of **this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis** for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender, and class oppression. **Oppression is** multiple and **intersecting but its causes are not**.¶ The cohesiveness of this position suggests that forms of exploitation and oppression are related internally to the extent that they are located in the same totality— one which is currently deﬁned by capitalist class rule. Capitalism is an overarching totality that is, unfortunately, becoming increasingly invisible in post-Marxist ‘discursive’ narratives that valorize ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct.

Cap is the root cause of racism. The essential feature of the Middle Passage was the fact that slaves became commodities.

**Smallwood 7** writes[[208]](#footnote-208)

The half century 1675–1725 marked the most active years of **England**’s Royal African Company, the chartered firm that from the time of its inception in 1672 until the close of the century **held a monopoly on** all English **trade to Africa and that continued to play a**n active **role in** the first several decades of the eighteenth century, an era of **“free trade.”**4 The company employed a network of colonists as agents responsible for receiving slave cargoes in Anglo- American ports. **As the Gold Coast was a region whose Atlantic exports moved through** the bevy of coastal trading **forts initially established to manage gold exports**, most of the area’s human traffic flowed through those settlements in the seventeenth century; and any that did not pass through these holding centers was closely monitored by the fort administrators. From this English slaving system emerged a unique documentary record of slave trading on both African and American sides of the ocean. Working out of African and American ports, the agents of the Royal African Company generated a voluminous record of the system’s inner workings. Moreover, it is a record that, unlike the papers of most of the private individuals and independent firms that had come to dominate the English slave trade by the middle of the eighteenth century, has survived in relatively comprehensive form. The corpus of records produced by agents stationed in both West Africa and the English American colonies is uniquely transatlantic in scope, affording a kind of detail regarding the various stages of African migration in the Atlantic arena that is rarely available elsewhere. The business of slave trading produced two interrelated but distinct bodies of archival material—one quantitative, and the other largely textual. The former comprised the ledgers, bills of lading, and other instruments of accounting by which traders monitored and measured their investments. The latter comprised internal correspondence between and among officials in London and agents stationed in Africa and the Americas. It was the quantitative content of the archives that entered most directly into the public domain, in the form of commercial vital statistics published for British consumption. Circulating alongside the formal accounting of economic exchange, the correspondence formed a more private transcript that was largely hidden from public view. It is from the rich content of the company’s internal correspondence—between the trading factories along the Gold Coast and the company’s main fort, Cape Coast Castle; between the agents at Cape Coast Castle and their superiors in London; and finally between London and the company’s agents in the American colonies—that we gain a remarkably detailed picture, a window opening out onto the day-today conduct of the commerce in human beings. In this less visible transcript both traders and those traded appear as actors on the transatlantic stage. Distinct from the public transcript that produced the winners’ version of the story (how many units of merchandise sold, how many pounds sterling earned, how much profit, how much loss), the more hidden, internal transcript tells a fuller story—the human story of the Atlantic slave trade. **At every point along the passage** from African to New World markets, **we find** a stark contest between slave traders and slaves, between **the traders’ will to commodify people** and the captives’ will to remain fully recognizable as human subjects. The correspondence, voyage journals, and other texts that slave traders produced show us the inner workings of the system and its constitutive practices. They serve as a kind of mirror in which we can see reflected aspects of the human experience of captivity and migration. The documents detail the activities of the Europeans who traded for slaves in Africa and transported them to markets in America, the merchants from whom slaves were purchased on the African coast, and the planters to whom they were sold in American colonies. In documenting their roles as buyers and sellers of humans, the slave traders in their records also unwittingly reveal part of the slaves’ own stories. From the interplay of these stories, we can excavate something of the slaves’ own experience of the traffic in human beings and of life aboard the slave ship. **Following** the trace of **African life within** the **commodity circuits of the Atlantic economy brings an essential element of the African diaspora into focus—the** inexorable **one-way trajectory of** African **dispersal** via the transatlantic slave trade and its implications for African life in the Americas. Always doubling back on return voyages, **ships made loops and spirals as they carried** thecommodities that sustained transatlantic markets: **gold and silver, sugar** and tobacco**, rice** and coffee**,** woolens and silks, cottons and linens, wine, brandy, and rum, muskets and **gunpowder . . .and captive people**. Unlike the ships, which plied back and forth, though, the human commodities followed a relentlessly linear course: the direction of their transatlantic movement never reversed. **Ships traced circles. Commodities traveled in a straight line.** For people who traveled not as emigrants seeking new lives in new places but as commodities, transatlantic exile admitted none of the return journeys, correspondence, and other means of contact by which migrants shaped networks of social and information exchange between their origins and destinations, the Old and New Worlds. Atlantic slaves in diaspora did not lack connections to the “Old World.”

Cap ensures a constant reshuffling of artificial divisions. Prefer class analysis to their focus on race

**Hill 9** writes[[209]](#footnote-209)

In contrast to both Critical Race Theorists and revisionist socialists/left liberals/equivalence theorists, and those who see caste as the primary form of oppression, Marxists would agree that objectively- **whatever our “race”** or gender or sexuality or current level of academic attainment or religious identity, whatever the individual and group history and fear of oppression and attack- **the** fundamental **objective and material** form of **oppression** in capitalism **is class** oppression**. Black and Women capitalists, or Jewish and Arab capitalists**, or Dalit capitalists in India, **exploit** the **labour** power of their multi-ethnic men and women workers, essentially (in terms of the exploitation of labour power and the appropriation of surplus value) in just **the same way as** do **white male capitalists**, or upper-caste capitalists. But the subjective consciousness of identity, this subjective **affirmation of** one particular **identity**, while seared into the souls of its victims, **should not mask the objective nature of** contemporary oppression under **cap**italism – class oppression that, of course, hits some “raced” and gendered and caste and occupational sections of the working class harder than others. Martha Gimenez (2001:24) succinctly explains that “**class is not simply another ideology** legitimating oppression.” Rather, class denotes “exploitative relations between people **mediated by** their relations to the **means of production**.” Apple’s “parallellist,” or **equivalence** model of exploitation (equivalence of exploitation based on “race,” class and gender, his “tryptarchic” model of inequality) produces valuable data and **insights** into aspects of and the extent and manifestations of gender oppression and “race” oppression in capitalist USA. However, such analyses serve to **occlude the** class-capital **relation**, the class struggle, to obscure an essential and defining nature of capitalism, class conflict. Objectively, whatever our “race” or gender or caste or sexual orientation or scholastic attainment, whatever the individual and group history and fear of oppression and attack, the fundamental form of oppression in capitalism is class oppression. While the capitalist class is predominantly white and male, capital in theory and in practice can be blind to colour and gender and caste – even if that does not happen very often. African Marxist-Leninists such as Ngugi wa Thiong’o (e.g., Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Ngugi wa Mirii, 1985) know very well that **when** the **white colonialist oppressors were ejected** from direct rule over African states **in the 1950s** and 60s, the **white bourgeoisie in** some African **states such as Kenya was replaced by a black bourgeoisie, acting** in concert **with** transnational capital and/or capital(ists) of **the former** colonial **power.** Similarly **in India, capitalism is no longer exclusively white**. It is Indian, not white British alone. As Bellamy observes, the **diminution of class analysis “denies** immanent critique of any **critical bite,” effectively disarming** a meaningful **opposition** to the capitalist thesis (Bellamy, 1997:25). And as Harvey notes, neoliberal rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of justice through the conquest of state power. (Harvey, 2005:41) To return to the broader relationship between “race,” gender, and social class, and to turn to the USA, are there many who would deny that Condoleeza Rice and Colin Powell have more in common with the Bushes and the rest of the Unites States capitalist class, be it white, black or Latina/o, than they do with the workers whose individual ownership of wealth and power is an infinetismal fraction of those individual members of the ruling and capitalist class? The various oppressions, of caste, gender, “race,” religion, for example, are functional in dividing the working class and securing the reproduction of capital; constructing social conflict between men and women, or black and white, or different castes, or tribes, or religious groups, or skilled and unskilled, thereby tending to dissolve the conflict between capital and labor, thus occluding the class-capital relation, the class struggle, and to obscure the essential and defining nature of capitalism, the labor-capital relation and its attendant class conflict.

# Northland Christian

## South Tyneside 1NC

### T – General Principle

A. The aff must defend the resolution as a general principle.

B. They specify a country.

C. Standards

1. Common usage. Country-spec is inconsistent with it. Common usage is a voter and outweighs fairness and education.

**Nebel 14** writes[[210]](#footnote-210)

To my ear, the generic reading is correct. I think the best evidence for this is simply the undistorted judgments of ordinary speakers. **No competent speaker of English would**, without distorting influence or additional evidence of generalizability, **endorse an inference from a** plan involving two **just government**s **to the resolution**. Suppose Sally, an American citizen, believes that the U.S. and Canada should require employers to pay a living wage, but that no other government (just or unjust, actual or possible) should. She would not represent her view by asserting, “Just governments ought to require that employers pay a living wage.” She would deny this claim and hold that the U.S. and Canada are exceptions. One might object that Sally would endorse this assertion if she believed that the U.S. and Canada are the only just governments. Maybe she would, but that is explained by the generic reading, because she would then be making a generalization about (what she believes to be) just governments. And the onus would be on the affirmative, when specifying particular governments, to add such a premise. Moreover, many linguists would add that Sally could not regard it is as mere accident that these governments are just and that they ought to require employers to pay a living wage: the resolution requires there to be some explanatory connection between the justness of governments and the living wage requirement (see Carlson 2005). This is good evidence because **ordinary speakers have** an **implicit** (but not infallible) **mastery over the language in which the res**olution **is stated. The res**olution **is** stated in English, **not in some** special **debate-specific dialect** of English. **Facts of usage constrain interpretation**. The existential interpretation is not even, as I see it, eligible. So its **pragmatic benefits are irrelevant. Compare: I think it would be better if the res**olution **were, “It is not the case that just governments ought to …” But that’s not the resolution, so it’s not** even an **eligible** interpretation **in a T debate**. (Here I assume a controversial view about whether pragmatic benefits can justify a semantically inadequate interpretation of the resolution. I cannot defend this view here, but I welcome questions and objections in the comments to be addressed in a later article.)

2. Predictable limits. Their interp justifies a huge amount of affs about any country along with various solvency mechanisms and particular industries. This aff in particular proves the abuse; there’s no way negs can predict a single county in England, and county-spec alone justifies 1000s of affs.

Only limited topics protect participants from research overload which materially affects our lives outside of round.

**Harris 13** writes[[211]](#footnote-211)

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. **The limits debate** is an argument that **has real** pragmatic **consequences.** I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, **I could put together a strategy against any random argument** somebody makes employing an energy metaphor **but** the reality is **there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to** actually spend time **play**ing **catch** with my children occasionally or maybe even **read a book or go to a movie** or spend some time with my wife. **A world where there are** an **infinite** number of **affirmatives** is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that **says this community doesn’t care whether** its **participants have a life** or **do well in school or spend time with their families.** I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get **to talk about anything** they want to talk about **without having to debate** against **Topicality or framework** arguments are interested in constructing a world that **might make debate an unending nightmare** and not a very good home in which to live. **Limits**, to me, **are a real impact because I feel their impact** in my **everyday** existence.

Research shows that research overload leads to superficial education, meaning we won’t learn about the aff or anything else.

**Chokshi 10** writes[[212]](#footnote-212)

When it comes to focus, turning on the spotlight may not matter as much as our ability to dim the ambient light. Nicholas Carr argued on Saturday in The Wall Street Journal that the Internet is making us dumber and on Monday The New York Times had a front-page feature on the mental price we pay for our multi-tasked lifestyles. If we are indeed losing our ability to think deeply, the key to fighting back may lie in a subtlety: focus may be more about our ability to filter out distractions than our ability to home in on the issue at hand. Carr posed his idea that technology is making us stupid in a 2008 Atlantic cover story and his forthcoming book "The Shallows" is a longer rumination on the theory. **According to professors and research cited in The Times piece "the idea that information overload causes distraction was supported by more and more research." And those distractions**, according to research Carr cites**, are forcing us to change the way we think. Deep thought is losing ground to superficiality.** So, if our multitasking lifestyle causes distraction, and distraction leads to superficial thinking, how do we fight back? Carr offers some advice:

D. Education is a voter since it’s the end-goal of debate. Substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational benefit to discussing it.

Drop the debater—

1. The NC was skewed. I can’t redo it after the 1AR shifts.

2. Key to deterrence. Drop the arg means aff will run abusive cases for the time skew.

3. Jurisdiction. Can’t vote for a nontopical plan.

4. Depth. Reject-the-arg theory forces us to cover theory and substance which leads to shallow theory debates that set worse norms for the activity.

Prefer competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

### Discourse Ethics NC

The limits of human knowledge necessitate rejecting government coercion

**Powell 13** writes[[213]](#footnote-213)

The virtue of humility is found in recognizing our limits—and that **humility ought to make us libertarians. I could be wrong about** pretty much **anything**. What I don’t know so outweighs what I do that my actual knowledge appears as little more than a small raft on an ocean of ignorance. I suffer no shame admitting this unflattering fact, not only because there’s never any shame in acknowledging the truth, but also because everyone else is in the same boat. **Our ignorance**—what we don’t know—always and **enormously outweighs our knowledge**. It’s true of even the smartest and most educated. Recognizing that fact ought to humble us. And that humility, informed by a realistic picture of how government operates, ought to make us libertarians. **Libertarianism** is a philosophy of humility. It’s one that **takes us as we are and** grants us the freedom to make as much of ourselves as we can. And it’s a philosophy that **understands** just **how damaging human failings can be when coupled with** the **coercive** force of **government. Libertarianism limits rulers because it recognizes that rulers are just ordinary people** who exercise extraordinary power—and that the harm that power can inflict more often than not outweighs any good it might achieve. Libertarianism rests on humility and refuses to tolerate the hubris of those who would consider themselves higher and mightier than others. Let’s start by looking at what it means to have humility in our claims to knowledge. Each of us certainly seems to know quite a lot, from what we ate this morning to the number of moons circling Mars. We know that George Washington was the first president of the United States of America, that Boris Yeltsin was the first president of the Russian Federation, and that driving while drunk is a bad idea. But **if we look to the whole of intellectual history, we see one overturned conviction after another**. What was scientific truth three hundred years ago is balderdash today. Our brightest once believed that you could understand a person’s mind and character by studying the bumps on his or her head. (It was given the scientific sounding name of “phrenology.”) The wise and the great were once certain that the Earth sat at the center of the universe. It’s not just science that can’t seem to finally and forever get it right. Very smart people have argued about deep philosophical problems for as long as there have been very smart people. Two and a half millennia ago, Plato thought he’d figured out what justice is. Most philosophers since have disagreed—but none have offered an alternative that wasn’t itself open to strong counter-argument. **We ought to** always **be skeptical of claims to absolute knowledge**. If you believe a philosophical point is settled, you’re almost certainly wrong. If you believe science today understands a topic fully, you’re likely to find in just a few years that it didn’t. Furthermore, if we’re properly skeptical about humanity’s knowledge in general, we ought to be even more skeptical about proclamations of certainty from individual members of our species. But all of that doesn’t stop many of us from often feeling like there’s just no way we could be wrong. It was in college that I first began to understand how common such intellectual hubris is. I was baffled by how broadly many of my professors saw their own expertise. A PhD in early twentieth-century American comedic film felt qualified to critique the cutting edge of physics research and to lecture his students on which types of cancer ought to get the most funding. It happens outside the university, too, especially in politics. How many Americans look at the fantastic complexity of our health care delivery system and say, “Oh, I know how to fix that”? How many voters without even basic knowledge of economics think it’s clear which candidate’s proposals will promote prosperity? It takes some effort to admit that we could be wrong about the things we think we have good reason to believe. But at the very least, it ought to be easier to recognize when we clearly know nothing about a topic. Furthermore, many of us aren’t adequately skeptical about the move from knowledge of facts to knowledge of values. Take nutritionists, for example. They believe they know which foods are most healthy, that is, which give us the most nutrients with the least harmful other stuff. If we consume substance X, we can expect result Y. (Of course, even that knowledge has changed dramatically in recent years.) But notice this “is” doesn’t get us to an “ought.” What’s healthy is a different question entirely from what I ought to eat. I can recognize that fried potatoes aren’t as healthy as steamed broccoli while still being right that I ought to eat French fries for dinner tonight. That’s because what I ought to eat doesn’t necessarily mean the same thing as what’s healthiest for me. “Ought” can include other values, too, such as the pleasure I’ll get, the varying prices of the alternatives, and so on. Nutrition speaks to the one value (what’s healthy), but it has nothing to say about the rest. Proper skepticism applies to both others and to us. I should be skeptical about your claims of absolute certainty, and I should likewise be skeptical about the veracity of my own. Such skepticism shouldn’t make us abandon all claims to knowledge, of course. But it should lead us to adopt an attitude of humility. Knowing others face the same difficulties in ascertaining truth, we should expect humility from them, as well. This is where humility urges us in the direction of libertarianism. **If we embrace legitimate skepticism about our knowledge of** both **truth and values,** then **we should hesitate before compelling people who may disagree with us to live by our convictions**. We should hesitate, in other words, before reaching for a club or calling on the police to use their nightsticks.

The right to self-ownership is presupposed by the nature of argumentation

**Kinsella 96** writes[[214]](#footnote-214)

The first rationalist argument that I will discuss is Hans- Hermann Hoppe's path-breaking argumentation ethic. Professor Hoppe shows that basic rights are implied in the activity of argumentation itself, so that anyone asserting any claim about anything necessarily presupposes the validity of rights. Hoppe first notes that any truth at all (including norms such as individual rights to life, liberty and property) that one would wish to discuss, deny, or affirm, will be brought up in the course of an argumentation, that is to say, will be brought up in dialogue. **If participants** in argumentation necessarily **accept** particular truths, including **norms**, in order **to engage in argumentation, they could never challenge these norms in an argument without thereby engaging in a performative contradiction. This would establish these norms as literally incontestable truths.** **Hoppe establishes self-ownership by pointing out** that **argumentation**, as a form of action, **implies the use of the scarce resources of one's body. One must have** control over, or own, **this scarce resource** in order **to engage in** meaningful **discourse**. This is because argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting, by its very nature, since it is an attempt to find what the truth is, to establish truth, to persuade or be persuaded by the force of words alone. **If one is threatened into** accepting the statements or **truth-claims** of another, **this does not** tend to **get at the truth**, which is undeniably a goal of argumentation or discourse. **Thus,** anyone engaging in **argumentation** implicitly **presupposes the right of self-ownership** of other participants in the argument, for otherwise the other would not be able to consider freely and accept or reject the proposed argument. Only as long as there is at least an implicit recognition of each individual's property right in his or her own body can true argumentation take place. When this right is not recognized, the activity is no longer argumentation, but threat, mere naked aggression, or plain physical fighting. Thus, anyone who denies that rights exist contradicts himself since, by his very engaging in the cooperative and conflict-free activity of argumentation, he necessarily recognizes the right of his listener to be free to listen, think, and decide. That is, any participant in **discourse presupposes the non-aggression axiom, the libertarian view** that one may not initiate force against others. Thus, Hoppe points out that anyone who would ever deny the ethics underlying the free market is already, by his very engaging in the civilized activity of discourse, presupposing the very ethics that he is challenging. This is a powerful argument because, instead of seeking to persuade someone to accept a new position, it points out to him a position that he already maintains, a position that he necessarily maintains. Thus, opponents of liberty undercut their own position as soon as they begin to state it.

Self-ownership is fundamental to moral agency

**Hampton 93** writes[[215]](#footnote-215)

Such behavior illustrates a third way in which **morality** involves self-regard: namely, it **requires us to ensure that we have the time,** the **resources, and** the **capacity to develop** the characteristics, skills, plans, and **projects that make us unique individual selves**. One of the traits that mark us out as human beings is our capacity to develop distinctive personalities. Granted, some of the distinctiveness that differentiates us from one another is the product of the environments in which each of us grows up--our families, schools, religious organizations, political institutions, and so forth. And some of it is the product of biological characteristics, destined to develop in us because of our genetic make-up. But **some** of that **distinctiveness is** what I shall call **"self-authored."** There are **many times in our lives** when **we choose what we will be**. For example, when a young girl has the choice of entering into a harsh regimen of training to become an accomplished figure skater, or else refusing it and enjoying a more normal life with lots of time for play, she is being asked to choose or author whom she will be. When a graduate student decides which field of her discipline she will pursue, or when a person makes a decision about his future religious life, or when someone takes up a hobby--all of these choices are ways of determining one's traits, activities, and skills, and thus ways of shaping one's self---of determining one's selfidentity. Nor are these self-determining choices always earthshaking or major. In small ways we build up who we are: if we successfully forgive a friend a misdeed, we thereby become a little more generous, or if we give way to anger and hit a loved one, we do a little bit more to build an abusive personality. Just as a sculptor creates a form out of a slab of rock, so too do people (in concert with their environment and their biology) create a distinctive way of interacting with, thinking about, and reacting to the world. It is this distinctiveness which each individual plays a major role in creating, that I am calling the "self." **Whereas we say that we respect one another as "persons," we say that we** love or hate, **approve or condemn**, appreciate or dislike, **others' selves** . This **self-authorship is not only something that we do, but** also something that it **is deeply important** for us to do**; through self-authorship we express our autonomy and prosper as human beings**, To be prevented from self-authorship is to undergo brutal psychological damage, **Therefore, morality requires that others give each** of us **the opportunity to author ourselves**, and it requires of each of us that we perform that self-authorship, But the objective requirement of self-authorship is satisfied by an individual when she subjectively defines who she is, what she wants, and what she will pursue in her life. Whereas the conception of legitimate needs is objectively defined, reflecting a theory of what it is that each of us requires, as a human being, to flourish (where this includes, among other things, the ability and opportunity to engage in self-authorship), the conception of "personal needs" sets out what one requires as a particular personality or self, and is subjectively defined, arising from a person's decision to be a certain way, to have certain aspirations, and to undertake certain projects--all of which are up to her to determine So who I am is partly "up to me.” Nonetheless, to make sense of self-authorship each of us needs to understand when we are genuinely engaged in self-defining, as opposed to self-denying, activities. I shall now argue that in order to define what counts as genuine self-authorship, we require objective constraints. The subjectivity of preference formation only counts, from a moral point of view, as self-authorship if that preference formation occurs in a certain way, when a person is in a certain kind of state. In the discussion that follows, I will attempt to suggest the rough nature of these objective constraints, but this is theoretically difficult terrain, and as the reader will see, I will leave many questions unanswered.

Thus the standard is **respecting self-ownership**.

Living wage is government coercion that hinders economic freedom

**Phillips 13** writes[[216]](#footnote-216)

The focus on wages reverses cause and effect. The focus on wages is a focus on consumption—what a worker can buy from his wages. But an individual cannot consume until he produces, unless he wishes to live as a parasite. Government intervention impedes production. Government intervention prevents individuals from starting businesses, creating jobs, developing new products or processes. **Government intervention prevents individuals from acting on their own judgment**. If someone wants to offer a job with a pay of $2 an hour, he should be free to do so. If he cannot attract enough workers at that wage, he will need to offer more or go out of business. If a worker is willing to work for $2 an hour, why should anyone prevent him from doing so? **If the business owner judges that a job is only worth $2 an hour, he should be free to act** on his own judgment**. If a worker judges that** a job paying **$2 an hour is his best opportunity, he should be free to act** on his own judgment. Government intervention in the employer/employee relationship prohibits each from acting as he thinks best for his own life. Like all advocates of government intervention, the **advocates of a “living wage” believe that they know what is best for other** individual**s. They are willing to use government coercion to dictate** how others may live **their lives**. Ironically, and sadly, while advocating a “living wage” they simultaneously seek to prohibit others from actually living.

Economic freedoms are key to self-ownership. We must allow individuals to personally negotiate the terms of their employment.

**Tomasi 12** writes[[217]](#footnote-217)

Consider first the classical liberals and libertarians. All liberals value the civil and political rights of individuals: the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, political participation, personal autonomy, and so on. But the members of this camp are distinct in asserting that the **economic rights of capitalism –** the right **to** start a business, **personally negotiate** the **terms of one’s employment, or decide how to spend** (or save) the income one earns **– are essential parts of freedom** too. Possessing some particular bundle of material goods, according to classical liberals and libertarians, is not nearly as important as possessing those goods because of one’s own actions and choices. **When we are free, we are aware of ourselves as central causes of the lives we lead**. It is not just captains of industry or heroes of Ayn Rand novels who define themselves through their accomplishments in the economic realm. **Many ordinary people become who they are**, and express who they hope to be, **by** the **personal choices they make regarding work**, saving and spending. These are areas in which people earn esteem from others and feel a proper pride for things they themselves do. Like many people around the world, I associate these libertarian ideas with the United States (though we might debate whether Americans affirm these ideas still). Dean Alfange’s 1951 poem ‘An American’s Creed’ includes these lines: ‘I do not wish to be a kept citizen, Humbled and dulled by having the state look after me. I want to take the calculated risk, To dream and to build, To fail and to succeed.’ According to philosophers in this camp, **diminishing personal agency in economic affairs – no matter how lofty the social goal – drains vital blood from a person’s life**. Whatever life they lead, on this ideal, citizens know it is substantially one of their own creation. Why this emphasis on property rights? Well, classical liberals such as Hayek and Richard Epstein are consequentialists: for purposes of political justification, they think of the person as a happiness seeker. They believe that capitalist institutions are efficient and defend market-society for that reason. Their **libertarian campmates, such as Nozick**, slightly differently, **begin** their political discussions **from the** Lockean **idea of persons as self-owners** – beings **who, having natural rights of ownership in themselves, have natural** ownership **rights to** the **fruits of their labour** too. Whether self-owners or individual happiness maximisers, philosophers on this coast claim that respecting persons means respecting property rights. These rights define, and strictly limit, the scope of legitimate state action.

If self-ownership is important, negative rights outweigh positive rights. Coercion isn’t justified simply because it benefits the coerced.

**Powell 13** writes[[218]](#footnote-218)

So what is Nozick’s libertarian position? It begins with natural rights. Quite literally. Here’s the first line of ASU: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).” These rights are natural in that we have them because of what we are and not because they were given to us by someone. But just saying we have rights isn’t the same as giving an argument for why we have them. To do this, Nozick draws on Immanuel Kant’s famous Categorical Imperative, specifically its second formulation: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” Humans are by nature rational beings possessing dignity. This **dignity prevents us from being used by others**, and hence we have rights against such use. **Our rights function as “side-constraints**,” Nozick says, limiting what others—including the state—may do to us. We can’t trade rights away for benefits. For example, we are prohibited from deciding that a little more happiness or a little more wealth (or a lot more) is sufficient grounds for violating a person’s rights. People “may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent,” Nozick writes. “Individuals are inviolable.” **From this Nozick moves to** a basic principle of **self-ownership. I own myself and thus have a right to do with myself as I please**. You own yourself and have the same right. **I don’t own you and you don’t own me**. This gives each one of us rights not only to ourselves, but also to the fruits of our labor. (Nozick argues for this last point along Lockean lines.) In other words, **Nozick takes our fundamental rights to be** of the **negative** sort. **These are rights to be free from** certain acts by other people (**assault, theft, enslavement, etc.**)**, not rights to be provided with certain goods and services** (a right to healthcare, or a right to education).

### \*\*\*Case

### Contention

Minimum wage increases reduce employment

**Clemens and Wither 14** writes[[219]](#footnote-219)

We next estimate the minimum wage’s effects on employment. We find that **increases in** the **minimum wage significantly reduced** the **employment of low-skilled workers**. By the second year following the $7.25 minimum’s implementation, we estimate that targeted workers’ employment rates had fallen **by 6 percentage points** (8 percent) **more in bound states than** in **unbound states**. We further analyze a sample of teenagers and food service workers to compare our approach with approaches commonly used in the literature. For this sample, we estimate an employment decline of just under 4 percentage points. The estimated employment effects thus scale roughly in proportion to the minimum wage’s bite on these groups’ wage distributions. All else equal, Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012) note that **estimates** of the minimum wage’s effects **on employment will scale with the extent** to which **an analysis sample contains unaffected workers. Their insight** thus **points to a partial line of reconciliation between** the **disemployment effects we observe and** the **statistical null results** found **in some** of the **recent literature**. The magnitude of our estimated employment effects also likely reflects the setting we analyze, namely the Great Recession and subsequently sluggish recovery. The primary threat to our estimation framework is the possibility that low-skilled 3workers in the bound and unbound states were differentially affected by the Great Recession. We show graphically that the housing crisis was more severe in unbound states, potentially biasing our estimates towards zero. In our baseline specification, we control directly for a proxy for the severity of the crisis. As noted above, our use of monthly, individual-level panel data enables us to more systematically construct within-state control groups with baseline wages only moderately higher than the new federal minimum. Our initial results are robust to netting out changes in the employment of these slightly higher skilled workers. We further find our estimates to be robust to a broad range of potentially relevant changes to our baseline specification.

Prefer my evidence. It doesn’t focus on a single demographic and controls for low-skilled workers unaffected by a minimum wage increase

**Clemens and Wither 14** writes[[220]](#footnote-220)

Our approach’s first advantage is its capacity to describe the minimum wage’s effects on a broad population of targeted workers. **Past work focuses** primarily on the minimum wage’s effects **on particular demographic** group**s**, such as teenagers (Card, 1992a,b; Currie and Fallick, 1996), and/or specific industries, like food service and retail (Katz and Krueger, 1992; Card and Krueger, 1994; Kim and Taylor, 1995; Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2010; Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti, 2013; Giuliano, 2013). While minimum and sub-minimum wage workers are disproportionately represented among these groups, both are selected snapshots of the relevant population. Furthermore, it is **primarily lowskilled adults, rather than teenage dependents**, who **are** the **intended beneficiaries** of anti-poverty efforts (Burkhauser and Sabia, 2007; Sabia and Burkhauser, 2010). **Assessing** the **minimum wage from an anti-poverty perspective thus** **requires characterizing its effects on the broader population of low-skilled workers**, which we are able to do.2 Econometrically, our setting has several advantages. One benefit of **our rich baseline data** is that they **allow us to limit the extent to which our “target” group contains unaffected individuals**. Second, **the data allow us to identify relatively low-skilled workers whose wage distributions were not directly bound by the new federal minimum. We use these workers**’ employment trajectories **to construct a set of within-state counterfactuals.** The experience of these workers allows us to control for the form of time varying, statespecific shocks that are a source of contention in the recent literature (Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2010; Meer and West, 2013; Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer, 2013). Third, our research design allows for transparent, graphical presentations of the employment and income trajectories underlying our regression estimates.

A lit review of the most credible evidence confirms minimum wage hikes cause unemployment

**Neumark 14** writes[[221]](#footnote-221)

**An extensive review of** this **new**er wave of **evidence looked at more than 100 studies** of the employment effects of minimum wages, assessing the quality of each study and focusing on those that are most reliable [2], [3]. **Studies focusing on the least skilled were highlighted**, as the predicted job destruction effects of minimum wages were expected to be more evident in those studies. Reflecting the greater variety of methods and sources of variation in minimum wage effects used since 1982, this review documents a wider range of estimates of the employment effects of the minimum wage than does the review of the first wave of studies [1]. **Nearly two-thirds of the studies** reviewed **estimated that** the **minimum wage had negative** (although not always statistically significant) **effects on employment**. Only eight found positive employment effects. **Of the 33 studies judged** the **most credible,** 28, or **85%**, **pointed to negative employment effects**. These included research on Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Portugal, the UK, and the US. In particular, the studies focusing on the least-skilled workers find stronger evidence of disemployment effects, with effects near or larger than the consensus range in the US data. In contrast, few—if any—studies provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages.

**Living wage hurts the poor; it causes job loss among small businesses**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

When the government imposes a higher minimum wage, employers face higher labor costs and are forced to respond by decreasing other production expenses.3 Some employers make labor-saving capital investments that reduce reliance on employees, decrease pay raises to employees that earn more than the minimum wage, or replace the lowest-skilled individuals with more highly skilled employees. 4 Other firms may make adjustments such as reducing employees’ hours, non-wage benefits or training.5 Businesses cannot afford to pay employees more than those employees produce on the aggregate. Employees who are paid the minimum wage earn that wage rate because they lack the productivity to command higher pay.6 Advocates of increasing the minimum wage rely on the idea that businesses are able but unwilling to pay higher wages to their employees. The hope is that these businesses will simply take a hit in their profits while employment and prices are negligibly affected. Unfortunately, most minimum wage earners work for small businesses, rather than large corporations.7 According to an analysis by the Employment Policies Institute, roughly half of the minimum wage workforce is employed at businesses with fewer than 100 employees, and 40 percent work at businesses with fewer than 50 employees.8 Small businesses face a very competitive market and often push profits as low as they can go to stay open. Minimum wage earners employed by large corporations would also be affected, because these corporations are under tremendous pressure from shareholders to keep costs low. Last year, the California chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) projected the potential negative effects of the state’s 2013 legislation that raises California’s minimum wage rate to $9 per hour in 2014 and again to $10 by 2016.9 It estimated the increase to the wage rate would shrink the California economy by $5.7 billion in the next 10 years and result in approximately 68,000 jobs being cut from the state. It further projected that 63 percent of the estimated 68,000 jobs lost would be from small businesses that could no longer afford to pay their employees.10 The bottom line is that someone must pay for the costs associated with an increased minimum wage. Often, because a business cannot pay these costs, they are paid for by the individuals the minimum wage is intended to help—low-skilled, undereducated individuals— as they lose out on job opportunities.

**Unemployment is worse for the poor than low wages**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

The problem plaguing America’s poor is not low wages, but rather a shortage of jobs.34 At a time when the nation’s workforce participation is only 62.8 percent, policymakers must avoid policies that destroy job opportunities.35 Increasing the minimum wage does nothing to help the unemployed poor. In fact, as discussed above, it hurts individuals looking for employment as it decreases available job opportunities. So, who is helped by an increase to the minimum wage? According to a 2012 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, although workers under age 25 represented only 20 percent of hourly wage earners, they made up just over half (50.6 percent) of all minimum wage earners.36 The average household income of these young minimum wage earners was $65,900.37 Among adults 25 and older earning the minimum wage, 75 percent live well above the poverty line of $22,350 for a family of four, with an average annual income of $42,500.38 This is possible because more than half of older minimum wage earners work part-time and many are not the sole earners in their households.39 In fact, 83.5 percent of employees whose wages would rise due to a minimum wage increase either live with parents or another relative, live alone, or are part of a dual-earner couple.40 Only 16.5 percent of individuals who would benefit from an increase to the minimum wage are sole earners in families with children.41 With national unemployment still hovering around 7 percent, national, state, and local demands for an increased minimum wage could not be more ill-timed.42 Increasing the minimum wage would make it more difficult for emerging businesses to expand payrolls and for existing businesses to maintain employees. Further, a higher wage rate would make it more difficult for individuals with less education and experience to find work. Raising the minimum wage favors those who already have jobs at the expense of the unemployed. Public policy would be more beneficial if it lowered barriers to entry for employment and increased economic opportunities. Raising the minimum wage may be a politically attractive policy option, but it is harmful to the very people policymakers intend it to help.

**Living wage doesn’t help the poor—it’s poorly targeted**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

Recent studies have shown that there is little to no relationship between increases in the minimum wage and reductions in poverty.29 These studies find that, although some lower-skilled workers living in poor families see their incomes rise when the minimum wage increases, others lose their jobs or have their hours substantially cut.30 Economists Joseph Sabia and Richard Burkhauser found that workers living in households below the poverty line received few of the benefits of past minimum wage increases. Even assuming that no minimum wage workers are laid off or have their hours reduced, they found only 10.5 percent of the benefits of a potential federal minimum wage increase would go to individuals living below the poverty line. More than 60 percent of the benefits would help families living at more than 200 percent of the poverty level.31 A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report examining the proposed federal minimum wage increase to $10.10 by 2016 found that, although the proposal would move approximately 900,000 people above the poverty threshold (of the estimated 45 million currently below that threshold), just 19 percent of the increased earnings would go to families below the poverty line.32 The same report found that an increase to $10.10 would reduce total employment by approximately 500,000 workers.33

Living wage causes poverty; consensus of economists

**Quigley 1** writes[[222]](#footnote-222)

Opponents of living wages argue that these ordinances could potentially increase the local poverty rate and cost too much. **A survey of over 300 economists** conducted in 2000 for the Employment Policies Institute, a nonprofit research organization generally opposed to raises in both the minimum wage and the enactment of living wage ordinances, **found that** nearly **eight in ten** of the labor economists surveyed **thought living wag**e ordinances **would result in employers hiring** higher **skilled workers, and over 70% said the laws could** potentially **reduce** the number of **entry-level jobs and thus increase the** local **poverty rate**. [n180](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n180) The opposition also suggests that living wage ordinances increase the cost of governmental contracts. Pasadena, California, estimated their living wage ordinance cost to be about $ 200,000 for the year 2000; Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimated its cost at $ 300,000; Madison, Wisconsin, estimated its cost at $ 47,000. [n181](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n181) While there is certainly some cost associated with living wages, this article will not join in the aforementioned melee of economists. Others disagree. [n182](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n182)

Prefer expert consensus. It’s most likely to be valid.

**LaBossiere 14** writes[[223]](#footnote-223)

3. The claims made by the expert are consistent with the views of the majority of qualified experts in the field. This is perhaps the most important factor. **As a general rule, a claim** that is **held as correct by the majority of qualified experts in the field is** the **most plausible** claim. The basic idea is that **the majority of experts are more likely to be right than those who disagree** with the majority. It is important to keep in mind that no field has complete agreement, so some degree of dispute is acceptable. How much is acceptable is, of course, a matter of serious debate. It is also important to be aware that the majority could turn out to be wrong. That said, the reason it is still reasonable for non-experts to go with the majority opinion is that non-experts are, by definition, not experts. After all, **if I am not an expert** in a field**, I would be hard pressed to justify picking the expert I happen to** like or **agree with against the view of the majority** of experts.

### Reductionism

**Action presupposes personal identity**

**Korsgaard 89**

Korsgaard, Christine (voted most likely to be a reincarnation of Kant by her high school class). 1989. Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 2: 101-132. http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3219881/Korsgaard\_UnityofAgency.pdf?sequence=2

The second element in this pragmatic unity is the unity implicit in the standpoint from which you deliberate and choose. It may be that what actually happens when you make a choice is that the strongest of your conflicting desires wins. But that isn't the way you think of it when you deliberate. When you deliberate, **it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires**, something that is you, and **that chooses which one to act on.** The idea that you choose among your conflicting desires, rather than just waiting to see which one wins, suggests that you have reasons for or against acting on them.21 And it is these reasons, rather than the desires themselves, which are expressive of your will. The strength of a desire may be counted by you as a reason for acting on it; but this is different from its simply winning. This means that there is some principle or way of choosing that you regard as being expressive of yourself, and which provides reasons that regulate your choices among your desires. To identify with such a principle or way of choosing is to be "a law to yourself," and to be unified as such. This does not require that your agency be located in a separately existing entity or involve a deep metaphysical fact. Instead, it is a practical necessity imposed upon you by the nature of the deliberative standpoint.22 It is of course important to notice that the particular way you choose which desires to act on may be guided by your beliefs about certain metaphysical facts. Parfit evidently thinks that it should. When he argues about the rationality of future concern, Parfit assumes that my attitude about the desires of the future inhabitant of my body should be based on the metaphysics of personal identity. That is, I should treat a future person's desires as mine and so as normative for me if I have some metaphysical reason for supposing that she is me.23 But this argument from the metaphysical facts to normative reasons involves a move from "is" to "ought" which requires justification. I will be arguing shortly that there may be other, more distinctively normative grounds for determining which of my motives are "my own"; metaphysical facts are not the only possible ground for this decision. For now, the important points are these: first, the need for identification with some unifying principle or way of choosing is imposed on us by the necessity of making deliberative choices, not by the metaphysical facts. Second, the metaphysical facts do not obviously settle the question: I must still decide whether the consideration that some future person is "me" has some special normative force for 11 me. It is practical reason that requires me to construct an identity for myself; whether metaphysics is to guide me in this or not is an open question. The considerations I've adduced so far apply to unification at any given moment, or in the context of any given decision. Now let's see if we can extend them to unity over time. We might start by pointing out that the body which makes you one agent now persists over time, but that is insufficient by itself. The body could still be a series of agents, each unified pragmatically at any given moment. More telling considerations come from the character of the things that human agents actually choose. First of all, as Parfit's critics often point out, most of the things we do that matter to us take up time. Some of the things we do are intelligible only in the context of projects that extend over long periods. This is especially true of the pursuit of our ultimate ends. In choosing our careers, and pursuing our friendships and family lives, we both presuppose and construct a continuity of identity and of agency.24 On a more mundane level, the habitual **actions we perform for** the sake of **our health presuppose ongoing identity.** It is also true that we think of our activities and pursuits as interconnected in various ways; we think that we are carrying out plans of life. In order to carry out a rational plan of life, you need to be one continuing person. You normally think you lead one continuing life because you are one person, but according to this argument the truth is the reverse. **You are one** continuing **person because you have one life to lead.** You may think of it this way: suppose that a succession of rational agents do occupy my body. I, the one who exists now, need the cooperation of the others, and they need mine, if together we are going to have any kind of a life. The unity of our life is forced upon us, although not deeply, by our shared embodiment, together with our desire to carry on long-term plans and relationships. But actually this is somewhat misleading. To ask why the present self should cooperate with the future ones is to assume that the present self has reasons with which it already identifies, and which are independent of those of later selves. Perhaps it is natural to think of the present self as necessarily concerned with present satisfaction. But it is mistaken. Your present self must, in order to make deliberative choices, identify with something from which you will derive your reasons, but not necessarily with something present. The sort of thing you identify yourself with may carry you automatically into the future: and I have been suggesting that this will very likely be the case. Indeed, the choice of any action, no matter how trivial, takes you some way into the future. And to the extent that you regulate your choices by identifying yourself as the one who is implementing something like a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even now.25 When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self.26

**That means prefer deon over util**

**Korsgaard 89**

Korsgaard, Christine (voted most likely to be a reincarnation of Kant by her high school class). 1989. Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 2: 101-132. http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3219881/Korsgaard\_UnityofAgency.pdf?sequence=2

A person is both active and passive, both an agent and a subject of experiences. Utilitarian and Kantian moral philosophers, however, characteristically give a different emphasis to these two aspects of our nature. The Utilitarian emphasizes the passive side of our nature, our capacity to be pleased or satisfied, and is concerned with what happens to us. The Kantian emphasizes our agency, and is concerned with what we do. Alternatively, we may say that the Utilitarian focuses first on persons as objects of moral concern, and asks, "what should be done for them?", while the Kantian addresses the moral agent, who is asking, "what should I do?" One might think that this can only be a difference of emphasis. Any acceptable moral philosophy must take both sides of our nature into account, and tell us both how people ought to be treated and what we ought to do. Yet the difference of emphasis can lead to substantive moral disagreement. Kantians believe in what are sometimes called "agent-centered" restrictions, obligations which are independent of the value of the outcomes they produce.2 Even when thinking of persons as objects of moral concern, the Kantian is more likely to focus on agency. The question, "what should be done for them?" is answered, roughly, "they should be given the freedom to make their own choices, and to do things for themselves." Rawls believes that asking the agentless "what should be done for them?" leads to distortion in the Utilitarian view of moral and political decision. The idea that burdens for some people can be justified simply by benefits to others: ⋯ arises from the conception of individuals as separate lines for the assignment of benefits, as isolated persons who stand as claimants on an administrative or benevolent largess. Occasionally persons do so stand to one another; but this is not the general case⋯3 When persons are viewed as agents who are making agreements with one another, this way of looking at their relations is not the natural one.

#### Agency best explains split-brain persons

Korsgaard 89

Korsgaard, Christine (voted most likely to be a reincarnation of Kant by her high school class). 1989. Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 2: 101-132. http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3219881/Korsgaard\_UnityofAgency.pdf?sequence=2

The sense that consciousness is in these ways unified supports the idea that consciousness requires a persisting psychological subject. The unity of consciousness is supposed to be explained by attributing all of one's experiences to a single psychological entity. Of course, we may argue that the hypothesis of a unified psychological subject does nothing to explain the unity of consciousness. It is simply a figure for or restatement of that unity. Yet the idea of such a subject seems to have explanatory force. It is to challenge this intuition that Parfit brings up the facts about persons with divided brains. People are often upset by these facts because they think that they cannot imagine what it is like to be such a person. When the hemispheres function separately, the person seems to have two streams of consciousness. If consciousness is envisioned as a sort of place, then this is a person who seems to be in two places at the same time. If consciousness requires a subject, then this person's body seems, mysteriously, to have become occupied by two subjects. Here, the hypothesis of a psychological subject brings confusion rather than clarity. Parfit own suggestion is that the unity of consciousness "⋯ does not need a deep explanation. It is simply a fact that several experiences can be co-conscious, or be the objects of a single state of awareness."(250) Split-brain people simply have experiences which are not co-conscious, and nothing more needs to be said. This seems to me close to the truth but not quite right. Privileging the language of "having experiences" and "states of awareness" gives the misleading impression that we can count the experiences we are now having, or the number of objects of which we are aware, and then ask what unifies them. The language of activities and dispositions enables us to characterize both consciousness and its unity more accurately.28 16 Consciousness, then, is a feature of certain activities which percipient animals can perform. These activities include perceiving; various forms of attending such as looking, listening, and noticing; more intellectual activities like thinking, reflecting, recalling, remembering, and reading; and moving voluntarily. Consciousness is not a state that makes these activities possible, or a qualification of the subject who can do them. It is a feature of the activities themselves. It is misleading to say that you must be conscious in order to perform them, because your being able to perform them is all that your being conscious amounts to. Voluntary motion is an important example because of a distinction that is especially clear in its case. When we move voluntarily, we move consciously. But this is not to say we are conscious that we are moving. Much of the time when we move nothing is further from our minds than the fact that we are moving. But of course this does not mean that we move unconsciously, like sleepwalkers. It is crucial, in thinking about these matters, not to confuse being engaged in a conscious activity with being conscious of an activity. Perhaps such a confusion rests behind Descartes's bizarre idea that non-human animals are unconscious. In the direct, practical sense, an adult hunting animal which is, say, stalking her prey, knows exactly what she is doing. But it would be odd to say that she is aware of what she is doing or that she knows anything about it. What she is aware of is her environment, the smell of her prey, the grass bending quietly under her feet. The consciousness that is inherent in psychic activities should not be understood as an inner observing of those activities, a theoretic state. An animal's consciousness can be entirely practical. The unity of consciousness consists in one's ability to coordinate and integrate conscious activities. People with split brains cannot integrate these activities in the same way they could before. This would be disconcerting, because the integration itself is not something that we are ordinarily aware of. But it would not make you feel like two people. In fact, such persons learn new ways to integrate their psychic functions, and appear normal and normally unified in everyday life. It is only in experimental situations that the possibility of unintegrated functioning is even brought to light.29 What makes it possible to integrate psychic functions? If this is a causal question, it is a question for neurologists rather than philosophers. But perhaps some will still think there is a conceptual necessity here: that such integration requires a common psychological subject. But think again of persons with split brains. Presumably, in ordinary persons the corpus callosum provides means of communication between the two hemispheres; it transmits signals. When split-brain persons are not in experimental situations, and they function normally, the reason appears to be simply that the two hemispheres are able to communicate by other means than the corpus callosum. For example, if the left hemisphere turns the neck to look at something, the right hemisphere necessarily feels the tug and looks too.30 Activities, then, may be coordinated when some form of communication takes place between the performers of those activities. But communication certainly does not require a common psychological subject. After all, when they can communicate, two different people can integrate their functions, and, for purposes of a given activity, become a single agent. Communication and functional integration do not require a common subject of conscious experiences. What they do require, however, is the unity of agency. Again, there are two aspects of this unity. First, there is the raw practical necessity. Sharing a common body, the two hemispheres of my brain, or my various psychic functions, must work together. The "phenomenon" of the unity of consciousness is nothing more than the lack of any perceived difficulty in the coordination of psychic functions. To be sure, when I engage in psychic activities deliberately, I regard myself as the subject of these activities. I think, I look, I try to remember. But this is just the second element of the unity of agency, the unity inherent in the deliberative standpoint. I regard myself as the employer of my psychic capacities in much the same way that I regard myself as the arbiter among my conflicting desires. If these reflections are correct, then the unity of consciousness is simply another instance of the unity of agency, which is forced upon us by our embodied nature.

**The concept of the state relies on a notion of personal identity**

**Korsgaard 89**

Korsgaard, Christine (voted most likely to be a reincarnation of Kant by her high school class). 1989. Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 2: 101-132. http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3219881/Korsgaard\_UnityofAgency.pdf?sequence=2

Still, Parfit might reply that all this concedes his point about the insignificance of personal identity. The idea that persons are unified as agents shares with Reductionism the implication that personal identity is not very deep. If personal identity is just a prerequisite for coordinating action and carrying out plans, individual human beings do not have to be its possessors. We could, for instance, always act in groups. The answer to this is surely that for many purposes we do; there are agents of different sizes in the world. Whenever some group wants or needs to act as a unit, it must form itself into a sort of person: a legal person, say, or a corporation. Parfit himself likes to compare the unity of persons to the unity of nations. A nation, like a person, exists, but it does not amount to anything more than "the existence of its citizens, living together in certain ways, on its territory." (211-212) In a similar way, he suggests, a person just amounts to "the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events." (211) On the view I am advancing, a better comparison would be the state. I am using "nation" here, as Parfit does, for an historical or ethnic entity, naturalistically defined by shared history and traditions; a state, by contrast, is a moral or formal entity, defined by its constitution and deliberative procedures. A state is not merely a group of citizens living on a shared territory. We have a state only where these citizens have constituted themselves into a single agent. They have, that is, adopted a way of resolving conflicts, making decisions, interacting with other states, and planning together for an ongoing future. For a group of citizens to view themselves as a state, or for us to view them as one, we do not need to posit the state as a separately existing entity. All we need is to grant an authoritative status to certain choices and decisions made by certain citizens or bodies, as its legislative voice. Obviously, a state is not a deep metaphysical entity underlying a nation, but rather something a nation can make of itself. Yet the identity of states, for practical reasons, must be regarded and treated as more determinate than the identity of nations. But the pragmatic character of the reasons for agent unification does not show that the resulting agencies are not really necessary. Pragmatic necessity can be overwhelming. When a group of human beings occupy the same territory, for instance, we have an imperative need to form a unified state. And when a group of psychological functions occupy the same human body, they have an even more imperative need to become a unified person. This is why the human body must be conceived as a unified agent. As things stand, it is the basic kind of agent.

### Act-Omission Distinction

**There is a distinction between actions and omissions**

**1. An agent can’t be held culpable for omissions because she did not cause the harms in question. Even if a person dies because the agent failed to save them, she does not will that death, so it doesn’t represent a failure of the will.**

**2. Overdemandingness. Positive obligations are logically infinite since there’s no brightline for when one has fulfilled enough of the obligation. This means the agent will be compelled to act a certain way in every instance, which removes any ability for autonomous choice.**

**3. Human psychology justifies an act/omission distinction. Human willpower is finite and time-consuming, so we can’t expect humans to consider every possible action.**

Richard **Chappell 08** writes[[224]](#footnote-224)

**Humans have limited** executive **cognitive control or 'willpower'** (cf. the psychological literature on ego-depletion). Decision-making and **conscious action is draining.** It's hard work. **The immediate concerns of everyday life can be burdensome enough without adding all the world's ills to one's plate.** Again, so long as one is leading a basically decent life, it just doesn't seem reasonable to condemn them or demand that they attend to more pressing concerns elsewhere. Most people have more than enough to attend to already! So perhaps we should say that one would be 'doing'/bringing about X (or 'allowing' not-X) iff the X option requires more effortful decision-making (i.e. is more ego-depleting) than the not-X option. **This could make sense of why bringing about harms is more blameworthy than merely allowing them.**

**4. Begs the question of framework. If I win my meta-ethics, then only intentional harms are relevant because prohibitions on unintended harm violate freedom.**

**Ripstein 9**

Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto). Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press. 2009.

The other way in which I can subject you to my choice is by injuring you or, in the limiting case, killing you, ending your purposiveness. If I break your arm, I wrong you because I interfere with your person. The wrong interferes with a specific aspect of your purposiveness: in this case, I destroy your ability to use your arm (for some period of time) and in so doing limit the ends that you are able to set and pursue for yourself. The wrong does not consist in the fact that you no longer have those powers; you are not wronged if a disease or a wild animal produces the same result. I subject you to my choice because I deprive you of them. I dominate you because I treat your powers as subject to my choice: I take it upon myself to decide whether you can keep them. If I usurp your powers, I decide what purposes you will pursue, and make you dependent on me in one way; if I destroy them, I may not set any particular purposes for you, but treat your means as though they were mine to dispose of. This second category of wrongdoing enables the right to freedom to account for all of the core examples that make Mill’s harm principle seem plausible. Bodily injury reduces your powers no matter how it comes about, but it only violates your independence if another person injures you. Any injury potentially reduces your ability to set and pursue your own purposes, but intentional injury does something more: if I set out to deprive you of powers you have, I subordinate your ability to use your powers to set and pursue your own purposes as you see fit to my pursuit of my purposes. I set myself up as your master by deciding that you will no longer have them. Intentional injury is despotism by another name. **Harm merits prohibition when it is** a manifestation of **despotism, but not otherwise.** Use and injury exhaust the space of possible violations of independence. Other possible losses are excluded. Your entitlement to be your own master is only violated if another person makes you pursue an end you have not chosen, by using your powers without your authorization, or restricts your ability to use your powers, either by physically constraining you or by depriving you of the ability to use them. Your self-mastery is not compromised if others decline to accommodate you, because the idea of self-mastery is explicitly contrastive. The person who declines to exercise his own self-mastery in aid of your wishes or needs does not thereby become your master. Indeed, **any other restrictions** on the freedom of others **would require them to use their powers for another person’s purposes.** Many wrongs against persons combine use and injury. Touching a person without her consent uses her for a purpose she didn’t authorize; if she is also injured in the process, it may limit her ability to use her powers, at least temporarily. But intentional touching is objectionable even if harmless or undetected, or the injury is small. Your person—your body— is yours to use for your own purposes, and if I take it upon myself to touch you without your permission, I use it for a purpose you haven’t authorized. The problem is not that I interfere with your use of your person or powers, but that I violate your independence by using your powers for my purposes. The trespass against your person is primary, and any consequent injury secondary to it. If I cause you minor harm, such as the distraction of the few seconds of pain you experience when slapped, the small injury is serious because it aggravates an unauthorized touching. That is why an unauthorized caress or kiss can be a serious wrong, even if the victim is asleep or anesthetized. Other people might do various things that annoy you in various ways. You might be happier if other people dressed in ways that you found tasteful or modest, or refrained from public displays of affection. However troubling you might subjectively find such conduct, your right to your own person does not entitle you to constrain it, because it does not stop you from using your body as you see fit. Again, you could not enjoy a right against others looking at you under a universal law, because embodied and motile persons can only avoid bumping into each other by looking where they are going, and so sometimes at each other.21 Defenders of Mill’s harm principle have sought to explain the wrong in harmless trespasses against persons by pointing to their effects on third parties, arguing, for example, that people are particularly likely to be upset by or afraid of such forms of conduct22 or, alternatively, that most trespasses against persons are harmful, and so it is better to have a general rule proscribing them.23 The Kantian idea of an innate right of humanity in your own person provides a simpler explanation: the person who touches you without your authorization uses you for a purpose that is his but not yours. The ground for prohibiting such conduct does not depend on any hypothesis about the likelihood that some third person will harm yet a fourth. More generally, innate right’s indifference to harm, considered as such, enables it to explain the familiar exceptions to the harm principle.24 Self-inflicted injury involves no despotism—it is not something that one person has done to another. Ordinarily, injury that results from consensual undertakings will not involve despotism either. If consent is genuine, the person injured as a result of a voluntarily undertaken danger is not subject to another person’s despotism. By consenting, you can turn an act that would otherwise be another person’s despotism over you into an exercise of your own freedom. The right to engage in consensual interactions and the rights you acquire through consensual interactions are, strictly speaking, not parts of the innate right of humanity as such. Instead, they are acquired rights, which require affirmative acts to establish them. We will return to them in detail in Chapter 4. The idea of independence also explains why **other harms do not matter** to right. Voluntary cooperation enables people to use their powers together to pursue purposes they share. It can be made to look as though potential cooperators are always subject to each other’s choice: unless you agree to cooperate with me, I can’t use my powers in the way I want to. But this is an example of our respective independence. Cooperation only contrasts with domination when it is voluntary on both sides. You get to decide whether to cooperate with me because you get to decide how your powers will be used. I can no more demand that you make your powers available to accommodate my preferred use of mine than you can make that demand of me. Each of us is sovereign over our powers, and the power to decide who to cooperate with is a basic expression of that sovereignty. That is why I wrong you when I use your powers for my purposes, even if it doesn’t cost you anything: in appropriating your powers as my own, I force you to cooperate with me. Each person’s entitlement to decide how his or her powers will be used precludes prohibiting many of the setbacks people suffer as effects of other people’s nondominating conduct. People always exercise their powers in a particular context, but that context is normally the result of other people’s exercises of their own freedom. To protect me against the harms that I suffer as you go about your legitimate business, perhaps because you set a bad example for others, or deprive me of their custom, would be inconsistent with your freedom, because it would require you to use your powers in the way that most suited my wishes or vulnerabilities. You do not dominate me by failing to provide me with a suitable context in which to pursue my favored purposes. To the contrary, **I would dominate you if I could call upon the law to force you** to provide me with my preferred context for those purposes. That would just be requiring you to act on my behalf, to advance purposes I had set. That is, it would empower me to use force to turn you into my means. Refusing to provide me with a favorable context to exercise my powers is an exercise of your freedom, not a violation of mine, no matter how badly the refusal reflects on your character.25 Indifference to harm that is suffered as a result of one person’s failure to provide another with a favorable context is just the generalization of the protections the right to freedom provides. That is the precise sense in which it articulates reciprocal limits on freedom: you would be wronged if I could prohibit you from doing something that doesn’t wrong me. You can be prohibited from dominating me, but the basis for that prohibition is also the basis for prohibiting me from calling on the state to make you provide me with favorable background conditions to use my own powers.26

**5. Act-Omission distinction is key to personal identity. Agency demands standing in the right relation to values, not just maximizing them.**

**Korsgaard 6**

Christine Korsgaard (C Kizzle in the Hizzle, where Hizzle means Harvard). “Morality and the Logic of Caring: A Comment on Harry Frankfurt.” Stanford University Press. 2006.

Elsewhere I have proposed a different model for understanding the relation between universal values and personal projects.28 I believe instead of thinking of personal projects as arising from specific or personal values, we should think of them as arising from a desire to stand in a special relationship to something that we regard as having intersubjective or universal value. Love, as I understand it, would be an example of this. When I love, say, a person, I regard his humanity—his autonomy and his interests—as something of universal and public value. These are values that I think everyone has reason to respect and perhaps even some reason to promote. But I also desire to stand in a special relation to him and to those values: I want to share in his life and his decisions and if it is possible to be the one who promotes his good. I do not want this, as the utilitarian would have it, merely because it is the way I can most effectively promote the sum total of value, but because it is something of special concern to myself— perhaps something that is essential to my practical identity. Nevertheless, any reasons that spring from this desire are essentially limited by the values to which I want to stand in a special relation. So although I would prefer to be the one who makes my beloved happy, I cannot therefore conclude I have a reason to try to prevent someone else from making him happy, or to undercut his autonomy by trying to prevent him from consorting with his other friends. My reasons must be essentially respectful of the kind of value I accord to him, which is the value of his humanity, and requires respect for his autonomy and his good.

### NC Turns the AC

**Free Markets Are The Historical Root Cause Of Growing Global Prosperity**

**Ames and Forbes, 2012:**

(Freedom Manifesto: Why Free Markets Are Moral And Big Government Isn’t. Steve Forbes, Publishing Executive. Elizabeth Ames, Former Member of The Texas House Of Representatives. 2012 104-107)

Today **we have scant appreciation for just how harsh conditions were just two centuries ago.** As noted author and theologian Michael Novak has described them: Famines ravaged the civilized world on average once a generation . Plagues seized scores of thousands. **In the 1780s, four fifths of French families devoted 90 percent of their incomes simply to buying bread—only bread—to stay alive.** **Life expectancy in 1795 in France was 27.3 years for women and 23.4 for men. In the year 1800, in the whole of Germany fewer than a thousand people had incomes as high as $1,000** [in today’s dollars]. Liberty of religion and speech was rare. In most cultures, absolute rulersreigned simultaneously over political, economy, and moral-cultural matters. In such a world, in most places, traditional Christianity and Judaism lived under severe constraints. **The development of the market economy in Britain and the United States,** Novak writes, **changed everything. “After five millennia of blundering, human beings finally figured out how wealth may be produced in a sustained, systematic way.” Economic freedom gave rise to an era of innovation that dramatically improved living conditions.** People were able to look beyond the necessities of survival. They gained a greater “liberty of personal choice” and advantages like “a varied diet, new beverages, new skills, new vocations.” Philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s famed description of life as “nasty, brutish and short” has become less true with each generation. In the bestselling, influential *The Rational Optimist,* British journalist Matthew Ridley describes in powerful detail how **free markets have uplifted mankind: [T]he vast majority of people [today] are much better fed, much better sheltered, much better entertained much better protected against disease and much more likely to live to old age than their ancestors have ever been. Even allowing for the hundreds of millions who still live in abject poverty, disease and want, this generation of human beings has access to more calories, watts, lumen-hours, square feet, gigabytes, megahertz, light-years, nano-meters, bushels per acre, miles per gallon, food miles, air miles and of course dollars than any what went before.** They have more Velcro, vaccines, vitamins, shoes, singers, soap operas, mango slicers, sexual partners, tennis rackets, guided missiles and anything else they could even imagine needing. By one estimate, the number of different products that you can buy in New York or London tops ten billion. Even in poor countries, Ridley tells us, **people are living longer. “The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955.** The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955.” Food, clothing, fuel, and shelter over decades has grown steadily cheaper:[S]urprising as it may seem, **the average family house probably costs slightly less today than it did in 1900 or even 1700**, despite including far more modern conveniences like electricity, telephone and plumbing. We also get far more for our labor, he notes, than we ever did: An hour of work today earns you 300 days’ worth of reading light; an hour of work in 1800 earned you ten minutes.” (This achievement may dim considerably if Big Government ends up making consumers buy those expensive bulbs.) **Entrepreneurial creativity has been the foremost force for good that society has ever known.** Entrepreneur and free enterprise evangelist Michael Strong believes that ‘**the creation of new enterprises is the most powerful way to make positive change in the world.** If all the energy that is currently invested in zero-sum political conflict was gradually transferred to the committed creation of sustainable enterprises, the cumulative impact on behalf of good would be extraordinary.”

**Free Markets Solve Poverty; Every Indicator Goes Neg**

**MacKenzie, 2014:**

(The Data Is Clear: Free Markets Reduce Poverty. June 16, 2014. D.W. MacKenzie, Assistant Professor of Economics At Carroll College)

I have no doubt that Pope Francis has seen many poor people with his own eyes. But, **our comprehension of the root causes of poverty requires both data on economic conditions and theoretical knowledge of economic systems**. What does rational analysis of evidence tell us about global poverty? It is an obvious fact that **severe poverty has disappeared in the most industrialized countries. Nations like the US, UK, Switzerland, and Japan industrialized within what were predominantly laissez-faire free-market conditions. Even the so-called social democracies**, like Sweden and Germany, **developed in free-market conditions**, and adopted extensive state welfare and regulatory programs only after achieving high levels of economic development and industrialization. **World Bank data shows that there is inequality, but this inequality is between the free-market nations and the crony-capitalist and socialistic nations.**[1] **The idea that domestic laissez-faire causes poverty is unfounded.** It is a historical fact that India, China, and Kenya never tried capitalism, so this system was never given a chance to work. **Furthermore, China and India have realized some progress in abating poverty since they moved in the direction of capitalism.** Of course, China and India adopted regulated crony capitalism, but this is still better than their old socialist systems. One could argue that global capitalism allows a few people in some nations to exploit the masses of other nations. Marxists have attempted to make this case since Lenin. Lenin revised Marx because even in his day it had become obvious that Marx’s prediction that capitalists would exploit domestic workers was refuted by evidence. We now know that Lenin’s attempt to blame poverty on global markets is wrong. As previously mentioned, economic conditions in China and India improved after switching from socialism to crony capitalism. China and India have also expanded trade in global markets. **There have been significant improvements in living conditions around the world over the past thirty years. The largest improvements in the poorest nations took place during the wave of globalization** that took place twenty years ago, after the fall of the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened the door to unprecedented globalization of industry. What does real data tell us about poverty during this period? Per Capita GDP rose dramatically: **Thirty years ago half (50 percent) the people in the poorer nations of the world lived** [**in extreme poverty**](http://data.worldbank.org/news/extreme-poverty-rates-continue-to-fall)**. In 2012, 21 percent of people in the poorer nations of the world live in extreme poverty. Development of global markets has greatly lessened poverty around the world.** This is a very important fact. Movement from being in the lowest global income bracket, to lower middle income to middle income means moving from average life expectancy in the low forties to life expectancy of fifty or sixty, respectively. Cardinal Maradiaga is wrong: this economy does not kill; it has extended the lives of the poorest people in the world. A superficial examination of the world today reveals that there is poverty, that this poverty has real consequences for living-standards and life-expectancies, and that we do have global markets and capitalism in most of the world. Careful analysis shows that **capitalism has truly lessened the severity of poverty over time, and that the main problem with capitalism in most nations is that it has too many elements of government regulation and cronyism.** Pope Francis and Cardinal Maradiaga have good intentions, but their anti-capitalistic beliefs are unfounded. Their campaign against global capitalism endangers the poorest people of the world.

### General Indicts

**Geographic studies prove util doesn’t model real-world values**

**Kurtzleben 14**

Danielle Kurtzleben (Vox reporter). “Map: The happiest places in America.” Vox. 24 July 2014. http://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5931565/map-the-happiest-places-in-america

There's more to take away from this study than a list of which cities are winners and which are losers. The data also carries in it an insight into how people make major life choices. If people only sought to live in happy places, cities like Richmond and Charlottesville, Virginia would be swamped with people, while New York would be desolate. Clearly, that hasn't happened. "One interpretation of these facts is that individuals do not aim to maximize self-reported well-being, or happiness, as measured in surveys, and they willingly endure less happiness in exchange for higher incomes or lower housing costs," they write. That said, places with low income growth and low population growth also tend to be particularly unhappy, both currently and historically. "[C]ities that have declined also seem to have been unhappy in the past, which suggests that ... these areas were always unhappy — and that was one reason why they declined," write the authors. The upshot seems to be that people make decisions based on happiness, but only on a limited basis. So at least in the economics world, there's more to life than being happy.

Util fails because not all values are reducible to good consequences.

**Nagel 2** writes[[225]](#footnote-225)

The central claim is that the motivational source of morality is something quite different from the impartial universal benevolence most naturally expressed by a utilitarian system—a system whose ultimate standard is the maximization of overall, aggregate well-being. In fact he sets himself against the natural but simplistic idea that well-being is the domin ant value or that any other measure of the good, conceived as an end to be promoted by everyone, is the basic form of value. **Value takes many forms other than that of something to be** promoted or **maximized. One would not**, he observes, **show an appreciation for the value of friendship by betraying one friend in order to make several new ones. Morality**, too, **is not identiﬁed with promoting the good**—human happiness, for example.

Util calculation is infinitely regressive. **Bales 71** writes[[226]](#footnote-226)

For the sake of simplicity, **we begin by supposing** that **two acts, A and B, are open to the agent.** Which should he perform? **If the agent is** a consistent act-**utilitarian,** the argument goes, **he will** estimate and **compare the** probable **consequences** of A and B and perform the one with the better probable consequences. In brief, he will calculate. **But the act of calculating is itself an act** which the agent may or may not choose to perform. **Thus, a third act, C,** the act of calculating, **has entered the picture. Shall the agent, then**, simply **perform A,** or shall he perform **B, or** shall he perform **C?** If the agent is a consistent act-utilitarian, **these** alternatives, **too**, **provide an occasion for calculating, and a fourth alternative presents itself, D**, which is the act of calculating the probable consequences of A, B, and C. **But of course D is** an alternative **itself subject to calculation, and the agent is caught in a** vicious **regress.**

# Oakwood

## Neolib 1NC

### Baudrillard K

Labor is symbolically dead. It is founded on the slow death of the worker. The employer dominates the employee because they have the privilege of deciding that they are worthy of life.

**Baudrillard 93** writes[[227]](#footnote-227)

[Brackets for gendered language] Labour power is instituted on death. A man must die to become labour power. He converts this death into a wage. But the **economic violence** capital inflicted on him in the equivalence of the wage and labour power **is nothing next to** the **symbolic violence inflicted** on him **by** his **[one’s] definition as a productive force**. Faking this equivalence is nothing next to the equivalence, qua signs, of wages and death. The very possibility of quantitative equivalence presupposes death. **The equivalence of wages and labour power presupposes the death of the worker**, while that of any commodity and any other presupposes the symbolic extermination of objects. Death makes the calculation of equivalence, and regulation by indifference, possible in general. **This death is not violent and physical, it is** the indifferent consumption of life and death, the mutual **neutralisation of life and death in survival**, or death deferred. **Labour is slow death.** This is generally understood in the sense of physical exhaustion. But it must be understood in another sense. Labour is not opposed, like a sort of death, to the "fulfilment of life", which is the idealist view; labour is opposed as a slow death to a violent death. That is the symbolic reality. Labour is opposed as deferred death to the immediate death of sacrifice. Against every pious and "revolutionary" view of the "labour (or culture) is the opposite of life" type, we must maintain that the only alternative to labour is not free time, or non-labour, it is sacrifice. All **this becomes clear in the genealogy of the slave.** First, **the prisoner of war is** purely and **simply put to death** (one does him honour in this way). **Then he is "spared"** [épargné] and conserved [conservé] (=servus), **under the category of** spoils of war and **a prestige good: he becomes a slave** and passes into sumptuary domesticity. It is only later that he passes into servile labour. However, he is no longer a "labourer", since **labour** only **appears in the phase of** the serf or **the emancipated slave,** finally **relieved of the mortgage of being put to death. Why** is he **[are they] freed?** Precisely **in order to work.** Labour therefore everywhere draws its inspiration from deferred death. It comes from deferred death. Slow or violent, immediate or deferred, the scansion of death is decisive: it is what radically distinguishes two types of organisation, the economic and the sacrificial. We live irreversibly in the first of these, which has inexorably taken root in the différance of death. The scenario has never changed. Whoever works has not been put to death, he is refused this honour. And **labour is** first of all **the sign of being judged worthy only of life**. Does capital exploit the workers to death? Paradoxically, the worst it inflicts on them is refusing them death. It is **by deferring** their **death** that **they are made into slaves and condemned to** the **indefinite abjection of a life of labour**.

The symbolic death of labor under capitalism renders labor hyperreal—an abstraction that thrives by simulating itself but lacks referent in reality. This is why wage increases do not challenge capitalism but enable the system to perpetuate itself through molding our social relations.

**Pawlett 7** writes[[228]](#footnote-228)

In a characteristic reversal strategy, directed at Marxist theory, Baudrillard argues that capitalism, rather than being ‘transcended’ by socialism, has actually leapt over the dialectic as it ‘substitutes the structural form of value, and currently controls every aspect of the system’s strategy’ (1993a: 7). Given this metamorphosis, **Baudrillard asks whether we are we still living within capitalism. ‘Hyper-capitalism’ may be** a **more accurate** term, he suggest, but what is not in doubt is that ‘the structural law of value is the purest, more illegible form of social domination . . . it no longer has any references within a dominant class or a relation of forces’ (1993a: 10-11). These are bold claims, yet Baudrillard, at this stage in his thought, does offer considerable substantiation in a discussion of the effects of the sign on labor, on wages and on strikes. **Instead of labour we have signs of labour**. In other words, **labour as living historical agency**, as force with the power to transform social relations, **becomes a ‘dead’ abstraction in** the economic calculations of **capitalism**. This process was well under way in Marx’s time and Marx produced the concepts of abstract labour and commodity fetishism to describe the way in which the living force of labour is hidden behind finished commodities. But, for Baudrillard, the living agency of labour is not just hidden or reified into commodities, it is also rendered symbolically dead – it is less and less a living principle of exchange. In an age of structural, permanent high unemployment, labour cannot be exchanged for employment, for a salary or for a comfortable life: Labour power is instituted on death. A man must die to become labour power . . . the economic violence capital inflicted on him in the equivalentce of the wage and labour power is nothing next to the symbolic violence inflicted on him by his definition as a productive force. (1993a: 39). Labour, then, is a slow death; it is neutralization by slow death, by ‘total conscription’. **Labour no longer possesses a determinate relationship to production, having no meaningful equivalence in wages**. Further, production no longer exists in a determinate relationship to profit or surplus value. There is in political economy, Baudrillard contends, a general loss of representational equivalence: ‘the monetary sign is severed from every social production and enters a phrase of speculation’ (1993a: 21). In this new reign of indeterminacy there is ‘nothing with which to fight capital in determinate form’ (1993a: 19; see also 1993b: 26-35). **Capital flows in** global, **deregulated money markets without reference to labour, work, production – without equivalence in terms of a ‘gold standard’**. Similarly, Baudrillard contends, strikes once functioned within a binary system of equivalence held in dialectical tension, that of labour and capital, unions and management. But this notion of the strike is now ‘dead’ because striking cannot affect capitalism as ‘the production of the form of social relations’ (1993a: 24). **Capitalism can endure** the **lowering of profit margins**, strike disruption and even the collapse of share values. These ‘contents’ are no longer fundamental to its operation. **Capital need only impose itself as form** in order **to reproduce itself endlessly** and it achieves this **by investing all individuals with needs, wants and desires** – the apparatus of the active consumer. Any ‘gains’ won by unions, such as **pay increases** or improvements in working conditions, are immediately realised as **benefit**s to **the functioning of the system**; for example, **as wages poured into consumer spending or** in **proliferating signs of an attractive progressive workplace**. Baudrillard allows that new fractures and instabilities emerge. He gives the example of non-unionised immigrant workers destabilizing the game of signs carried out by managers and unions. However, such instabilities are quickly neutaralised by strategies of incorporation and assimilation. Increasingly management is able to appeal directly to workers without the intermediary of unions; such strategies, Baudrillard argues, were central to the events of May 1968 when unions backed down, compromising with management to maintain their role as representatives of labour. Nevertheless, Baudrillard never suggests that the integrated, coded system is complete or invulnerable. Quite the reverse! The system’s construction of the person as individual, productive, rational unit never really convinces anyone and is ‘beginning to crack dangerously’. Further, the system is constantly under threat from symbolic challenges, as we shall see in the next chapter.

The idea of “basic needs” is also hyperreal. Rather than being grounded in objective reality, it is a sign promoted by capitalist ideology.

**Mendoza 10** writes[[229]](#footnote-229)

Beyond the Use and Exchange Value: The Myth of Needs and the Reign of the Sign When Marx bifurcated needs into primary and secondary needs, the former is premised on an “anthropological minimum” while the latter is founded on the “post-survival threshold.” From this he is able to cement the concept of the Use-Value. Because the Use-Value is subjective, 22 it therefore requires a value that is objective that standardizes the utility of an object. (This object may be useful for you, but this is junk to me.) In order to find a standard value for exchange, Marx introduces the Exchange-Value. The exchange – value is merely secondary to the use-value for the former merely standardizes the latter, since the latter is already inherent in the object. The exchange-value is the appearance, the “socially recognized standards of measurement for the quantities of these useful objects.”23 But according to **Baudrillard**, this form of analysis in our contemporary society no longer follows. He **argues that** the core of which **a commodity's value is determined is not by** the **use-value** or the value in which a subject satiates a need, **but** by the **exchange-value**. In here, he again subverts two conceptually related terms in Marx. He argues that there is really no more "objective" value of a commodity because the exchange-value only uses the use-value, as a mere alibi for its existence. The exchange-value uses the use-value as a legitimizing factor that initiates the exchange process. This reduction of the use-value as an imaginary excuse for the exchange-value has rendered it as a value that is non-objective and use-less. How is this so? The **use-value operates on the assumption of need**. Precisely because an object is needed then it is accrued with a use-value. **But** according to Baudrillard, **needs** and everything that possesses a use-value **only occur**s **within a system of exchange** since the use-value cannot be realized without its exchange-value. **Within this system of exchange,** and coming from the importance of communication that Baudrillard earlier presented, **the commodity** therefore not merely **possesses** an exchange -value but **a Sign value**.24 Thus with the eclipse of use-value, exchange-value exchanges not just the inherent utility in objects but already what it signifies in a system of integration. This is the value that Baudrillard supplemented in the analysis of society. **Thus, primary needs, which possess the premise of an “anthropological minimum”** according to Baudrillard **is** merely **a myth**, and that needs are always secondary since a primary need is a concept organized to ground the system of exchange, similar to the Signified in the semiotic process.25 But here we witness a spiral, Baudrillard cites Marx in saying that: “**Production not only produces goods; it produces people to consume them, and** the **corresponding needs**.” Thus, **when one "needs" he has to enter** the realm of **the social, and** when he enters he **does not only exchange a commodity, but** also **language, concepts and signs**. In this realm, primary and secondary needs blur, so far as I want to “eat” to satiate my hunger, I may chose not to, or I may choose to do so,26 and if I do so I have to face the tyranny of choice, or what Baudrillard calls "discretionary income"27, one chooses what to consume in which the limitation is income. In contemporary society, one could no longer consume the foodcommodity in its raw sense, one always consume its sign-value inherent in the commodity as it is exchanged in the current system. Hence, **when one chooses a restaurant, it is hardly** a choice **governed by** need in the context of **survival, it is** a choice **prompted by the spectacle of the image and** the **limitation of income**. To choose between fast-food over five-star dining, between Chinese or French cuisine is a choice for signification rather than a choice for survival. Another example would be Bread. There is no such thing as a generic loaf of bread, not even homemade bread is generic in a sense since the ingredients, the qualities, the brands, the labels, that it takes to create the bread, is loaded with Signs. Signs are interchange in society, anything up for exchange, also possesses this Sign-value. The raw object is nowhere to be found; the raw object which is ideally what the primary need correspond to is blurred with the presence and ubiquity of the Sign in our times. Baudrillard even asks: “Is loss of status- or social non-existence less upsetting than hunger?”28 With this, needs become problematic in the political economy. There is no such thing as **an “anthropological minimum”** this premise **was** only **created** as an ideology **by the System** as **to convince** man **of a primary need, which** in turn **convinces him of a secondary need** that crosses what the primary needs encapsulate**; the drive for meaning, in which meaning is found in consumption**. He writes: Even before survival has been assured, every group or individual experiences a vital pressure to produce themselves meaningfully in a system of exchange and relationships. Concurrently, with the production of goods, there is a push to elaborate significations, meaning with the result that the one-for-the-other exists before the one and the other exist themselves. Thus, the there could be a million possible motivation of one's consumption of a certain good, but what lies underneath is always a meaning. This meaning does not exist in the relation of the subject and the object in rational ends (needs) but in difference and signification. One's difference from another person through his consumption of objects loaded with signification that determines difference.29 Baudrillard’s radical analysis of Marx’s critique of society through the supplementation of semio-linguistics, has introduced the importance of the Sign in political economy. As the sign-value begins to overshadow both exchange-value and use-value, so do all commodities become an Image. For Baudrillard, **as signs proliferate, needs no longer arise from objective** and stable **origins as objects transmuted to signs become Ideological**. Baudrillard states that: “needs could no longer be defined in the naturalist-idealist thesis (need as objective and rational) rather they are defined as function induced by the internal logic of the system – there are only needs because the system needs them”30 This last statement necessitates a revisiting of Marx’s moment of inverting his Master to stand on his feet, his theory of the Base Structure and Super Structure. How could the concept of needs be ideological if need is located as an assumption in the Base Structure and ideology in the Marxist conception as “false-consciousness” is located in the Superstructure? Here, Baudrillard once again radicalizes Marx’s analysis, and presents how this spectrum, the material life and Consciousness, is de-leveled. In this stage, the reality problematic in Baudrillard slowly crystallizes, to replace the commodity paradigm that serves as the theme in his earlier analysis of society.

2 impacts.

a. Meaning and value are impossible in a hyperreal order, so the alternative is an epistemic prerequisite to the aff.

**LaFountain 8** writes[[230]](#footnote-230)

The source of the reversal and the ascendancy of the object over the subject is a central focus of Baudrillard’s work. Beginning with his earlier Marxist works, the concern was the political economy of the sign. That is, he was concerned not so much with work and political economy but with the increasing structuring of society by and as a system of signs. At one point in modern history, Baudrillard argued, there was a relatively fixed relationship between the object world and those signs and meanings used to understand them. Individuals were assumed to be the authors of these meanings and were considered capable of using them to represent the world and their own interior realities. In the mid-twentieth century, however, the relationship between the sign and the world was profoundly altered by developments in information technology, media, and advertising. No longer did signs represent the world. Instead, the referents of signs became other signs. As Boorstin noted earlier, **images replace or are substituted for,** rather than represent, **the outside world of reality**. Thus, **“reality” is what emerges as signs refer to signs, and signs** themselves **become more real than “the real”. This self-referential order** is what Baudrillard described in the 1980s in *Simulations*, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majority*, *Fatal Strategies*, and the *Ecstasy of Communication*. The self-referential relationship between signs **produces “simulations”, which are the basis of “hyperreality”**. In **hyperreality**, signs do not exchange with nonlinguistic reality, or with the objective world. They exchange only with each other in an “ecstasy of communication” that does not produce meaning or value. What it **produces** is **the frenzy of signs pointing to their equivalents. Because the relationship between the sign and the objective world has been effaced** and replaced by simulations**, there are no referent points between signs and “the real”** by which **to establish value or difference. When meaning and value can be established no longer,** and when they themselves are simulated by a profusion of simulations, the social world “implodes” and a silent majority arises. The silence of the majority is marked by a restless consumption of signs and by an inability to determine what values, if any, are at stake in the treadmill of consumption. **What then are the possibilities for critical thought**, for assertive individualism, **or** for **emancipatory practice? For Baudrillard, there are none.**

b. Those in power rely on simulations to maintain their power. This delays the collapse of oppressive institutions. **Baudrillard 81** writes[[231]](#footnote-231)

Conjunction of the system and of its extreme alternative like the two sides of a curved mirror, a "vicious" curvature of a political space that is henceforth magnetized, circularized, reversibilized from the right to the left, a torsion that is like that of the evil spirit of commutation, the whole system, the infinity of capital folded back on its own surface: transfinite? And is it not the same for desire and the libidinal space? Conjunction of desire and value, of desire and capital. Conjunction of desire and the law, the final pleasure as the metamorphosis of the law (which is why it is so widely the order of the day): only capital takes pleasure, said Lyotard, before thinking that we now take pleasure in capital. Overwhelming versatility of desire in Deleuze, an enigmatic reversal that brings desire "revolutionary in itself, and as if involuntarily, wanting what it wants," to desire its own repression and to invest in paranoid and fascist systems? A malign torsion that returns this revolution of desire to the same fundamental ambiguity as the other, the historical revolution. All the referentials combine their discourses in a circular, Mobian compulsion. Not so long ago, sex and work were fiercely opposed terms; today both are dissolved in the same type of demand. Formerly the discourse on history derived its power from violently opposing itself to that of nature, the discourse of desire to that of power-today they exchange their signifiers and their scenarios. It would take too long to traverse the entire range of the operational negativity of all those **scenarios of deterrence,** which, **like Watergate, try to regenerate a moribund principle through simulated** scandal, phantasm, and murder-a sort of hormonal treatment through **negativity and crisis**. It is always a question of moving the real through the imaginary, proving truth through scandal, proving the law through transgression, proving work through striking, proving the system through crisis, and capital through revolution, as it is elsewhere (the Tasaday) of proving ethnology through the dispossession of its object-without taking into account: the proof of theater through antitheater; the proof of art through antiart; the proof of pedagogy through antipedagogy; the proof of psychiatry through antipsychiatry, etc. **Everything is metamorphosed into its opposite to perpetuate itself in its expurgated form**. All the powers, all the **institutions speak of themselves through denial,** in order **to attempt, by simulating death, to escape their real death throes. Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence** and legitimacy. Such was the case with some American presidents: the Kennedys were murdered because they still had a political dimension. The others, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, only had the right to phantom attempts, to simulated murders. But this aura of an artificial menace was still necessary to conceal that they were no longer anything but the mannequins of power. **Formerly, the king** (also the god) **had to die, therein lay his power. Today, he is miserably forced to feign death**, in order **to preserve the blessing of power. But it is lost. To seek new blood in its own death**, to renew the cycle through the mirror of crisis, negativity; and antipower**: this is the only solution-alibi of every power**, of every institution **attempting to break the vicious circle** of its irresponsibility and of its fundamental nonexistence, of its already seen and **of its already dead.**

The alternative is to refuse labor. Only putting our symbolic death at stake by refusing the power relation through which we are judged worthy of life can eliminate domination. **Baudrillard 93** writes[[232]](#footnote-232)

This changes every revolutionary perspective on the abolition of power. If power is death deferred, it will not be removed insofar as the suspension of this death will not be removed. And if power, of which this is always and everywhere the definition, resides in the act of giving without being given, it is clear that the power the master has to unilaterally grant life will only be abolished if this life can be given to him -- in a non-deferred death. There is no other alternative; you will never abolish this power by staying alive, since there will have been no reversal of what has been given. Only **the surrender of** this **life**, retaliating against a deferred death with an immediate death, **constitutes** a radical response, and **the only possibility of abolishing power. No revolutionary strategy can begin without the slave putting his own death back at stake, since** this is what the master puts off in the différance from which he profits by securing his power. Refuse to be put to death, refuse to live in the mortal reprieve of power, refuse the duty of this life and never be quits with living, in effect be under obligation to settle this long-term credit through the slow death of labour, since this **slow death does not alter the future of this abject dimension**, in the fatality of power. Violent death changes everything, slow death changes nothing, for there is a rhythm, a scansion necessary to symbolic exchange: something has to be given in the same movement and following the same rhythm, otherwise there is no reciprocity and it is quite simply not given. **The strategy of the system** of power **is to displace the time of the exchange, substituting continuity** and mortal linearity **for** the **immediate** retaliation of **death. It is thus futile for** the slave (**the worker**) **to give little by little**, in infinitesimal doses, **to the rope of labour on which he is hung to death**, to give his life to the master or to capital, **for this "sacrifice" in small doses** is no longer a sacrifice -- it doesn't touch the most important thing, the différance of death, and **merely distils a process whose structure remains the same**. We could in fact advance the hypothesis that in labour the exploited renders his life to the exploiter and thereby regains, by means of this very exploitation, a power of symbolic response. There was counter-power in the labour process as the exploited put their own (slow) death at stake. Here we agree with Lyotard's hypothesis on the level of the libidinal economics: the intensity of the exploited's enjoyment [jouissance] in their very abjection. And Lyotard is right. Libidinal intensity, the charge of desire and the surrendering of death are always there in the exploited, but no longer on the properly symbolic rhythm of the immediate retaliation, and therefore total resolution. The enjoyment of powerlessness (on sole condition that this is not a phantasy aimed at reinstating the triumph of desire at the level of the proletariat) will never abolish power. The very modality of the response to the slow death of labour leaves the master the possibility of, once again, repeatedly, giving the slave life through labour. The accounts are never settled, it always profits power, the dialectic of power which plays on the splitting of the poles of death, the poles of exchange. **The slave remains the prisoner of the master's dialectic**, while his death, or his distilled life, serves the indefinite repetition of domination. **This domination increases as the system is charged with neutralising** the **symbolic retaliation by buying it back through wages**. If, through labour, the exploited attempts to give his life to the exploiter, the latter wards off this restitution by means of wages. Here again we must take a symbolic radiograph. **Contrary to all appearances** and experience (capital buys its labour power from the worker and extorts surplus labour), **capital gives labour to the worker** (and the worker himself gives capital to the capitalist). In German this is Arbeitgeber: the entrepreneur is a "provider of labour"; and Arbeitnehmer: it is the capitalist who gives, who has the initiative of the gift, which secures him, as in every social order, a preeminence and a power far beyond the economic. The **refusal of labour**, in its radical form, **is the refusal of this symbolic domination** and the humiliation of being bestowed upon. **The gift and** the **taking of labour function** directly **as the code of the dominant social relation**, as the code of discrimination. **Wages are the mark of this poisonous gift, the sign which epitomises the whole code**. They sanction this unilateral gift of labour, or rather wages symbolically buy back the domination exercised by capital through the gift of labour. At the same time, **they furnish capital with** the possibility of confining the operation to **a contractual dimension**, thus stabilising confrontation on economic grounds. Furthermore, **wages turn the wage-earner into a "consumer of goods", reiterating his status as a "consumer of labour"** and reinforcing his symbolic deficit. To refuse labour, to dispute wages is thus to put the process of the gift, expiation and economic compensation back into question, and therefore to expose the fundamental symbolic process. Wages are no longer "grabbed" today. You too are given a wage, not in exchange for labour, but so that you spend it, which is itself another kind of labour. **In** the **consumption** or use of objects, **the wage-consumer finds himself reproducing** exactly the same symbolic relation of **slow death** as he undergoes in labour. **The user experiences** exactly the same **deferred death in the object (he does not sacrifice it, he "uses"** it **and "uses" it functionally) as the worker does in capital.** And just as wages buy back this unilateral gift of labour, the price paid for the object is only the user buying back the object's deferred death. The proof of this lies in the symbolic rule which states that what falls to you without charge (lotteries, presents, gambling, wins) must not be devoted to use, but spent as pure loss. Every domination must be bought back, redeemed. This was formerly done through sacrificial death (the ritual of the death of the king or the leader), or even by ritual inversion (feasts and other social rites: but these are still forms of sacrifice). This social game of reversal comes to an end with the dialectic of the master and the slave, where the reversibility of power cedes its place to a dialectic of the reproduction of power. The redemption of power must always, however, be simulated, and this is done by the apparatus of power where formal redemption takes place throughout the immense machine of labour, wages and consumption. Economics is the sphere of redemption par excellence, where the domination of capital manages to redeem itself without ever really putting itself at stake. On the contrary, it diverts the process of redemption into it own infinite reproduction. This is perhaps where we find the necessity of economics and its historical appearance, at the level of societies so much more vast and mobile than primitive groups, where the urgency of a system of redemption which could be measured, controlled and infinitely extended (which rituals cannot be) all at the same time, and which above all would not put the exercise and heredity of power back into question. Production and consumption are an original and unprecedented solution to this problem. By simulating redemption in this new form, the slide from the symbolic into the economic allows the definitive hegemony of political force over society to be secured. Economics miraculously succeeds in masking the real structure of power by reversing the terms of its definition. While power consists in unilateral giving (of life in particular, see above), a contrary interpretation has been successfully imposed: power would consist in a unilateral taking and appropriation. Under cover of this ingenious retraction, real symbolic domination can continue to do as it will, since all the efforts of those under this domination will rush into the trap of taking back from power what it has taken from them, even "taking power" themselves, thus blindly pushing on along the lines of their domination. In fact, labour, wages, power and revolution must all be read against the grain: - **labour is not exploitation, it is given by capital**; - wages are not grabbed, capital gives them too -- it does not buy a labour power, it buys back the power of capital; - the slow death of labour is not endured, it is a desperate attempt, a challenge to capital's unilateral gift of labour; - **the only effective reply to power is to give it back what it gives you, and this is only symbolically possible by** means of **death.**

The alternative is a protest strategy, not a mere rejection. This protest strategy is the only way to challenge the system

**Dant 3** writes[[233]](#footnote-233)

In marked contrast to Andre Gorz, Baudrillard argues that **renegotiating the relation between labour and free time**, or non-work, **is futile**. Instead, **what is required to stall the code is to refuse the** slow, **deferred death that capital gives** as the gift of work **to labour**: ‘To refuse labor, to dispute wages is thus to put the process of the gift, expiation and economic compensation back into question, and therefore to expose the fundamental symbolic process’ (Baudrillard 1993a: 41). The power of capital is not confronted in the labour process, Baudrillard warns, and it cannot be seen as merely exercised in the work-for-wages that is labour. It is in a symbolically violent form that the dispersed power of capital can be seen to operate and a refusal to participate is the only response: ‘**This is the only absolute weapon, and the mere collective threat** of it **can make power collapse. Power, faced with this symbolic “blackmail”** (the barricades of ’68, hostage-taking), **loses its footing**: since it thrives on slow death, I will oppose it with my violent death’ (Baudrillard 1993a: 43). This refusal is reminiscent of Marcuse’s ‘Great Refusal’, and indeed with the very risky response of the Metropolis workers to their situation, which exchanged the slow death of their work for the life-threatening violence of flooding their underground workplace. However, **Baudrillard is suggesting that** the **symbolic violence of public demonstration (which might include** the often **violent, risky and dramatic actions** of green activists, roads **protesters** and anti-capitalist demonstrators that have become more familiar since he was writing) **is** much **more appropriate than simply refusing to participate in** circulating **the code.**

Occupy Wall Street proves. Anti-work politics is a key starting point for a future without capitalism

**Frase 12** writes[[234]](#footnote-234)

The rejection of work has a rich history in left theory, but a more intermittent presence in mass politics. It crops up sporadically, from the nineteenth century ten hour day movement to the Italian Hot Autumn of 1969. One great difficulty is that by jettisoning the work ethic, **anti-work politics** simultaneously **takes up the cause of wage laborers while undermining their identity as wage laborers**. It insists that their liberation must entail the simultaneous abolition of their self-conception as workers. This is in contrast to the more traditional Marxist vision, in which the working class first realizes itself in the metaphorical “dictatorship of the proletariat” before ultimately dissolving itself into a totally classless society. Yet even as orthodox a Marxist as Georg Lukacs observed in History and Class Consciousness that “the proletariat only perfects itself by annihilating and transcending itself.” Its ultimate destiny is to be not just a class for-itself but “against itself.” This is not a problem unique to the struggle against capitalism, and it is perhaps inherent in any truly radical politics. It is always easier to pose demands on the terms of the enemy than it is to reject those terms altogether, whether that means racial minorities demanding assimilation to white society or gays and lesbians demanding admission to the institution of bourgeois marriage. By asking workers to give up not just their chains but their identities as workers, anti-work theorists relinquish the forms of working class pride and solidarity that have been the glue for many left movements. They dream of a workers’ movement against work. **But this requires some new conception of who we are and what we are to become**, if we are to throw off the label of “worker.” Writers in the anti-work tradition have often sought these new identities in the outlooks and practices of figures who are marginal to the production process and outside the working class. Lafargue lapsed into noble savagery, comparing the deluded proletariat to “the Spaniard, in whom the primitive animal has not been atrophied,” and who therefore recognized that “work is the worst sort of slavery.” For Oscar Wilde, the artist showed us the future of life after our liberation from work and property, when everyone could finally develop a “true, beautiful, healthy Individualism.” Labor was, for him, not the source of a meaningful life but its antithesis, and the promise of modernity was that it could be overcome for the many as it was once overcome for the few: The fact is, that civilisation requires slaves. The Greeks were quite right there. Unless there are slaves to do the ugly, horrible, uninteresting work, culture and contemplation become almost impossible. Human slavery is wrong, insecure, and demoralising. On mechanical slavery, on the slavery of the machine, the future of the world depends. And when scientific men are no longer called upon to go down to a depressing East End and distribute bad cocoa and worse blankets to starving people, they will have delightful leisure in which to devise wonderful and marvellous things for their own joy and the joy of everyone else. Lafargue and Wilde’s arguments have Nietzchean overtones, with the defense of work portrayed as a form of ressentiment and the work ethic as a detestable slave morality. Weeks makes this connection as well in her final chapter, joining Nietzsche to the iconoclastic Marxist Ernst Bloch as a theorist of utopian politics. To give up ressentiment, Weeks suggests, means to ask, “Can we want, and are we willing to create, a new world that would no longer be ‘our’ world’, a social form that would not produce subjects like us?” This brings about the difficulty raised above, as it pertains to the politics of rejecting work: “its mandate to embrace the present and affirm the self and, at the same time, to will their overcoming; its prescription for self-affirmation but not self-preservation or self-aggrandizement.” Elsewhere, Weeks remarks that **we should not underestimate** just **how much hesitation about anti-work positions is rooted in fear. Fear of idleness, fear of hedonism —** or to borrow a phrase from Erich Fromm, **fear of freedom. It is** relatively **easy to say that in the future I will be** what I am now — **a worker**, just perhaps with more money or more job security or more control over my work. **It is something else to imagine ourselves as different kinds of people** altogether. **That,** perhaps, **is the unappreciated value of Occupy Wall Street encampments** and similar attempts to carve out alternative ways of living within the interstices of capitalist society. **It may be**, as critics often point out, **that they cannot** really **build an alternative society so long as capitalism’s institutional impediments** to such a society **remain in place. But** perhaps **they can help remove** the **fear of what we might become if those impediments were lifted**, and we were able to make our exodus from the world of work to the world of freedom.

### \*\*\*Case

### K First

The kritik’s interrogation of hyperreal capitalism is a prior question—2 reasons

1. Destroying capitalism is the only way to end the impacts of neolib. Even if the aff has capitalists abandon neolib in the instance of prisons, it’ll resurface elsewhere

**Brooks 8** writes[[235]](#footnote-235)

Neoliberalism and capitalism This gives us a clue to answering the question posed at the beginning of this article: neoliberalism is discredited. Is it dead? Neoliberalism is a weapon in the arsenal of the ruling class. Capitalism is our enemy, not just neoliberalism. **Neolib**eralism **will not cease to be a threat till the capitalist class is destroyed**. The **capitalists stand before us as penitent sinners. They** appear to have **abandoned neolib**eralism **for the time being. But capitalists are motivated not by ideology but by material interests. They will use** the ideology of **neolib**eralism **when it suits their interests. They will discard it when it no longer suits their interests**. Their material interests have not changed. All that has changed is that the crisis has necessitated intervention to bail out the bosses. Once that temporary necessity has disappeared, they will hanker after business as usual. As long as they are able to make money without help, capitalists tend to oppose state intervention. And, **come rain or shine, the capitalists know that their profits are the unpaid labour of the working class** and that, by hook or crook, they have to drive down the workers’ living standards. German finance minister Peer Steinbruck raises a related issue to neoliberalism, “When we look back 10 years from now we will see 2008 as a financial rupture.” He goes on to predict the end of the USA as a “finance superpower.” For **even neolib**eral capitalism **has to run according to** a set of **rules**. Those rules have been imposed as a result of US hegemony. The crisis of neoliberalism will mean that those rules will be up for renegotiation. No doubt Steinbruck is staking a claim on behalf of Germany for a say in the making of this new world order.

2. Fiat is illusory. Voting aff will not actually benefit prisoners in the real world, so the ballot can only have a tangible impact in terms of endorsing representations.

### State Bad

The state exists to perpetuate capitalist exploitation; the aff’s use of legal measures will always be skewed in favor of the rich

**Organise 10** writes[[236]](#footnote-236)

Consider the following facts: 1. Capitalist society is class society. Despite the claims made by the most powerful people in our society—who, we might add, have vested interests in doing so—**the unity of the** nation-**state is** an **illusory** one, **because capitalist society is divided into** economic **classes**. On the one hand we have those who own and control social resources, and who enjoy the economic and social privileges that accompanies such ownership and control, and on the other those who lack such ownership and control and are obliged by the circumstances of their birth to sell their labour for a wage, which is generally most of us. 2. **Exploitation is inherent to class society.**The foundation of meaningful freedom is economic independence, and economic independence on a social level derives from the ability of each of us to control the fruits of our labour. This is a basic human right. In capitalist society the propertied classes own and control the tools of production, the places where we work and the things we work with, which means that those of us who don't own and control the tools of production are forced to work for those who do. Needless to say, this situation deprives us of our economic independence and forces us into a position of submission and subservience. But it gets worse. The capitalist class generates profits from the wage system by paying workers less in wages than the value of the product of our labour, which they take for themselves. This is exploitation, period, and any sort of exploitation is inconceivable in a free society, because as long as one person can be exploited none of us are free. The only difference between chattel slaves and wage workers is that the former were owned, whereas the latter are rented. Seen in the cold hard light of day, wage labour is really wage-slavery. Suffice it to say that the economic and social privileges that the propertied classes enjoy in our society depends for their existence on the denial of elementary human rights to the vast majority of society. 3. The exploitation inherent to capitalist society is protected by the state. The **denial of** the basic human right of **economic independence to the working class is protected by** the institutionalied violence of the state, by **the police, military and judiciary**. **The primary function of the state is to protect** and defend **the** social and economic **privileges of the propertied classes**. It is an institution of class domination which lords over the whole of society and imposes economic dependence and servitude on the great mass of humanity in the service of an opulent minority. (Some will argue in the defense of the state that it 1) maintains order and 2) protects us from violent crime. To this we pose the counter-arguments as follows: 1) what sort of order and in whose interests, and 2) that being 'protected' against 'crime' by the state is like being 'protected' against 'crime' by the mafia, and that as the state bequeaths its 'protection' to the working classes, facilitating the theft of the wealth it produces, so too does it perpetuate crime in the name of stopping it. Since the system of deterrence has failed to stop violent crime, we suggest alternative strategies such as addressing the causes). 4. The primary function of the state as a defender of privilege and injustice is reflected in capitalist law. The character of the state as an institution of class domination and the nature of its basic function (to protect the privileges of the propertied classes from the rest of us) forms the basis of capitalist law. The golden rule is that those with the gold make the rules. **The basic fraud behind** the doctrine of **equality before the law, the foundation for capitalist democracy, derives** then **from the fact that the laws are made by and for the rich**. The fact then that, in applying the same law to all, capitalist law has overcome the arbitrariness of kingly despotism is ultimately irrelevant for those of us in a state of economic servitude, since **the law itself is unjust;** being **grounded as it is in** the **protection of elite privilege** and the perpetuation of the master-slave relationship at the core of the wage system, it perpetuates the arbitrary rule—the despotism—of a class.

### Ethics Link

The aff’s appeal to moral criticism is nothing more than a simulation. It conceals the fact that morality is dead under conditions of capitalism.

**Baudrillard 81** writes[[237]](#footnote-237)

**Watergate. The same scenario as** in **Disneyland (**effect of **the imaginary concealing that reality no more exists outside than inside** the limits of **the artificial perimeter): here the scandal effect hiding that there is no difference between the facts and their denunciation** (identical methods on the part of the CIA and of the Washington Post journalists). Same operation, tending to regenerate through scandal a moral and political principle, through the imaginary, a sinking reality principle. The denunciation of scandal is always an homage to the law. And Watergate in particular succeeded in imposing the idea that Watergate was a scandal - in this sense it was a prodigious operation of intoxication. A large dose of political morality reinjected on a world scale. One could say along with Bourdieu: "The essence of every relation of force is to dissimulate itself as such and to acquire all its force only because it dissimulates itself as such," understood as follows: **capital, immoral and without scruples, can only function behind a moral superstructure, and whoever revives this public morality (through indignation**, denunciation, etc.) **works spontaneously for** the order of **capital**. This is what the journalists of the Washington Post did. But this would be nothing but the formula of ideology, and when Bourdieu states it, he takes the "relation of force" for the truth of capitalist domination, and he himself denounces this relation of force as scandal - he is thus in the same deterministic and moralistic position as the Washington Post journalists are. He does the same work of purging and reviving moral order, an order of truth in which the veritable symbolic violence of the social order is engendered, well beyond all the relations of force, which are only its shifting and indifferent configuration in the moral and political consciences of men. All that capital asks of us is to receive it as rational or to combat it in the name of rationality, to receive it as moral or to combat it in the name of morality. Because these 16 are the same, which can be thought of in another way: formerly one worked to dissimulate scandal - today one works to conceal that there is none. **Watergate is not a scandal**, this is what must be said at all costs, **because it is what everyone is busy concealing,** this dissimulation **masking** a strengthening of morality, of **a moral panic as one approaches** the primitive (mise en) scène of **capital: its instantaneous cruelty,** its incomprehensible ferocity, **its fundamental immorality - that is what is scandalous**, unacceptable to the system of moral and economic equivalence that is the axiom of leftist thought, from the theories of the Enlightenment up to Communism. One imputes this thinking to the contract of capital, but it doesn't give a damn - it is a monstrous unprincipled enterprise, nothing more. It is "enlightened" thought that seeks to control it by imposing rules on it. And all the recrimination that replaces revolutionary thought today comes back to incriminate capital for not following the rules of the game. "Power is unjust, its justice is a class justice, capital exploits us, etc." - as if capital were linked by a contract to the society it rules. It is the Left that holds out the mirror of equivalence to capital hoping that it will comply, comply with this phantasmagoria of the social contract and fulfill its obligations to the whole of society (by the same token, no need for revolution: it suffices that capital accommodate itself to the rational formula of exchange). Capital, in fact, was never linked by a contract to the society that it dominates. It is a sorcery of social relations, it is a challenge to society, and it must be responded to as such. It is not a scandal to be denounced according to moral or economic rationality, but a challenge to take up according to symbolic law.

## Seattle 1NC

### Revolution DA

High income inequality makes revolution against the super-rich inevitable.

**Hanauer 14** writes[[238]](#footnote-238)

But let’s speak frankly to each other. I’m not the smartest guy you’ve ever met, or the hardest-working. I was a mediocre student. I’m not technical at all—I can’t write a word of code. What sets me apart, I think, is a tolerance for risk and an intuition about what will happen in the future. Seeing where things are headed is the essence of entrepreneurship. And what do I see in our future now? I see pitchforks. At the same time that people like you and me are thriving beyond the dreams of any plutocrats in history, the rest of the country—**the 99**.99 **percent**—**is lagging** far **behind**. The divide between the haves and have-nots is getting worse really, really fast. In 1980, the top 1 percent controlled about 8 percent of U.S. national income. The bottom 50 percent shared about 18 percent. Today the top 1 percent share about 20 percent; the bottom 50 percent, just 12 percent. But the problem isn’t that we have inequality. Some inequality is intrinsic to any high-functioning capitalist economy. The problem is that **inequality is at historically high levels and getting worse** every day. Our country is rapidly becoming less a capitalist society and more a feudal society. Unless our policies change dramatically, the middle class will disappear, and we will be back to late 18th-century France. Before the revolution. And so I have a message for my fellow filthy rich, for all of us who live in our gated bubble worlds: Wake up, people. It won’t last. **If we don’t** do something to **fix the glaring inequities in this economy, the pitchforks are going to come for us. No society can sustain** this kind of **rising inequality.** In fact, **there is no example in** human **history where wealth accumulated like this and the pitchforks didn’t eventually come out**. You show me a highly unequal society, and I will show you a police state. Or an uprising. There are no counterexamples. None. **It’s not if, it’s when**. Many of us think we’re special because “this is America.” We think we’re immune to the same forces that started the Arab Spring—or the French and Russian revolutions, for that matter. I know you fellow .01%ers tend to dismiss this kind of argument; I’ve had many of you tell me to my face I’m completely bonkers. And yes, I know there are many of you who are convinced that because you saw a poor kid with an iPhone that one time, inequality is a fiction. Here’s what I say to you: You’re living in a dream world. What everyone wants to believe is that when things reach a tipping point and go from being merely crappy for the masses to dangerous and socially destabilizing, that we’re somehow going to know about that shift ahead of time. Any student of history knows that’s not the way it happens. **Revolutions, like bankruptcies, come gradually, and then suddenly**. One day, somebody sets himself on fire, then thousands of people are in the streets, and before you know it, the country is burning. And then there’s no time for us to get to the airport and jump on our Gulfstream Vs and fly to New Zealand. That’s the way it always happens. If inequality keeps rising as it has been, eventually it will happen. We will not be able to predict when, and it will be terrible—for everybody. But especially for us.

The revolution will challenge capitalism itself. Minimum wage increases stabilize capitalism and shut down anti-capitalist social movements

**Hanauer 14** writes[[239]](#footnote-239)

One thing we can agree on—I’m sure of this—is that the change isn’t going to start in Washington. Thinking is stale, arguments even more so. On both sides. But the way I see it, that’s all right. **Most major social movements have seen** their **earli**est **victories at** the **state and municipal levels**. The fight over the eight-hour workday, which ended in Washington, D.C., in 1938, began in places like Illinois and Massachusetts in the late 1800s. The movement for social security began in California in the 1930s. Even the Affordable Health Care Act—Obamacare—would have been hard to imagine without Mitt Romney’s model in Massachusetts to lead the way. Sadly, **no Republicans and few Democrats get this**. President **Obama doesn’t** seem to **either**, though his heart is in the right place. In his State of the Union speech this year, **he mentioned** the **need for a higher minimum wage but failed to make the case that less inequality** and a renewed middle class **would promote faster** economic **growth**. Instead, the arguments we hear from most Democrats are the same old social-justice claims. The only reason to help workers is because we feel sorry for them. These fairness arguments feed right into every stereotype of Obama and the Democrats as bleeding hearts. Republicans say growth. Democrats say fairness—and lose every time. But just because the two parties in Washington haven’t figured it out yet doesn’t mean we rich folks can just keep going. The conversation is already changing, even if the billionaires aren’t onto it. I know what you think: **You think that Occupy** Wall Street and all the other capitalism-is-the-problem protesters **disappeared without a trace. But that’s not true**. Of course, it’s hard to get people to sleep in a park in the cause of social justice. But the protests we had in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis really did help to change the debate in this country from death panels and debt ceilings to inequality. It’s just that so many of you plutocrats didn’t get the message. **Dear 1%ers, many of our fellow citizens are starting to believe that capitalism itself is the problem. I disagree, and I’m sure you do too**. Capitalism, when well managed, is the greatest social technology ever invented to create prosperity in human societies. **But capitalism left unchecked tends toward concentration and collapse**. **It can be managed** either **to benefit** the few in the near term or **the many in the long term**. The work of democracies is to bend it to the latter. That is why investments in the middle class work. And tax breaks for rich people like us don’t. Balancing the power of workers and billionaires by **raising the minimum wage isn’t bad for capitalism. It’s an indispensable tool smart capitalists use to make capitalism stable** and sustainable. And no one has a bigger stake in that than zillionaires like us. The oldest and most important conflict in human societies is the battle over the concentration of wealth and power. The folks like us at the top have always told those at the bottom that our respective positions are righteous and good for all. Historically, we called that divine right. Today we have trickle-down economics. What nonsense this is. Am I really such a superior person? Do I belong at the center of the moral as well as economic universe? Do you? My family, the Hanauers, started in Germany selling feathers and pillows. They got chased out of Germany by Hitler and ended up in Seattle owning another pillow company. Three generations later, I benefited from that. Then I got as lucky as a person could possibly get in the Internet age by having a buddy in Seattle named Bezos. I look at the average Joe on the street, and I say, “There but for the grace of Jeff go I.” Even the best of us, in the worst of circumstances, are barefoot, standing by a dirt road, selling fruit. We should never forget that, or forget that the United States of America and its middle class made us, rather than the other way around. **Or we could** sit back, **do nothing**, enjoy our yachts. **And wait for the pitchforks.**

Capitalism causes extinction from environmental destruction

**Street 14** writes[[240]](#footnote-240)

[Brackets in original] Put all that aside for a moment, if you can, and reflect on the growing **environmental catastrophe** that now **poses a genuine threat of** human **extinction in the not-so-distant** historical **future**. Marx suggested a different and actually apocalyptic alternative to proletarian revolution in the Manifesto: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”[4] Can there by any serious doubt that “the modern economic growth” that Piketty praises for having kept “the Marxist apocalypse” at bay threatens to bring about “the common ruin of the contending classes” – indeed the ever-increasing degradation and final destruction of life on Earth – precisely because it is taking place under the command of capital? More than merely dangerous, uncomfortable, and expensive, the **new weather patterns threaten** the world’s **food and water** supplies. **They raise the** real **specter of** human **extinction if** and when **terrible “tipping points” like** the **large-scale release of Arctic methane** (a potential near-term context for truly “runaway global warming”) **are passed**. The related problem of **ocean acidification** (a change in the ocean’s chemistry resulting from excessive human carbon emissions) **is attacking the** very **building blocks of life** under the world’s great and polluted seas. **Thanks to climate change and other forms of toxic human intervention** in global ecosystems, **we** most **add drastically declining biodiversity** – a technical phrase for the massive dying off of other species – to the list of “ecological rifts”[5] facing humanity and other living and sentient beings in the 21st century. The findings and judgments of the best contemporary earth science are crystal clear. As the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (UK) concluded last year: “Today, in 2013, we face an unavoidably radical future… We either continue with rising emissions and reap the radical repercussions of severe climate change, or we acknowledge that we have a choice and pursue radical emission reductions: No longer is there a non-radical option. Moreover, low-carbon supply technologies cannot deliver the necessary rate of emission reductions – they need to be complemented with rapid, deep and early reductions in energy consumption.”[6] Sadly, however, the Tyndall **scientists failed to raise the question of** the **deeper social-systemic cancer** behind the spreading disease of human-generated climate change. **The disease is capitalism**[7], for whose masters and apologists the answer to the venerable popular demand for equality has long been “more.” The answer is based on the theory that growth creates “a rising tide that lifts all boats” in ways that make us forget about the fact that a wealthy few are sailing luxuriantly in giant yachts while most of us are struggling to keep afloat in modest motorboats and rickety dinghies. As Le Monde’s ecological editor Herve Kempf noted in his aptly titled book The Rich Are Destroying the Earth (2007), “the oligarchy” sees the pursuit of material growth as “the solution to the social crisis,” the “sole means of fighting poverty and unemployment,” and the “only means of getting societies to accept extreme inequalities without questioning them. . . . Growth,” Kempf explained, “would allow the overall level of wealth to arise and consequently improve the lot of the poor without—and this part is never spelled out [by the economic elite]—any need to modify the distribution of wealth.”[8] “Growth,” the liberal economist Henry Wallich explained (approvingly) in 1972, “is a substitute for equality of income. So long as there is growth there is hope, and that makes large income differentials tolerable.”[9] Of course, growth is more than an ideology under the profit system. It is also a material, economic imperative for investors, managers, workers, and policymakers caught up in the disastrous competitive world-capitalist logic of what John Bellamy Foster calls “the global ‘treadmill of production.” **Capitalism demands constant growth to meet** the **competitive accumulation requirements** of capital**,** the **employment needs** of an ever-expanding global class or proletarians (workers dependent on wages)**,** the **sales needs** of corporations, **and governing officials’ need to legitimize** their **power by appearing to advance** national economic **development** and security.[10] This system can no more forego growth and survive than a person can stop breathing and live. It is, as Joel Kovel notes, a system based on the “eternal expansion of the economic product,” and the “conver [sion of] everything possible [including the air we breathe, the water we drink, the soil and plants] into monetary [exchange] value.” “The Earth we live on,” Kovel notes, “is finite, and its ecosystems have evolved to accommodate to that finitude. Therefore, **a system built on endless growth is going to destroy the integrity of the ecosystems upon which life depends for food, energy, and other resources**.”[11] Consistent with this harsh reality, the system’s leading investors have invested massively in highly wasteful advertising, marketing, packaging and built-in-obsolescence. The commitment has penetrated into core processes of capitalist production, so that millions toil the world over in the making of complex electronic (and other) products designed to lose material and social value (and thus to be dumped in landfills) in short periods of time.[12]

### Military Recruitment DA

Military recruitment goals are met now but that could change. Competitive military compensation rates are key to continued recruitment efforts

**Lopez 14** writes[[241]](#footnote-241)

WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Jan. 16, 2014) -- Military budgets have declined, the U.S. military is preparing to pull out of Afghanistan, and the Army is drawing down its force. But the Army must still recruit new Soldiers every year, and less money means it may be harder to put young Americans into uniform. Maj. Gen. Thomas Seamands, the Army's director of Military Personnel Management, discussed those challenges with members of the House Armed Services Committee, subcommittee on Military Personnel, Jan. 16. "Our Army is now made up of the highest quality, best trained, most experienced, and highest skilled Soldiers ever," Seamands said. "Our ability to meet the challenges of the current and future operational environment depends on our ability to recruit great citizens and retain great Soldiers." The general told lawmakers the Active Army met its recruiting mission, while the Army National Guard and Army Reserve fell short. He also said the active Army and Army Reserve exceeded their retention missions and the National Guard met 86% of its assigned mission. "**The total Army percentage of newly enlisted Soldiers** with a high school diploma **was 98 percent**," he said. "**Well above historic rates**. Additionally, **the Army achieved 99 percent for each of its military occupational specialties**." Seamands told lawmakers that the recruiting mission for the Army is shrinking, but that it has decided to maintain its pool of recruiters because their presence in communities builds and maintains trust between civilians and the military. "What the Army is doing is taking a long-term view of the issue," he said. "If you look at our accessions mission for 2014, there is a reduction from 2013. What we opted to do is leave the recruiting force in the communities. We feel that what recruiters do ... is built on trust. You need to keep the recruiters in the high schools, in the communities, in the cities, to have that relationship and that trust. So we maintain roughly the same level of support, despite a reduced mission out in the recruiting force." Vee Penrod, deputy asistant secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, also addressed lawmakers. She said that health and fitness issues prevent many youth from joining the military. Additionally, she said, the opinions of young Americans are changing away from considering the military as an "attractive" lifestyle. Seamands said that **while the Army met recruiting goals, other indicators may be a harbinger of tough** recruiting **times ahead**. One of those indicators is the number of young people enrolled in the Army's Delayed Entry Program. "As we look at our delayed entry pool, we see that decreasing," Seamands said. "We see that as kind of a canary in the coal mine in terms of warning about a tough environment ahead. If you were to go back in time about a year ago, we would have had about half our mission in the Delayed Entry Program. If you look at it now, it's about a third. It's going down." With declining budgets, and the money military services receive for recruiting also decreasing, it becomes more important that the services be able to manage their own funds and use them where they think the funds can best be used. "We believe the services are really in the best position to determine how to spend recruiting dollars," Pinrod said. "They understand their force, they know the requirements, they understand the culture. When the services are directed, or not directed to spend recruiting dollars, it is, we believe, a misdirection of funds. So we absolutely believe the decision should be left to the services. And we provide oversight to ensure they follow policy and law." The Army does not just recruit, it also works to retain Soldiers. When Soldiers choose to leave the active force, the service hopes they transition to the Army National Guard or Army Reserve. To facilitate that, Seamands said the Army has bolstered its relationships with the two reserve components. "We have developed a great partnership with the Reserve and the Guard, and work hand-in-hand with them as we identify and downsize the active component," Seamands said. "If you were to look at the active-component to reserve-component transition, the last couple of years we've exceeded 157 percent two years ago. We've raised the standard, or the goal for that across the board. My counterparts in the Guard and Reserve understand what our process is." The general said one of the things the Army has done with the Reserve recruiters is ensure that Reserve recruiters get to meet earlier with departing active Soldiers. "It becomes part of their thought process about getting out, going into the Reserve and Guard," Seamands said. "We talk about Soldier for Life, where you continue to be a Soldier after you leave the service. We don't like using the words separation of service. It's really a transition, whether you go to be a civilian, or you go into the reserve component." Seamands also told lawmakers that the Army is working to increase recruiting of Soldiers who are equipped to go into the Army's cyber career fields. To that end, he said, recruiters are looking to recruit more among those who have educations and backgrounds in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. He also told legislators that continued support from Congress for funding of recruiting efforts is what will help the Army continue to meet its recruiting goals in a difficult recruiting environment. "Recruiting is expected to become increasingly more difficult due to the tough recruiting environment and the impacts of the budget," Seamands said. "These will likely cause a decline in the entry pool. The **continued support of Congress for competitive military** benefits and **compensation**, incentives, bonuses for our Soldiers, and marketing **to help us tell our story will remain critical to the** all-volunteer **Army's effort to recruit, retain, and support the highest caliber Soldier**. While we transfer to a smaller Army, we will remain dedicated to improving readiness, and building resilience in our Soldiers, civilians and families."

People will be less likely to join the military if civilian pay is higher

**VanFossen 2k** writes[[242]](#footnote-242)

As we might have expected, more young men and women were in the military service in 1980 (at the end of the draft) than were serving in 1999 (nearly 20 years after the end of compulsory service). However, the greatest percentage decrease in service personnel took place from 1990 to 1995, more than 10 years after the end of the compulsory service requirement. It looks as if some other factors may account for the dramatic drop-off in the number of military personnel in service. What might some of these factors be? [Budget cuts, low pay, military no longer seen as an attractive career, post-Viet Nam attitude changes, post-Desert Storm cutbacks.] Robert **Schlesinger has an economic explanation for** this mystery in his article "Army Reserve Battling an Exodus ." What does Schlesinger say are the **main causes of** this mass **exodus of military personnel**? [ (a) Tight labor markets--U.S. prosperity means that most everyone has a job, and low-paying industries like fast food restaurants are forced to pay more than minimum wage to attract workers; (b) lack of prestige to military service; (c) **mostly due to low wages relative to other, less dangerous occupations**, the base pay of a private in the U.S. Army is about the same as starting wages at fast food restaurants.] armyLet's test Schlesinger's theory by comparing the base salary of a private in the U.S. Army with what the same person might make earning the minimum wage in the civilian world. Currently the minimum wage in the United States is $5.15/hour. If our civilian worker is working 40 hours per week over 50 weeks then how much would he or she earn in a year? [$5.15/hr. X 40 hrs./week X 50 weeks = $10,300] What does a private earn per year? Log on to the military monthly base pay table, Basic Military Pay . Assume that our private (rank rating of E-1) has less than two years experience. What is her annual salary? [$12,060] Using a 2000 hour work year (as we did above), what is her hourly wage? [$6.03] So the private, who is risking her life for her country, is making $.88 an hour more than the civilian burger flipper! In order to compete, the Army (and the other branches of service) must use other, non-salary incentives to attract personnel. What might some of these incentives be? [College tuition, enlistment bonuses, housing and food allowances.] Log on to the Army's Recruitment Page to find several examples of these incentives. Let's look at how one of these incentives, the housing allowance, contributes to our private's income. Using the Army's Basic Allowance for Housing Database , chose your private's rank and state. What is the monthly housing allowance? [Answers will vary depending on location, but should be in the range of $425/month for a single soldier, $550/month for a soldier with dependents.] Adding this monthly allowance to the private's salary means an annual income of how much? [Approximately $17,160 for the single soldier; $18,660 for the solider with dependents.] **With** this **additional income, our private is** now clearly **making more than the minimum wage worker**, but is it enough to get by? To learn more about the financial strain some military families experience read Feeling the Pinch of a Marine Salary . Is it possible that, even with housing and food allowances, many U.S. soldiers and sailors are--as the previous article implies-- living in poverty? If our private were the only breadwinner for her family of four (herself and three dependents), what is the US Census Bureau's Poverty Threshold ? [$16,954] Is our private 'living in poverty'? [Clearly no, but she's not too far removed...her income is only $1,700 above the poverty threshold for a family of four with three dependents and she's risking her life for her country...!] **Two basic tenets of economic behavior are that every decision has a cost** (Economic Content Standard 1 ) **and that people respond to incentives** (Economic Content Standard 4 ). **If U.S. citizens chose to join the military, they 'trade-off'** the possibility of **other** (perhaps more lucrative) **forms of employment. If the choice is between a potentially dangerous career in the military,** then, **or a safer, more stable civilian career where the pay is better, rational people will choose the latter**. It would seem that Congress, the president and the nation's military leadership have recognized these issues (as well as the severity of this most recent labor shortage), as recent legislation has been passed that gives military personnel the largest pay raise (4.8%) since 1981. Perhaps those who are trying to "Be All They Can Be" can do so on a bit more than minimum wage. The article Military Pay Raise Gap does a nice job of exemplifying this dilemma.

Military readiness is key to prevent multiple nuclear conflicts

**O’Hanlon and Kagan 7** write[[243]](#footnote-243)

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas **threats must be countered before they** can directly **threaten** this country’s shores, that the basic stability of **the international system** is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that **no country besides the U**nited **S**tates **is in a position to lead the way** in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the **threats** and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that **involve key strategic regions** of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, **or** key potential threats to American security, such as the **spread of nuclear weapons** and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that **Tehran is on the verge** of fielding a nuclear weapon? **North Korea**, of course, **has already done so**, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino- **Taiwan**ese **tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan**, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. **The only** serious **response** to this international environment **is to develop armed forces capable of protecting** America’s **vital interests** throughout this dangerous time. **Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including** not only **deterrence of great power conflict in** dealing with potential **hotspots** in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnelintensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

### \*\*\*Case

### Dedev – Warming

Economic collapse is the only way to solve warming.

**U-News 9** writes[[244]](#footnote-244)

In a provocative new study, a University of Utah scientist argues that rising carbon dioxide emissions—the major cause of global warming—cannot be stabilized unless the world’s economy collapses or society builds the equivalent of one new nuclear power plant each day. “It looks unlikely that there will be any substantial near-term departure from recently observed acceleration in carbon dioxide emission rates,” says the new paper by Tim Garrett, an associate professor of atmospheric sciences. Garrett’s study was panned by some economists and rejected by several journals before acceptance by Climatic Change, a journal edited by renowned Stanford University climate scientist Stephen Schneider. The study will be published online this week. The study—which is based on the concept that physics can be used to characterize the evolution of civilization—indicates: **Energy conservation** or efficiency **doesn’t** really **save energy, but** instead **spurs** economic **growth and accelerated** energy **consumption**. **Throughout history, a** simple **physical “constant”**—an unchanging mathematical value—**links global energy use to** the world’s **accumulated economic productivity**, adjusted for inflation. So it isn’t necessary to consider population growth and standard of living in predicting society’s future energy consumption and resulting carbon dioxide emissions. “**Stabilization of carbon** dioxide **emissions at current rates will require** approximately 300 gigawatts of new non-carbon-dioxide-emitting power production capacity annually—**approximately one new nuclear** power **plant (or equivalent) per day**,” Garrett says.“**Physically, there are no other options without killing the economy**.” GettingHeat for Viewing Civilization as a “Heat Engine” Garrett says colleagues generally support his theory, while some economists are critical. One economist, who reviewed the study, wrote: “I am afraid the author will need to study harder before he can contribute.” “I’m not an economist, and I am approaching the economy as a physics problem,” Garrett says. “I end up with a global economic growth model different than they have.” Garrett treats civilization like a “heat engine” that “consumes energy and does ‘work’ in the form of economic production, which then spurs it to consume more energy,” he says. “If society consumed no energy, civilization would be worthless,” he adds. “It is only by consuming energy that civilization is able to maintain the activities that give it economic value. This means that if we ever start to run out of energy, then the value of civilization is going to fall and even collapse absent discovery of new energy sources.” Garrett says his study’s key finding “is that accumulated economic production over the course of history has been tied to the rate of energy consumption at a global level through a constant factor.” That “constant” is 9.7 (plus or minus 0.3) milliwatts per inflation-adjusted 1990 dollar. So if you look at economic and energy production at any specific time in history, “each inflation-adjusted 1990 dollar would be supported by 9.7 milliwatts of primary energy consumption,” Garrett says. **Garrett** tested his theory and **found this** constant **relationship between energy use and econ**omic **production** at any given time by **using U**nited **N**ations **stat**istic**s for global GDP** (gross domestic product), U.S. **D**epartment **o**f **E**nergy **data on global energy consumption** during 1970-2005, **and previous studies that estimated global** economic **production as long as 2,000 years ago.** Then he investigated the implications for carbon dioxide emissions. “Economists think you need population and standard of living to estimate productivity,” he says. “In my model, all you need to know is how fast energy consumption is rising. The reason why is because there is this link between the economy and rates of energy consumption, and it’s just a constant factor.” Garrett adds: “By finding this constant factor, the problem of [forecasting] global economic growth is dramatically simpler. **There is no need to consider population growth and** changes in **standard of living because they are marching to the tune of** the **availability of energy supplies**.” To Garrett, that means the acceleration of carbon dioxide emissions is unlikely to change soon because our energy use today is tied to society’s past economic productivity. “Viewed from this perspective, civilization evolves in a spontaneous feedback loop maintained only by energy consumption and incorporation of environmental matter,” Garrett says. It is like a child that “grows by consuming food, and when the child grows, it is able to consume more food, which enables it to grow more.”

Ocean studies prove warming causes extinction. **Sify 10** writes[[245]](#footnote-245)

Sydney: Scientists have sounded alarm bells about how growing concentrations of **greenhouse gases are driving irreversible** and dramatic **change**s **in** the way the **oceans** function, providing evidence that humankind could well be on the way to the next great extinction. **The findings** of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems' **emerged from a synthesis of recent research** on the world's oceans, carried out **by two of the world's leading marine scientists**. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). 'We may see sudden, unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for the overall well-being of humans, including the capacity of the planet to support people. This is **further evidence that we are well on the way to** the next great **extinction** event,' says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind, particularly **if the trend continues.** The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in which the ocean services upon which humanity depends are undergoing massive change and in some cases beginning to fail', he added.

Collapse now solves – it would create a mindset shift toward sustainable local communities

**Lewis 2k** writes[[246]](#footnote-246)

With the collapse of global industrial civilization, smaller, autonomous, local and regional civilizations, cultures, and polities will emerge. We can reduce the threat of mass death and genocide that will surely accompany this collapse by encouraging the creation and growth of sustainable, self-sufficient regional polities. John Cobb has already made a case for how this may work in the United States and how it is working in Kerala, India. **After the collapse of global industrial civilization,** First and Third World **people**s **won't have the** material **resources**, biological capital, and energy and human resources **to re-establish global** industrial **civilization. Forced by economic necessity to become dependent on local resources and ecosystems** for their survival, **people**s throughout the world **will** work to **conserve and restore their environments.** Those societies that destroy their local environments and economies, as modern people so often do, will themselves face collapse and ruin.

### Dedev – Food Wars Defense

No famine. Countries will always have sufficient access to food despite resource shortages.

**Gardiner 8** writes[[247]](#footnote-247)

In short the world is demanding more food, more fiber, and more industrial crops grown on less land using less water. If the population continues to increase at the current rate (7000 more people per hour), one can predict that **the world will experience** critical **resource shortages** during the lifetime of young people alive today. **Despite** all **this** doom and **gloom, most people are not hungry**. In fact, **the food supply has become more stable**, especially for the more developed countries. **During the twentieth century, growth in** world **economies and standards of living exceeded growth in population**.

No food wars. Empirics prove.

**Salehyan 7** writes[[248]](#footnote-248)

First, aside from a few anecdotes, **there is little** systematic **empirical evidence that resource scarcity** and changing environmental conditions **lead to conflict.** In fact, **several studies** have **show**n **that** an **abundance of** natural **resources is more likely to contribute to conflict**. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that **5 million** people **in** **Malawi have** been experiencing chronic **food shortages** for several years. **But** famine-wracked Malawi **has yet to experience** a major civil **war**. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, **there is much more to** armed **conflict than resource scarcity** and natural disasters.

### Dedev – Food Wars Turn

Growth turns resource wars

**Trainer 2**

Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales (Ted, If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 8, No. 2, EBSCO)

If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. **If we** all **remain determined to** **increase** our **living standards**, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then **nothing is more guaranteed than** that there will be **increasing** levels of **conflict** and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example, as ‘development’ under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel’s invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world’s leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central Asia over ‘terrorism’. Few would doubt that a ‘collateral’ outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ‘... US military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World’. Taylor referred to ‘… fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States’ and ‘… growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts’.62 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets’.63 ‘**That more than half of the** **people** on this planet **are poorly nourished** while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury **is a** sure **recipe for** continued and even **escalating** international **conflict**.’64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. ‘President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war.’ It would ‘… be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States’.65 ‘The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Brown, said yesterday.’66 Klare’s recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. ‘Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. … the incidence of **conflict over** vital **materials is sure to grow**. … The **wars** of the future **will** largely **be fought** **over** the possession and control of vital **economic goods**. … resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.’67 Much of the rich world’s participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, ‘The rich prize that is Shaba’, Breeze begins, ‘Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco– Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire. … These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship …’68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. ‘The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.’69 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets …’70 Growth, competition, expansion … and war Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… **warfare appears** as a **normal** and periodic form of competition **within the capitalist** world **economy**. … **world wars regularly** **occur** **during** a period of **economic expansion**. ’71 ‘**War is an inevitable result of the struggle** between economies **for expansion**.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic **growth is a strong** **determinant of** national **expansion** and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second **World Wars can be seen as** being largely about **imperial grabbing**. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! ‘Finite **resources** in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands **create a situation ripe for** international **violence**.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So **long as** the dynamics of differential **growth** **remain unmanaged, it is probable that these** long term **processes** will sooner or later **carry major powers into war**.’75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their unjust privileges. In other words, **if we want affluence we must prepare for war**. If we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not possible unless rich countries move to ‘The Simpler Way’.

### Dedev – Inevitable

Economic collapse is inevitable. **Pelerin 13** writes[[249]](#footnote-249)

**It is nearly impossible to convince people that** an economic **collapse is** likely, perhaps **inevitable**. It is beyond anything they have seen or can imagine. **I attribute that to** a **normalcy bias, an inherent weakness of experiential learners**. For many, accepting something that has not occurred during their time on the planet is not possible. The laws of economics and mathematics may shape history but they are not controlled by history. The form of cataclysm and its timing is indeterminable. Political decisions continue to shape both. The madmen who are responsible for the coming disaster continue to behave as if they can manage to avoid it. Violating Einstein's definition of insanity, they continue to apply the same poison that caused the problem. These fools believe they can manage complexities they do not understand. We are bigger fools for providing them the authority to indulge their hubris and wreak such damage. James Quinn provided the following graph. If a picture is worth a thousand words, this graph is worth millions. The route to economic demise is depicted below: Debt and GDP The relationships in this graph are terrifying! Debt is shown relative to GDP. GDP growth has been one-third the growth in debt for the period. That is, the economy required $3 of debt to produce $1 more in real GDP. **In recent years diminishing returns to debt required $6 of debt to increase GDP** a **$1**. Whatever the benefits of debt, they have clearly diminished, almost to zero. Debt expansion has gone exponential in order to salvage the weak growth in GDP. To put this into a perspective the average reader can understand, think of GDP as a household's spending. The "family" depicted above has to borrow each year in order to maintain its spending level. Imagine the condition of your family if you borrowed 6 times the amount of incremental spending each year. Then imagine the condition of your family after forty years of continuously increasing your debt levels substantially in excess of your income. Long Term Debt vs GDP © The Burning Platform It is impossible for a family without a printing press and a cooperative Federal Reserve to engage in such behavior. The government is different, you say? Surely it is, but not necessarily in a meaningful financial manner. Just as you would not survive such behavior, governments cannot either. **History is full of examples of government collapses** resulting **from excessive debt** and overspending. A printing press only provides the luxury of more time before the failure. You may object that a macroeconomy is different from a family. Debt (parroting the political claim) makes an economy grow faster. The evidence shown to the right does not support this claim. Government reported GDP growth rates are shrinking as the debt expansion accelerates. **Since** 19**65** the **growth** rate of the economy **has been declining**. Even if you accept government GDP reporting, the chart to the right shows a trend this is pointing to an average declining standard of living. That point will be reached when the GDP growth falls below the population growth. The US economy has been underperforming since the 1970s according to government's statistics. That is after all the games have been played with these numbers. How much longer can these trends continue and what happens at the end? No one can reasonably answer either of these questions. What Is Known And Not Known Two things are known: So long as borrowing increases faster than GDP, the ability to repay diminishes. That has been occurring for more than forty years and the differential growth rates have widened dramatically in recent years. Not borrowing at this pace would likely have decreased reported GDP dramatically. While that may have been a proper economic response, it is now politically impossible (or highly unlikely). **Continuing to increase debt** at a rate **greater than GDP ensures** financial **collapse**. Stopping or slowing down at this point likely leads to the same point. This country has maneuvered itself into a no-escape situation. What would happen to GDP and the standard of living if borrowing were dramatically reduced? How much of the last $10 trillion in debt borrowed between 2000 and 2009 went directly into reported GDP? Is it possible that reported GDP for this period could have been $10 trillion lower? If there is indeed a monetary/fiscal multiplier as Keynesians insist, then results would have been worse. Answers to these questions are speculative. Those in favor of more debt argue that a calamity would have occurred had the massive rise in debt and its accompany stimulative effects not happened. For the Paul Krugmans of the world, more debt and stimulus is always the answer. All problems look like nails when you own only a hammer. Rapidly increasing amounts of debt since 1965 have been accompanied by falling rates of growth. One may speculate what this growth would have been with different rates of debt expansion. Whether the rate of debt expansion increased or decreased the rate of real GDP is moot. Economists can use their competing paradigms to duel over this issue, but cannot come to a conclusion that is acceptable to most. Mathematics, on the other hand, is definitive. **There are mathematical limits that control the ability to service debt**. Once these limits have been breached, some amount of the debt will be defaulted on. The breach point is referred to as a debt death spiral. **The US has passed this** mathematical **point and is in a death spiral**. The political class in America, either via misguided economic policies or a deliberate attempt to hide the true condition of the country, has put us here. They will continue to employ whatever policies they believe will keep things going for a while longer. The tragic ending has been cast. Economics cannot trump mathematics.

### Dedev – Nanoweapons

Growth leads to development of nanoweapons.

**Zakaria 11** writes[[250]](#footnote-250)

**Advances in warfare** usually **are a result of** a confluence of changes unfolding in **economics**, politics, technology and society. However the impact of warfare is more obvious because of its brutal nature while those of the other fields are more insidious. This is **due to** the pressing need to bring any warfare to a quick resolution resulting in **intense and accelerated development** and introduction **of new weapons**, strategies and tactics by all sides to the conflicts. Hence changes in the other fields can be foretold by looking at developments on the battlefields. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the 30-year religious war between the Catholics and the Protestants, warfare took on a new dimension. After 1648, wars were being fought out by nation-states instead of tribes and cities. The root cause for the Thirty Years' War can be traced to the invention of printing in 1450 which in turn had been made feasible by the introduction of cheap paper. We have come full circle since then with the invention of the social media, allowing every one of us to broadcast our points of view to the whole world. Social media have also empowered protesters bent on bringing down governments. Much as the impact of the hard media was to lead to the rise of nation-states, the soft media's impact would herald the demise of nation-states. This trend towards disintegration of nation-states is also being felt in warfare. Warfare has its own cycles which closely mirrors those of the Kondratieff waves. It has been accepted by military writers and strategists that there are four cycles to-date. The evolution from one cycle to another usually involves a radical change in the manner in which it is fought, as summarised below: 1GW - massed manpower 2GW - massed firepower 3GW - mechanisation 4GW - non-state actors (groups) You can view the detailed explanations on the above modes or generations of warfare at Security XXI and Antiwar.com. Our main interest however is in finding out how warfare will emerge post-4GW, i.e., the 5GW, since this will also presage how the 5th Kondratieff wave will unfold. Our useful guide in this respect is a pattern that's been used for stock market trading, the Elliott Wave, which in turn is based on the Fibonacci numbers. The Fibonacci sequence of numbers is prevalent in the natural world where behind nature's seeming randomness, you can discover order and structure based on the Fibonacci numbers. The Elliott Wave consists of 5 motive or impulse waves (coloured green on the left chart from StockCharts.com) and 3 corrective waves (coloured red). The motive waves drive man's progress in productive capacity. The first 3 green waves drive the pattern upward while the last 2 downward. Mapping this pattern onto the warfare pattern, we can deduce that the 1st 3 waves mark the growth of nation-states while the last 2 herald their demise. From 1 GW to 3GW, warfare was defined by state combatants. However after the fall of communism, states have retreated from wars between themselves because of the disappearance of one of the two major backers. But mankind's propensity towards conflict remains. Wars continue on a small scale with non-state actors, in the form of guerrilla bands fighting small wars against states. To be sure, guerrilla warfare has a long history; in fact as long as the history of mankind. But post-commmunism, non-state actors have been empowered in new ways, enabling them to capitalise on the weaknesses of state combatants. Moreover, in the past guerrilla movements relied on a plan issued from central command; nowadays they operate in cellular mode needing only a recipe instead of a plan. Several reasons can account for the rise of the non-state actors. First, the internet has allowed them to bypass the states' hold on information dissemination. The ability of each group to broadcast, or rather narrowcast, to its target audience makes for a fractured society. Second, state combatants have costs attached; every US soldier in Afghanistan costs $1m a year to maintain while that of the non-state group runs on a very minimal budget. Third, the failure of communism has provided room for the rise of religion and ethnicity as alternatives to capitalism, turning the clash from a conflict over ideology into a more passionate conflict over faith and culture. This is worsened by the recession which is morphing into a depression; **the economy instead of being the glue that holds** nation-**states together will** be the force that **pull**s **them apart.** Even homogeneous societies, such as the Arabs of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya are sliding into turmoil mainly because of lack of jobs to keep their youths off the streets. The weakening of nation-states also will be somewhat hastened by the progress of the 5th Kondratieff wave. The **advances** expected of that wave **will be in biotechnology and nanotechnology.** The outcome will be cheap energy, materials and food, all produced by consumers for their own consumption, destroying the wealth accumulated in big manufacturing facilities. Design for the products will be available as open source blueprints the way open source codes are currently available for software. Nation-states also are no longer needed to provide the infrastructure and security for the distribution or circulation of such goods. Money which used to be the means of accumulating wealth may have passed its usefulness, making barter or precious metals as the medium of exchange. By the way, not much needs to be exchanged if you can produce your own goods and energy. Without exchange, nation-states won't be able to assess incomes for taxation. Weapons of destruction will come in new forms. **As biotech**nology **advances, the cost of creating new** types of **viruses drops, easing** the way for the **development of bio**logical **weapons.** Similarly, **nanotech**nology **can facilitate** the development of **nano-sized toxic materials that can be easily dispersed** in public places. With such ease, **individuals can now act alone**, dispensing with the need for group organisations to unleash chaos. A mild foretaste of this danger was demonstrated in the anthrax attacks in the US that began just one week after the 9/11 attacks. In the present 4th Kondratieff wave, we've also witnessed how Lulzsec and Anonymous mounted cyber attacks, all without the need for a formal organisation or central command. Each hacker knew what to do and had the tools to do it. That however was virtual yet the financial losses were immense, what more if the attacks were physical. 5GW **there**fore **will emerge** as **warfare conducted by non-state actors most likely working as lone wolves.** That'll be the ultimate combatant, reduced to one. To be sure, nation-states with their resources have made much progress in mechanising warfare through miniaturisation. In order to fight the non-state actors, war has to be cheapened by replacing humans with machines, such as unmanned vehicles and drones. Their prices have substantially declined as machines get miniaturised; the new $56,000 Raven drone price tag pales in comparison with the $5m Predator. Future drones can even be as small as bugs. A drone printed out by a 3D nylon laser sintering printer, has also successfully flown. However, such progress can turn against the innovators. There's nothing to stop any malicious individual from inventing his own drone to stake out his conspicuous opponents. Indeed the power doesn't lie in technology but in size as in future technology can be easily procured. A small size on the other hand confers stealthiness. The invisible has become invincible while the visible has turned vulnerable. Future battles no longer favour the big and strong but the small and weak. The world is changing too, the sooner the nation-states adapt to it, the less resources wasted on maintaining the status quo.

Nanotech development risks an arms race which causes extinction and outweighs nuclear war.

**Vassar and Frietas 6** write[[251]](#footnote-251)

**Molecular manufacturing** also **raises the possibility of horrifically effective** nonreplicating **nanoweapons.** The difference in purpose between a nanotech weapon and an ecophage is that an ecophage seeks primarily to replicate by consuming biological matter, thus becoming a direct resource competitor to biology, while nanotech weapons can have a far greater diversity of purposes, including killing only specific parties. Ecophages must devote significant resources to replication, whereas nanoweapons can focus solely on destruction. This means that active nanoweapons can be far more dangerous per gram than ecophages, and can act much more rapidly because they need not waste time replicating. As an example, the smallest insect is about 200 microns. This creates a plausible size estimate for a nanotech-built antipersonnel weapon capable of seeking and injecting toxin into unprotected humans. The human lethal dose of botulism toxin is about 100 nanograms, or about 1/100 the volume of the weapon. **As many as 50 billion toxin-carrying devices —** theoretically **enough to kill every human on earth — could be packed into a single suitcase. Guns** of all sizes **would be far more powerful, and their bullets could be self-guided.** Aerospace hardware would be far lighter and higher performance. Built with minimal or no metal, it would be much harder to spot on radar. Embedded computers would allow remote activation of any weapon, and more compact power handling would allow greatly improved robotics. Other possible nanoweapons (most of which have known defenses that could be incorporated into NanoShield) include: Arbitrarily large numbers of any robot. Deuterium filters for separating deuterium from seawater. Microscale isotopic separation of uranium. Massive utility fog banks that simply contain all movement in a large region. Computer viruses that make other people’s nanofactories build bombs. Inhalable or skin-penetrating machines that travel to the nervous system, allowing outside sources to take over inputs or outputs. Massive nanofactories could consume a substantial fraction of earth’s CO2. An important question is whether nanotech weapons — both replicating and nonreplicating — would be stabilizing or destabilizing. Nuclear weapons, for example, could perhaps be credited with preventing major wars since their invention. However, nanotech weapons differ from nuclear weapons. Nuclear stability stems from at least three factors. The most obvious is the massive destructiveness of all-out nuclear war. All-out nanotech war is probably equivalent in the short term, but nuclear weapons also have a high long-term cost of use (fallout, contamination) that would be much lower with nanotech weapons. Nuclear weapons cause indiscriminate destruction; nanotech weapons could be targeted. And nuclear weapons require massive research effort and industrial development, which can be tracked far more easily than nanotech weapons development. Finally, nanotech weapons can be developed much more rapidly due to faster, cheaper prototyping. **Greater uncertainty of the capabilities of the adversary, less response time** to an attack, **and better targeted destruction** of an enemy’s visible resources during an attack all **make nanotech arms races less stable.** Also, unless nanotech is tightly controlled, **the number of nanotech nations** in the world **could be much higher than** the number of **nuclear nations, increasing the chance of a regional conflict blowing up.**

### Dedev – AT Nuclear War

Bearden’s unqualified

**Gardner 7** writes[[252]](#footnote-252)

One of the strangest books ever written about modern physics was published in 2002, and reprinted two years later. Titled Energy from the Vacuum (Cheniere Press), this monstrosity is two inches thick and weighs three pounds. Its title page lists the author as “Lt. Col. Thomas E. Bearden, PhD (U.S. Army retired).” “Dr.” **Bearden** is fond of putting PhD after his name. An Internet check revealed that his **doctorate was given**, in his own words, **for “life experience** and life accomplishment.” **It was purchased from a diploma mill** called Trinity College and University—a British institution with no building, campus, faculty, or president, and run from a post office box in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The institution’s owner, one Albert Wainwright, calls himself the college “registrant.” Bearden’s central message is clear and simple. He is persuaded that it is possible to extract unlimited free energy from the vacuum of space-time. Indeed, he believes the world is on the brink of its greatest technological revolution. Forget about nuclear reactors. Vacuum energy will rescue us from global warming, eliminate poverty, and provide boundless clean energy for humanity’s glorious future. All that is needed now is for the scientific community to abandon its “ostrich position” and allow adequate funding to Bearden and his associates. To almost all physicists this quest for what is called “zero-point energy” (ZPE) is as hopeless as past efforts to build perpetual motion machines. Such skepticism drives Bearden up a wall. Only monumental ignorance, he writes, could prompt such criticism. The nation’s number two drumbeater for ZPE is none other than Harold Puthoff, who runs a think tank in Austin, Texas, where efforts to tap ZPE have been underway for years. In December 1997, to its shame, Scientific American ran an article praising Puthoff for his efforts. Nowhere did this article mention his dreary past. Puthoff began his career as a dedicated Scientologist. He had been de¬clared a “clear”—a person free of malicious “engrams” recorded on his brain while he was an embryo. At Stanford Research International, Puthoff and his then-friend Russell Targ claimed to have validated “remote viewing” (a new name for distant clairvoyance), and also the great psi powers of Uri Geller. (See my chapter on Puthoff’s search for ZPE in Did Adam and Eve Have Navels?, Norton 2000.) Bearden sprinkles his massive volume with admirable quotations from top physicists, past and present, occasionally correcting mistakes made by Einstein and others. For example, Bearden be¬lieves that the graviton moves much faster than the speed of light. He praises the work of almost every counterculture physicist of recent decades. He admires David Bohm’s “quantum potential” and Mendel Sach’s unified field theory. Oliver Heaviside and Nikola Tesla are two of his heroes. Bearden devotes several chapters to antigravity machines. Here is a sample of his views: In our approach to antigravity, one way to approach the problem is to have the mechanical apparatus also the source of an intense negative energy EM field, producing an intense flux of Dirac sea holes into and in the local surrounding space-time. The excess charge removed from the Dirac holes can in fact be used in the electrical powering of the physical system, as was demonstrated in the Sweet VTA antigravity test. Then movements of the mechanical parts could involve movement of strong negative energy fields, hence strong curves of local space-time that are local strong negative gravity fields. Or, better yet, movement of the charges themselves will also produce field-induced movement of the Dirac sea hole negative energy. This appears to be a practical method to manipulate the metric itself, along the lines proposed by Puthoff et al. [217] The 217 superscript refers to a footnote about a 2002 paper by Puthoff and two friends on how to use the vacuum field to power spacecraft. Bearden’s anti-gravity pro¬pulsion system is neatly diagrammed on page 319. “Negatively charged local space-time,” says the diagram, “acts back upon source vehicle producing anti-gravity and unilateral thrust.” In the 1950s, numerous distinguished writers, artists, and even philosophers (e.g., Paul Goodman, William Steig, and Paul Edwards) sat nude in Wilhelm Reich’s “orgone accumulators” to absorb the healing rays of “orgone energy” coming from outer space. Bearden suspects (in footnote 78) that orgone energy “is really the transduction of the time-polarized photon energy into normal photon energy. We are assured by quantum field theory and the great negentropy solution to the source charge problem that the instantaneous scalar potential in¬volves this process.” I doubt if the Reichians, who are still around, will find this illuminating. To my amazement Bearden has good things to say about the notorious “Dean drive”—a rotary motion device designed to propel spaceships by inertia. It was promoted by John Campbell when he edited Astounding Science Fiction, a magazine that unleashed L. Ron Hubbard’s Dianetics on a gullible public and made Hubbard a millionaire. Only elementary physics is needed to show that no inertial drive can move a spaceship in frictionless space. On pages 448–453 Bearden lists eighty patents for inertial drives. They have one feature in common: none of them works. Counterculture scientists tend to be bitter over the “establishment’s” inability to recognize their genius. Was not Galileo, they like to repeat, persecuted for his great discoveries? This bitterness is sometimes accompanied by paranoid fears, not just of conspiracies to silence them, but also fears of being murdered. **Bearden’s pages** 406–453 **are devoted to** just such **delusions.** Several kinds of “shooters” are described that induce fatal heart attacks. He himself, Bearden writes, has been hit by such devices. An associate, Stan Meyer, died after a “possible” hit by a close-range shooter. Another ZPE researcher was killed by a bazooka-size shooter. Steve Marikov, still another researcher, was assaulted by a sophisticated shooter and his body thrown off a rooftop to make it appear a suicide. When his body was removed, the pavement “glowed.” One day at a Texas airport a person three feet from Bearden was killed with symptoms suggesting he was murdered by an ice-dart dipped in curare! “That was apparently just to teach me ‘they’ were serious.” The colonel goes on to explain that “they” refers to a “High Cabal” who were offended by a friend’s “successful transmutation of copper (and other things) into gold. . . . We have had numerous other assassination attempts, too numerous to reiterate. . . . Over the years probably as many as fifty or more overunity researchers and inventors have been assassinated . . . some have simply disappeared abruptly and never have been heard from since.” Overunity is Bearden’s term for machines with energy outputs that exceed energy inputs. Any significant researcher should be wary of “meeting with a sudden suicide” on the way to the supermarket. Another thing to beware of, is a calibrated auto accident where your car is rammed from the rear, and you are shaken up considerably. An ambulance just happens to be passing by moments later, and it will take you to the hospital. If still conscious, the researcher must not get in the ambulance unless accompanied by a watchful friend who understands the situation and the danger. Otherwise, he can easily get a syringe of air into his veins, which will effectively turn him into a human vegetable. If he goes to the hospital safely, he must be guarded by friends day and night, for the same reason, else he runs a high risk of the “air syringe” assassination during the night. Simply trying to do scientific work, I find it necessary to often carry (legally) a hidden weapon. Both my wife and I have gun permits, and we frequently and legally carry concealed weapons. As early as the 1930s, T. Henry Moray—who built a successful COP>1.0 power system outputting 50kW from a 55 lb power unit—had to ride in a bulletproof car in Salt Lake City, Utah. He was repeatedly fired at by snipers from the buildings or sidewalk, with the bullets sometimes sticking in the glass. He was also shot by a would-be assassin in his own laboratory, but overpowered his assassin and recovered. Obviously, I’m not competent to wade through Bearden’s almost a thousand pages to point out what physicists tell me are howlers. I leave that task to experts, though I suspect very few will consider it worth their time even to read the book. To me, a mere science journalist, the book’s dense, pompous jargon sounds like hilarious technical double-talk. The book’s annotated glossary runs to more than 120 pages. There are 305 footnotes, 754 endnotes, and a valuable seventy-three-page index. The back cover calls the book “the definitive energy book of the twenty-first century.” In my opinion it is destined to be the greatest work of outlandish science in both this and the previous century. It is much funnier, for instance, than Frank Tipler’s best-seller of a few decades ago, The Physics of Immortality.

No impact to economic decline.

**Drezner 14** writes[[253]](#footnote-253)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple **analysts asserted** that the **financial crisis would lead states to** increase their **use** of **force** as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether **through** greater internal repression, **diversionary wars, arms races, or** a ratcheting up of **great power conflict.** Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. **The aggregate data suggest otherwise**, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "**the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is** approximately **the same as** it was in **2007**."43 **Interstate violence** in particular has **declined** since the start of the financial crisis, **as have military expenditures** in most sampled countries. Other **studies confirm** that **the Great Recession has not triggered** any increase in **violent conflict**, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "**the crisis has not** to date **generated** the surge in **protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion** that might have been expected."43

### Soft Power – General

#### Too many alt causes.

#### A. Fukuyama 14’s minimized text says financial market regulation, middle-class employment, labor-saving tech and domestic manufacturing growth are all key.

#### B. Winkates 7’s minimized text says that the death penalty, gun ownership, climate change, health insurance, creationism in schools, and Gitmo harm our soft power.

**No impact and single issues aren’t key. Data proves.**

Christopher **Fettweis**, professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Winter 20**08**, Political Science Quarterly, Ingenta.

There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. ColdWar history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions. While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, **it almost inevitably failed**.

**Legitimacy is inevitable and isn’t key to cooperation anyway**

**Wohlforth 9** — Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale (William and Stephen Brooks, Reshaping the World Order, March / April 2009, Foreign Affairs Vol. 88, Iss. 2; pg. 49, 15 pgs)

FOR ANALYSTS such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, the key reason for skepticism about the United States' ability to spearhead global institutional change is not a lack of power but a lack of legitimacy. Other states may simply refuse to follow a leader whose legitimacy has been squandered under the Bush administration; in this view, the legitimacy to lead is a fixed resource that can be obtained only under special circumstances. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues in After Victory that states have been well positioned to reshape the institutional order only after emerging victorious from some titanic struggle, such as the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, or World War I or II. For the neoconservative Robert Kagan, the legitimacy to lead came naturally to the United States during the Cold War, when it was providing the signal service of balancing the Soviet Union. The implication is that today, in the absence of such salient sources of legitimacy, the wellsprings of support for U.S. leadership have dried up for good. But this view is mistaken. For one thing, it overstates how accepted U.S. leadership was during the Cold War: anyone who recalls the Euromissile crisis of the 1980s, for example, will recognize that mass opposition to U.S. policy (in that case, over stationing intermediaterange nuclear missiles in Europe) is not a recent phenomenon. For another, it understates how dynamic and malleable legitimacy is. Legitimacy is based on the belief that an action, an actor, or a political order is proper, acceptable, or natural. An action - such as the Vietnam War or the invasion of Iraq - may come to be seen as illegitimate without sparking an irreversible crisis of legitimacy for the actor or the order. When the actor concerned has disproportionately more material resources than other states, the sources of its legitimacy can be refreshed repeatedly. After all, this is hardly the first time Americans have worried about a crisis of legitimacy. Tides of skepticism concerning U.S. leadership arguably rose as high or higher after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and during Ronald Reagan's first term, when he called the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Even George W. Bush, a globally unpopular U.S. president with deeply controversial policies, oversaw a marked improvement in relations with France, Germany, and India in recent years - even before the elections of Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy in France. Of course, the ability of the United States to weather such crises of legitimacy in the past hardly guarantees that it can lead the system in the future. But there are reasons for optimism. Some of the apparent damage to U.S. legitimacy might merely be the result of the Bush administration's approach to diplomacy and international institutions. Key underlying conditions remain particularly favorable for sustaining and even enhancing U.S. legitimacy in the years ahead. The United States continues to have a far larger share of the human and material resources for shaping global perceptions than any other state, as well as the unrivaled wherewithal to produce public goods that reinforce the benefits of its global role. No other state has any claim to leadership commensurate with Washington's. And largely because of the power position the United States still occupies, there is no prospect of a counterbalancing coalition emerging anytime soon to challenge it. In the end, the legitimacy of a system's leader hinges on whether the system's members see the leader as acceptable or at least preferable to realistic alternatives. Legitimacy is not necessarily about normative approval: one may dislike the United States but think its leadership is natural under the circumstances or the best that can be expected. Moreover, history provides abundant evidence that past leading states - such as Spain, France, and the United Kingdom - were able to revise the international institutions of their day without the special circumstances Ikenberry and Kagan cite. Spain fashioned both normative and positive laws to legitimize its conquest of indigenous Americans in the early seventeenth century; France instituted modern concepts of state borders to meet its needs as Europe's preeminent land power in the eighteenth century; and the United Kingdom fostered rules on piracy, neutral shipping, and colonialism to suit its interests as a developing maritime empire in the nineteenth century. As Wilhelm Grewe documents in his magisterial The Epochs of International Law, these states accomplished such feats partly through the unsubtle use of power: bribes, coercion, and the allure oflucrative long-term cooperation. Less obvious but often more important, the bargaining hands of the leading states were often strengthened by the general perception that they could pursue their interests in even less palatable ways - notably, through the naked use of force. Invariably, too, leading states have had the power to set the international agenda, indirectly affecting the development of new rules by defining the problems they were developed to address. Given its naval primacy and global trading interests, the United Kingdom was able to propel the slave trade to the forefront of the world's agenda for several decades after it had itself abolished slavery at home, in 1833. The bottom line is that the United States today has the necessary legitimacy to shepherd reform of the international system.

**Err neg – Soft Power studies are unscientific and arbitrary**

**White ’12** – staff writer for the Heptagon Post (Dylan, “The Maple Leaf Brief: Canada's Soft Power and Why It Counts,” The Heptagon Post, March 3, 2012, <http://www.heptagonpost.com/node/176>)//SS

Of course, **measuring soft power can be a** slippery, **subjective task**. London's Institute for **Government set out to develop a measuring system** in 2007. Their **researchers soon realized that there can be "no set methodology" for gauging soft power** other than opinion surveys. When considering whether or not a state is worthy of emulation, or a force for good rather than ill in the world, perception is indeed reality. Much work in international relations has focused on categorizations and ranks of power. These include binaries (large/small; major/minor), as well as gradated divisions (hegemonic/great/middle/small), and systems theory ranks (system affecting/influencing/ineffectual) for states. However, **many of these divisions are completely arbitrary, constructed on subjective perceptions of relative power. This can cause much debate and controversy over where nations are seen to stand in the international system**: is Italy a great power today, or has it moved to the middle rank? What about Germany, or Japan? Are nations like Israel and Sweden too influential to be called small powers?

### Soft Power – Terror Defense

The experts surveyed were cherry-picked—they were surveyed by a Republican Senator

One-in-a-billion risk of the impact

**Mueller 10**

<John Mueller, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter 2010, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>

**Politicians** of all stripes **preach** to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of **dramatic risk inflation** that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of **a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up**” about **1% of the city**’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, **terrorist groups** seem to have **exhibit**ed only **limited desire and even less progress** in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright **armed theft** of fissile material **is exceedingly unlikely** not only because of the resistance of guards, but because **chase would be immediate**. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, **they would** then probably **have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain** and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, **terrorists would need** to set up **a large** and well-equipped **machine shop** to manufacture a bomb **and** then to populate it with a very select team of **highly skilled scientists**, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that **precise blueprints are required**, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the **tech**nical **requirements** in several fields **verge on the unfeasible**. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, **the process** of making a bomb **could take** months or even **a year** or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. **Adopting** probability estimates that purposely and heavily **bias** the case **in the terrorists’ favor**—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—**the chances** that a concerted effort would be successful **comes** out **to** be less than **one in a million.** If one assumes, somewhat **more realistically**, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, **the** cumulative **odds** that they will be able to pull off the deed **drop to one in** well over **three billion**. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. **They are unlikely to** be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly **purchase a “loose nuke”** somewhere. However, it seems probable that **none exist.** All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished **bombs have** been out-fitted with **devices that** trigger a non-nuclear explosion that **destroy**s **the bomb if** it is **tampered with**. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and **multiple codes are required** not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge **if a nuclear state were to** utterly **collapse**; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear **weapons would** probably **remain under heavy guard** by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. **They would still have locks and**, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would **be disassembled**. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that **al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond** searching **the Internet**. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that **terrorists prefer weapons that they know** and understand, not new, exotic ones

No nuclear retaliation

**Neely 13**

Meggaen Neely, The George Washington University Master of Arts (M.A.), Security Policy Studies 2012—2014 (expected) Baylor University Master of Arts (M.A.), Public Policy and Administration 2010—2012, Richard D. Huff Distinguished Masters Student in Political Science (2012) Baylor University Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), Political Science and Government, Research Assistant, Elliott School at George Washington University, Research Intern, Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Communications Intern at Federation of American Scientists Graduate Assistant at Department of Political Science, Baylor University [March 21, 2013, “Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism]

Because of the difficulty of deterring transnational actors, many deterrence advocates shift the focus to deterring state sponsors of nuclear terrorism. The argument applies whether or not the state intended to assist nuclear terrorists. If terrorists obtain a nuclear weapon or fissile materials from a state, the theory goes, then the United States will track the weapon’s country of origin using nuclear forensics, and retaliate against that country. If this is U.S. policy, advocates predict that states will be deterred from assisting terrorists with their nuclear ambitions. Yet, let’s think about the series of events that would play out if a terrorist organization detonated a weapon in the United States. Let’s assume forensics confirmed the weapon’s origin, and let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that country was Pakistan. **Would the U**nited **S**tates then **retaliate with a nuclear strike?** If a nuclear attack occurs within the next four years (a reasonable length of time for such predictions concerning current international and domestic politics), it seems **unlikely**. Why? First, there’s the problem of time. Though **nuclear forensics** is useful, it **takes time to analyze the data and determine the country of origin. Any** justified **response** upon a state sponsor **would not be swift.** Second, even if the United States proved the country of origin, **it would** then **be difficult to determine that Pakistan** willingly and intentionally **sponsored** nuclear terrorism. If Pakistan did, then nuclear retaliation might be justified. However, if Pakistan did not, nuclear retaliation over unsecured nuclear materials would be a disproportionate response and potentially further detrimental. Should the United States launch a nuclear strike at Pakistan, Islamabad could see this as an initial hostility by the United States, and respond adversely. An obvious choice, given current tensions in South Asia, is for Pakistan to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear launch on its territory by initiating conflict with India, which could turn nuclear and increase the exchanges of nuclear weapons. Hence, it seems more likely that, after the international outrage at a terrorist group’s nuclear detonation, **the U**nited **S**tates **would** attempt to **stop the bleeding without a nuclear strike**. Instead, some choices might include deploying forces to track down those that supported the suicide terrorists that detonated the weapon, pressuring Pakistan to exert its sovereignty over fringe regions such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and increasing the number of drone strikes in Waziristan. Given the initial attack, such measures might understandably seem more of a concession than the retaliation called for by deterrence models, even more so by the American public. This is not an argument against those technologies associated with nuclear forensics. The United States and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should continue their development and distribution. Instead, I question the presumed American response that is promulgated by deterrence advocates. By looking at possibilities for a U.S. response to nuclear terrorism, a situation in which we assume that deterrence has failed, we cast doubt on the likelihood of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike and hence cast doubt on the credibility of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike as a deterrent. Would the United States launch a nuclear weapon now unless it was sure of another state’s intentional sponsorship of nuclear terrorism? **Any reasonable doubt** of sponsorship might **stay the U**nited **S**tates’ **nuclear hand. Given the opaqueness of countries’ intentions, reasonable doubt over sponsorship is inevitable** to some degree. **Other countries are** probably **aware of U.S. hesitance** in response to terrorists’ use of nuclear weapons. If this thought experiment is true, then the communication required for credible retaliatory strikes under deterrence of nuclear terrorism is missing.

# PV Peninsula

## Gulf Council Cards

### Adv. CP

#### The Republic of India should engage in capacity building programs with the United Arab Emirates, including development and promotion of higher education, research and development, health, medical tourism, and a strong knowledge community.

#### The Republic of India and the United Arab Emirates should sign the bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreement.

#### The Republic of India and the United Arab Emirates should expand defense cooperation, with an emphasis on real time information sharing and increased logistical support to the Indian Navy.

#### The Republic Of India should assist and train United Arab Emirates personnel, with a focus on counter-terrorism, disaster relief, rescue and search operations.

#### Solves Relations; TIEA Is Specifically Key To Economic Cooperation. Their Author

Hussain, 2012:

(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24)

**Conclusion** Looking at the range of issues and potentialities both the countries share and possess, it is can be said that India and the UAE have all sinews to build a strong and meaningful bilateral relationship that goes beyond trade and investment. Both can work together and shape regional political landscape. India can be an effective partner not only in stimulating UAE’s economic programmes but also assist and contribute to the Emirates on its defence, security and strategic matters. The 21st century could be an India-UAE century in the Gulf region. Besides, India can participate as a capacity building partner of the UAE and develop and promote, particularly higher education, R&D, health, medical tourism and developing cheap world class pharmaceutical industries as well as assisting in the development of strong ‘knowledge community’ in the Emirates. Further, both the countries can work together to ensure effective tax compliance and prevention as well as minimisation of the flow of black money. On the similar pattern of Bahrain, India and the UAE may also consider signing of the bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA).xxxvi This will potentially check tax avoidance and tax evasion and promote healthy economic cooperation between the two countries.

#### Solves Piracy; Their Author

Hussain, 2012:

(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24)

***Strategic and Diplomatic***

Although both countries have signed defence cooperation agreements in 2006, it needs fine-tuning, particularly on two policy-dimensions: *one*, a real time assistance and cooperation by sharing information and providing necessary support to the Indian Navy to check the growing and expanding menace of piracyxxv in the Gulf of Aden, which is equally fatal to the oil-exporting Gulf *rentier* economies.xxvi Besides, the presence of the Indian Navy can also effectively handle the growing nexus between pirates and the terror outfits, particularly between the Somali-based *al Shabab* and the *al Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula* (AQAP) of Yemen. UAE could consider giving the Indian Navy logistic supports such as refuelling, deployment, providing bases during emergency as well as enabling Indian Navy to evacuate its large diaspora community during crisis period.xxvii India can assist and train the UAE crew in counter-terrorism, disaster relief management, rescue and search operations, etc. Besides this, both the countries can work and enhance their strategic engagementsxxviii at a higher level.

### U/Q (Rels High Now)

#### Relations High Now; Economic Cooperation Is Strong, But Not Key

Ahmed, 2015:

(UAE-India Bilateral Relations. Talmiz Ahmed, Indian Ambassador To The UAE. Last Updated March 14, 2015)

Relations between the UAE and India are strong and based on cultural contacts between the peoples of the two countries. What are the historical ties that bind the two nations and what are the new strategies for strengthening their cultural and traditional bonds? India-UAE relations are on the upswing. The two countries share bonds of cultural affinity and have strong commercial and cultural linkages. Our expanding ties cover the full range of economic, technical, social and cultural fields that are mutually beneficial for both peoples. A momentum to the growing relationship of India with the Gulf countries, especially the UAE, was provided by the visit of Foreign Minister Shaikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan to India in June. During the visit, both sides had fruitful and substantial discussions on a wide range of subjects, including bilateral relations, regional situation, security, defence and renewable energy. From the Indian side, the then Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee and Commerce and Industry Minister Kamal Nath had visited UAE in May and April 2008, respectively. Our relations are not determined by trade and economic aspects alone. Indians were present in the UAE long before oil was discovered and have played a vital role in the development of the country. They have been active partners with their Emirati hosts. UAE leaders have on several occasions acknowledged the contributions made by Indians in different spheres. What are the developments in the fields of business and commerce between the two countries? India and the UAE are making robust efforts to renew and strengthen the bilateral economic and trade relations. The relationship between the two countries has evolved into a significant partnership in the economic and commercial sphere, with UAE emerging as the second largest market globally for Indian products. At the same time, Indians have emerged as important investors in the UAE, and India as an important export destination for the UAE manufactured goods.

#### Relations High Now; Their Author

Hussain, 2012:

(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24 AT)

In the last couple of years India has been trying to regain international clout in West Asia and this has resulted in an increasing number of visits of the Foreign Minister to Egypt, Jordan, UAE (United Arab Emirates), Israel and also Palestine.i Likewise, the Indian Defence Minister also undertook visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar.ii This clearly shows that India’s strategic orientation is being redefined in the Gulf region. While India has engaged a number of countries in the region, it has nurtured special relations with the UAE because it has been the largest trading partner as well as a strategically important country. Indian expatriate workers also list the UAE as a relatively labour friendly country in terms of wages, facilities, freedom and the annual leave.iii UAE had assumed the chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) immediately after India and, therefore, greater understanding was developed on the maritime issues also. With shrinking markets in Europe and the US, UAE is increasingly looking towards India for exports and investment. In less than six months, India and the UAE have exchanged four high level bilateral visits and almost all visits underpinned the significance of economic and strategic engagements between the two countries. A host of factors such as deep historical links, culture, economy, polity, security and changing geo-strategic and maritime environment helped bring the two nations closer. On his visit to India on 15-16 May this year, the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abduallah Zayed bin Al Nayahan, described India as an ‘ally and cherished neighbour’ and said that UAE would like to have a ‘strong presence’ in the Indian market in the future. Besides this, he also acknowledged the need for working together with India on some of the pressing regional issues such as stabilising Afghanistan, combating maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden as well as stabilising Somaliaiv and religious and sectarian faultlines emerging in the West Asian countries. Today, India and the UAE enjoy a wide spectrum of engagements; they have signed a gamut of agreements and MoUs in almost all possible fields of mutual interest, including economy, culture, manpower services, civil aviation, managing criminals and criminal activities, developing people-to-people interactions and exchange of news and information through print and electronic media.vi

#### Relations High; Defense Co-Op Makes Relations Resilient

Ahmed, 2015:

(UAE-India Bilateral Relations. Talmiz Ahmed, Indian Ambassador To The UAE. Last Updated March 14, 2015)

Will there be a new, more dynamic, phase in UAE-India relations in future? Reflecting the global realities, ties between India and the UAE are acquiring a new dimension. The two countries have established strong partnerships in the field of commerce and trade. This partnership is expanding, diversifying and emerging into a strategic partnership with emphasis on cooperation in defence, energy, etc. UAE as a neighbour will be given priority attention in upgrading our ties. Both countries can cooperate with each other bilaterally and regionally in defence and security issues and become partners in the global fight against terrorism and extremism. Since UAE is focusing on knowledge based industries and with India emerging as world leaders in space, agriculture, pharmaceuticals and bio-technology, there is considerable scope for cooperation in technology transfer, R&D and for joint ventures. Defence cooperation reached a new high with the first ever India-UAE air exercise and the second India-UAE Joint Defence Cooperation Committee meeting. India got firm support of the UAE side on the issue of terrorism, specially on the Mumbai terror attacks of November last year.

### L/D (General)

#### Indian Migrant Workers Are High Now Despite Wage Hikes; Recent Data

Malit and Youha, 2013:

(September 18, 2013. Froilan T. Malit Jr, Ali Al Youha, Analysts For The Migration Policy Institute. Labor Migration In The United Arab Emirates.)

Over the past few decades, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—one of the world's pre-eminent oil-rich nations located in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region—has become a popular destination for temporary labor migrants seeking employment opportunities and higher standards of living. In 2013, the UAE had the fifth-largest international migrant stock in the world with 7.8 million migrants (out of a total population of 9.2 million), according to United Nations (UN) estimates. With immigrants, who come particularly from India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, comprising over 90 percent of the country's private workforce, the UAE attracts both low- and high-skilled migrants due to its economic attractiveness, relative political stability, and modern infrastructure—despite a drop in oil prices and the international banking crisis in 2008.

## Stuff for Mexico Aff

### Farm DA UQ (Mexico Specific)

#### Mexican agriculture is at a tipping point over living wage fights.

Marosi 3-25

Richard Marosi (2015 Pulitzer Price finalist for his coverage of Mexican laborers). “Mexico growers offer striking farmworkers in Baja only 6% wage hike.” 25 March 2015. http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-baja-farmworkers-strike-talks-20150325-story.html

Labor negotiations in Baja California appeared **on the verge of breaking down** Wednesday after an association of agribusinesses offered striking farmworkers a raise of 6%, a figure far lower than what laborers are demanding. The highly anticipated offer was made by an attorney for the Agricultural Council of Baja California, and was met with stunned silence from dozens of farmworkers gathered in a restaurant salon in San Quintin. Striking farmworkers in Baja California march by the thousands along the Baja Trans Peninsular Highway near San Quintin, Mexico, in a peaceful but angry show of force after growers refused to meet their demands to boost wages. With coastal fog hanging over the rich farmland in San Quintin, Mexico, marching farmworker families chant slogans about respect, dignity and a living wage they hope will be forthcoming as the Baja labor strike goes into its second week. “It’s another slap in the face to farmworkers,” said Justino Herrera, a labor leader for the coalition of indigenous groups that represents thousands of workers in the region 200 miles south of San Diego. Laborers, who have been on strike since last week, now earn about $10 a day and say the wage hasn’t changed in more than a decade. They also want growers to pay government-required benefits as well as overtime.

### CP Ev

#### Sequencing’s key.

Telesur 14

TeleSUR (Latin American News). “Mexican Central Bank Head Says Security Affects Economy.” 9 December 2014. http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Mexican-Central-Bank-Head-Says-Security-Affects-Economy-20141209-0027.html

While saying that **productivity should increase before raising Mexico’s** below-poverty **minimum wage**, Agustin Carstens acknowledged that the country’s insecurity issue affects impacts investment potential. Agustin Carstens, Mexico’s National Bank Governor, stated that the Nation’s current security crisis, with incidents such as the disappearance of 43 students in the southern state of Guerrero, does affect investors decisions, weakening trust and certainty. “Companies make choices based on the information available, and if social incidents are in the news, incidents that move away from adequate social order, people prefers not to act,” said the official. “Yes, its an influential factor.” The economist highlighted that Mexico is being detrimentally impacted by three important external factors: low global growth rates, a drop in oil prices and higher costs for financing. “The country has to become more aggressive (...) we have to generate our own sources of growth and that will be achieved with the reforms,” said Carstens regarding the much criticized actions by the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico’s oil sector. Many Mexicans accuse Peña Nieto’s reform of Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) as a way to hand the country’s oil reserves to foreign interests. Carstens voiced concerns about a proposal to raise the minimum wage by 10 percent, saying the measures would affect economy in a “negative way.” “**The economy has been stalled, that’s the big challenge** we have,” he said. Others, including Uruguayan President Jose Mujica, have said that poverty contributes to and enables the violence and insecurity that some countries in the region face.

### Case D (General)

#### Doesn’t assume new legal changes

DoS 14

Department of State. “2014 Investment Climate Statement.” June 2014.

The Mexican Congress enacted a sweeping labor reform bill into law on November 29, 2012. The law encompasses major changes to make Mexico’s labor market flexible and incorporate modern statutes such as non-discrimination. Included in the 300 articles are provisions for the easing of hiring-and-firing of workers, establishing an apprenticeship system, establishing an hourly wage system, and regulating outsourcing. The labor reform also prohibits job discrimination based on sex, health, sexual preference, age, and disability. It makes it illegal for employers to require pregnancy tests of their female workers and job candidates. The reform also restructures Mexico’s labor courts and incorporates the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) concept of decent work. The full text of the new law can be found at: http://www.stps.gob.mx/bp/micrositios/reforma\_laboral/ref\_lab.html. In 2014, Mexico’s Congress approved constitutional changes to raise the minimum work age from 14 to 15 which will allow Mexico to ratify Convention 138 of the International Labor Organization. State legislatures will need to approve the reform before it is enacted into law.

#### Squo solves; minimum wage increases

Yucatan Times 15

The Yucatan Times. “General Increase Of Minimum Wages In Mexico.” 2 January 2015. http://www.theyucatantimes.com/2015/01/general-increase-of-minimum-wages-in-mexico/

The Council of Representatives of the National Minimum Wage Commission agreed to grant a general increase in “minimum wages” in the two geographical areas for 2015 of 4.2 percent. The new general minimum wages for the two geographical areas that apply from 1 January 2015 are: Geographic area “A” will be $70.10 pesos per day. This area includes the Mexico DF and its metropolitan area, the states of Baja California and Baja California Sur, the cities of Acapulco, Gro., Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Guadalajara and its suburbs, Monterrey, N.L. and its metropolitan area, Hermosillo Sonora, Matamoros and Reynosa, Tamaulipas and Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz amongst others. Geographic area “B” general minimum wage will be $66.45 pesos per day. This wage applies in states like Aguascalientes, Campeche, Coahuila, Colima, Chiapas, Durango, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Tabasco, Tlaxcala, Yucatán and Zacatecas; and in specific municipalities in the states of Chihuahua, Guerrero, Jalisco, State of Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, Tamaulipas and Veracruz not in the geographic area “A”. The Council of Representatives agreed to hold until 2015, the ongoing integration of geographical areas for the application of minimum wages and the same number of activities, professions, occupations and types of jobs for professional governing minimum wage. With regard to professional minimum wages, members of the Council of Representatives decided to an increase in the same proportion as done with the general minimum wage for the two identified geographic areas, retaining for each profession the same percentage of perception above the general minimum that was determined by the degree of skill required to perform it. The Council of Representatives to establish minimum wages to be effective as of 1 January 2015, based its resolution on the following factors:

### UQ (Cartels)

#### Violence down- Knights Templar capture

Wilkinson 2/27 Mexico arrests fugitive drug lord, head of Knights Templar cartel, Tracy Wilkinson, Feb 27, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-drug-lord-20150227-story.html

What distinguished Gomez’s organization — La Familia, which morphed into the Knights Templar — was its insidious ability to dominate an entire state, Michoacan on Mexico’s Pacific Coast, penetrating city halls and police departments and intimidating agricultural businesses. And all the while, it built and monopolized a booming methamphetamine industry.∂ Gomez, one of Mexico’s most-wanted fugitives and the last founding commander of La Familia still on the lam, was captured Friday morning by federal police in the Michoacan capital of Morelia, 180 miles west of Mexico City.∂ Some Mexican news reports said he was detained while eating hot dogs at 3 a.m. in downtown Morelia, but others said he was captured in a house there that he had been occupying for months.∂ President Enrique Peña Nieto, his government much-criticized for failing to confront the country’s destructive waves of violence and insecurity, confirmed Gomez’s arrest and quickly took credit.∂ “This is the result of intense intelligence work by the security institutions,” Peña Nieto said via his Twitter account. “With this detention, the rule of law in the country is being fortified, and we continue advancing toward a Mexico in Peace.”∂ The Knights Templar and its precursor were as ruthless as any of Mexico’s numerous drug cartels. But the cartel created a cult-like, pseudo-religious mystique around its dogma and its actions, portraying itself as the savior of a Michoacan under siege from rival gangs. One of its slain leaders is still revered by followers as something of a dark saint.

#### Drug violence is decreasing and there’s no impact

Dibble 14

Sandra Dibble 14, master’s degree in journalism from Columbia University, worked at The Miami Herald for nearly a decade, specializing in coverage of the Cuban, Nicaraguan and Haitian communities, got the Pulitzer Prize as part of the team that uncovered Iran-Contra, 4/15/2014, “Mexico homicides down, but other drug-related crimes persist”, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/Apr/15/mexico-crime-violence-report-university-san-diego/2/?#article-copy

Mexico’s crackdown on powerful drug cartels has succeeded in driving homicides down for the second year in a row, but it has opened the door for an increase in crimes, such as kidnapping and extortion, that affect greater numbers of ordinary citizens, according to report released Tuesday. The crimes are being carried out by smaller and weaker groups “that focus on making money where they can,” said David Shirk, one of the authors of the University of San Diego study. “Unfortunately, improvements in the homicide rate did not entail universal improvements in citizen security.” The study comes as President Enrique Peña Nieto is well into the second year of his six-year term. Unlike his predecessor, Felipe Calderón, Peña Nieto has played down public rhetoric against drug trafficking organizations, focusing instead on the need for political and economic reforms. But analysts say that Peña Nieto’s administration has continued to deploy federal forces to combat organized crime, and continued to arrest major drug traffickers. “I think the government repression of the bigger groups pulverizes them,” said John Bailey, a professor emeritus at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and author of the book, “The Politics of Crime in Mexico.” “The criminals look at other ways to make money.” The USD study, entitled “Drug Violence in Mexico,” was funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the fifth annual report prepared under the auspices of the university’s Justice in Mexico Project. In documenting drug violence, the researchers looked at different tallies, including those of Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information and data from the National Security System, as well as independent counts by Mexican media organizations. The report comes amid public discussion in Mexico about the federal government’s crime statistics under Peña Nieto. The Tijuana newsweekly, Zeta, has challenged statements by high-ranking officials that homicides fell by 16.1 percent in Mexico in 2013, reporting last month that 23,640 murders related to organized crime have taken place since Peña Nieto took office in December 2012. The USD study reported 15 percent drop in homicides in 2013, but says “these findings should be viewed with caution, due to questions raised by analysts over “possible withholding or manipulation of data.” It also reported significant increases in extortion and kidnapping cases. The states that registered the highest number of homicides in 2013 were Guerrero, Mexico, Chihuahua, Sinaloa and Jalisco, according to government figures cited in the study. The largest decreases from the previous year were registered in Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Tamaulipas, Veracruz and Morelos. Of those states showing the largest increases in 2013, Baja California presented the highest rate, 31 percent, the study reported. Among other findings: • Mexico's homicide rate is about average for the Americas, well below Honduras and Venezuela but higher than the United States, Cuba and Canada. • Many homicides in Mexico continue to be attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime groups. • Community self-defense groups have expanded in Guerrero, Michoacan and other states. • Compared with previous years, recent organized crime arrests have not appeared to produce large spikes in violence. Tijuana has been held up as an example of how civic participation and improved law enforcement can lead to reduced crime rates. But the report listed 492 homicides in Tijuana in 2013, up from 320 the previous year and second only to Acapulco, with 883. It called the spike “the most significant surge in intentional homicides among major municipalities in 2013.” The numbers are still far below the city’s homicide peak in 2008, and Tijuana’s homicide rate in 2013 remained lower than those of the cities of Acapulco, Culiacán, Juarez, Chihuahua and Torreon, according to the report. “Tijuana stands out in part because things had gotten so much better,” Shirk said. The study does not delve into the causes of Tijuana’s rise in homicides. But the rise has drawn calls for greater crime-fighting efforts by state and municipal law enforcement officials. “Local authorities are not recognizing these figures, they are saying, ‘no everything is fine,’” said Roberto Quijano, a Tijuana attorney who studies the city’s crime trends for the umbrella group, Tijuana Coordinating Council. “We have mixed results. We have to recognize that.” Baja California government figures show that overall crime in Tijuana, Baja California’s largest city, has gone down since 2008, most notably car thefts, commercial robberies and armed robberies. But house break-ins have remained high. Kidnappings have been relatively low, though there has been an increase in abductions in which there are no ransom demands — frequently a form a retribution among members of criminal organizations. With most of the illicit drugs in Mexico destined for users in the United States, U.S. users “are a major driving force behind this (drug) violence,” Shirk said. And criminal groups in Mexico who perpetrate the violence typically used weapons smuggled across the border from the United States, Shirk said. But save for certain high-crime areas, U.S. citizens should not fear traveling to Mexico, Shirk said: “When you consider the volume of travelers and the volume of crimes against U.S. citizens, there is very little cause for concern.”

### INL/D (Terrorism)

#### No Link Between Cartels And Terrorism

Valencia, 2011:

(Robert Valencia, Research Fellow At The Council On Hemispheric Affairs. Mexican Drug Cartels Are Not Terrorists. October 26, 2011)

Still, many experts are not buying the so-called Quds-Zetas connection. Writer and journalist Sergio González Rodríguez believes that the way U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder framed the story is more of a plot by the U.S. intelligence to place political pressure on Mexico and impose military deployment on the border, which Republican presidential candidate and Texas Gov. Rick Perry has already suggested. Others like author José Reveles and Autonomous University of Mexico professor Raúl Benitez say that Mexican drug cartels would never attack the United States, because this could spark an unwanted military response from the White House. U.S. intelligence consulting firms like Stratfor, meanwhile, question Holder’s accusation because such connection couldn’t have existed without us knowing. The CIA, FBI, and other agencies are deeply embedded in Latin America—particularly Mexico. The U.S. agencies cooperate in tandem with local authorities and informants to detect any anti-U.S. organizations on Latin American soil, and work to infiltrate dangerous drug rings. Instead of seeking alliances with visible Islamic organizations, Stratfor goes on, the Zetas prefer to focus on other challenges posed by other drug cartels that pursue to control the drug market and human trafficking at the border.

### I/D (Cartels)

#### No Cartels Impact; Fragmented Leadership

Johnson, 2014:

(Will Mexican Cartels Go The Way Of Colombia Crime Syndicates. 2/24/2014. Tim Johnson, Member Of McClatchy Foreign Staff.)

Almost as soon as Sinaloa Cartel boss Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, reputedly the head of one of the world's largest crime syndicates, was captured after a 13-year manhunt, young drug dealers began campaigns to take his place — a sign that the group, responsible for 25 percent of all illegal drugs smuggled into the United States, might not be headless for long. But even as the internal jockeying intensified, experts predicted that the arrest of the legendary crime boss over the weekend would prove to be a watershed event likely to usher in the breakup of Mexico's huge crime syndicates. "The fragmentation we've seen here in Colombia will be replicated in Mexico," said Jeremy McDermott, a former British army officer based in Medellin, Colombia, who's a co-director of InSightCrime, a research group. "The capture of Chapo will accelerate that process in Mexico of criminal fragmentation. The days of big cartels are gone." Considered the world's No. 1 crime lord, Guzman was snared in a messy bedroom in an oceanfront condo in Mazatlan early Saturday. Mexican and U.S. counter-drug agents had tracked him over several weeks, tracing him to safe houses in Culiacan, the capital of Sinaloa state, and then staying on his trail to Mazatlan when he disappeared through a series of tunnels and drainage pipes. Guzman, whose Spanish nickname means "Shorty," built the Sinaloa Cartel into one of the world's biggest narcotics-trafficking groups, with a reach deep into Latin America, across the Atlantic to Africa and Europe, and into major U.S. cities. He operated the cartel with the help of at least two other reputed crime chieftains, Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada and Juan Jose "El Azul" Esparragoza, both in their 60s and allegedly with decades of experience in smuggling narcotics to the United States. Guzman has worked with Zambada since an earlier drug gang, the Guadalajara Cartel, was divided up in the late 1980s, and shared management with Esparragoza of the Sinaloa Cartel, which sometimes is called a federation because of its loose organization. Potential rivals are watching closely to see whether they might make a move on Sinaloa Cartel turf or on its leadership, said Sylvia Longmire, a security consultant who's the author of the 2011 book "Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug War." "There will be a lot of wait-and-see going on by a lot of groups: rivals like Los Zetas, smaller trafficking groups that are members of the federation who are weighing their options, and cocaine suppliers who want to make sure the federation is a stable client," Longmire said. "El Mayo and El Azul need to work fast to exude confidence and power to friends and foes alike," she added. If the two aging leaders don't move fast, the criminal underworld that the Sinaloa Cartel controlled may begin to crumble. "When there's no control, what was organized crime becomes disorganized crime," McDermott said. The cartel's biggest rival in Mexico, Los Zetas, fractured after the killing in October 2012 of its undisputed leader, Heriberto Lazcano, and the arrest last July of his successor, Miguel Trevino Morales. In significant ways, Mexico might be following the course of Colombia, which was the epicenter of the global cocaine trade in the 1980s and 1990s under the Medellin and Cali cartels but began to take a lesser place as a crime headquarters after the leaders of those cartels were slain or imprisoned. A plethora of weaker successor groups with names such as the Urabenos, the Rastrojos and La Oficina became wholesale suppliers to the more powerful Mexican groups, Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel.

### No Oil Shocks

#### Shocks won’t collapse the economy

Dechaux, 7 – Reporter for the Herald Sun Australia (Delphine, “Less Damage in Third Oil Shock”, 5-5, <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/news/business/nations-learn-to-weather-oil-shock/2007/12/04/1196530678712.html>)//AA

THE world is enduring a third ''oil shock'' as crude prices trade at record levels close to $US100 a barrel after a sustained surge over the past three years, according to economists. But unlike the oil shocks of 1973 and 1980, this time the global economy remains solid, even amid the added threat of the US housing crisis. ''There is no doubt we are in the third oil price shock,'' said Leo Drollas, chief economist at the Centre for Global Energy Studies in London. ''Because since 2004 . . . prices have gone from $US30 to almost $US100.'' OPEC ministers meeting in Abu Dhabi today to decide on output quotas for the cartel argue that the oil price spike does not reflect the supply-demand situation. Rather they believe prices have surged because of geopolitical concerns, such as that over Iran's nuclear program. In the run-up to the 1980 oil shock prices had more than doubled. Francois Lescaroux, an economist at IFP, a French state-run energy research body, said majority opinion was that the first two oil shocks were due to supply factors. ''Everyone agrees this time that demand factors are pulling up prices,'' he said. The oil price shock of 1973 occurred after Arab members of OPEC halted shipments of crude to the United States, Western Europe and Japan for their perceived support of Israel in its battle against Syria and Egypt during the Yom Kippur War. Following the oil embargo, the price of crude jumped above $US10 a barrel for the first time. The second oil crisis, in 1979, followed the Iranian Revolution. By the start of 1981, oil prices had surged to $US39, which, adjusted for inflation, is the equivalent of $US101 a barrel today. Yahia Said, a professor at the London School of Economics, said political unrest was a common factor in all three oil shocks. ''In the first case, it was the Yom Kippur War of 1973, in the second case it was the Iraqi invasion of Iran (after the Iranian Revolution). In this case it is tensions around Iraq and Iran,'' he added. ''The shock this time has not had the same negative repercussions in terms of inflation or in terms of recession. ''It means that the economies as the result of the previous two shocks have managed to reduce the impact of high oil prices, especially in developed countries,'' he added.

**No resource wars over oil**

David **Victor**, David G. Victor is a professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, November 12, **2007**, What Resource Wars?, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020

**RISING ENERGY prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the world may be headed for a spate of “resource wars”**—hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources. **Such fears come in many stripes, but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly in three areas**. First is the rise of **China**, which is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs—such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals—and **has already “gone out” to the world with the goal of securing what it wants.** Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts others aside. **A second potential path down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the hands of terrorists**. And **third is global climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars, catalyze the spread of disease or bring about mass migrations. Most of this is bunk, and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world.** To be sure, **resource money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere. Fixing them requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine whether stress explodes into violence. When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn’t a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance.**

## India Sweat Shops 1NC

### Evidence Ethics

This card was blatantly doctored to say what they wanted it to:

Consensus proves the plan won’t increase unemployment.  
Rani 11 Belser, Patrick, and Uma Rani. "Extending the coverage of minimum wages in India: Simulations from household data." Economic and Political Weekly 46.28 (2011): 47-55 AJ  
Our simulations have not yet discussed any potential employment- displacing effect of minimum wages. The implicit assumption in our analysis, so far, has been that minimum wages redistribute in- comes without hurting employment. This is not entirely unrealis- tic. One recent view is that standard neoclassical economics has probably overstated the adverse effects of minimum wages on employment. Based on an assessment of recent academic literature, more than 650 economists, including five Nobel Prize winners and six past presidents of the American Economic Association, issued a statement in which they consider that higher minimum wages “can significantly improve the lives of low-income workers and their families, without the adverse effects that critics have claimed”.10 A recent ILO publication (2008a: 44-45) also considers that if set at a reasonable level, minimum wages “can increase the number of workers with access to decent wages and reduce the gender pay gap with little or no adverse impact on employment levels”. Keynesian arguments suggest that minimum wages may even have positive employment effects if they contribute towards raising household consumption and overall aggregate demand (Herr, Kazandziska and Mahnkopf-Praportnik 2009: 25).

This card begins on page 22 and the second half of the paragraph is suspiciously missing

**Rani and Belser 11** write[[254]](#footnote-254)

While our study so far highlights the important fact that not all wage-earners in India are above the poverty line, our simulations have not yet discussed any potential employment-displacing effect of minimum wages. **The implicit assumption in our analysis**, so far, **has been that minimum wages redistribute incomes without hurting employment. This is not entirely unrealistic**. [The minimized text here isn’t present in their card after “This is not entirely unrealistic”] A number of economists now believe that the employment effects of minimum wages are minimal or even altogether ―swamped by other factors going on in the economy‖ (Stiglitz, quoted in Chipman, 2006). The U.K. Low Pay Commission reached the same conclusion after commissioning a large body of research during the first ten years of the country‘s new national minimum wage (U.K. Low Pay Commission, 2009). This provides some more recent support to Freeman‘s view that ―the debate over the employment effects of the minimum is a debate of values around zero‖ (Freeman, 1996, p. 642).

Then they skip the second half of the paragraph and replaced it with a paragraph on page 4

**Rani and Belser 11** write[[255]](#footnote-255)

One recent view is that standard **neoclassical economics has probably overstated the adverse effects** of minimum wages **on employment**. Based on an assessment of recent academic literature, **more than 650 economists**, including five Nobel Prize winners and six past presidents of the American Economic Association, issued a statement in which they **consider that higher minimum wages “can significantly improve the lives of low-income workers and their families**, without the adverse effects that critics have claimed**”**.10 A recent ILO publication (2008a: 44-45) also considers that if set at a reasonable level, minimum wages “can increase the number of workers with access to decent wages and reduce the gender pay gap with little or no adverse impact on employment levels”. Keynesian arguments suggest that minimum wages may even have positive employment effects if they contribute towards raising household consumption and overall aggregate demand (Herr, Kazandziska and Mahnkopf-Praportnik 2009: 25).

Not only did they skip the second half of a paragraph, but they skipped the paragraph following it which denies their “lit consensus proves no unemployment” argument

**Rani and Belser 11** write[[256]](#footnote-256)

While our study so far highlights the important fact that not all wage-earners in India are above the poverty line, **our simulations have not yet discussed any** potential **employment-displacing effect** of minimum wages. The implicit assumption in our analysis, so far, has been that minimum wages redistribute incomes without hurting employment. This is not entirely unrealistic. [PVP’s card ends and jumps to a different page] A number of economists now believe that the employment effects of minimum wages are minimal or even altogether ―swamped by other factors going on in the economy‖ (Stiglitz, quoted in Chipman, 2006). The U.K. Low Pay Commission reached the same conclusion after commissioning a large body of research during the first ten years of the country‘s new national minimum wage (U.K. Low Pay Commission, 2009). This provides some more recent support to Freeman‘s view that ―the debate over the employment effects of the minimum is a debate of values around zero‖ (Freeman, 1996, p. 642). [Initial paragraph ends] **Yet, as there is no consensus within the literature, we do not wish to discard the possibility that minimum wages reduce labour demand** and the total number of days worked by low-paid workers. The extent to which labour demand may fall depends on the elasticity of labour demand. Indeed, Fields and Kanbur (2007) try to address this theoretically and show how poverty effects of a minimum wage increase depends on four parameters: ―how high the minimum wage is relative to the poverty line, how elastic the demand for labour is, how much income-sharing takes place, and how sensitive the poverty measure is to the depth of poverty‖ (p. 146). Available estimates of the so-called ―wage elasticity of employment‖ vary widely, depending on methodologies and counterfactuals. While many find an elasticity around zero (as indicated above), others have estimated much more sizeable values.

For the paragraph that begins on page 22, they skipped the first part of the sentence

Real sentence: **While our study so far highlights the important fact that not all wage-earners in India are above the poverty line, our simulations have not yet discussed any potential employment-displacing effect of minimum wages.**

Their unformatted full text version of the card:

[First part of the sentence missing with “O” in “our” capitalized]

Our simulations have not yet discussed any potential employment- displacing effect of minimum wages. The implicit assumption in our analysis, so far, has been that minimum wages redistribute in- comes without hurting employment. This is not entirely unrealis- tic. One recent view is that standard neoclassical economics has probably overstated the adverse effects of minimum wages on employment. Based on an assessment of recent academic literature, more than 650 economists, including five Nobel Prize winners and six past presidents of the American Economic Association, issued a statement in which they consider that higher minimum wages “can significantly improve the lives of low-income workers and their families, without the adverse effects that critics have claimed”.10 A recent ILO publication (2008a: 44-45) also considers that if set at a reasonable level, minimum wages “can increase the number of workers with access to decent wages and reduce the gender pay gap with little or no adverse impact on employment levels”. Keynesian arguments suggest that minimum wages may even have positive employment effects if they contribute towards raising household consumption and overall aggregate demand (Herr, Kazandziska and Mahnkopf-Praportnik 2009: 25).

Not to mention, their Rani evidence isn’t even about their aff

**Rani and Belser 11** write[[257]](#footnote-257)

Who would benefit from such a compulsory national minimum wage and what would be the impact on poverty and inequality? What could be the potential impacts on employment if minimum wage is made compulsory? These are the main questions that we explore in the present paper. We consider two different policy options: making the national minimum wage floor compulsory across the country or, as an alternative, extending the coverage of existing state-level minimum wages to all workers. The latter option is perhaps more attractive in a huge country such as India, where the costs of living as well as economic conditions differ widely across states. At the outset, we would also clarify that we are not proposing to have a single national minimum wage floor or only state-level minimum wages. Our proposition is that there should be a national minimum wage floor or state-level minimum wages, and that no worker should be paid below the minimum wage that has been set. Other occupational wages could exist, which should be set above this basic minimum wage. While there is a fairly large literature on the effects of minimum wages on poverty and inequality in the United States and Europe, we are not aware of many studies which simulate ex-ante such impacts in developing countries (a notable exception is Bird and Manning, 2008). Also, contrary to most papers on minimum wages, we look at the effects of an extension in the coverage of minimum wages and analyse the impact of an increase in the level of minimum wages. In fact, **we do not discuss whether** the **existing** levels of **minimum wages in India are appropriate for leading a decent life**. Although we are aware of the literature which considers that minimum wages in India are perhaps too low, **we believe that this subject needs a separate investigation**. **We hope that this paper will contribute to** the **on-going debate** and be useful for policy-makers **in considering whether to expand** the **minimum wage coverage to all workers at** the **prevailing levels** set **in India.**

### Util Framework

The standard is **maximizing utility**.

First, util’s better than absolutism for evaluating the ethics of sweatshop labor

**Wong 13** writes[[258]](#footnote-258)

Companies are not charity organizations and are inevitably subjected to market mechanisms, but this does not mean that they can maximize their profits without regard for the well-being of sweatshop laborers. Immanuel Kant’s practical moral imperative asserts that human beings must be treated as ends in themselves and not merely as a means, and so sweatshops are inherently unacceptable from a deontological perspective since their workers seem to be treated as mere instruments in the amassing of business profits. Yet, **if sweatshop labor was simply banned, people in developing** Asian **countries** who are **critically reliant on these jobs for survival would suffer even more**, and this is all the worse for their Kantian right to self-determination. This suggests that **in the real world**—or at least in this case—**ideas of absolute right vs. wrong are** at best **inadequate, and cannot be conflated with** ideas of **better vs. worse**, which account, more importantly, for the relative outcomes of decisions.   The Kantian right to self-determination has great intuitive force and cannot simply be abandoned. Yet, if deontology alone is an unsatisfactory approach to evaluating the moral value of sweatshop labor, perhaps the **existing conditions of the modern economic world call for** a supplementary **util**itarian approach. Utilitarianism—defined by the likes of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill—considers how everyone’s collective welfare may be maximized. Sweatshop workers are relatively better off than if they had no such work, as are the companies which benefit from lower production costs, and the governments of the United States and Asia, which further benefit from lucrative economic relations with each other. Normatively speaking, **sweatshop labor is** morally **wrong** and should be banned. **Practically speaking, however, there are shades of gray representing better and worse outcomes** of moral decision-making within the existing political and economic environment. Theoretically, the need to respect human rights is directly associated with deontology and not utilitarianism. Yet, the **util**itarian relativization of outcomes **appears**—counter-intuitively—**to support human rights in the case of sweatshop labor better than** a strictly **deon**tological approach which flatly denies that sweatshop labor could ever be morally acceptable.

Second, revisionary intuitionism is true and leads to util.

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[259]](#footnote-259)

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my **meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless.** And this appears to be a general syndrome - **people do much better when discussing whether torture is** good or **bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level** wherever I possibly can. Occasionally **people object** to any discussion of morality on the grounds **that morality doesn't exist**, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that **"exist" is not the right term to use** here, I generally say, "But **what do you do anyway?**" and **take the discussion back down to the object level.** Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. **I see** the project of **morality as a project of renormalizing intuition.** We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all** the **intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your** specific **intuitions and** refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a** grunting **caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. **Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - **it**'s **just** that modus ponens **still seems like a good idea after being** formalized, **reflected on**, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate** "**util**itarianism", **you run into paradoxes, contradictions**, circular preferences, **and other** things that aren't **symptoms of** moral wrongness so much as **moral incoherence.** After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. **After** the two hundred and eighty-seventh **research** study **showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity** - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could** look at this intuition, and **think it was** revealing **some** kind of **incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could** look at that and **say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't** successfully **multiply** by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. **But it ought to**, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. **When you've read enough** heuristics and **biases research, and enough coherence** and uniqueness **proofs for** Bayesian probabilities and **expected utility**, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, **then you don't see** the **preference reversals** in the Allais Paradox **as** revealing **some** incredibly **deep moral truth** about the intrinsic value of certainty. **It just goes to show that the brain doesn't** goddamn **multiply.** The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that **primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of** symbols standing for **small quantities** - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected** on enough intuitions, **and corrected enough absurdities, you** start to **see a common denominator, a meta-principle** at work, **which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. **And that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

And third, respect for human worth would justify util. **Cummiskey 90** writes[[260]](#footnote-260)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends any market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

### Manufacturing DA

India has potential to be a strong manufacturing power because of cheap labor. Cheap labor is why India will outpace China.

**Einhorn 14** writes[[261]](#footnote-261)

With its chronic blackouts, crumbling roads, and other infrastructure woes, India should have no appeal for John Ginascol. A vice president at Abbott Laboratories (ABT), Ginascol is responsible for ensuring that the company’s food-products factories run smoothly worldwide. He can’t afford surprises when it comes to electricity, water, and other essentials. “People like me,” he says, “dream of having existing, good, reliable infrastructure.” Yet Abbott has just opened its first plant in India, and Ginascol says there haven’t been any nightmares so far. In October the company began production at a $75 million factory in an industrial park in the western state of Gujarat. The factory is producing Similac baby formula and nutritional supplement PediaSure, which Abbott plans to sell to the growing Indian middle class. The plant will employ about 400 workers by the time it’s fully up and running next year. As for India’s infrastructure, Ginascol has no complaints. The officials in charge of the park “were able to deliver very good, very reliable power, water, natural gas, and roads,” he says. “Fundamentally, the infrastructure was in place.” **Indian Prime Minister** Narendra **Modi is hoping** other **executives will be** similarly **impressed with** the **ease of manufacturing in his country**. Before Modi took charge in New Delhi, he headed the state government in Gujarat, and during his 13 years in power there he made the state an industrial leader. Manufacturing accounts for 28 percent of Gujarat’s economy, compared with 13 percent for the country as a whole, and a touch less than the 30 percent figure for manufacturing titan China. Story: Why Factory Jobs Are Shrinking Everywhere In an attempt to build India’s industrial base nationwide, Modi is pushing the Make in India campaign, designed to attract foreign investment by highlighting the ongoing changes. “We have to increase manufacturing and ensure that the benefits reach the youth of our nation,” Modi tweeted after the initiative’s Sept. 25 introduction. By now he’s eased restrictions on foreign investment in property projects and begun an overhaul of the railroad system. In the year ahead **the prime minister’s campaign may gain momentum, thanks to** the **shifting fortunes of India and** its neighbor **China. The Indian economy**, which slumped badly in 2012 and 2013, **will likely grow** 6.3 percent next year, **in part because of investor confidence in Modi. By 2016 the** country’s **growth rate** of 7.2 percent **will surpass China**’s 7.1 percent, says CLSA senior economist Rajeev Malik. Well before the arrival of Modi, Indian leaders had talked about promoting manufacturing. The slowdown in China, however, could make a big difference this time. **China became an export powerhouse because of** its vast pool of **low-wage workers, but it’s no longer** so **cheap** to manufacture **there. Pinched by double-digit increases in China’s minimum wages, many companies are looking for low-cost alternatives**. Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia are attractive, but they lack the deep supply of workers available in India. “It’s the only country that has the scale to take up where China is leaving off,” says Frederic Neumann, a senior economist with HSBC (HSBC). Vietnam and Indonesia? “Neither one is big enough to take up the slack,” he says**, leaving India with a “golden opportunity.”**

Indian manufacturing has momentum and is key to India’s economic growth

**The Economist 12** writes[[262]](#footnote-262)

IF INDIA is to become “the next China”—a manufacturing powerhouse—it is taking its time about it. “We have to industrialise India, and as rapidly as possible,” said the country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1951. Politicians have tried everything since, including Soviet-style planning. But India seems to prefer growing crops and selling services to making things you can drop on your foot. In this section Manufacturing is still just 15% of output (see chart), far below Asian norms. **India needs a big manufacturing base. No major country has grown rich without one and nothing else is likely to absorb the labour of** the 250m **youngsters set to reach working age in the next 15 years**. But it can seem a remote prospect. In July power cuts plunged an area in which over 600m people live into darkness, reminding investors that India’s infrastructure is not wholly reliable. And workers boiled over at a car factory run by Maruti Suzuki. Almost 100 people were injured and the plant was torched. The charred body of a human-resources chief was found in the ashes. Yet not all is farce and tragedy. Take Pune in west India, a booming industrial hub that has won the steely hearts of Germany’s car firms. Inside a $700m Volkswagen plant on the city’s outskirts, laser-wielding robots test car frames’ dimensions and a giant conveyor belt slips by, with sprung-wood surfaces to protect workers’ knees. It is “probably the cheapest factory we have worldwide”, says John Chacko, VW’s boss in India. In time it could become an export hub. Nearby, in the distance it takes a Polo to get to 60mph, is a plant owned by Mercedes-Benz. Both German firms were attracted by (fairly) reliable power and access to land but also Pune’s engineering colleges and tradition of manufacturing. “It is a hub for auto-suppliers,” says Peter Honegg, Mercedes’s boss. Smaller firms are arriving too. Zubin Kabraji, of the Indo-German chamber of commerce, says Pune hosts 262 German companies, up from 130-odd in 2008. The foreign influx is not limited to Germans; and local suppliers benefit regardless. Three-quarters of VW’s parts are bought locally. Some foreigners are not really manufacturing but rather assembling imported parts to get around Indian customs duties. Still they use some Indian suppliers too—30-40% of Mercedes’s components are local. Indian champions are also prospering. Tata, a conglomerate, has been in Pune for decades and has a new plant assembling Land Rover cars. Bharat Forge, with $1.3 billion of sales, makes car parts, with 70% going abroad. Its boss, B.N. Kalyani, says local entrepreneurs are “doing a damn good job”. **Industrial hotspots such as Pune, Chennai and** the state of **Gujarat are not the only ev**idence **that manufacturing has momentum. India’s share of global merchandise exports has doubled to 1.5% since 2000** (but is still far below China’s 11%)

Indian economic growth solves poverty and is key to India’s global economic influence. India’s economic standing is key to US-India relations.

**Schaffer 13** writes[[263]](#footnote-263)

The story of the Indian economy’s fall from grace is by now familiar – almost a new cliché. After three years of 9 percent growth, **India’s economy has sharply slowed**. Projections for 2014 range from 4 to 5.5 percent; Paribas bank estimates growth during the April-June 2013 quarter at 3.7 percent. **Manufacturing growth**, which had done well during the boom years, sank to 3.5 percent in 2011 and **barely topped 3 percent in 2012**. Perhaps the biggest attention-getter has been the plummeting value of the rupee, down 22 percent between May and September 2013, Rs. 63 to the dollar in mid-September. The picture is not all bleak. Services, accounting for about 59 percent of the Indian economy, grew over 7 percent – below the double digit levels of the past two decades, but still ahead of GDP, and some decline in services growth was widely expected. Domestic capital investment remains relatively high by international standards, though it did fall from a high of 38 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to 35.4 percent in 2011/12. International trade has held up better – exports and imports came close to doubling in the five years since 2007. Incoming investment has zigzagged. And undergirding all of this is the fact that private economic activity has been steadily expanding as a share of the economy for twenty years or more. Two decades ago, India’s economic travails would have been greeted with hand-wringing and a sense of the inevitable. Today, the reaction is different. **Indian decision-makers** and policy elites **recognize that economic dynamism is** not just **a prerequisite for bringing prosperity to India’s poor**, but also a strategic asset – or liability. And around the world, **India’s economic performance is seen as a prime indicator of its capacity to shape** regional and **global events**. The government clearly understands that it needs to turn the economy around. In the past couple of months, Finance Minister P. Chidambaram has pushed through some measures intended to bring in more foreign investment and improve relations with international business. These included the suspension of the Indian government’s policy on “preferential market access” (local content requirements) for electronic equipment purchased by the government. The government also revised and moved to implement its decision to open single-brand retail to foreign investment. Unfortunately, to sell this measure politically, the government surrounded it with conditions that have kept investors away. None had signed on as of mid-September; the government is working hard to bring in at least one of the major retailers. In other indications of a push to revive the economy, the Foreign Investment Promotion Board with some fanfare cleared 8 new proposals in mid-July. The appointment of economist Raghuram Rajan as new Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, India’s central bank, normally an event confined to the fine print on the financial pages, was greeted with a full-court media press. Rajan’s initial statements emphasized the importance of growth – and of patience. He is evidently betting on the long term, and willing to take some short term heat, as witnessed by his September 20 hike in the bank’s key interest rate. However, elections loom before May 2014. The government has turned inward; populist issues top its legislative agenda. The Food Security bill, passed during the last session of parliament, will extend food entitlement programs to up to 50 percent of the urban population and up to 75 percent of the rural population. The Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Act, also passed during the last session, updates the often troublesome process of land acquisition. Legal experts familiar with the process expressed hope that the enhanced compensation levels it enacts will reduce the frequency of protracted litigation over land acquisition. Business observers fear that the requirement for administrative review of the social impact of each land transaction in which the government is involved will lead to even further delays on the creation of new industrial establishments. And the impending election has slowed progress toward the unification of India’s tax system through a nation-wide Goods and Services Tax – ironically, because the major parties agree that it would be beneficial, but the opposition does not want to give the current Congress-led government a chance to look good. The impact of these developments goes beyond the domestic scene. For the past twenty years, **India has enjoyed** and nurtured **a global role that** goes **starts with primacy in its own neighborhood but also** features **a dynamic** new **relationship with the U**nited **S**tates**,** expanded trade as well as **strategic competition with China**, a growing role in Asian security extending from the Indian Ocean through to the Pacific, **and** a growing network of **economic agreements**, including Free Trade Agreements already concluded with Japan, Korea and ASEAN and pacts under negotiation with the EU and Canada. **India has** also **built up** its **ties with** the **BRICS countries** – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. **Each of these relationships is driven in significant part by India’s economic profile.**  In each of these arenas, India’s economic slowdown will act as a drag on its strategic objectives. Take the strategic competition with China: India grew more slowly than China even during the boom years, and the present slump coincides with some speed bumps in China’s economic advancement. Nonetheless, India’s lackluster economic performance suggests that the time when India might move into the same economic league as China is not getting closer. Deepening economic engagement with Southeast and East Asia will continue – and India is fortunate to have concluded most of its trade agreements in that region before pre-election distraction set in. But security engagement to India’s east will depend in part on the budget, and at the moment, austerity is holding planned defense increases below the rate of inflation. The economic question marks that hang over some of BRICS’s more ambitious goals are bound to be intensified by India’s economic doldrums. The clearest example is the proposed BRICS development bank: unless India’s economic surge resumes, it becomes almost impossible to imagine such a bank having sufficient capital to make a difference unless its financing is turned over to China, a decision that India would probably be reluctant to accept. **India’s economic slowdown** and pre-election introspection **has probably had its most serious impact on ties with the U**nited **S**tates**. Economics were the starting point for the expanded U.S.-India relationship, and economic** and commercial **issues have an unusually large impact on a country’s profile in Washington**. In the five years since the global financial crisis started, the U.S.-India bilateral economic agenda has made relatively little progress. Long-standing issues important to U.S. business, such as the cap on foreign investment in insurance, have stalled. Recent Indian legislation, especially on land acquisition, has raised hackles among prospective investors. Compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals in 2012 and 2013 may, as India argues, be consistent with India’s intellectual property laws and its agreements with the United States, but American businesses that went through the IP dispute in earlier years wonder whether India is moving back toward its former policy that basically disallowed foreign patents. The result is an extraordinarily sour mood among senior U.S. officials concerned with economic ties with India.

US-India relations are key to avoid nuclear war. India’s economic position is a key foundation of relations.

**Schaffer 2** writes[[264]](#footnote-264)

**Washington's increased interest in India** since the late 1990s **reflects India's economic** expansion and **position** as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, **both** giant **democracies** see that they **can benefit by closer cooperation**. For Washington, **the advantages include** a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as **a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade** and investment **benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India**. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

Adopt a parliamentary model to account for moral uncertainty. This entails minimizing existential risks. **Bostrom 9** writes[[265]](#footnote-265)

It seems people are overconfident about their moral beliefs.  But **how should one** reason and **act if one** acknowledges that one **is uncertain about morality** – not just applied ethics but fundamental moral issues? if you don't know which moral theory is correct?

It doesn't seem **you can[’t] simply plug your uncertainty into expected utility** decision theory and crank the wheel; **because many** moral **theories** state that you **should not** always **maximize** expected **utility.**

Even if we limit consideration to consequentialist theories, it still is hard to see how to combine them in the standard decision theoretic framework.  For example, suppose you give X% probability to total utilitarianism and (100-X)% to average utilitarianism.  Now an action might add 5 utils to total happiness and decrease average happiness by 2 utils.  (This could happen, e.g. if you create a new happy person that is less happy than the people who already existed.)  Now what do you do, for different values of X?

The problem gets even more complicated if we consider not only consequentialist theories but also deontological theories, contractarian theories, virtue ethics, etc.  We might even throw various meta-ethical theories into the stew: error theory, relativism, etc.

I'm working on a paper on this together with my colleague Toby Ord.  We have some arguments against a few possible "solutions" that we think don't work.  On the positive side we have some tricks that work for a few special cases.  But beyond that, the best **we have managed** so far is **a** kind of **metaphor, which** we don't think is literally and exactly correct, and it is a bit under-determined, but it **seems to get things roughly right** and it might point in the right direction:

**The Parliamentary Model.**  Suppose that you have a set of mutually exclusive moral theories, and that you assign each of these some probability.  Now imagine that **each** of these **theorie**s **gets to send** some number of **delegates to The Parliament**.  The number of delegates each theory gets to send is **proportional to the probability of the theory.**  Then the delegates bargain with one another for support on various issues; and the Parliament reaches a decision by the delegates voting.  What you should do is act according to the decisions of this imaginary Parliament.  (Actually, we use an extra trick here: we imagine that the delegates act as if the Parliament's decision were a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A.  This has the effect of eliminating the artificial 50% threshold that otherwise gives a majority bloc absolute power.  Yet – unbeknownst to the delegates – the Parliament always takes whatever action got the most votes: this way we avoid paying the cost of the randomization!)

The idea here is that moral theories get more influence the more probable they are; yet **even a** relatively **weak theory can still get its way on some issues** that the theory think are extremely important **by sacrificing** its influence **on other** i**s**sues that other theories deem more important.  For example, **suppose you assign 10% probability to** total **util**itarianism and 90% to moral egoism (just to illustrate the principle).  Then **the Parliament** would mostly take actions that maximize egoistic satisfaction; however it **would make some concessions to util**itarianism **on** issues that utilitarianism thinks is especially important.  In this example, the person might donate some portion of their income to **existential risks** research and otherwise live completely selfishly.

I think there might be wisdom in **this model**.  It **avoids the** dangerous and **unstable extremism** that would result **from letting one’s current favorite moral theory completely dictate action**, while still allowing the aggressive pursuit of some non-commonsensical high-leverage strategies so long as they don’t infringe too much on what other major moral theories deem centrally important.

### Sweatshops DA

Sweatshops are currently the best possible alternative for the majority of the Indian population—the aff dooms them to rural poverty

**Blacksburg 14** writes[[266]](#footnote-266)

**When a person voluntarily chooses** to **work in a sweatshop**, it is because **that person views that option as their best** choice **among alternatives**. This is a truth known a priori, and it is based on the fact that they chose to do so. This a priori theory is confirmed with empirical data from real world analysis. Oxford University published economist Benjamin Powell’s book, Out of Poverty: Sweatshops in the Global Economy, last month. Dr. Powell devoted an entire chapter to the alternative jobs that sweatshop workers would have if they lost their jobs in the sweatshops. He found that “**in countries where sweatshops tend to be located large portions** of the population **work in agriculture**.”(2) Furthermore, these agricultural workers tend to be subsistence farmers. In the poorest of these countries, other alternatives include prostitution and sifting through garbage dumps. How do these alternatives compare to sweatshop labor? In Bangladesh, over 80% of the population live with a daily income under $2 a day. **In India, it’s 60% of the population**. For China, just over half the population earns under $2 a day. The average daily income of a sweatshop worker in Bangladesh is just over $2. For the Chinese sweatshop worker, it’s over $4 a day. The average Indian sweatshop worker earns $8 a day.(3) There’s a reason that people choose to work in sweat shops. As Paul Krugman noted in his article, aptly titled “In Praise of Cheap Labor: Bad Jobs at Bad Wages Are Better than No Jobs at All,” “while **wages** and working conditions **in** the new **export industries of the Third World** are appalling, they **are a big improvement over** the previous, less visible **rural poverty**.”(4) **These countries are** countries **with little capital. Thus, these countries are** countries **with little productivity. Wages rise as productivity rises**. But the productivity must rise first. The relationship between productivity and pay has been demonstrated countless times. But let’s look at the productivity of sweatshop labor and the productivity of subsistence farming. In Bangladesh, agriculture only accounts for 23% of the GDP, even though 58% of Bangladeshis are employed in agriculture. In China, almost half the population is employed in agriculture, yet agriculture only accounts for around 13% of the GDP.(5) There is a reason why sweatshop labor gets paid, on average, higher than the alternatives. **Sweatshops are more productive** and employ more capital **than** the **agricultural alternatives. As more people invest** in these companies**, wages will rise**. However, **legally raising** the **wages** of these workers higher than the value they produce **will not result in higher productivity. It will result in unemployment. Productivity must rise before wages** rise. Wages respond to productivity but productivity does not respond to artificially mandated wages.

Living wage for sweatshop labor pushes factories out of India. This turns poverty

**Kristof 9** writes[[267]](#footnote-267)

Mr. Obama and the Democrats who favor labor standards in trade agreements mean well, for they intend to fight back at oppressive sweatshops abroad. But while it shocks Americans to hear it, **the** central **challenge in** the **poor**est **countries is not that sweatshops exploit** too many people**, but that they don’t exploit enough**. Talk to these families in the dump, and a job in **a sweatshop is** a cherished dream, **an escalator out of poverty**, the kind of gauzy if probably unrealistic ambition that parents everywhere often have for their children. “I’d love to get a job in a factory,” said Pim Srey Rath, a 19-year-old woman scavenging for plastic. “At least that work is in the shade. Here is where it’s hot.” Another woman, Vath Sam Oeun, hopes her 10-year-old boy, scavenging beside her, grows up to get a factory job, partly because she has seen other children run over by garbage trucks. Her boy has never been to a doctor or a dentist, and last bathed when he was 2, so a sweatshop job by comparison would be far more pleasant and less dangerous. I’m glad that many Americans are repulsed by the idea of importing products made by barely paid, barely legal workers in dangerous factories. Yet sweatshops are only a symptom of poverty, not a cause, and banning them closes off one route out of poverty. At a time of tremendous economic distress and protectionist pressures, there’s a special danger that tighter labor standards will be used as an excuse to curb trade. When I defend sweatshops, people always ask me: But would you want to work in a sweatshop? No, of course not. But I would want even less to pull a rickshaw. **In the hierarchy of jobs in poor countries, sweltering at a sewing machine isn’t the bottom**. My views on sweatshops are shaped by years living in East Asia, watching as living standards soared — including those in my wife’s ancestral village in southern China — because of sweatshop jobs. Manufacturing is one sector that can provide millions of jobs. Yet **sweatshops usually go** not to the poorest nations but **to better-off countries with** more **reliable electricity and ports**. I often hear the argument: Labor standards can improve wages and working conditions, without greatly affecting the eventual retail cost of goods. That’s true. But labor standards and **“living wages” have a larger impact on production costs that companies are** always **trying to pare. The result is to push companies to operate** more **capital-intensive factories in better-off nations** like Malaysia, rather than labor-intensive factories in poorer countries like Ghana or Cambodia. Cambodia has, in fact, pursued an interesting experiment by working with factories to establish decent labor standards and wages. It’s a worthwhile idea, but **one result of paying above-market wages is that those in charge of hiring often demand bribes** — sometimes a month’s salary — **in exchange for a job**. In addition, these standards add to production costs, so some factories have closed because of the global economic crisis and the difficulty of competing internationally.

Outweighs the aff—2 reasons

a. Workers are better off in sweatshops, which outweighs their exploitation claims

**Zwolinski 11** writes[[268]](#footnote-268)

Even if they are unfair, there is very good reason to believe that all of the exchanges described above are usually mutually beneficial.1 In other words, both parties come away from the exchange better off than they would have been without it. This claim is supported, I think, by the rather impressive empirical data on sweatshop wages. But even apart from the empirical evidence, there’s a fairly strong a priori argument to be made in favor of the assumption of mutual benefit. After all, **if workers didn’t expect to be made better off by** working in **a sweatshop – if they didn’t think it was** all-things-considered **their best available alternative –** then **why would they take the job?** And the poorer workers are, the more dramatic the impact on their overall welfare will be of even slight improvements to their material conditions. So sweatshops are doing something to make poor workers better off. On the other hand, **I assume that most of us do nothing to make any serious improvement in the lives of people in** desperate **poverty**. We might give a few dollars to the Red Cross when a tsunami hits and makes the evening news, but most of don’t do anything on a regular basis that is going to have any real long-term impact on the lives of poor workers in the developing world. But if all this is true, then we face a bit of a philosophical puzzle. For **if exploiters** like sweatshops are doing something to **make the lives of the poor better, while most of us** are **do**ing **nothing,** then **how bad can exploitation really be?** We vilify sweatshops, price gougers, and payday loan operators for exploiting the vulnerable. But **we give ourselves a pass on our own neglect of those same vulnerable people**, even though exploitation is often better for the vulnerable than neglect. As Joan Robinson once claimed, “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all.” So why do we think of exploiters as so much worse than us?

b. Unemployment is worse for the poor than low-wage sweatshop labor

**Powell 8** writes[[269]](#footnote-269)

Economists have often pointed to anecdotal evidence that **alternatives to sweatshops are** much **worse**. But until David **Skarbek and I** published a study in the 2006 Journal of Labor Research, nobody had **systematically quantified** the **alternatives**.3 We searched U.S. popular news sources for claims of sweatshop exploitation in the third world and found 43 specific accusations of exploitation in 11 countries in Latin America and Asia. We found that sweatshop workers typically earn much more than the average in these countries. Here are the facts: **We obtained apparel industry** hourly **wage data for 10** of the **countries accused of** using **sweatshop labor**. We compared the apparel industry wages to average living standards in the country where the factories were located. Figure 1 summarizes our findings.4 Figure 1. Apparel Industry Wages as a Percent of Average National Income Figure 1. Apparel Industry Wages as a Percent of Average National IncomeZOOM **Working in** the **apparel** industry **in** any one of **these countries results in earning more than the average income in that country. In half** of the countries **it results in** earning **more than three times the national average**.5 Next we investigated the specific sweatshop wages cited in U.S. news sources. We averaged the sweatshop wages reported in each of the 11 countries and again compared them to average living standards. Figure 2 summarizes our findings. Figure 2. Average Protested Sweatshop Wages as a Percent of Average National Income Figure 2. Average Protested Sweatshop Wages as a Percent of Average National IncomeZOOM From "In Praise of Cheap Labor," by Paul Krugman. Slate Magazine, March 1997: A country like Indonesia is still so poor that progress can be measured in terms of how much the average person gets to eat; since 1970, per capita intake has risen from less than 2,100 to more than 2,800 calories a day. A shocking one-third of young children are still malnourished—but in 1975, the fraction was more than half. Similar improvements can be seen throughout the Pacific Rim, and even in places like Bangladesh. These improvements have not taken place because well-meaning people in the West have done anything to help—foreign aid, never large, has lately shrunk to virtually nothing. Nor is it the result of the benign policies of national governments, which are as callous and corrupt as ever. It is the indirect and unintended result of the actions of soulless multinationals and rapacious local entrepreneurs, whose only concern was to take advantage of the profit opportunities offered by cheap labor. **Even in** specific **cases where a company was allegedly exploiting** sweatshop labor **we found** the **jobs were usually better than average**. In 9 of the 11 countries we surveyed, the average reported sweatshop wage, based on a 70-hour work week, equaled or exceeded average incomes. In Cambodia, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras, the average wage paid by a firm accused of being a sweatshop is more than double the average income in that country. The Kathy Lee Gifford factory in Honduras was not an outlier—it was the norm. **Because sweatshops are better than** the **available alternatives, any reforms aimed at improving the lives of workers in sweatshops must not jeopardize** the **jobs that they already have**. To analyze a reform we must understand what determines worker compensation.

### Case

Any benefits of the aff are virtually impossible to monitor because of a large informal sector

**Bhattacharjee 14** writes[[270]](#footnote-270)

**Government officials said the higher** but flat **floor of minimum wages will have a national footprint** like the GST. It will go down well with workers especially in the informal sector, reduce labour unrest, and make it easier for industry to open in new areas without having to negotiate through a forest of wage rates. **Labour sector specialists**, however, **said the move would likely be** rendered **“ineffective”** due to implementation difficulties. Manish Sabharwal of Teamlease Services said, **“Unlike in the US for** instance, **where a hike in minimum wages immediately translates into a raise for every worker**, the **benefits here are practically impossible to monitor because of the huge unorganised sector**.” Santosh Mehrotra, a former director-general of the Institute of Applied Manpower Research, said, “Such a rise never works. **Implementation is a big issue**. A far better option would be to intervene through social security measures like insurance cover, where the slippages can be tracked.”

# Scarsdale

## Airport Security 1NC (Bugatti)

### Econ DA

#### Global economy is growing but we’re still recovering from the recession-US is key.

**Davidson 14** Paul “IMF: World economy stronger; recovery uneven” USA Today April 8, 2014 http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/04/08/imf-global-forecast/7441869/

**The I**nternational **M**onetary **F**und **said** Tuesday the **global recovery will gain strength this year, but** it **trimmed** its **growth forecast amid** a sharp **rise in Japan's sales tax** and a slowdown in emerging markets. An accelerating **U.S. recovery will help the world economy** **grow** 3.6% this year, the IMF said, up from 3% in 2013 but down slightly from its 3.7% projection in January. Growth will pick up to a 3.9% pace in 2015, the fund said in advance of the spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Washington this week. "**A recovery** which was starting to take hold in October **is becoming stronger but** also **broader**," IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard said at a press briefing Tuesday. **But**, he added, "the recovery **remains uneven**." The IMF's 2014 growth forecast for the U.S. was unchanged at 2.8%. That is the highest among advanced economies, which the IMF said are driving the global expansion. "A major impulse to global growth has come from the United States," the IMF said in its World Economic Outlook, adding that U.S. growth will pick up to 3% next year. The IMF cited more modest federal government spending cuts this year, higher household wealth, the recovering housing market and banks that are more willing to lend.

#### US airline competitiveness increasing.

**Blakey 14** Marion C. Blakey (President and Chief Executive Officer of AIA, the nation’s largest trade association representing aerospace and defense manufacturers) “THE U.S. AVIATION INDUSTRY AND JOBS: KEEPING AMERICAN MANUFACTURING COMPETITIVE” March 13th 2014 <http://www.aia-aerospace.org/news/the_us_aviation_industry_and_jobs_keeping_american_manufacturing_competitiv/> JW 3/23/15

U. S. **aircraft manufacturers continue to hold strong positions in the world market due to the dedication and hard work** of American workers, the wisdom of executives leading those companies, and the pursuit of technological advances that drive world markets. In fact, the aerospace industry continues to be the United States' leading exporter of manufactured goods. By value, **our industry exported** $**72**.1 **billion more than we imported last year. This figure was up 10%** over the previous year, even as the overall U. S. economy improved in fits and starts.

#### Living wage for airports specifically causes inflation that kills competitiveness and collapses economy. This card is sick.

**Opdyke 14** Jeff D. Opdyke (Editor, Profit Seeker) “Americans Are Expensive” June 24th 2014 The Sovereign Investor Daily <http://thesovereigninvestor.com/economic-collapse-2/americans-are-expensive/> JW

Politicians, economists and random rabble-rousers are determined to fix this “problem” of questionable significance by way of minimum-wage increases — never stopping to consider that the problem isn’t the minimum wage in America … it’s the wages the rest of the world earns in a globalized economy, mixed with the policies of a paternal American government that buys its power through costly give-away programs that are draining the nation’s productive capacity. **The prescription being offered** to cure the earnings gap **will** do more to **reduce America’s competitiveness and throw her into economic collapse** than it will improve the lot of our middle class. And for us, investors, that fact says a lot about where we should have our money at work … and where we should scale back. The latest organization to weigh in on the “raise the wage” debate is the International Monetary Fund. The IMF last week said the U.S. minimum wage is too low by historical and global standards, and that raising the minimum would, duh!, raise the incomes for millions of working-poor Americans. On a nominal basis, that’s true. But on a real basis, meaning adjusted for the inflation that wage hikes necessarily engender, it’s pure pabulum — lip-service designed to play to the masses who feel the system is rigged against them, and, oh, improve the IMF’s image. The early events already taking place in Seattle, where the city now mandates a $15 minimum wage, tell you exactly why these “living wage” arguments are bogus and why, ultimately, they will do very little to improve the financial standing of America’s middle class. Small-businesses in Seattle are already realizing the true impact of this legislation isn’t just a raise for minimum-wage earners … it’s an across-the-board wage hike for just about everyone below the corporate/ownership level, and it’s a cost hike — i.e. inflation — for everyone in Seattle. Restaurants serve as a great example. They employ workers earning at or just above minimum wage, which in Washington state is already $9.32 an hour. Managers who oversee those workers earn in the $15 range currently. You can clearly see the dots that are connecting. America’s Achilles Heel **If minimum-wage Jack is suddenly earning $15 an hour**, then **manager Jill certainly is not going to cotton to earning the same salary for taking on more responsibility**. **She will** rightly **demand a wage commensurate with the wage gap she once enjoyed** … **which**, of course, **means Jill’s manager is going to demand a raise**, too, for having to manage all the Jills in the organization. At least one Subway franchisee has calculated the real cost on his restaurant and has determined that he will have to raise costs by $0.75 per sandwich. Doesn’t sound like much, but it represents an inflation rate for sandwiches of as much as 15%. But, more important, that’s just one price rise in the many price rises consumers will face for all sorts of products — the definition of broad-based inflation. **It’s trickle up economics and it is fundamentally the kind of maneuver that leads toward economic collapse. America’s Achilles Heel is its overpriced labor force**. The rest of the world can make much of what we make here at home, only it can do it at cheaper prices and with equal or better quality. Now, they certainly can’t make and import a Subway sandwich; some things must be made locally. However, **when a sandwich jockey earns $15** an hour for slapping some turkey on wheat bread, then **the line worker building airplanes for Boeing** in Seattle **is**, ultimately, **going to demand a higher wage**, too, **at some point** because **he’s having to compete for goods with the sandwich maker** who now has more money to spend … **and that begins to trickle up the labor pool at Boeing and** other **manufacturers that are competing globally**. Yet, **when** American **manufacturers** like Boeing **face bloated labor costs**, **they must either cut corners on quality** (**which helped bring G**eneral **M**otors **to the brink of death**), **reduce research and development that would give them a competitive edge, or reduce their workforce** for fear of losing contract opportunities. So, tell me: How does raising the minimum wage help the American middle class if it reduces the quality of American-made goods, leads to a reduction in job opportunities (at the very moment technology is making so many no-, low- and medium-skilled jobs redundant) and increases the cost of living that hurts the very workers the higher wage is supposed to help? Investing in Profit-Friendly Markets In the end, raising the minimum wage just makes America increasingly less competitive. In a closed economy, that wouldn’t necessarily matter. But in a global economy, where labor is abundant, cheap and fungible (who cares where my iPhone is made, so long as it’s affordable to the masses) America’s “raise the wage” debate is anachronistic and blind to the reality of global labor markets. For investors, that tells you that you don’t want your portfolio concentrated in U.S. markets. The economy faces the headwinds of rising labor costs that will crimp corporate profits, which pushes stock prices down … or inflationary pressures, which, also, pushes stock prices down. You want your money in markets where labor is more conducive to corporate profitability — and that tends to be Asia. That’s where the real opportunities are today. And that’s where you should begin putting some of your wealth to work.

#### Airline industry drives US competitiveness.

**Kelly 8** Gary Kelly (Chief Executive Officer of Southwest Airlines) “CEOpinion: Airline Industry Very Fuel-Efficient” Corporate Responsibility Magazine 2008 http://www.thecro.com/node/620

The problem of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the resulting climate change is one that faces all of us—as individuals, but also as corporations. The backbone of the aviation industry is helping individuals go, see and do in a time-effective manner. If we don’t address the problem of GHG emissions, there will not be natural places to go, a world to see or things to do. We, as an industry, are highly motivated to preserve the natural world around us. Southwest Airlines and the entire airline industry have a great story to tell about improving fuel efficiency and reducing GHG emissions. Compared to other industries, and even other modes of transportation, the airline industry is incredibly fuel-efficient and continues to improve efficiency with investments in new technology and by adopting new operational procedures. We are driven to be as fuel efficient as possible because, not only is it the right thing to do, frankly, it’s good business. Fuel accounts for an incredibly large portion of any airline’s operating costs. And thus, we have every reason in the world to be as fuel (and carbon) efficient as possible. We are constantly searching for ways to reduce our fuel costs. When we reduce our fuel consumption, we help both the environment and our bottom line. Any government solution to climate change should leverage this economic reality**. According to a recent study, “Commercial Aviation and the American Economy,” the airline industry, which includes both passenger and cargo carriers, is a major driver of economic activity, especially in the United States, where the airline industry is directly responsible for 5.8 percent of gross economic output and 8.8 percent of national employment.** Despite our role in being a major generator of economic activity, airlines account for only about 2 percent of GHG emissions in the United States and 3 percent worldwide. Again, the airline industry delivers more value to the economy while maintaining a low carbon footprint because we are constantly improving our fuel efficiency. The industry has already contributed to the reduction of emissions through technology and efficiency. The industry has improved its fuel efficiency—and hence GHG efficiency—by 103 percent between 1978 and 2006.

Empirics prove that competitiveness creates economic hegemony which solves global conflict. **Hubbard 10** writes[[271]](#footnote-271)

Research into the theoretical underpinnings of this topic revealed that there are two main subfields within the literature on hegemonic stability. One line of study, an avenue pursued by prominent theorists such as Kindleberger, Keohane, and Ikenberry focuses primarily on questions of related to the economic system. The other avenue, pursued by theorists such as Gilpin, looks at the role of hegemonic governance in reducing violent conflict. In my research, I focus on this aspect of hegemonic stability – its implications for military conflict in the international system. To research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs, focusing on the years of 1815-1939 in the case of British hegemony, and 1945 to 1999 in the case of American hegemony. I hypothesized that hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the international system. Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. **I** then **matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts** in the international system **since 1815**. I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. **Regression** analysis of the data **revealed** that there was **a statistically significant negative correlation between** relative **heg**emonic power **and conflict** levels in the international system. However, further statistical tests added complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further **analysis revealed** that in both cases, **military power was a less accurate predictor of** military **conflict than economic power**. There are several possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition, **weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged militarily** than stronger hegemons. Thus, the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the **most important** implication of this research **is that hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power** than through the exercise of military force. II. Research Question In examining hegemonic stability theory, there are several important questions to consider. First of all, an acceptable definition of what constitutes a hegemon must be established. Secondly, a good measure of what constitutes stability in the international system must be determined. Certainly, the frequency and severity of interstate conflict is an important measure of stability in the international system. However, other measures of stability should also be taken into account. Conflict in the international system takes on a wide range of forms. While military conflict is perhaps the most violent and severe dimension, it is only one of many forms that conflict can take. Conflict need not be confined to wars between traditional states. Terrorism, piracy, and guerilla warfare are also types of conflict that are endemic to the international system. Economic conflict, exemplified by trade wars, hostile actions such as sanctions, or outright trade embargos, is also an important form of conflict in the international system. States can also engage in a range of less severe actions that might be deemed political conflict, by recalling an ambassador or withdrawing from international bodies, for example. Clearly, “stability” as it pertains to the international system is a vast and amorphous concept. Because of these complexities, a comprehensive assessment of the theory is beyond the purview of this research. However, completing a more focused analysis is a realistic endeavor. Focusing on international armed conflicts in two select periods will serve to increase the feasibility the research. I will focus on the period of British hegemony lasting from the end of the Napoleonic wars to 1939 and the period of American hegemony beginning after the Second World War and continuing until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. The proposed hypothesis is that in these periods, the **heg**emon **acted as a stabilizing force** by reducing the frequency and severity of international armed conflict. The dependent variable in this case is the frequency and severity of conflict. The primary independent variable is the power level of the hegemon. This hypothesis is probabilistic since it posits that the hegemon tended to reduce conflict, not that it did so in every single possible instance. One way to test this hypothesis would be through a case-study method that examined the role of Britain and the United States in several different conflicts. This method would have the advantage of approaching the problem from a very feasible, limited perspective. While it would not reveal much about hegemony on a broader theoretical level, it would help provide practical grounding for what is a highly theoretical area of stuffy in international relations. Another method would be to do a broader quantitative comparison of international conflict by finding and comparing data on conflict and hegemonic strength for the entire time covered by British and American hegemony. The hypothesis is falsifiable, because it could be shown that the hegemon did not act as a stabilizing force during the years of study. **It** also **avoids** some of **the pitfalls** associated **with the case study method, such as selection bias and** the inherently **subjective** nature of **qualitative analysis.**

Absent heg, these conflicts will escalate and cause extinction. **Kagan 7** writes[[272]](#footnote-272)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. **Nationalism** in all its forms **is back**, if it ever went away, **and so is international competition for power**, influence, honor, and status. **American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying** — its regional as well as its global predominance. **Were the U**nited **S**tates **to diminish its influence** in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the **other nations would settle disputes** as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often **through confrontation and wars** of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that **most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons.** **That could make wars** between them less likely, or it could simply make them more **catastrophic.**

### Wage Subsidies CP

Counterplan: Municipal, local, and state governments will implement a permanent targeted wage subsidy for airport workers across the country and abolish statutory minimum wage laws.

Wage subsidies are better than living wage, and economists agree

**EPI 1** writes[[273]](#footnote-273)

It is revealing that the **living wage** activists promote policies at the local level that **would raise** the **costs of employers, rather than** targeted policies that **promote** economic **growth** and expansion. Writing in the influential Brookings Review, Edward Hill and Jeremy Nowak have made the case that distressed urban areas need a combination of tax subsidies and market-based policies that attract businesses and encourage investments in workers and infrastructure.6 **Living wage ordinances, by raising employer costs,** work in the opposite direction by **limiting job growth and employment opportunities for low-skill workers. A more appealing policy** alternative to wage mandates **is a targeted living wage subsidy that encourages the poor to work, yet does not place hiring barriers in their path. Professional labor economists**, who study the effects of wage mandates and wage subsidies, **are overwhelmingly opposed to living wage ordinances and prefer** tax credits or **wage subsidies** as antipoverty devices. This is shown in a recent survey, conducted in March and April 2000, of members of the American Economic Association who specialize in labor economics.7 Of the 336 labor economists who responded to the survey, 69 percent expressed the opinion that localized living wage ordinances were “not at all” efficient in addressing the income needs of poor families. Indeed, 43 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that a national living wage mandate would increase poverty. On the other hand, 98 percent of the responding labor economists expressed a belief that the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was either a “very efficient” (51%) or a “somewhat efficient” (47%) means of assisting the poor.

The aff destroys 50% of minimum wage contractor jobs, and that’s a conservative estimate—the CP solves

**EPI 1** writes[[274]](#footnote-274)

Wage Mandates Cause Job Displacement While Wage Subsidies Do Not One compelling argument against mandated wage increases on the scale advocated by the living wage movement is that they would result in job losses for the very population they seek to help. Wage mandates are thought to cause job loss by raising employers’ costs of employing low-skill labor without corresponding increases in skills or productivity. This increase in relative costs leads employers to substitute higher skilled labor and capital equipment for the very-low-wage workers the living wage movement purports to help. Without jobs, the living wage ordinances offer an empty promise. On the other hand, **targeted wage subsidies do not destroy jobs** for less-skilled workers **because they do not raise** the **employers’ costs** of employing them. The benefits are delivered to either the worker or the employer through a subsidy payment or tax credit. a. Wage Mandates Cause the Less Skilled to Lose Jobs **Based on decades of research, most labor economists agree that minimum wages do not reduce poverty** partly **because** the **costs of minimum wages are borne disproportionately by the poor.**10 When labor costs rise through wage mandates, **employers have strong incentives to substitute high**er**-skilled labor** and capital **for** the **less-skilled labor that has become more expensive**. Also, to the extent that **businesses raise prices** as a result of the wage hikes, **they stand to lose customers, which leads to further reductions in jobs**. Unfortunately, those who need the jobs the most and who have the most difficulty finding and keeping Page 3 stable work are those most likely to be hurt by the wage increases. It is thus not surprising that labor economists take a dim view of living wage ordinances because these ordinances are nothing more than the minimum wage on steroids. Based on an extensive body of respectable research, a conservative estimate would be that a mandated 10 percent increase in wages would reduce the employment and/or hours of those affected by at least 5 percent.11 Other credible studies have found much higher effects.12 This means that, **speaking conservatively, a living wage ordinance that doubled labor costs** for low-wage workers (e.g., a wage hike from $5.15 to $10.30) **could** be expected to **reduce employment of those previously working at** the **minimum wage by 50 percent**.13 That is, one out of every two affected minimum wage workers could expect to be displaced (or the equivalent in reductions in hours across the minimum wage work force) because of the higher-wages mandated by living wage ordinances. The effect for higher wage workers would also be significant. For workers whose wages were raised by 50 percent, say from $7.00 to $10.50, one of four of them is likely to be displaced (or we would see an equivalent hours reduction for the work force). This is just the shortrun effect. The longer-term effects are less well documented, but are likely to lead to further skilled labor or capital substitution, or other adjustments that reduce labor demand. The disemployment effects could be lower for contractor-based mandates if the local government absorbs a high fraction of the higher wage and benefit costs. Is it any wonder that labor economists generally regard wage mandates as being more likely to increase poverty than to reduce it?

Taxes and benefit reductions offset aff solvency; the CP avoids this

**EPI 1** writes[[275]](#footnote-275)

Unlike Living Wage Ordinances, Wage Subsidies Do Not Cause Poor Families to Lose Government Benefits For poor families receiving government assistance, there is yet another reason mandated wage policies are ineffective in alleviating their poverty. **Government assistance programs such as T**emporary **A**ssistance for **N**eedy **F**amilies**, food stamps,** the **E**arned **I**ncome **T**ax **C**redit **and housing assistance** all **reduce their benefits incrementally** as a family’s earnings increase. A recent study from New York University Law School has documented just how pervasive such work disincentives can be for workers in poor families.37 This means that for every additional dollar a family earns it could lose as much as 90 cents or more in federal benefits. **Thus,** the **upside potential for a living wage mandate to** substantially **increase a poverty family’s net income is** extremely **limited**. Indeed, **even advocates** of living wage mandates **concede that a significant part** of any mandated wage increase **is lost through taxes and benefit losses**. For example, Pollin and his colleagues estimated that in the absence of job losses, a New Orleans minimum wage of $6.15 would increase the gross earnings of affected workers by 12 percent, but would increase their after-tax, after-benefit incomes by only 2.9 to 4.4 percent.38 In contrast **targeted wage subsidies do not impinge on a family’s eligibility for government programs, and thus cause no loss of benefits**.39 In view of these facts, most labor economists view wage mandates as inefficient and likely to cause more harm than good. They prefer wage subsidies that can be more efficiently targeted to those in need and that do not cause the loss of jobs.

### \*\*\*Advantage

### Solvency

#### Plan barely solves security

**Harris 2**

Douglas H. Harris (chairman and principal scientist of Anacapa Sciences, Inc., specialized in improving human performance on inspection, investigation, and intelligence tasks and has served on the National Research Council’s Committee on Commercial Aviation Security and Panel on Airline Passenger Security Screening) “How to Really Improve Airport Security” Ergonomics in Design Winter 2002 <https://www.hfes.org/web/Newsroom/Improve_Airport_Security.pdf> JW 3/23

The **low wages** paid to screeners **are frequently cited as a** principal **contributor to poor** operator **performance**. It is argued that higher wages would attract “better” people to these jobs and, in turn, lead to better performance. However, **increased pay alone is not likely to increase operator performance directly. A substantial body of evidence suggests** that **any linkage between pay and performance is tenuous** at best **and** is probably **insignificant** in the face of much more powerful determinants of operator performance, such as job design, performance measurement and feedback, and the match between operator aptitudes and tasks (for example, see Filipczak, 1996; Guzzo, 1988; Guzzo, Jette, & Katzell, 1985; Hertzberg, 1968; Lawler, 1971, 1981).

**AT: Reich**

**The MCO Is San Francisco Airport’s Living Wage Law; That’s Distinct From QSP**

**Reich et al., 2003:**

(Living Wage And Economic Performance: The San Francisco Airport Model. March 2003. Michael Reich, Peter Hall, Ken Jacobs, Institute Of Industrial Relations At University Of California, Berkeley.)

**San Francisco’s living wage law, the Minimum Compensation Ordinance (MCO),** was passed by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in August 2000 and went into effect in October 2000. The MCO **requires private contractors** performing services for the city, or **operating at the San Francisco International Airport, to meet specified minimum wage and benefit requirements.** The law also covers home care workers employed through the In Home Support Services Public Authority (IHSS). The MCO exempts contracts of less than $25,000 with for-profit businesses and $50,000 with non-profit agencies. Contracts with small businesses that have fewer than 20 total employees in all affiliated entities are also exempt from the ordinance.11 **The pay provisions of the MCO are slightly different from those of the QSP.** The required minimum pay rate in the MCO was set initially at $9 an hour, increasing to $10 on January 1, 2002, and with a 2.5 percent cost of living increases in each of the following three years. Compensation must also include 12 paid days off a year for vacation and sick leave a nd 10 uncompensated days off for family emergencies.12

**The 1AC Evidence Is About QSP, Which Is Hiring And Training Standards**

**Reich et al., 2003:**

(Living Wage And Economic Performance: The San Francisco Airport Model. March 2003. Michael Reich, Peter Hall, Ken Jacobs, Institute Of Industrial Relations At University Of California, Berkeley.)

**The Quality Standards Program The QSP was** passed by the Airport Commission in January 2000 and its implementation began the following April. The program **establishes hiring, training and compensation standards** for all employers with workers in security areas or performing security functions. The standards, which exceeded those set at the time by the FAA, cover some 8,300 workers in over 80 firms, including baggage screeners, skycaps, baggage handlers, airplane cleaners, fuelers and boarding agents— anyone whose performance affects airport security and safety. **With the QSP,** airline **service contractors that had previously evaded regulatory oversight have to be certified by the Airport Commission;** the quality standards are a condition of certification. The implementation of the program was phased in over the course of 2000, first going into effect for airline services contracts on April 1, and airline employees on October 1. It was later amended to include skycaps and wheelchair agents, starting June 1, 2000. The program established minimum compensation levels of $9 an hour with benefits, $10.25 an hour without benefits, which increased to $10 an hour with benefits, $11.25 without benefits on January 1, 2001. This amount is adjusted annually in accordance with the Bay Area CPI. Benefits are defined as company-paid membership in a group medical plan, twelve paid days off and ten unpaid days off a year. **Firms must also satisfy a range of hiring, training and performance standards,** many of which were designed to exceed FAA regulations. **These standards included high school diplomas and substantially greater training, approximately 40 hours for airport screeners under the QSP,** compared to about 8 hours under then-existing FAA regulations. The QSP policy departed from previously issued but not implemented FAA proposals in five important respects. First, it extended coverage well beyond pre-board screeners to include all airport workers employed in safety and security-related positions. Second, it addressed wages and benefits, establishing minimum compensation levels for covered workers. **Third, for security-related employees, the QSP established higher standards for hiring, specifically in the areas of English language competence** and ability to deal with contingencies on the job. **Fourth, it extended standards for entry and recurrent training in security and safety topics. Fifth, the QSP established a regulatory relationship between the airport and the airline service contractors that previously had evaded oversight.**

**AT Bernstein**

**Bernstein’s Not About Living Wage; He Also Concludes Negative**

**Bernstein, 2005:**

(The Living Wage Movement. What Is It, Why Is It, and What’s Known About Its Impact?, Published In Emerging Labor Market Institutions For The Twenty-First Century. Jared Bernstein. 2005)

**+A final important impact study is Reich, Hall, and Jacobs’s (2003) analysis of a particularly broad ordinance (in terms of coverage, wages, and other mandates, such as training standards) implemented at the San Francisco International Airport in 2000.** While the authors find the expected increase in wages (they note that the wage of affected entry-level workers rose by an average of 33 percent), what’s most notable about their findings are the efficiency wage effects. They report that turnover fell by an average of 34 percent among firms covered by the ordinance and that the decline in turnover rates increase with wages. To cite a particularly relevant occupation in our post-9/11 world, they report that turnover among airport security screeners, whose average wage rose by 55 percent after the living wage went into effect, fell from 94.7 percent per year to 18.7 percent fifteen months later.23While Fairris (2003) finds a negative relation between living wages and training, Reich, Hall, and Jacobs report increased training as mandated by the ordinance itself. Finally, while they argue that employment levels were not affected by the ordinance, they do not offer the controls that would enable them to test this assertion relative to unaffected firms**. [1AC CARD ENDS]** **The impact studies thus reveal somewhat of a “mixed bag.”** As the lowcoverage/ low-impact arguments suggest, the ordinances have not thus far led to far-reaching disruptions of employment or contract costs. Relative to the size of the low-wage labor market, the wages of a small number of workers have gotten a significant lift. There are over 100 of these ordinances, and as living wage expert Robert Pollin (2002) has quipped, if the enacted ordinances were leading to significant problems, we’d be hearing about it.24 **Yet, while minor, disemployment effects do show up** in some of the work, **and, perhaps more importantly, Elmore (2003) reports that the Oakland living wage probably played a role in discouraging two national retailers from locating there. This one case** does not imply that such firms will invariably make this choice or that localities will necessarily decide that such a tradeoff is unacceptable, but it **is a finding of which advocates and policymakers should take note.** On the other hand, as reported in a newspaper story about a new ordinance in Lawrence, Kansas, a siteselection consultant stated, “‘I don’t think that [living wage] knocks you out of the running’ in attracting new businesses.”25 Clearly, **we need to learn more about the impact of living wages on such incentives.**

### More Indicts

#### Edwards says terrorists won’t attack us—it says “The safety of travelers in recent years may have more to do with the dearth of terrorists than with the TSA”

#### Goudie says a GAO report proves passenger screening and the terrorist watch list are extremely ineffective; the aff can’t solve those structural issues.

#### The CBS evidence is about an Ebola attack in East Africa, which is irrelevant to the domestic TSA.

### Bioterror Defense

**Absolutely zero risk of a bioterror impact. Empirics are overwhelmingly decisive.**

**Dove 12**

<Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/>

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it. There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies. Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died. That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that. Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack. The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so this release over the world’s largest city really represented a worst-case scenario. Nobody got sick or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon. Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

### AT: Lippman

**Lippman’s writing in the 9/11 aftermath and doesn’t assume a decade of new scholarship. New consensus goes neg on both motivation and capacity**

Matt **Fay 13**, PhD student in the history department at Temple University, has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier University and a Master’s in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a minor in Transnational Security Studies from American Military University, 7/18/13, “The Ever-Shrinking Odds of Nuclear Terrorism”, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HoItCUNhbgUJ:hegemonicobsessions.com/%3Fp%3D902+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack really? While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and **argued against** the **prevailing alarmism**. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John **Mueller ridiculed** the notion of **nuclear terrorism** in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place. But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use. Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis. The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude: [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence. From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—nuclear terrorism hardly warrants the type of exertions many alarmist assessments indicate it should.

### \*\*\*AT: Theory Pre-empts

### Overview

Neg gets RVIs if I don’t run theory. Key to reciprocity. Also key to deter the 1AR from using blippy theory to minimize topic engagement. If the 1AR was too skewed to win substance, she should collapse to 4 minutes of theory anyway.

The neg gets to answer spikes in the 2NR.

**Thompson 4-21** writes[[276]](#footnote-276)

Here I will give a number of reasons to think that **it is unreasonable to expect the negative to answer spikes before they are applied in the 1AR**. I recognize that the common assumption is that one may respond to the application of spikes e.g. the ‘violation’ but it is my position that one should actually be able to respond to any part of the argument. First, **you can only assess an argument** by **knowing the way it is used. Because different uses of the same premise**, will give the argument more or less credence. If I have a set of premises that entail a conclusion, those premises may cause me to accept the conclusion. However, I could also, given how much I doubt the conclusion give up on the premises. Thus for instance, if I started with the premise ‘I am not dreaming right now’ (which I do not think I am) that would lead me to think ‘I really am on a bus going to the airport.’ However, if that premise lead me to think ‘that really is my prize watermelon yodeling over the Swiss Alps, I would instead have reason to rethink my premise (perhaps I am dreaming after all). (Incidentally this is one of several reasons why the idea of a ‘skep trigger’ does not make sense. Just because my premise was strong enough to be part of an argument that your moral theory is false, does not mean it is strong enough to be part of an argument that no moral theory is true). . Now, **before someone applies a spike, the strength of the conclusion is not there**. Will the RVI apply to I-meets or only counter interpretations? Will the 1AR do something abusive that I will want to read theory against? Does prefer aff offense mean ‘always prefer’ or just ‘give it some higher credence’? Will no Neg RVIs suddenly apply to even if they read 3 new shells in the 1AR? **The spike may seem** reasonable in the context of the AC, but **unreasonable in the context of the 1AR**. A good example is a round I saw this last weekend. The affirmative read a spike that basically said the negative can only have one layer of offense (like only substance or only theory). The negative missed it and read theory and an NC. The aff extends it, but then also goes heavily for ‘reasonability’ against the negative theory. Now, by the ‘reasonability threshold’ the 1AR read it was clear that the spike was ‘unreasonable.’ I feel we should all agree that the negative should be allowed to argue that in the context of reasonability in the 1AR the spike should not be applied, however it strikes me that if all spikes are first ‘applied’ in the 1AR and thus the context of the 1AR should be provided to answer the argument. Therefore, given that one cannot assess the ‘conclusion’ of the spike, because the conclusion assumes the context of the 1AR, there it is unreasonable to expect the negative to try to answer the argument.

Spikes are esoteric, so the neg should get to contest them once they’re complete args.

**Thompson 4-21** writes[[277]](#footnote-277)

A second reason to think this is the **specialized vocabulary** that **has grown up around debate terms. What** exactly **does it mean to ‘prefer,’** what is ‘comply or conflict,’ **what** exactly **is entailed by ‘competing interp**retation**s,’** what does it mean for X to be a ‘voter,’ **what are the conditions of ‘fairness’**. I assume that no one thinks that fairness or education are monolithic concepts, thus I might agree with you that the argument is ‘educational’ in the way you use the word education, but not in the sort of education debate should value. **Until the entire argument is out there and put to use, there is no framework of verification for what those words mean.** Debaters from different regions, camps and contexts will interpret different spikes differently and thus we should wait to verify how it used before being expected to answer it. Once when expressing this opinion, it was responded that debaters should just make the argument that the implication was unclear and they can have that debate in round. The problem is, that debate starts too late. The negative does not get a chance to contest the application of the spike till the 2nr, and any judge will tell you it is basically impossible to assess a debate that start in the 2nr, the judge will almost always just end up siding with which opinion they think is right (which will again stem from their region, school, camps etc.). No article would be complete without a dubiously applied, decontextualized aphorism of Wittgenstein’s so I will end this argument with “For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this way can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI 43, emphasis added).

Reject the arg is key to proportionality

**Nebel 14** writes[[278]](#footnote-278)

Proportionality. The **punishment of losing** the round **is** much **worse than the “crime**,**” even according to the biggest theory impacts** (**which claim that winning becomes easier** or more likely, **but not certain**). **Fairness requires proportionality because fairness is** the **satisfaction of claims in proportion to their strength**. (That requires a bit more development. For the basic idea, see John Broome, “Fairness.”) **The only residual cost if you drop the arg**ument **is** the **time investment for running theory. But that is balanced by the investment in** the initial practice and in **defending “drop the arg**ument**”**; there’s no evidence that they needed to spend so much time on theory; dropping the debater is the main incentive for the excessive time investment; even if dropping the argument would not fully rectify the “abuse,” it’s closer to being proportional than dropping the debater;

### AT Side Bias

I will concede rejecting theory that’s not weighed against side bias is the key to solve time skew. Don’t let him cross-apply side bias to get him anything else because that’d overcompensate.

### AT No 2NR Theory

1. Justifies literally infinite abuse; I’d have no recourse, which outweighs any possible impact.

2. Judges gutcheck on late-breaking theory which solves technical concessions.

3. Let’s be real. I’m not reading frivolous 2NR theory but you know for sure if I dropped this he’d have 5 theory shells in the 1AR.

4. Extensions solve time skew.

### AT Conceded Aff Args Come First

1. Arguments never start from 100% validity because shitty theory spikes are only as good as their warrant.

2. No warrant—the Thompson 15 card answers this.

3. Aff concessions are worse. First is worse; second is best.

### AT Reasonability on T

I’ll concede this—but infinite theory interps means reasonability applies more broadly.

### AT Neg Abuse o/w

1. Reactivity doesn’t help the neg. It’s impossible to prep for every aff, and they’ll always have more specific substantive research since they set the terms of the debate.

2. Abuse is abuse, regardless of whose side it’s on—it’s better to weigh the standards.

3. If you do weigh, Aff abuse outweighs neg abuse because they get the 2AR to spin things and I don’t have a 3NR to answer it.

### AT Aff Theory=Drop the debater

Reject the argument is key to proportionality. That’s Nebel 14. Outweighs because proportionality is definitionally key to fairness.

By the same logic, I’d need drop the debater or he can be abusive and force me to waste more time than I can afford. CX proves the waste of time.

## Deon 1NC (Old Version)

### Util Framework

The standard is **maximizing happiness**.

First, revisionary intuitionism

Revisionary intuitionism is true and leads to util.

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[279]](#footnote-279)

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my **meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless.** And this appears to be a general syndrome - **people do much better when discussing whether torture is** good or **bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level** wherever I possibly can. Occasionally **people object** to any discussion of morality on the grounds **that morality doesn't exist**, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that **"exist" is not the right term to use** here, I generally say, "But **what do you do anyway?**" and **take the discussion back down to the object level.** Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. **I see** the project of **morality as a project of renormalizing intuition.** We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all** the **intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your** specific **intuitions and** refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a** grunting **caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. **Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - **it**'s **just** that modus ponens **still seems like a good idea after being** formalized, **reflected on**, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate** "**util**itarianism", **you run into paradoxes, contradictions**, circular preferences, **and other** things that aren't **symptoms of** moral wrongness so much as **moral incoherence.** After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. **After** the two hundred and eighty-seventh **research** study **showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity** - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could** look at this intuition, and **think it was** revealing **some** kind of **incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could** look at that and **say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't** successfully **multiply** by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. **But it ought to**, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. **When you've read enough** heuristics and **biases research, and enough coherence** and uniqueness **proofs for** Bayesian probabilities and **expected utility**, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, **then you don't see** the **preference reversals** in the Allais Paradox **as** revealing **some** incredibly **deep moral truth** about the intrinsic value of certainty. **It just goes to show that the brain doesn't** goddamn **multiply.** The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that **primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of** symbols standing for **small quantities** - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected** on enough intuitions, **and corrected enough absurdities, you** start to **see a common denominator, a meta-principle** at work, **which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. **And that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

And second, reductionism

Brain studies prove personal identity doesn’t exist. **Parfit 84** writes[[280]](#footnote-280)

Some **recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View.** Human beings have a **lower brain and** two **upper hemispheres**, which **are connected by a bundle of fibres.** In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of his visual field, and can receive two different answers** written by this person’s two hands.

In the absence of personal identity, only end states can matter. **Shoemaker 99**[[281]](#footnote-281)

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. Many people claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not justified in maximizing the good across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single, deeply unified person, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if the only justification for the different treatment of individual lives and sets of lives is the further fact, and this fact is undermined by the truth of reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment. **There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives** and sets of lives **is mistaken.** If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them** and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, **would be the most plausible. Util**itarianism **is just such a theory.**

### Revolution DA

High income inequality makes revolution against the super-rich inevitable.

**Hanauer 14** writes[[282]](#footnote-282)

But let’s speak frankly to each other. I’m not the smartest guy you’ve ever met, or the hardest-working. I was a mediocre student. I’m not technical at all—I can’t write a word of code. What sets me apart, I think, is a tolerance for risk and an intuition about what will happen in the future. Seeing where things are headed is the essence of entrepreneurship. And what do I see in our future now? I see pitchforks. At the same time that people like you and me are thriving beyond the dreams of any plutocrats in history, the rest of the country—**the 99**.99 **percent**—**is lagging** far **behind**. The divide between the haves and have-nots is getting worse really, really fast. In 1980, the top 1 percent controlled about 8 percent of U.S. national income. The bottom 50 percent shared about 18 percent. Today the top 1 percent share about 20 percent; the bottom 50 percent, just 12 percent. But the problem isn’t that we have inequality. Some inequality is intrinsic to any high-functioning capitalist economy. The problem is that **inequality is at historically high levels and getting worse** every day. Our country is rapidly becoming less a capitalist society and more a feudal society. Unless our policies change dramatically, the middle class will disappear, and we will be back to late 18th-century France. Before the revolution. And so I have a message for my fellow filthy rich, for all of us who live in our gated bubble worlds: Wake up, people. It won’t last. **If we don’t** do something to **fix the glaring inequities in this economy, the pitchforks are going to come for us. No society can sustain** this kind of **rising inequality.** In fact, **there is no example in** human **history where wealth accumulated like this and the pitchforks didn’t eventually come out**. You show me a highly unequal society, and I will show you a police state. Or an uprising. There are no counterexamples. None. **It’s not if, it’s when**. Many of us think we’re special because “this is America.” We think we’re immune to the same forces that started the Arab Spring—or the French and Russian revolutions, for that matter. I know you fellow .01%ers tend to dismiss this kind of argument; I’ve had many of you tell me to my face I’m completely bonkers. And yes, I know there are many of you who are convinced that because you saw a poor kid with an iPhone that one time, inequality is a fiction. Here’s what I say to you: You’re living in a dream world. What everyone wants to believe is that when things reach a tipping point and go from being merely crappy for the masses to dangerous and socially destabilizing, that we’re somehow going to know about that shift ahead of time. Any student of history knows that’s not the way it happens. **Revolutions, like bankruptcies, come gradually, and then suddenly**. One day, somebody sets himself on fire, then thousands of people are in the streets, and before you know it, the country is burning. And then there’s no time for us to get to the airport and jump on our Gulfstream Vs and fly to New Zealand. That’s the way it always happens. If inequality keeps rising as it has been, eventually it will happen. We will not be able to predict when, and it will be terrible—for everybody. But especially for us.

The revolution will challenge capitalism itself. Minimum wage increases stabilize capitalism and shut down anti-capitalist social movements

**Hanauer 14** writes[[283]](#footnote-283)

One thing we can agree on—I’m sure of this—is that the change isn’t going to start in Washington. Thinking is stale, arguments even more so. On both sides. But the way I see it, that’s all right. **Most major social movements have seen** their **earli**est **victories at** the **state and municipal levels**. The fight over the eight-hour workday, which ended in Washington, D.C., in 1938, began in places like Illinois and Massachusetts in the late 1800s. The movement for social security began in California in the 1930s. Even the Affordable Health Care Act—Obamacare—would have been hard to imagine without Mitt Romney’s model in Massachusetts to lead the way. Sadly, **no Republicans and few Democrats get this**. President **Obama doesn’t** seem to **either**, though his heart is in the right place. In his State of the Union speech this year, **he mentioned** the **need for a higher minimum wage but failed to make the case that less inequality** and a renewed middle class **would promote faster** economic **growth**. Instead, the arguments we hear from most Democrats are the same old social-justice claims. The only reason to help workers is because we feel sorry for them. These fairness arguments feed right into every stereotype of Obama and the Democrats as bleeding hearts. Republicans say growth. Democrats say fairness—and lose every time. But just because the two parties in Washington haven’t figured it out yet doesn’t mean we rich folks can just keep going. The conversation is already changing, even if the billionaires aren’t onto it. I know what you think: **You think that Occupy** Wall Street and all the other capitalism-is-the-problem protesters **disappeared without a trace. But that’s not true**. Of course, it’s hard to get people to sleep in a park in the cause of social justice. But the protests we had in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis really did help to change the debate in this country from death panels and debt ceilings to inequality. It’s just that so many of you plutocrats didn’t get the message. **Dear 1%ers, many of our fellow citizens are starting to believe that capitalism itself is the problem. I disagree, and I’m sure you do too**. Capitalism, when well managed, is the greatest social technology ever invented to create prosperity in human societies. **But capitalism left unchecked tends toward concentration and collapse**. **It can be managed** either **to benefit** the few in the near term or **the many in the long term**. The work of democracies is to bend it to the latter. That is why investments in the middle class work. And tax breaks for rich people like us don’t. Balancing the power of workers and billionaires by **raising the minimum wage isn’t bad for capitalism. It’s an indispensable tool smart capitalists use to make capitalism stable** and sustainable. And no one has a bigger stake in that than zillionaires like us. The oldest and most important conflict in human societies is the battle over the concentration of wealth and power. The folks like us at the top have always told those at the bottom that our respective positions are righteous and good for all. Historically, we called that divine right. Today we have trickle-down economics. What nonsense this is. Am I really such a superior person? Do I belong at the center of the moral as well as economic universe? Do you? My family, the Hanauers, started in Germany selling feathers and pillows. They got chased out of Germany by Hitler and ended up in Seattle owning another pillow company. Three generations later, I benefited from that. Then I got as lucky as a person could possibly get in the Internet age by having a buddy in Seattle named Bezos. I look at the average Joe on the street, and I say, “There but for the grace of Jeff go I.” Even the best of us, in the worst of circumstances, are barefoot, standing by a dirt road, selling fruit. We should never forget that, or forget that the United States of America and its middle class made us, rather than the other way around. **Or we could** sit back, **do nothing**, enjoy our yachts. **And wait for the pitchforks.**

Capitalism causes extinction from environmental destruction

**Street 14** writes[[284]](#footnote-284)

[Brackets in original] Put all that aside for a moment, if you can, and reflect on the growing **environmental catastrophe** that now **poses a genuine threat of** human **extinction in the not-so-distant** historical **future**. Marx suggested a different and actually apocalyptic alternative to proletarian revolution in the Manifesto: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”[4] Can there by any serious doubt that “the modern economic growth” that Piketty praises for having kept “the Marxist apocalypse” at bay threatens to bring about “the common ruin of the contending classes” – indeed the ever-increasing degradation and final destruction of life on Earth – precisely because it is taking place under the command of capital? More than merely dangerous, uncomfortable, and expensive, the **new weather patterns threaten** the world’s **food and water** supplies. **They raise the** real **specter of** human **extinction if** and when **terrible “tipping points” like** the **large-scale release of Arctic methane** (a potential near-term context for truly “runaway global warming”) **are passed**. The related problem of **ocean acidification** (a change in the ocean’s chemistry resulting from excessive human carbon emissions) **is attacking the** very **building blocks of life** under the world’s great and polluted seas. **Thanks to climate change and other forms of toxic human intervention** in global ecosystems, **we** most **add drastically declining biodiversity** – a technical phrase for the massive dying off of other species – to the list of “ecological rifts”[5] facing humanity and other living and sentient beings in the 21st century. The findings and judgments of the best contemporary earth science are crystal clear. As the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (UK) concluded last year: “Today, in 2013, we face an unavoidably radical future… We either continue with rising emissions and reap the radical repercussions of severe climate change, or we acknowledge that we have a choice and pursue radical emission reductions: No longer is there a non-radical option. Moreover, low-carbon supply technologies cannot deliver the necessary rate of emission reductions – they need to be complemented with rapid, deep and early reductions in energy consumption.”[6] Sadly, however, the Tyndall **scientists failed to raise the question of** the **deeper social-systemic cancer** behind the spreading disease of human-generated climate change. **The disease is capitalism**[7], for whose masters and apologists the answer to the venerable popular demand for equality has long been “more.” The answer is based on the theory that growth creates “a rising tide that lifts all boats” in ways that make us forget about the fact that a wealthy few are sailing luxuriantly in giant yachts while most of us are struggling to keep afloat in modest motorboats and rickety dinghies. As Le Monde’s ecological editor Herve Kempf noted in his aptly titled book The Rich Are Destroying the Earth (2007), “the oligarchy” sees the pursuit of material growth as “the solution to the social crisis,” the “sole means of fighting poverty and unemployment,” and the “only means of getting societies to accept extreme inequalities without questioning them. . . . Growth,” Kempf explained, “would allow the overall level of wealth to arise and consequently improve the lot of the poor without—and this part is never spelled out [by the economic elite]—any need to modify the distribution of wealth.”[8] “Growth,” the liberal economist Henry Wallich explained (approvingly) in 1972, “is a substitute for equality of income. So long as there is growth there is hope, and that makes large income differentials tolerable.”[9] Of course, growth is more than an ideology under the profit system. It is also a material, economic imperative for investors, managers, workers, and policymakers caught up in the disastrous competitive world-capitalist logic of what John Bellamy Foster calls “the global ‘treadmill of production.” **Capitalism demands constant growth to meet** the **competitive accumulation requirements** of capital**,** the **employment needs** of an ever-expanding global class or proletarians (workers dependent on wages)**,** the **sales needs** of corporations, **and governing officials’ need to legitimize** their **power by appearing to advance** national economic **development** and security.[10] This system can no more forego growth and survive than a person can stop breathing and live. It is, as Joel Kovel notes, a system based on the “eternal expansion of the economic product,” and the “conver [sion of] everything possible [including the air we breathe, the water we drink, the soil and plants] into monetary [exchange] value.” “The Earth we live on,” Kovel notes, “is finite, and its ecosystems have evolved to accommodate to that finitude. Therefore, **a system built on endless growth is going to destroy the integrity of the ecosystems upon which life depends for food, energy, and other resources**.”[11] Consistent with this harsh reality, the system’s leading investors have invested massively in highly wasteful advertising, marketing, packaging and built-in-obsolescence. The commitment has penetrated into core processes of capitalist production, so that millions toil the world over in the making of complex electronic (and other) products designed to lose material and social value (and thus to be dumped in landfills) in short periods of time.[12]

Capitalism is oppressive, turns the case.

**Marx 44** writes[[285]](#footnote-285)

The labor prices of the various kinds of workers show much wider differences than the profits in the various branches in which capital is applied. In labor all the natural, spiritual, and social variety of individual activity is manifested and is variously rewarded, whilst dead capital always keeps the same pace and is indifferent to real individual activity. In general we should observe that in those cases where worker and capitalist equally suffer, the worker suffers in his very existence, the capitalist in the profit on his dead mammon. **The worker has to struggle not only for** his **physical means of subsistence; he has to struggle to get work**, i.e., the possibility, the means, to perform his activity. Let us take the three chief conditions in which society can find itself and consider the situation of the worker in them: (1) If the wealth of society declines the worker suffers most of all, and for the following reason: although the working class cannot gain so much as can the class of property owners in a prosperous state of society, no one suffers so cruelly from its decline as the working class. (2) Let us now take a society in which wealth is increasing. This condition is the only one favorable to the worker. Here competition between the capitalists sets in. The demand for workers exceeds their supply. But: In the first place, the raising of wages gives rise to overwork among the workers. **The more they wish to earn, the more must** they **sacrifice their time** and carry out slave-labor, **completely losing** all **their freedom**, **in the service of greed.** Thereby they shorten their lives. This shortening of their life-span is a favorable circumstance for the working class as a whole, for as a result of it an ever-fresh supply of labor becomes necessary. This class has always to sacrifice a part of itself in order not to be wholly destroyed. Furthermore: When does a society find itself in a condition of advancing wealth? When the capitals and the revenues of a country are growing. But this is only possible: (a) As the result of the accumulation of much labor, capital being accumulated labor; as the result, therefore, of the fact that more and more of his products are being taken away from the worker, that to an increasing extent his own **[their] labor confronts him as another man’s property and** that **the means of his existence and** his **activity are** increasingly **concentrated in the hands of the capitalist.** (b) The accumulation of capital increases the division of labor, and the division of labor increases the number of workers. Conversely, the number of workers increases the division of labor, just as the division of labor increases the accumulation of capital. With this division of labor on the one hand and the accumulation of capital on the other, the worker becomes ever more exclusively dependent on labor, and on a particular, very one-sided, machine-like labor at that. Just as he is thus **[they are] depressed** spiritually and physically **to the condition of a machine and** from being a man becomes an abstract activity and a belly, so he also **becomes** ever **more dependent on** every fluctuation in market price, on the application of capital, and on **the whim of the rich.** Equally, the **increase in the class of people wholly dependent on work intensifies competition among** the **workers, thus lowering their price.** In the factory system this situation of the worker reaches its climax. (c) In an increasingly prosperous society only the richest of the rich can continue to live on money interest. Everyone else has to carry on a business with his capital, or venture it in trade. As a result, the competition between the capitalists becomes more intense. The concentration of capital increases, the big capitalists ruin the small, and a section of the erstwhile capitalists sinks into the working class, which as a result of this supply again suffers to some extent a depression of wages and passes into a still greater dependence on the few big capitalists. The number of capitalists having been diminished, their competition with respect to the workers scarcely exists any longer; and the number of workers having been increased, their competition among themselves has become all the more intense, unnatural, and violent. **Consequently, a section of the working class falls into beggary or starvation** just as necessarily as a section of the middle capitalists falls into the working class. Hence even in the condition of society most favorable to the worker, **the inevitable result for the worker is overwork and premature death, decline to a mere machine, a** bond **servant of capital**, which piles up dangerously over and against him, more competition, and starvation or beggary for a section of the workers

**The intent/foresight distinction doesn’t take out the disad.**

**Sethness 13**

Javier Sethness (Writer and rights advocate; his articles have appeared in Climate and Capitalism, Counterpunch, Dissident Voice, MRZine, Countercurrents, and Perspectives on Anarchist Theory), “The Structural Genocide That Is Capitalism”, Truthout 2013, <http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/16887-the-structural-genocide-that-is-capitalism>

Transitioning then to consideration of the question of whether the large number of avoidable deaths observed under conditions of capitalism should in fact be considered genocidal, Leech concedes that the UN's 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide excludes mass death resulting from one's pertaining to a given social class as constituting genocide. However, he notes that an initial draft of the Convention from 1947 did include death or injury resulting from "lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene and medical care, or excessive work or physical exertion" within the definition of genocide. Hence, while such a formulation did not appear in the final version with which we are all familiar, Leech does not accept legal positivism in this case as final; in this vein, he could have done well to have also mentioned that Raphael Lemkin, inventor of the concept of genocide, himself believed the charge should include mass murder of persons following from their belonging to particular classes. Leech nonetheless does mention that the 1998 Rome Statute defines the crime of extermination in part as "the intentional infliction of . . . deprivation of access to food and medicine calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population," so in this sense has the weight of international law behind him. Leech's only remaining theoretical difficulty, then, is to argue that intentionality exists within the context of the perpetuation of capital-induced genocide: This proves an easy task, for the question of intent in judging capitalism is not one of examining the actions of particular persons or states (as in most traditional cases of the charge of genocide) but rather of judging the "logic" of the system as a whole. Hence, structural genocide - defined by Leech as "structural violence that intentionally inflicts on any group or collectivity conditions of life that bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part" - can be said to be [is] an intentional outcome of adherence to norms which govern a social system that by nature "inevitably results in . . . death on a mass scale," as does capital. For Leech, the proffered defense of willful blindness - "such was not our intention," the system's managers might exclaim - is no defense at all. Or, in Jean-Paul Sartre's words: "The genocidal intent is implicit in the facts. It is not necessarily premeditated."

### \*\*\*Case

### Ripstein Bad

**Freedom alone can’t justify even basic state health policies which proves that her framework fails. Pain also harms freedom, so Ripstein devolves to util.**

**Yankah 12**

Ekow Yankah (Professor of Law @ Cardozo School of Law; New York democratic politician; holds degrees from UMich, Columbia, and Oxford). “Crime, Freedom, and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy.” Criminal Law and Philosophy. Springer. March 4th, 2012.

Because Ripstein’s Kant takes only the protection of freedom to justify law, law is indifferent to the potential harms that befall one outside of the protection of freedom (48). Indeed, Ripstein repeatedly points out that a Kantian legal structure cannot premise legal coercion on any other benefits it can secure (1 85-190). The law, in such a world, is utterly insensitive to any other interests a person might have insofar as they are not freedom preserving (Tadros 2011). This, Ripstein insists, includes even your most fundamental interests, yes, life itself (274-275). Yet Ripstein, like most of us, must be well aware that many, perhaps most of the activities of the thick modern state reach[es] deeply into the lives of citizens in ways that seem aimed at preserving their health, wealth and standards of living. One finds it hard to imagine that Ripstein, the proud Torontonian, would be willing to give up all the public parks in that city to say nothing of the Canadian national healthcare system. The tug of this dilemma will be equally felt by all who are tempted to take freedom not simply as a unique but as the sole justification for a legal system (Tadros 201 l:200-2ol, 205-206). In order to placate, if not entirely satisfy this intuition, Ripstein must pack an awful lot into his concept of freedom. To do so, Ripstein relies on Kant’s notion, earlier raised, that equal freedom can only be secured in a “rightful condition.” Thus, the only powers the state can justifiably wield are those aimed at perfecting the rightful condition (23). Ripstein argues, however, that securing the rightful condition confers broad powers. Some of these state powers are quite naturally described as preserving freedom. As earlier noted, Ripstein argues that freedom allows the state to protect citizens against extreme poverty or reliance only on private charities, for this would make such citizens dependent on (and dominated by) the private will of other individuals. In the same vein, roads are required not for convenience or utility but to allow public movement and thus freedom. Likewise, the modern state may provide for generally for public health in order to secure freedom in the rightful condition by, for example, quarantining and treating potentially dangerous epidemics (240). This strikes me as true as far as it goes but one cannot help to eventually grow suspicious that Ripstein’s concept of freedom has ironically imperial ambitions, seeking to include much of what we have come to think of as perfectly natural functions of the modern state. Let’s take a recent controversial example in America. I think that the connection between healthcare and freedom draws on more than dangerous epidemics which threaten the very integrity of the state. One ought not underestimate the ways in which the recurring illness and chronic pains that beset so many erodes, pinprick by increasingly hobbling pinprick, the ability to engage even basic freedoms. Still, it seems overly ambitious to describe the entire range of modern health care services provided by most developed countries as plausibly justified as merely freedom securing. Modern health care services in Canada, to take one example, quickly outrace the basic services that preserve the basic freedom in order to contain costs and distribute a basic good for the welfare of its citizens. Secondly, it remains unclear to me, despite Ripstein’s confidence, why freedom as such would permit, much less could require, the State to provide health services. This is true for two reasons which undermine his earlier arguments. Perhaps one can understand why having citizens only rely on private charity alone could pose a risk to freedom. All too often, particular charities capture the public imagination, receiving disproportionate amounts of funding, while other problems insufficiently championed by glamorous advocates or afflicting poor, minority or other populations go largely unaided. What is harder to describe as required by freedom alone is a state needing to provide healthcare if there were a functioning private market, even if government intervention could assist others in securing better healthcare outcomes at better prices for all. If this worry is correct and the concept of freedom is being overworked here Ripstein cannot, despite his seeming equanimity on the subject, justify even the simplest government actions that improve health beyond quarantines and crippling disease, to say nothing of public parks, international aid to the most desperate of countries and support for the arts. One worries that Ripstein, married to the idea of freedom as a singular justification for law, reaches to find a way to include aspects of public action that stretch well beyond securing freedom, lest he present too bare a picture of government for most to stomach. Unless Ripstein is willing to sacrifice, indeed prohibit, much of the modern state, in which case the reader should be clearly informed, Kantian freedom begins to look too thin.

Ripstein’s conception of freedom is circular and unintuitive

**Valentini 12** writes[[286]](#footnote-286)

In this section, I argue that **Ripstein’s ‘right to freedom’** cannot ground all other rights because the notion of freedom on which it relies **presupposes** the very **rights it aims to establish**. This is what I call the ‘circle of freedom’. This vicious circularity arises from Ripstein’s endorsement of the following claims: a. The right to freedom grounds all other rights. b. The right to freedom is the right of each individual to be his/her own master, to be independent of the will of others. c. Independence of the will of others consists in the ability to use one’s own means to pursue one’s own purposes robustly unhindered by others. d. One’s own means and purposes are the means and purposes one has a right to. e. The right to freedom is therefore the right to use the means and pursue the purposes one has a right to, robustly unhindered by others. As Ripstein puts it, a system where all have freedom as independence ‘is one in which each person is free to use his or her powers, individually or cooperatively, to set his or her own purposes, and no one is allowed to compel others to use their powers in a way designed to advance or accommodate any other person’s purposes’ (ibid.: 33, emphases added). But how are we to determine what one’s powers and purposes are? Certainly not by looking at their actual powers and purposes. To be sure, **when policemen stop a thief**, they prevent him from using his (positive, as opposed to normative) powers for his (positive) purposes, yet **we would hardly regard such an intervention as** unjust, as a **violation of the thief’s right to freedom**. This is paradigmatically a legitimate intervention, aimed at ‘hindering a hindrance to freedom’ (i.e., the freedom of the victim, whose means would serve someone else’s, the thief’s, purposes). The **freedom referred to in** the expression **‘hindering a hindrance** to freedom**’ cannot be any freedom, but** must be the **freedom one is entitled to on grounds of justice. Until we have an independent account of justice**, then, **we cannot know whether someone is free** or unfree. Unless we know what is ours, we cannot know whether constraints on our de facto agency are violations of our independence or consistent with it. Rather than grounding all rights and entitlements, Ripstein’s Kantian notion of freedom is derivative of them (i.e., it presupposes them). This appears clear once we notice that the cases Ripstein offers to illustrate instances of dependence and independence only work for his purposes if we assume a certain background account of justice. For instance, in the example offered earlier, involving market competition between Sam and John, a tacit assumption was made about the entitlement-generating character of free market processes. Recall that, in Ripstein’s view, Sam’s driving customers away from John does not constitute a violation of John’s freedom as independence. This can only be so on the assumption that free market exchanges are entitlementgenerating independently of their outcomes. This assumption is controversial, and certainly not ‘implicit’ in the meaning of freedom. On some accounts of justice (Rawls’s, for instance), free market processes need to be regulated in order to be consistent with individuals’ rights. If such processes lead to excessive inequalities, Rawls argues, their outcomes need to be rectified in order to preserve free market exchanges over time (Rawls 1993: 266).6 Whether the interaction between Sam and John involves a breach of freedom as independence, then, depends on what particular account of rights and entitlements one holds. The right to freedom as independence is not the answer, but an independent (and necessarily controversial) account of persons’ rights is needed to know what freedom as independence is. If my argument up to this point is correct, the unified nature of the Kantian approach offered by Ripstein is only illusory. His articulation of the right to freedom cannot constitute the ground of all other rights because freedom itself is defined in terms of persons’ rights. Without a prior account of what those rights are, the notion of freedom as independence is empty; with such an account, it is expositionally parsimonious, but surreptitiously presupposes a complex theory of justice. I have suggested that Ripstein’s articulation of the notion of freedom presupposes an account of individual rights and thus cannot strictly speaking ground any such rights. Despite its lacking rights-grounding capacity, this notion may still be of value. That is, it may offer a plausible account of freedom, which we might want to employ in elaborating our all-things-considered theory of persons’ rights and entitlements. After all, as we saw earlier, this notion is more in line with at least some of our intuitive judgements about freedom than the popular notion of freedom as non-interference.7 Freedom as independence conceives of persons’ freedom in relation to their in-principle subjection (or lack thereof) to the will of others. Recall that a slave with a benevolent master is still unfree because in principle subject to the master’s will. Even though the master does not interfere with the slave in the actual world, there are many nearby possible worlds in which such interference would occur (the master is indeed legally entitled to interfere with the slave), and this fact, says the proponent of freedom as independence, must be taken into account when judging whether the slave is free (cf. the discussion in Pettit 1997: ch. 2, and List 2006). Although such a focus on the robustness of non-interference renders freedom as independence rather appealing, **the appeal is significantly undermined by** this notion’s **reliance on a prior conception of rights. If to be independent** of the will of another **is to not have one’s rights violated** (robustly across possible worlds), then limitations of one’s capacity to act that do not violate rights do not count as restrictions of freedom. On this view, **my freedom is not restricted when I am not allowed to access property that is not mine**.8 Or else, my freedom is not restricted whenever I am forced to pay taxes (if such taxes are demanded by justice). Even more strikingly, **I cannot say that my freedom is restricted if I am justly incarcerated for violating** others’ **rights**. All of **these judgements are** deeply **counter-intuitive**, but they inevitably follow from an understanding of freedom according to which someone is free if she can robustly use the means and pursue the purposes she has a right to use and pursue. What we would intuitively call ‘justified’ restrictions of freedom are no restrictions of freedom at all, on Ripstein’s account.9 It is worth noting at this point that these counter-intuitive implications of freedom as independence are not fully transparent from Ripstein’s text. In fact, there are passages, discussing the use of coercion, which explicitly exclude them. Ripstein tells us that ‘Kant does not conceive of coercion in terms of threats, but instead as the limitation of freedom’ (Ripstein 2009: 54). From this it would seem to follow that acts of coercion that are consistent with freedom (i.e., with people’s rights) simply do not count as coercive because they do not limit freedom. Again, forcing a criminal to go to jail, on this view, would not be ‘coercive’ because it would be consistent with his freedom as independence (i.e., the freedom he has a right to). Yet Ripstein does not use the language of coercion in this way. Instead, he distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate coercion, the former being coercion exercised in accordance with people’s rights, the latter being coercion exercised in breach of those rights. He illustrates this with the following example: Using force to get the victim out of the kidnapper’s clutches involves coercion against the kidnapper, because it touches or threatens to touch him in order to advance a purpose, the freeing of the victim, to which Kant, Ripstein, and the Circle of Freedom: A Critical Note 455 © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. he has not agreed. The use of force is rightful because an incident of the victim’s antecedent right to be free. (ibid.: 55) In this quote, Ripstein appeals to a notion of freedom which differs from the moralized one we encountered in the previous section. If it is true that the use of force to free the victim limits the kidnapper’s freedom because it prevents him from using his resources to achieve his purposes, then ‘his resources’ and ‘his purposes’ have to be interpreted in positive rather than normative terms. ‘His’ resources and purposes are not those he has a right to, but those he happens to possess. There thus appear to be two notions of freedom at play in Ripstein’s work, one (the dominant one, it seems to me) is moralized, the other non-moralized10: FMoralized = A is free if, and only if, A can use the means and pursue the purposes A has a right to, robustly unhindered by others. FNon-Moralized = A is free if, and only if, A can use the means A happens to possess and pursue the purposes A happens to have, robustly unhindered by others.

Ripstein’s relies on two notions of freedom both of which are wrong

**Valentini 12** writes[[287]](#footnote-287)

**There** thus **appear** to be **two notions of freedom** at play **in Ripstein’s work**, one (the dominant one, it seems to me) is moralized, the other non-moralized10: FMoralized = **A is free if**, and only if, **A can use** the **means and pursue** the **purposes A has a right to**, robustly unhindered by others. FNon-Moralized = **A is free if**, and only if, **A can use** the **means A happens to possess and pursue** the purposes A happens to have, robustly unhindered by others. **The former** notion of freedom **presupposes an account of justice**, and for this reason leads to rather counter-intuitive judgements (e.g., the use of force against the kidnapper does not limit his freedom). **The latter** notion delivers much more plausible judgements but can hardly form the basis of a tenable political morality. Specifically, understanding the right to freedom as the right to use the means one happens to possess and pursue the purposes one happens to have (robustly unhindered by others) generates two difficulties for a freedom-based account of justice. First, it **leads to** an **implausibly status-quo-biased** political **morality**, according to which people’s positive entitlements automatically determine their moral entitlements. Second, **given that** people’s **ends inevitably conflict, a world in which each can pursue** the **ends she happens** (or wants) **to have unhindered by others cannot exist, and therefore represents an invalid ideal of justice** (on the Kantian assumption that ‘ought implies can’). As Ripstein himself notes, ‘[t]he Kantian right to independence . . . is always an entitlement within a system of reciprocal limits on freedom’ (ibid.: 34, emphasis added). But if this is the case, then one is not either free or unfree, but one can enjoy more or less freedom, depending on the nature of the relevant limits. This idea of reciprocal limits on freedom, I think, implicitly contains a solution to the difficulties discussed in the present piece.

### Deon Bad

**Absolutism fails. It can’t explain empirical uncertainty.**

**Jackson and Smith 6**

Frank Jackson (Australian National University) and Michael Smith (Princeton). “Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 103, No. 6 (June 2006), pp. 267-283. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20619943

A skier is heading in a direction you know for sure will trigger an avalanche that will kill ten people. You know the only way to save the ten people is for you to shoot him. The probability that the skier intends to trigger the avalanche and kill the ten people is 1-p. We can agree that our target absolutist theory says it is right for you to shoot if it is certain that the skier intends to kill the ten, that is, if p = 0, for in that case you would not be killing someone innocent—you would be protecting the ten in the only way possible from an unprovoked attack. We can agree that our target theory says that it would be wrong for you to shoot if you are certain he simply happens to be skiing in that direction, that is, if p = 1, for then you would be intentionally killing someone innocent, and that is never right no matter how many you will be allowing to die by your failure to shoot. The number of lives that would be saved in the example as described is ten, but of course the distinctive position of absolutism is that the number does not matter: it is never right intentionally to kill the innocent no matter how many lives would be saved by doing so. Our question is, What should the theory say for other values of p? III. THE INFINITE DISVALUE APPROACH Perhaps the simplest absolutist answer to our question is to hold that whenever there is any chance that an action violates an absolute prohibition, the action ought not to be performed. This is the answer suggested by the absolutists' case against early stage abortion summarized above. In our example, the answer would prohibit shooting the skier whenever there is any chance that he is innocent, whenever, that is, p < 1. One way of implementing this answer is to assign infinite disvalue to intentionally killing the innocent and some finite disvalue to allowing people to die. For then the expected disvalue of the shooting—that is, the product of the disvalue of intentionally killing the innocent times the chance that the shooting is an intentional killing of the innocent—will exceed the disvalue of allowing others to die, no matter how many others die and how certain it is that they will die, provided there is some chance that the shooting is indeed an intentional killing of the innocent. It will, on this approach, be impossible to make the action that has some chance of being the intentional killing of someone innocent the right thing to do by making the number allowed to die by refraining from shooting large enough—the numbers allowed to die will be irrelevant, just as absolutists typically say.6 The trouble with this response is that there is nearly always some greater than zero chance that someone is innocent. All the evidence may be against them, but induction from the past record of over turned verdicts in cases that looked watertight at the time tells us that there is nearly always some chance that someone who looks clearly to be guilty is in fact innocent. We will get the result that it is never, or hardly ever, right to shoot the skier. Indeed, it will be hard to find any cases where it is right intentionally to kill someone as there is always some chance that the someone is innocent, and a small chance times an infinite disvalue equals an infinite dis value. We will have a quick (too quick) argument from absolutism against intentionally killing the innocent to an extreme kind of personal pacifism.

**Intentions are also uncertain**

**Jackson and Smith 6**

Frank Jackson (Australian National University) and Michael Smith (Princeton). “Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 103, No. 6 (June 2006), pp. 267-283. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20619943

We have been treating absolutism as absolutely forbidding certain actions, but sometimes it is thought of as a thesis about the mind in action, a thesis about which intentions a moral agent can properly form and act on. In terms of our target version of absolutism, the contention is not that the action of intentionally killing the innocent is absolutely forbidden but that forming the intention of killing the innocent is.12 When it is said that it is never right intentionally to kill the innocent, what is meant is that it is never right to form that intention. The suggestion is not, of course, that there is nothing to say about action per se; indeed, the precise relation between the moral status of the intention and of action in accord with it is open to debate in such theories.13 There are troubles on two fronts for this suggestion. One arises from the possibility of uncertainty about one's intentions, the other from asking after the content of the intention. Although it has been suggested to us in discussion that absolutisms of the kind in question avoid the troubles we have been raising on the ground that subjects can be certain of what they intend, this is a mistake. We do not have incorrigible knowledge of our mental states and the point is especially obvious and widely agreed in the case of intentions (and the same goes for motives). It is a commonplace that we can believe that our intention is to serve someone's interests by informing them of an unpalatable truth they need to know, when it is obvious to our friends that our real intention is to upset them. Likewise, subjects can sometimes be wrong about an action's being in self-defense, or about their "real" intention in making a devastating criticism in discussion. The problems we have been raising for absolutism about actions arising from uncertainty about their nature can be raised mutatis mutandis for absolutism about intentions.

### Cummiskey

Only util treats people as ends in themselves.

**Cummiskey 90** writes[[288]](#footnote-288)

Indeed, despite Kant’s deontological intuitions about particular moral cases, his basic normative principle is best interpreted as having a fundamentally consequentialist structure. In order to justify agent-centered constraints, one needs a non-value-based rationale. Many Kantians attempt to provide such a rationale by appealing to the Kantian principle of treating persons as ends. The Kantians’ strategy is clear: Treating persons as ends involves respecting persons, and respecting persons involves recognizing agent-centered constraints on action. We have seen, however, that this strategy is problematic. The Kantian principle itself generates a duty to advance a moral goal: **The duty** to strive as much as one can **to promote** the **flourishing of rational beings, and** to **make others’ ends one’s own, is the** very **essence of treating humanity as an end.** Morality thus constrains and shapes the pursuit of individual well-being or happiness. We have seen, however, that **Kant**’s moral theory **does not provide a rationale for** basic **agent-centered constraints that limit** what we can do in the pursuit of **this** complex moral **goal.** The imperative to respect persons thus does indeed generate a consequentialist normative theory, rather than the desired deontological alternative. It certainly seems that a Kantian ought to be a normative consequentialist. Conscientious **Kantian agents have a** basic **duty** to strive, as much as possible, **to promote** the freedom and **happiness** of all rational beings. In the pursuit of this moral goal, **it may be necessary for** the **interests of some to give way for** the sake of **others.** If we are sacrificed, we are not treated simply as a means to another’s goal; on the contrary, our sacrifice is required by a principle we endorse. Our non-moral interests and inclinations may cause us to feel reluctant, but **since our sacrifice furthers a moral goal that we endorse and** that we **are required to pursue,** our **sacrifice does not violate our moral autonomy** or our rights.

### Practical Reason Bad

Overwhelming neuroscientific evidence proves practical reason isn’t key to moral motivation

**Schroeder 10** writes[[289]](#footnote-289)

What, then, is left? **The cognitivist holds** the view **that moral motivation begins with** occurrent **belief**. In particular, it begins with beliefs **about what** actions **would be right.** The cognitivist holds that, at least in cases of morally worthy action, such beliefs lead to motivation to perform those actions, quite independently of any antecedent desires. The cognitivist is happy to call this motivational state ‘‘a desire,’’ but thinks of it as entirely dependent upon the moral belief that created it. The cognitivist position has recognizable afﬁnities to familiar positions in the philosophical literature (e.g. **Korsgaard**, 1994; McDowell, 1998: ch. 4; Smith, 1994). These philosophers, of course, hold that much more is going on in the mind of a morally worthy agent than the simple picture painted by our cognitivist. They generally **agree[s]**, however, **that moral**ly worthy **action is not dependent** up**on** antecedent **desires, but** stems in the ﬁrst instance from one’s **judgments.** On the cognitivist’s view, Jen’s desires are not irrelevant to her action, but they are not the initiating engines of her action either. Instead, her desires are mere data that she considers (perhaps) in coming to be motivated. Given what is available to her, perhaps she comes to believe that it would be right to give the homeless man money, and it never occurs to her to even consider her desires. This consideration of the rightness of giving money to the homeless man motivates Jen to give him some money, and she does. Because she is moved by the right sort of belief, her action has moral worth.

[…]

Of our four caricature theorists, it is obviously **our cognitivist** who is most likely to have **[has] difﬁculties accommodating the neuroscientiﬁc evidence.** Although it was pointed out earlier that the theoretical possibility exists that moral cognition can lead directly to moral motivation independently of the reward system (and so independently of desire), this theoretical possibility proves to be problematic upon closer inspection. We begin with evidence from Parkinson disease. As will be familiar to many, Parkinson disease is a disorder that results in a number of effects, including tremor, difﬁculty in initiating movement, and (if taken to its limit) total paralysis. Parkinson disease is caused by the death of the dopamine-producing cells of the substantia nigra pars compacta (the SNpc in Figure 3.1), the very cells that make up the reward system’s output to the motor basal ganglia. Thus, on the interpretation of the reward system advocated earlier, **Parkinson disease is a disorder in which intrinsic desires slowly lose their** capacity to causally inﬂuence **motivation.** As it turns out, **Parkinson** disease impairs or **prevents action** regardless of **whether the action is moral**ly worthy **or not,** regardless of whether it is intuitively desired or intuitively done out of duty, regardless of **whether the individual** trying to act **gives a law to herself. Thus Parkinson** disease **appears to show that intrinsic desires are necessary to** the production of **motivation** in normal human beings, and this would seem to put serious pressure on the cognitivist’s position. The cognitivist might allow that intrinsic desires must exist in order for motivation to be possible, but hold that intrinsic desires normally play no signiﬁcant role in producing motivation. After all, Parkinson disease shows that intrinsic desires are necessary for motivation, but it does not clearly reveal the role played by intrinsic desires in producing motivation when the desires exist. If sustainable, this would be just a minor concession, and so it is well worth investigating. What might motivation of the cognitivist’s sort look like, if desires play no substantive role in it? It was suggested in the previous section that it might look like motivation that stems directly from activity in the higher cognitive centers—like motivation that stems from choosing a law for one’s action, in other words. And it turns out that motivation derived from higher cognitive centers independently of desire is possible—but also that the only known model of it is pathological. It is the sort of motivation found in Tourette syndrome. Tourette syndrome is a disorder characterized by tics: eye blinks, shoulder jerks, barks, obscenities, profanities, and so on. Something like 70–90% of sufferers report that they often voluntarily produce their tics, because the effort of not ticcing is unpleasant and often doomed to failure in any case. But a typical sufferer from Tourette syndrome will also report that tics are quite capable of forcing themselves out regardless of how fiercely they are resisted. Tourette syndrome appears to be caused by a dysfunction in the motor basal ganglia, in which the motor basal ganglia inhibit most motor commands initiated by perceptual and higher cognitive centers, but not quite all. Some motor commands initiated by perceptual or higher cognitive centers get through in spite of the inhibition, and in spite of the fact that reward signals (intrinsic desires) have not released these inhibitions. A tic is the result (Schroeder, 2005). Thus direct causation of **motivation by higher cognition** via this pathway, quite independently of desire, **is the sort of thing that results in a Tourettic tic, but a Tourettic tic is anything but** the paradigm of **morally worthy action. This seems a very unpromising parallel** to be drawn **for** a **cognitivist** picture of **motivation.** There are other ways to investigate the biological plausibility of our cognitivist’s position as well. **If reason alone were responsible for moral motivation,** one would expect that **injuries that spare reason would also spare moral motivation, but** there are clinical **case studies** that **suggest otherwise.** Damage to the ventromedial (VM) region of prefrontal cortex (located in the OFC in Figure 3.1), a form of brain damage studied extensively by Damasio and colleagues (see, e.g., Damasio, 1994), impairs cognitive input to the reward system, and so alters the output of the reward system to the motor basal ganglia. Such damage seems to render subjects incapable of acting on their better judgments in certain cases—a finding that we think ought to capture the imagination of any moral psychologist. In a well-known non-moral experimental task, subjects with this sort of injury were asked to draw cards from any of four decks of cards. Each card was marked with a number indicating a number of dollars won or lost, and subjects were asked to draw as they liked from the four decks, attempting to maximize their winnings. Normal control subjects tended to draw at first from two of the decks, which quickly revealed themselves to have high-paying cards when drawn from. But those same decks also had high-costing cards in them, and normal subjects soon enough learned to stay away from these decks and shift to the other two decks, where returns were lower but penalties less punitive (Bechara et al., 1997). **Subjects with** VM **prefrontal injuries**—with injuries to structures that are crucial input to the reward system—started their play just as normal subjects did, but strongly tended not to switch to the safer decks, instead staying with the high-paying, high-costing decks until they ran out of money. Fascinatingly, these same subjects sometimes **reported being aware of** what **the better strategy** would be, **but** they nonetheless **failed to follow it** (Bechara et al., 2000). **This** sort of finding **should** once again **give our cognitivist pause**, for it suggests that, at least in non-moral contexts, **reason alone does not** suffice to **guide action independently of reward information**; it is reasonable to speculate that reason may fail to produce motivation in moral cases as well. Damasio himself interprets these findings as specifically vindicating the role of felt emotional responses in decision-making, a more personalist than instrumentalist conclusion. However, the precise interpretation of the mechanism by which VM prefrontal cortical injury leads to its own peculiar effects is not yet well understood. We return to a discussion of these people with VM damage after exploring the consequences for the cognitivist thesis of another population of people with disorders of moral motivation: psychopaths. Psychopaths are people who seem cognitively normal, but evince little remorse or guilt for morally wrong actions. Psychopaths are identified by scoring high on a standard psychopathy checklist (Hare, 1991), and seem to be deficient in two respects: (1) emotional dysfunction, and (2) antisocial behavior. **Psychopaths** seem able to **comprehend** social and **moral rules, and** they typically **do not** seem to **have impaired reasoning** abilities. (Recent studies suggest that limbic system damage is correlated with psychopathy, and this is consistent with the fact that psychopaths show diminished affective response to cues of suffering in others, but it does not suggest any particularly cognitive impairment [Kiehl, 2006; but see Maibom, 2005].) As a population apparently **capable of** making **moral judgments but not** at all **motivated by them, psychopaths present a**n obvious **challenge to the cognitivist.** However, research suggests that psychopaths’ moral cognition is deficient in at least the following respect: they show a diminished capacity to distinguish moral from conventional violations (Blair, 1995, 1997). For instance, children with psychopathic tendencies are more likely to judge moral violations as authority-dependent (so the morality of hitting another child in a classroom will be held to depend on whether or not the teacher permits it, rather than held to be independent of such rules, as it is by normally developing children). This deficit has led some to argue that psychopaths have impaired moral concepts (Nichols, 2004: 113). Although they are able to say whether an action is right or wrong, permitted or prohibited, philosophers such as these suggest that psychopaths merely mouth the words, or make moral judgments in the ‘‘inverted commas’’ sense: judgments of what is called ‘‘moral’’ by others. The ability of psychopaths to stand as counter-examples to cognitivism rests upon some argument to the effect that psychopaths really do make moral judgments. If psychopaths indeed lack moral concepts or moral knowledge, then their failure to act morally or to appear to lack motivation is no challenge to cognitivism, for it can plausibly be argued that to make moral judgments at all, one must have moral concepts and possess some modicum of moral knowledge (Kennett & Fine, 2007). However, if the ability to make the moral/conventional distinction is not required for moral concepts or moral knowledge, then psychopaths appear to be candidate counter-examples to our cognitivist (see, e.g., Kelly et al., 2007). Although some arguments have been offered to suggest that psychopaths have requisite abilities to make moral judgments (Roskies, 2007), these arguments remain indecisive. On our view, **it remains unclear whether psychopaths are competent moral judges.**

### Universalizability Bad

Universalizability fails.

**Macintyre 81** writes[[290]](#footnote-290)

How are we to decide whether this attempt to formulate a decisive test for the maxims for morality is successful or not? **Kant** himself tries to show that such maxims as ‘Always tell the truth,’ Always keep promises’, ‘Be benevolent to those in need’ and ‘Do not commit suicide’ pass his test, while such maxims as ‘Only keep promises when it is convenient to you’ fail. In fact however, even to approach a semblance of showing this, he **has to use notoriously bad arguments, the climax** of which **is** his assertion **that** any man who wills **the maxim ‘To kill myself** when the prospects of pain outweigh those of happiness’ **is inconsistent because such** willing **‘contradicts’ an impulse to life** implanted in all of us**. This is as if** someone were to assert that any man who wills **the maxim ‘Always to keep my hair** cut **short’ is inconsistent because** such **willing ‘contradicts’ an impulse to** the **growth of hair** implanted **in all of us**. But it is not just that Kant’s own arguments involve large mistakes. It is very easy to see that **many immoral and trivial non-moral maxims are vindicated by Kant’s test** quite as convincingly – in some cases more convincingly – than the moral maxims which Kant aspires to uphold. So **‘Keep all your promises throughout your entire life except one’, ‘Persecute all those who hold false religious beliefs’ and ‘Always eat mussels on Mondays in March’** will all pass Kant’s test, for all **can be consistently universalized.**

Universalizability devolves to util and doesn’t justify always treating people as ends.

**Macintyre 81** writes[[291]](#footnote-291)

This formulation clearly does have a moral content, although one that is not very precise, if it is not supplemented by a good deal of further elucidation. What Kant means by treating someone as an end rather than as a means seems to be as follows – as I noticed earlier in using Kant’s moral philosophy to highlight a contrast with emotivism. I may propose a course of action to someone either by offering him reasons for so acting or by trying to influence him in non-rational ways. If I do the former I treat him as a rational will, worthy of the same respect as is due to myself, for in offering him reasons I offer him an impersonal consideration for him to evaluate. What makes a reason a good reason has nothing to do with who utters it on a given occasion; and until an agent has decided for himself whether a reason is a good reason or not, he has no reason to act. By contrast an attempt at non-rational suasion embodies an attempt to make the agent a mere instrument of my will, without any regard for his rationality. Thus what Kant enjoins is what a long line of moral philosophers have followed the Plato of the Gorgias in enjoining. But **Kant gives us no good reason for holding this position**. I can without any inconsistency whatsoever flout it; **‘Let everyone except me be treated as a means’ may be immoral, but it is not inconsistent and there is not** even any **inconsistency in willing a universe of egotists** all of **who**m **live by this maxim. It might be inconvenient** for each if everyone lived by this maxim**, but it would not be impossible and to invoke** considerations of **convenience would** in any case be to **introduce** just that **prudential reference to happiness** which Kant aspires to eliminate from all considerations of morality.

### Intent-Foresight Bad

Util solves. Under util, we’d evaluate intentions over outcomes if the intention reflected good ex ante util calc.

**Tomasik 13** writes[[292]](#footnote-292)

Analogy to performance assessments In addition to moral judgments of actions, **there’s a**nother **context in which it’s common to evaluate** based on something like **intentions rather than outcomes:** **Performance assessments**. “A for effort” is not just a saying but is commonly used in schools and even in workplaces to some degree. A big portion of your grade or performance review may be based on the amount of work you put in rather than what ended up being achieved. At first this might seem nonsensical. Suppose you’re an employer, and your employee is working on a risky project that might produce anywhere between $100K and $300K of company value. In order to maximally incentivize the employee to take the right actions in the project, it seems you should pay a commission in direct proportion to the value produced (say, 1/2 of it) in order to substantially reduce principal-agent divergence. The problem is that people are loss-averse with respect to compensation. Faced with a choice between a job where the payoffs are random between $50K and $150K vs. a job with an assured payout of $90K, many people would choose the latter. Thus, because evaluating only based on actual outcomes introduces excess noise, it has a disadvantage relative to an effort/intention-based approach. Of course, effort-based evaluation has its own problems, which is why most companies use a mix of effort and results in their assessments. An ineffective employee may have the best of intentions. Even if the employee is effective, it can be harder to assess changes in effort than changes in results at review time. That said, if employee effort could be measured very precisely, then effort-based assessments could in some circumstances be superior to results-based assessments for the reasons discussed earlier in this essay: **Actual results** (especially in just one year of work) **may** be noisy and **not reflect priors**. Of course, **actual results matter** a lot **for** updating beliefs about an **employee**’s **effectiveness, but if** after such an update, you still conclude that **the employee had good intentions but merely got unlucky,** then **you should reward the employee and keep her around**. An employer compares results between two employees to (a) assess which one is more competent and (b) motivate the employees to align incentives with the company. A moral actor uses results between two actions to inform the assessment of which is better, but consideration (b) doesn’t directly apply in this case, because the possible actions aren’t other agents that need motivation. Of course, the actor himself needs motivation to pick the right action, but we can praise him either for model-free or model-based action selection. By definition, a pure-hearted moral actor is perfectly aligned with moral incentives. As external observers, we unfortunately can’t always assess good intentions, but we can assess them in ourselves (except insofar as we deceive ourselves), and many religions claim that God can assess them in everyone, thereby skirting information asymmetry. Like in the employer context, our moral feedback to other people should not just reflect their pure-heartedness but also should amend incorrect beliefs they may have about the expected value of different actions. Loss aversion and demoralization The comparison of job and moral evaluation highlights another possibility: Just as employees are usually loss-averse with respect to income, moral actors may be loss-averse with respect to what they accomplish. For instance, you might feel worse about causing one chicken to be factory-farmed than you feel good about preventing two chickens from being factory-farmed, even though the latter is twice as good on a chicken-by-chicken basis. A loss-averse moral actor may, ceteris paribus, do better with the explicit modeling approach in which actions are assessed based on intention to maximize expected value rather than the actual outcomes, because if he took to heart the actual outcomes, he would be discouraged from taking risks that are net positive altruistically. Evaluating based on outcomes also runs the risk of being demoralizing, given the nature of human psychology. **If someone does everything right in terms of ex-ante expectation but gets unlucky** with the result**, the person might** feel “that’s not fair” and **be discouraged from making a good effort in the future**. This is especially true if she sees someone else who made less wise choices but got lucky with success anyway. In theory an RL agent should just shrug this off as one more training example with which to update its assessments of actions, but in practice, a setback of this type might dampen a person’s spirits **or**, in the worst case, **turn** her **away from altruism entirely. If we base praise on expectations instead of outcomes,** it’s more likely **the person will feel good about what she tried to do**. One final observation suggested by the comparison of employee reviews with moral evaluations is that, as is often true in practice, our moral evaluations can be a mix of intent-based and outcome-based assessments. The mixing ratio can be determined based on the table in the previous section, depending on which considerations are most important in the given context.

Double effect is wrong—2 warrants

**Young 11** writes[[293]](#footnote-293)

Clause One “The original act without the side effect is good in itself or at least morally neutral. (It must not be malum in se)” So far in our argument we have held that much of the doctrine’s maligned reputation is largely unfounded and based on a misinterpretation of double effect; at this point however, we are abruptly confronted with a weakness of double effect which renders the doctrine impaired. The doctrine of double effect is a tool of moral analysis which is to be applied to situations of extreme moral conflict, such as for example, the principle of non-combatant immunity in wartime. However, a moral tool which seeks to ‘bridge the gap’ or find the middle ground between the two extremes of deontology and consequentialism cannot have its opening clause stating that in order for an act to be morally permissible it must not violate any intrinsically good values. Nancy-Ann Davis comments on the first clause of the double effect stating that, “To act rightly, agents must first of all refrain from acts that can be said and known to be, before the fact, wrong.”[19] It is however, an unreasonable task to demand that the original act be assessed independently and not be malum in se or inherently immoral. This is a problem because **one cannot assess a moral act in an abstract** or independent **manner** in an attempt to decipher its intrinsic worth. Indeed, **the value** or worth **of a moral act can only be found by applying it to a specific situation** or circumstance. A.J. Coates echoes this sentiment, stating that, “moral quality is not something that can be established by viewing the act abstractly, or on its own. It is only in context…that the act becomes intelligible.”[20] **Thus, we cannot find the moral worth of an act independent of** its **possible consequences**, its circumstances or **without** the **knowledge of** the agent’s **intention**. As we have already seen intentions are one factor which must be determined in order to attribute morality to the act. Indeed, it is a combination of these factors which enable us to ascertain a specific act’s moral permissiveness. In the light of this, the doctrine assumes the inviolability of absolute norms, whilst at the same time claims to be a tool which investigates the acceptability of ignoring moral absolutes. In other words, it does not make sense for a tool of moral analysis to talk about finding the moral good in a situation of extreme ethical difficulty whilst advocating for a strict observance of unbreakable norms. Therefore, the principle of **double effect** is weak; its application **is too dependent on the** moral **agent’s predisposition towards norms. If the** moral **agent decides that killing non-combatants even as a**n unintended **side-effect is** malum is se or **wrong in itself then double effect is useless** in determining whether an act violates or upholds a particular norm which is exactly what double effect sets out to evaluate. On the other hand, if the moral agent does not hold that the targeting of non-combatants is malum in se, then double effect has little defence to the criticism that it avoids applying fundamental norms. As **leaving the assessment of whether a norm is wrong in itself to the agent’s discretion is** both **unhelpful and dangerous**. This is an unequivocal contradiction which threatens the legitimacy of the entire principle of double effect. As we have already seen, the constituent clauses of the theory are interdependent with one another and therefore if one clause is found to be inherently flawed, the entire arrangement of the doctrine will be undermined. Much like a structure which has lost its cornerstone, the doctrine may be interesting to the just war theorist, but it would be wholly irresponsible for the doctrine of double effect to be applied to any situation of desperate moral conflict.

We don’t need to save the world all the time. Relaxation is good for effective altruism

**Tomasik 14** writes[[294]](#footnote-294)

P: **Some people feel like “saving the world” all the time is too much** and they need some balance in their life, so they might give only 10% of their income and 10% of their time, instead of all of it. It’s comforting that you make sure to spend a large amount of time on self-maintenance and sleep. What are your thoughts on this balance? B: I think the question assumes a premise that is (happily) misguided. There’s not a hard distinction between “save the world” work and everything else we do. Our altruism stands on the shoulders of the rest of our lives. We need to learn how the world works at a deep level to direct our altruism in helpful directions. This learning takes many decades and is happening all the time through our experiences. Likewise, earning money and developing social connections are other resources that we build as we go through life. Certainly some uses of time are more valuable per hour than others, **but even relaxation is important when it keeps our moods positive and ensures** that **we enjoy** our **altruistic activities**. I think altruism should generally be fun, and if it’s not, you might consider how else you can contribute to reducing suffering that is fun. There are so many ways to make a difference that the process doesn’t need to be a burden. **There’s no law stating that good accomplished is proportional to amount of sacrifice on your part** (even if perhaps social praise increases with degree of sacrifice because of the need to generate incentives for unpleasant tasks like military service or providing emergency aid). And if altruism is fun, then the problem of how much of it to do compared against other leisure activities becomes less potent. One way to make altruism more exciting is to become friends with other altruists. It’s natural to be more interested in what your friends are interested in. For me, the boundary between socializing and saving the world often breaks down; they are often the same thing. Finally, as noted previously, **I “waste”** some **time on** so-called **non-altruistic activities** as well. **In the past I found this troubling, but** I’ve grown to realize that **it’s part of being a finite human who needs** many forms of **rejuvenation**. If you feel burned out, you’re probably pushing yourself too hard. **Let yourself relax** a bit **without feeling guilty**. On the flip side, if you think about altruism very little, try increasing that somewhat. 10% of your effort seems a reasonable goal. Then you can evaluate where you are and see if you’re inspired to do more. But remember that **“altruism time” is not clearly defined. Ask yourself whether one of your ideal hobbies** or careers **is altruistically valuable even if it’s not what most effective altruists** spend their time **do**ing.

### Extinction 1st

Moral uncertainty means that extinction comes first under any moral system.

**Bostrom 13** writes[[295]](#footnote-295)

These **reflections on moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. **We may not** now **know**—at least not in concrete detail—**what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity;** we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly **uncertain about our ultimate aims,** then **we should recognize that there is** a **great option value in preserving**—and ideally improving—**our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.** To do this we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

### State=Util

Act-omission distinction doesn’t apply to states.

**Sunstein and Vermuele 5** write[[296]](#footnote-296)

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

## Ordinance 1NC (Rahul)

### Util Framework

The standard is maximizing happiness.

1. States can’t adhere to rules because they have to weigh between rules violations. Absolute constraints would paralyze action.

2. The value of happiness is axiomatic because not even skeptics can deny the badness of pain.

3. Moral uncertainty means that extinction comes first under either framework.

**Bostrom 13** writes[[297]](#footnote-297)

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly **uncertain about our ultimate aims,** then **we should recognize that there is** a **great option value in preserving**—and ideally improving—**our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.** To do this we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

### UE DA (Contractors)

**Living Wage For Contractors Increases Unemployment and income inequality; Best Statistical Evidence**

**Lammam, 2014:**

(The Economic Effects Of Living Wage Laws. January 2014. Charles Lammam. Analyst For The Fraser Institute)

**While** the specific definition and coverage of **living wage laws vary by** US **municipality, the ordinance is** typically **a minimum hourly wage that has to be paid to employees of private businesses that contract with the city to provide public services.** Some versions have broader coverage and also apply to employees of businesses that receive financial assistance (subsidies) from the city government. Although activists claim living wage laws can increase wages with minimal costs, the reality is quite different. **Both economic theory and evidence suggest that living wage ordinances,** like minimum wage legislation, **create distortions in the labour market that have a negative impact on employment.** When governments mandate a wage above the prevailing market rate, **a typical result is that fewer jobs and hours become available and it is usually the people who are less skilled who are most adversely affected.** Indeed, **there is a trade-off between the workers who benefit from a higher wage and those who endure the costs** due to fewer employment opportunities. **The research looking into the economic effects of living wage laws is not as developed as the minimum wage literature,** which spans several decades and over a hundred academic studies. **But the conclusion from the best and most rigorously analyzed evidence is that living wage laws have similar unintended consequences. Specifically, evidence shows that employers respond to living wages by cutting back on jobs, hours, and on-the-job training.** Those who advocate living wage laws tend to overlook these consequences and instead focus only on the benefits of such policies. **The reality is that, while some workers may benefit from a higher wage, their gain comes at the expense of others. According to research by leading scholars in the field, a 100% increase in the living wage (say going from a minimum wage of $10 per hour to a living wage of $20 per hour) reduces employment among low-wage workers by between 12% and 17%. Affected workers therefore lose valuable employment income and the ability to gain new skills and experience that foster upward income mobility.**

**Unemployment is worse for the poor than low wages**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

The problem plaguing America’s poor is not low wages, but rather a shortage of jobs.34 At a time when the nation’s workforce participation is only 62.8 percent, policymakers must avoid policies that destroy job opportunities.35 Increasing the minimum wage does nothing to help the unemployed poor. In fact, as discussed above, it hurts individuals looking for employment as it decreases available job opportunities. So, who is helped by an increase to the minimum wage? According to a 2012 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, although workers under age 25 represented only 20 percent of hourly wage earners, they made up just over half (50.6 percent) of all minimum wage earners.36 The average household income of these young minimum wage earners was $65,900.37 Among adults 25 and older earning the minimum wage, 75 percent live well above the poverty line of $22,350 for a family of four, with an average annual income of $42,500.38 This is possible because more than half of older minimum wage earners work part-time and many are not the sole earners in their households.39 In fact, 83.5 percent of employees whose wages would rise due to a minimum wage increase either live with parents or another relative, live alone, or are part of a dual-earner couple.40 Only 16.5 percent of individuals who would benefit from an increase to the minimum wage are sole earners in families with children.41 With national unemployment still hovering around 7 percent, national, state, and local demands for an increased minimum wage could not be more ill-timed.42 Increasing the minimum wage would make it more difficult for emerging businesses to expand payrolls and for existing businesses to maintain employees. Further, a higher wage rate would make it more difficult for individuals with less education and experience to find work. Raising the minimum wage favors those who already have jobs at the expense of the unemployed. Public policy would be more beneficial if it lowered barriers to entry for employment and increased economic opportunities. Raising the minimum wage may be a politically attractive policy option, but it is harmful to the very people policymakers intend it to help.

### Wage Subsidies CP (Contractors Version)

[only read the “in the US” part of the text if the aff is US specific]

Counterplan: Just governments [in the United States] ought to abolish minimum wage laws and make available for low-wage workers below the poverty level a permanent, targeted wage subsidy adjusted to local cost of living.

Living wage is ineffective for the poor. The counterplan solves the aff and avoids unemployment

**EPI 1** writes[[298]](#footnote-298)

**The living wage movement has been successful in promoting ordinances at the city** or county **level** that would mandate covered businesses to pay wages much higher than the effective state or local minimum wage. At least 60 local governments have adopted some type of living wage mandate legislation. A typical ordinance requires contractors and businesses receiving governmental financial assistance to pay a minimum wage ranging from 150 to 225 percent of the minimum wage. The movement has even broader goals, including federal living wage legislation and expansion of wage mandates to cover all low-wage employees. The living wage movement argues that public money should not be used to create jobs that pay “poverty level” wages. This argument has surface appeal, which has attracted a number of religious and charitable organizations to their cause. **However,** on closer examination, **living wage mandates are** at best an **inefficient** and inferior policy vehicle for helping poor families. At worst, they harm poor families by reducing their work opportunities and incomes. **A better alternative is a targeted wage subsidy** that lifts the income of those most in need without raising labor costs to employers. High labor costs discourage employers from hiring, which means that those workers with limited skills and work experience are likely to be excluded from the job market. **Wage subsidies usually are** administered through the tax code to provide **a tax credit** to either employers or workers. An example of an employer-type subsidy is the Work Opportunity Tax Credit that is available to businesses that employ certain types of low-skilled workers. An example of an employee-based subsidy is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) that is available to families with low earnings based on earnings level and family size. Advantages of Wage Subsidies Over Wage Mandates **Wage subsidies have three** primary **advantages** over the living wage mandates**: Wage mandates raise** the **cost of hiring and** thus **may destroy jobs** and work opportunities. In contrast, wage subsidies either lower, or have no effect on, labor cost and thus do not discourage, and may encourage, hiring of workers with limited skill. **Wage mandates are poorly targeted to low-income families, most** of whom **have either no workers or only part-time** workers. Conversely, many who would benefit from the wage mandates do not need the boost because they are secondary workers in relatively affluent families. In contrast, wage subsidies, by encouraging work, bring their benefits to more poor families than can be reached by wage mandates. **Wage subsidies** also are more cost-effective than wage mandates because they **limit eligibility to those most in need. Wage mandates are not efficient** in raising the disposable (i.e., after-tax, after-benefit) income of workers in poor families **because much** of the **gain in earnings is lost in taxes or benefit reductions**. Many of the poor receive governmental assistance, such as welfare, food stamps and the EITC, that is phased out as family income rises. Low-income families can lose as much as 90 percent (more in some cases) of wage gains in taxes, lost benefits and refundable tax credits. On the other hand, employee-based **wage subsidies** such as the EITC **provide benefits that** either **are not taxed** or are taxed at a lower effective rate than wages. Also, **under current regulations,** such **subsidy benefits do not cause families to lose as much** governmental assistance or tax credits as do wage increases.

Living wage ordinances kill job growth; wage subsidies are better, and economists agree

**EPI 1** writes[[299]](#footnote-299)

It is revealing that the **living wage** activists promote policies at the local level that **would raise** the **costs of employers, rather than** targeted policies that **promote** economic **growth** and expansion. Writing in the influential Brookings Review, Edward Hill and Jeremy Nowak have made the case that distressed urban areas need a combination of tax subsidies and market-based policies that attract businesses and encourage investments in workers and infrastructure.6 **Living wage ordinances, by raising employer costs,** work in the opposite direction by **limiting job growth and employment opportunities for low-skill workers. A more appealing policy** alternative to wage mandates **is a targeted living wage subsidy that encourages the poor to work, yet does not place hiring barriers in their path. Professional labor economists**, who study the effects of wage mandates and wage subsidies, **are overwhelmingly opposed to living wage ordinances and prefer** tax credits or **wage subsidies** as antipoverty devices. This is shown in a recent survey, conducted in March and April 2000, of members of the American Economic Association who specialize in labor economics.7 Of the 336 labor economists who responded to the survey, 69 percent expressed the opinion that localized living wage ordinances were “not at all” efficient in addressing the income needs of poor families. Indeed, 43 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that a national living wage mandate would increase poverty. On the other hand, 98 percent of the responding labor economists expressed a belief that the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was either a “very efficient” (51%) or a “somewhat efficient” (47%) means of assisting the poor.

The aff destroys 50% of minimum wage contractor jobs, by the most conservative estimate—the CP solves

**EPI 1** writes[[300]](#footnote-300)

Wage Mandates Cause Job Displacement While Wage Subsidies Do Not One compelling argument against mandated wage increases on the scale advocated by the living wage movement is that they would result in job losses for the very population they seek to help. Wage mandates are thought to cause job loss by raising employers’ costs of employing low-skill labor without corresponding increases in skills or productivity. This increase in relative costs leads employers to substitute higher skilled labor and capital equipment for the very-low-wage workers the living wage movement purports to help. Without jobs, the living wage ordinances offer an empty promise. On the other hand, **targeted wage subsidies do not destroy jobs** for less-skilled workers **because they do not raise** the **employers’ costs** of employing them. The benefits are delivered to either the worker or the employer through a subsidy payment or tax credit. a. Wage Mandates Cause the Less Skilled to Lose Jobs **Based on decades of research, most labor economists agree that minimum wages do not reduce poverty** partly **because** the **costs of minimum wages are borne disproportionately by the poor.**10 When labor costs rise through wage mandates, **employers have strong incentives to substitute high**er**-skilled labor** and capital **for** the **less-skilled labor that has become more expensive**. Also, to the extent that **businesses raise prices** as a result of the wage hikes, **they stand to lose customers, which leads to further reductions in jobs**. Unfortunately, those who need the jobs the most and who have the most difficulty finding and keeping Page 3 stable work are those most likely to be hurt by the wage increases. It is thus not surprising that labor economists take a dim view of living wage ordinances because these ordinances are nothing more than the minimum wage on steroids. Based on an extensive body of respectable research, a conservative estimate would be that a mandated 10 percent increase in wages would reduce the employment and/or hours of those affected by at least 5 percent.11 Other credible studies have found much higher effects.12 This means that, **speaking conservatively, a living wage ordinance that doubled labor costs** for low-wage workers (e.g., a wage hike from $5.15 to $10.30) **could** be expected to **reduce employment of those previously working at** the **minimum wage by 50 percent**.13 That is, one out of every two affected minimum wage workers could expect to be displaced (or the equivalent in reductions in hours across the minimum wage work force) because of the higher-wages mandated by living wage ordinances. The effect for higher wage workers would also be significant. For workers whose wages were raised by 50 percent, say from $7.00 to $10.50, one of four of them is likely to be displaced (or we would see an equivalent hours reduction for the work force). This is just the shortrun effect. The longer-term effects are less well documented, but are likely to lead to further skilled labor or capital substitution, or other adjustments that reduce labor demand. The disemployment effects could be lower for contractor-based mandates if the local government absorbs a high fraction of the higher wage and benefit costs. Is it any wonder that labor economists generally regard wage mandates as being more likely to increase poverty than to reduce it?

The aff’s poorly targeted; the CP solves

**EPI 1** writes[[301]](#footnote-301)

Compared with the question of whether wage mandates cause employment losses, there is even a greater degree of consensus among labor economists that wage mandates are ineffective in reducing poverty.32 **It is undisputed that many** of the **wage increases that result from minimum wage hikes go not to the needy, but** to **those in the middle or upper part of** the **income distribution**.33 Many of those who benefited are young people who live with their parents, are not the sole support of a family, or reside in households with above-average family incomes.34 Moreover, because **many poor families do not have** any **full-time workers**, they do not benefit, **or** they **benefit only marginally**, from the mandated wage increases.35 Also, as mentioned above, since wage mandates are thought to cause employment displacement among those who have limited skills and work experience, the poor end up paying disproportionately for any benefits they may receive. Because living wage ordinances are relatively new, we know less about the distribution of benefits from living wage ordinances than we do about those from minimum wage hikes. However, it is known that **in the U**nited **S**tates**, poverty is generally associated with either no work or part-time work.36 Mandated wage policies are limited** in their capability to raise families out of poverty because they benefit mostly those who work full-time and who are thus less likely to be poor. Wage mandates are considered inefficient because many of their benefits go to the non-poor, and because not all poor families receive benefits. The inefficiency is exacerbated by the job displacement effects that fall chiefly on the less skilled. **On the other hand, targeted wage subsidies by design are limited to workers in low-income families**, or to firms that employ such workers. Moreover, the targeted wage subsidies encourage the poor to increase their labor force participation without causing job losses. Thus, the truly needy are able to receive greater net benefits. Targeted wage subsidies are thus more efficient in helping families in need than untargeted wage mandates.

Taxes and benefit reductions offset aff solvency; the CP avoids this

**EPI 1** writes[[302]](#footnote-302)

Unlike Living Wage Ordinances, Wage Subsidies Do Not Cause Poor Families to Lose Government Benefits For poor families receiving government assistance, there is yet another reason mandated wage policies are ineffective in alleviating their poverty. **Government assistance programs such as T**emporary **A**ssistance for **N**eedy **F**amilies**, food stamps,** the **E**arned **I**ncome **T**ax **C**redit **and housing assistance** all **reduce their benefits incrementally** as a family’s earnings increase. A recent study from New York University Law School has documented just how pervasive such work disincentives can be for workers in poor families.37 This means that for every additional dollar a family earns it could lose as much as 90 cents or more in federal benefits. **Thus,** the **upside potential for a living wage mandate to** substantially **increase a poverty family’s net income is** extremely **limited**. Indeed, **even advocates** of living wage mandates **concede that a significant part** of any mandated wage increase **is lost through taxes and benefit losses**. For example, Pollin and his colleagues estimated that in the absence of job losses, a New Orleans minimum wage of $6.15 would increase the gross earnings of affected workers by 12 percent, but would increase their after-tax, after-benefit incomes by only 2.9 to 4.4 percent.38 In contrast **targeted wage subsidies do not impinge on a family’s eligibility for government programs, and thus cause no loss of benefits**.39 In view of these facts, most labor economists view wage mandates as inefficient and likely to cause more harm than good. They prefer wage subsidies that can be more efficiently targeted to those in need and that do not cause the loss of jobs.

### Outsourcing Bad DA

Companies nationwide absorbing wage increases leads to higher prices for the poor and causes outsourcing which kills US economic competitiveness.

**Leong 13** writes[[303]](#footnote-303)

The real problem is that other **low**er**-wage**-paying **companies**, such as McDonalds Corporation (NYSE/MCD), simply **won’t absorb** wage **increases without passing the increase** on **to** their **customers**. And there’s absolutely nothing illegal in this. It’s a fact: an increase in wages equals an increase in the price of goods. Think of it this way: when a company is forced to pay its minimum-wage employees a higher wage, **the company needs to allocate more** money **to**ward **payroll**. With an increase in wage costs, **that company now needs to find a** new **way to increase earnings so that it can cover this increase**. Raising the price of its goods is an obvious answer for the company. For instance, the cost of a $3.00 “Big Mac” rises to $3.25 following an increase in minimum wage. By boosting the minimum wage, the **low**er**-wage earners may make more, but it will be partly offset by higher costs for** end **goods**, such as those **at Wal-Mart and McDonald’s**, **which** are stores the **lower-income earners may be more inclined to shop** or eat **at**. Moreover, increasing the minimum wage will mean higher input costs at manufacturing plants across the nation. These **manufacturing plants will** then have two options: 1) **raise the price** of the end product; **or** 2) **move** part or all of their **manufacturing to cheaper labor markets** in places like Asia and Latin America. I suspect some companies will look more seriously at the latter option; and we all know **China and Mexico would welcome $2.00-per-hour plant jobs**. So before we just implement higher wages, we need to put more thought into the process; we need to consider what detrimental affects **higher wages** could have on America’s economy and its position in the broader economy, as a wage increase **could easily hurt** the **competitiveness of the country in the global market.**

Empirics prove that competitiveness creates economic hegemony which solves global conflict. **Hubbard 10** writes[[304]](#footnote-304)

Research into the theoretical underpinnings of this topic revealed that there are two main subfields within the literature on hegemonic stability. One line of study, an avenue pursued by prominent theorists such as Kindleberger, Keohane, and Ikenberry focuses primarily on questions of related to the economic system. The other avenue, pursued by theorists such as Gilpin, looks at the role of hegemonic governance in reducing violent conflict. In my research, I focus on this aspect of hegemonic stability – its implications for military conflict in the international system. To research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs, focusing on the years of 1815-1939 in the case of British hegemony, and 1945 to 1999 in the case of American hegemony. I hypothesized that hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the international system. Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. **I** then **matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts** in the international system **since 1815**. I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. **Regression** analysis of the data **revealed** that there was **a statistically significant negative correlation between** relative **heg**emonic power **and conflict** levels in the international system. However, further statistical tests added complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further **analysis revealed** that in both cases, **military power was a less accurate predictor of** military **conflict than economic power**. There are several possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition, **weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged militarily** than stronger hegemons. Thus, the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the **most important** implication of this research **is that hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power** than through the exercise of military force. II. Research Question In examining hegemonic stability theory, there are several important questions to consider. First of all, an acceptable definition of what constitutes a hegemon must be established. Secondly, a good measure of what constitutes stability in the international system must be determined. Certainly, the frequency and severity of interstate conflict is an important measure of stability in the international system. However, other measures of stability should also be taken into account. Conflict in the international system takes on a wide range of forms. While military conflict is perhaps the most violent and severe dimension, it is only one of many forms that conflict can take. Conflict need not be confined to wars between traditional states. Terrorism, piracy, and guerilla warfare are also types of conflict that are endemic to the international system. Economic conflict, exemplified by trade wars, hostile actions such as sanctions, or outright trade embargos, is also an important form of conflict in the international system. States can also engage in a range of less severe actions that might be deemed political conflict, by recalling an ambassador or withdrawing from international bodies, for example. Clearly, “stability” as it pertains to the international system is a vast and amorphous concept. Because of these complexities, a comprehensive assessment of the theory is beyond the purview of this research. However, completing a more focused analysis is a realistic endeavor. Focusing on international armed conflicts in two select periods will serve to increase the feasibility the research. I will focus on the period of British hegemony lasting from the end of the Napoleonic wars to 1939 and the period of American hegemony beginning after the Second World War and continuing until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. The proposed hypothesis is that in these periods, the **heg**emon **acted as a stabilizing force** by reducing the frequency and severity of international armed conflict. The dependent variable in this case is the frequency and severity of conflict. The primary independent variable is the power level of the hegemon. This hypothesis is probabilistic since it posits that the hegemon tended to reduce conflict, not that it did so in every single possible instance. One way to test this hypothesis would be through a case-study method that examined the role of Britain and the United States in several different conflicts. This method would have the advantage of approaching the problem from a very feasible, limited perspective. While it would not reveal much about hegemony on a broader theoretical level, it would help provide practical grounding for what is a highly theoretical area of stuffy in international relations. Another method would be to do a broader quantitative comparison of international conflict by finding and comparing data on conflict and hegemonic strength for the entire time covered by British and American hegemony. The hypothesis is falsifiable, because it could be shown that the hegemon did not act as a stabilizing force during the years of study. **It** also **avoids** some of **the pitfalls** associated **with the case study method, such as selection bias and** the inherently **subjective** nature of **qualitative analysis.**

Absent heg, these conflicts will escalate and cause extinction. **Kagan 7** writes[[305]](#footnote-305)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. **Nationalism** in all its forms **is back**, if it ever went away, **and so is international competition for power**, influence, honor, and status. **American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying** — its regional as well as its global predominance. **Were the U**nited **S**tates **to diminish its influence** in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the **other nations would settle disputes** as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often **through confrontation and wars** of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that **most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons.** **That could make wars** between them less likely, or it could simply make them more **catastrophic.**

### \*\*\*Case

### Pre-empts

Neg gets RVIs if I don’t run theory. Key to reciprocity. Also key to deter the 1AR from using blippy theory to minimize topic engagement. If the 1AR was too skewed to win substance, she should collapse to 4 minutes of theory anyway.

Use reasonability because competing interps allows the 1AR to use frivolous theory to evade clash which crushes neg incentive to research. No DA to gutchecking because intervention is inevitable in late-breaking 1AR theory debates.

Don’t vote on presumption or permissibility because human fallibility means there’s always a nonzero risk of offense.

### AT Rule Util

Devolves to act util.

1. “Maximize utility” is the utility maximizing rule.

2. If living wage is an exception to the rule, that proves that the rule “follow the aff principles except for living wage” is net better than the aff.

### AT Reject DAs

The heg impact is disjunctive; it’s not about heg solving one single conflict, but solving indefinite future conflicts each of which is independent. That means I don’t link to his indict of infinitely small scenarios.

His scenarios are conjunctive; they rely on “living wage solves unions solves working conditions solves poverty” and so on.

### Poverty

**Living wage ordinances cause poverty; consensus of economists**

**Quigley 1**

William Quigley, Law Professor-Loyola University New Orleans, 2001, "Full Time Workers Should Not Be Poor: The Living Wage Movement," Mississippi Law Journal, Spring, 70 Miss. J.J. 889, p. 935-6

Opponents of living wages argue that these ordinances could potentially increase the local poverty rate and cost too much. A survey of over 300 economists conducted in 2000 for the Employment Policies Institute, a nonprofit research organization generally opposed to raises in both the minimum wage and the enactment of living wage ordinances, found that nearly eight in ten of the labor economists surveyed thought living wage ordinances would result in employers hiring higher skilled workers, and over 70% said the laws could potentially reduce the number of entry-level jobs and thus increase the local poverty rate. [n180](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n180) The opposition also suggests that living wage ordinances increase the cost of governmental contracts. Pasadena, California, estimated their living wage ordinance cost to be about $ 200,000 for the year 2000; Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimated its cost at $ 300,000; Madison, Wisconsin, estimated its cost at $ 47,000. [n181](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n181) While there is certainly some cost associated with living wages, this article will not join in the aforementioned melee of economists. Others disagree. [n182](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n182)

Prefer expert consensus

**LaBossiere 14** writes[[306]](#footnote-306)

3. The claims made by the expert are consistent with the views of the majority of qualified experts in the field. This is perhaps the most important factor. **As a general rule, a claim** that is **held as correct by the majority of qualified experts in the field is** the **most plausible** claim. The basic idea is that **the majority of experts are more likely to be right than those who disagree** with the majority. It is important to keep in mind that no field has complete agreement, so some degree of dispute is acceptable. How much is acceptable is, of course, a matter of serious debate. It is also important to be aware that the majority could turn out to be wrong. That said, the reason it is still reasonable for non-experts to go with the majority opinion is that non-experts are, by definition, not experts. After all, **if I am not an expert** in a field**, I would be hard pressed to justify picking the expert I happen to** like or **agree with against the view of the majority** of experts.

### Bargaining Power/Unions

**Living wage is useless for organizers.**

Lange 14

Jonathan Lange (Labor organizer, former living wage advocate). “Why Living-Wage Laws Are Not Enough—and Minimum-Wage Laws Aren’t Either.” The Nation. 25 November 2014. http://www.thenation.com/article/191513/why-living-wage-laws-are-not-enough-and-minimum-wage-laws-arent-either

I am a lifelong organizer—in labor and community settings—and am proud to say that I helped spearhead the living-wage campaign in Baltimore twenty years ago this fall. Our campaign was led by the religious leaders of BUILD—Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development, an affiliate of the Industrial Areas Foundation—along with a team of determined low-wage service workers. While we received support from the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), this effort was conceived, planned, implemented and owned by local civic and clergy leaders alongside local workers. We won in Baltimore. Then, two years later, with almost no support from organized labor, we won in New York City. And we found that we had sparked a wave of living wage battles in cities and counties across the country that continues to this day. It pains me to say this, but I now believe that the effort going into raising the minimum wage and passing living-wage bills **fails to address the fundamental cause of low wages** and terrible conditions: a lack of worker power. Those who believe, as I do, that workers deserve a living wage and decent benefits, can’t ignore the fact that **twenty years of mobilizing** around higher minimum wages and legislated living-wage standards have not closed the wage gap. **That gap has continued to grow**. **And** the rate of growth has **accelerated**. It’s not a gap that will be filled by legislated solutions. It can and will only be filled by organized workers willing to fight for better wages and benefits in their own workplaces.

### Compliance

Monitoring compliance with living wage ordinances is difficult. Baltimore proves.

**Niedt et al 99** write[[307]](#footnote-307)

**Since the ordinance was** first **implemented, there have been several reports of** ongoing **violations**. Also, **there has been** some **ambiguity concerning when contractors must pay the living wage**, especially contractors with long contracts or options for extension. Whatever the cause of noncompliance, the result would be to reduce the upward pressure on costs to the city. A significant example concerns the bus contracts that make up such a large proportion of the contracts on which we were able to develop comparable data. **The majority of bus companies were not in compliance** during the first half of FY 1997 **due to** a **dispute over** the nature of bus **contract extensions**. At this point, wages were scheduled to rise to $6.60 an hour, but most companies continued paying at the FY 1996 rate of $6.10 an hour. Other bus companies were found to be in noncompliance since January 1997 (i.e., the second half of FY 1997). Compliance, in principle, is enforced by **the city Wage Commission**, which **must sift through payroll data on every worker. Because of** the **voluminous data and the small staff**, the commission has so far been able to monitor only bus contracts. But, as shown below, this **monitoring has not guaranteed compliance.**

### Productivity

Their productivity args ignore that low-skilled workers get screwed by the aff

**EPI 1** writes[[308]](#footnote-308)

We first consider the productivity or cost arguments. **While** it is true that covered **businesses** may increase their productivity by hiring more skilled workers, **this** in effect **reduces** the **employment opportunities for** the **less-skilled workers** who are thus placed at risk by the ordinance. Another argument sometimes heard is that workers would increase their effort if paid higher wages. While this may be better studied by psychologists, this argument also implies greater productivity per worker and thus a need for fewer workers. **These arguments are far from convincing in favor of living wage ordinances;** rather, **they confirm** the **concerns of labor economists that the less skilled will be harmed** by the wage mandate.16

Their evidence assumes businesses are hella inefficient prior to the wage increase, which is silly

**EPI 1** writes[[309]](#footnote-309)

Third, **other effects depend** largely **on** the **unsupported assumptions that businesses behave inefficiently before the wage increase** and that their efficiency is increased by the wage mandate. **Labor economists are skeptical** regarding such generally unsupported notions, **at least for** wage increases as large as those mandated by **living wage ordinances**.19

### Turnover

Low turnover harms low-skilled workers, and their evidence doesn’t deny labor substitution effects

**EPI 1** writes[[310]](#footnote-310)

Second, although **the turnover argument** has logical appeal and has some support in empirical research, it **misses an important dimension of** how **low-skill labor markets** operate. **One of the consequences of** a **lower** rate of voluntary **turnover is that employers post fewer job vacancies because there is less need to replace workers who quit. This** drop in job vacancies once again **hurts** most severely **the low-skilled, who** are known to **have limited labor force attachments and** who will **suffer from** the **fewer job openings**.17 **Also, notwithstanding** any **cost savings** realized **from lower turnover, firms** still **have incentives to substitute** capital and **higher-skilled workers for low-skilled workers** because the cost of low-skilled labor has been forced up.18

Low turnover kills growth and causes unemployment

**Meer and West 13** writes[[311]](#footnote-311)

Although there is support for employee hiring to be relatively more affected, the effect of the minimum wage on both job creation and job destruction is ultimately an empirical question. And, because the effects on these gross margins are theoretically ambiguous and potentially opposing, the net employment effect of the minimum wage could take several forms that are not mutually exclusive. First, the minimum wage could affect (positively or negatively) the total employment level. Second, by encouraging a longer duration of worker firm matches, the **minimum wage could reduce turnover** of employees within existing jobs. Finally, a minimum wage could change the net flow of workers into employment by altering the job growth rate. Any of these outcomes are consistent with the theoretical relationships discussed above, but the bulk of the literature has focused on the first relationship, investigating how a minimum wage affects the employment level. Several recent studies offer exceptions to the focus on employment levels. Dube et al. (2011) examine the relationship between the minimum wage and employee turnover using the 2001-2008 Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI). They focus on teenagers and restaurant employees employed in contiguous counties across state lines, and find that the minimum wage reduced both new hiring and separations despite having little effect on contemporaneous employment levels. Brochu and Green (2012) assess firing, quit, and hiring rates in Canadian survey data. They find that workers hired within the previous six months are less likely to separate from their jobs in the presence of a higher minimum wage, a result driven in part by a reduction in firings; they find no effect on workers with longer tenure. Similar to Dube et al. (2011), they find a reduction in hiring rates but do not estimate the net effect on job growth.6 It is important to note that even if it were the case that minimum wages just reduce employee turnover, **this outcome might be undesirable**. Lazear and Spletzer (2012) argue that **employee churn is an important component of the labor market because it indicates reallocation of workers to jobs in which they are more productive. They link declines in employee turnover to reduced economic output**. More to the point, the **total employment effects** of the minimum wage **are of primary interest** for policy-making. **It is uncertain what policy goals are served by increasing** the **tenure of** voluntary **employment** through labor market regulations. We believe that the relevant outcome is employers’ creation of new jobs or destruction of existing jobs – the net movement of workers into employment. In light of the issues discussed above, this effect may follow a slow process.

# Torrey Pines

## Prison Neg Cards

### General

#### Deterrence? Public trust?

Rebik 14

Dana Rebik (reporter). “Mass murderer Isaac Zamora paid minimum wage in state prison.” Q13 Fox. 13 March 2014. <http://q13fox.com/2014/03/13/mass-murderer-isaac-zamora-paid-minimum-wage-in-state-prison/>

Isaac Zamora went on a shooting rampage that day, also firing at Fred, hitting him in the hip and back. Zamora killed six people and pleaded guilty to four counts of first-degree murder, but also pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to two counts. That got him time at Western State Hospital, but in June 2013 a judge approved a transfer to the prison in Monroe because Zamora was a threat to hospital staff and considered an escape risk. But he is technically considered a psychiatric patient. “My worst fear with this situation is that because he is considered a patient or boarder, not an offender, is that there will be preferential or different treatment,” said Michelle Woodrow with Teamsters Local 117, the union that represents prison staff in June 2013 when commenting about Zamora’s initial transfer. Documents obtained by Q13 FOX News show that is exactly the case — that Zamora is being paid minimum wage to work as a part-time janitor or porter in prison. Most inmates make only 55 cents an hour and can work their way up to $2.60, but aren’t allowed to make more than $55 a month. A time sheet from the state Department of Corrections shows the hours Zamora logged between Dec. 21 and Feb. 6. So far, he’s only been paid about $95 in his part-time position, but victims feel it’s setting a concerning precedent. “It’s really wrong for him to have any rights. A prison is for punishment, not to reward you for a heinous crime like he did,” said Binschus. Emails between the Department of Corrections and Western State officials show it is the state Department of Social and Health Services, the agency that manages the hospital, which is paying Zamora this money. An email from Jan. 28, 2014, reads “Mr. Z now has a part time porter job. We need to find out how to get the money for his pay from Western State Hospital into Mr. Z’s account. He will be paid about $9 an hour”. The emails then show confusion whether to pay Zamora with a check or money order. “That is wrong, to give someone like that a job. He should be locked up and have bread and water, is what I think,” said Binschus. Last week, there was a hearing to determine if Zamora will become a permanent offender in prison and fall under DOC custody, or remain a DSHS “boarder,” as he is now. Skagit County Superior Court Judge Michael Rickert ruled to keep the situation as it stands and revisit the case in June. That means for now, DSHS will continue to pay Zamora minimum wage to work there. “It gets my blood pressure up because I didn’t get any closure over this. Everything was about him. He’s just got way too many rights,” said Binschus.

### Constitutionality

#### It’s constitutional

Mayeux 10

Sara Mayeux (JD, Stanford Law School; PhD candidate in US History, Stanford University). “Prison Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment.” Prison Law Blog. 16 December 2010. <https://prisonlaw.wordpress.com/2010/12/16/prison-labor-and-the-thirteenth-amendment/>

As this is ostensibly a legal blog, I would be remiss if I didn’t point out that it does not, in fact, violate the Thirteenth Amendment to require prisoners to work for free. (That, of course, is an entirely separate issue from whether prisoners should be paid as a policy matter, or whether particular prisoners may have constitutionally cognizable challenges to particular work assignments — I’m speaking here at a broad level of generality.) And I’d rather risk pedantic than remiss, so here’s the text of the Thirteenth Amendment, passed and ratified in 1865, with the relevant language bolded: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, **except as a punishment for crime** whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. This is why states that do pay prisoners can legally pay them well under the minimum wage. From the Prison Policy Initiative, here’s a breakdown of prison hourly wages, ranging from $0 in Georgia and Texas, to 13 cents in Nevada prison camps, to $1.15 in some federal prison industries jobs.

### Impact Turn

#### Private prisons good

Moore 99

Adrian T. Moore (vice president of policy at Reason Foundation, a non-profit think tank; Moore has testified before Congress on numerous occasions). “PRIVATE PRISONS: Quality Corrections at a Lower Cost.” Reason Public Policy Institute (RPPI). 1999. http://reason.org/files/d14ffa18290a9aeb969d1a6c1a9ff935.pdf

Why are U.S. federal agencies and state and local governments turning to the private sector for correctional services? Because tougher crime policies and budget constraints have combined to create a problem, if not a crisis, in the nation’s prisons and jails. Governments are incarcerating more criminals, but they have recently become unwilling to spend sufficient tax dollars for new prisons to house them. The prison system is increasingly characterized by overcrowding, lawsuits, and court orders. With taxpayers clearly demanding that criminals be put in prison and kept in longer, there seems to be no choice but to increase the capacity of the prison system. But with popular pressure to cut government spending, funding the increase will be difficult. Legislators face a lot of pressure to hold the line on corrections spending, and fewer than half of all referendums to approve bond financing of new prisons are being approved by voters. This has led federal, state, and local officials to consider how the private sector can become involved in corrections to lower costs while maintaining or even improving the quality of services and help cope with the growing number of prisoners without busting the budget. This study surveys the evidence on what private prisons have to offer and the evidence on how they have performed. Extent of Private Prisons: Contracting with private prisons is widely practiced¾ there are over 120 private facilities in 27 states, and around 120,000 inmates in their keeping. Private firms operate several maximum security facilities and dozens of medium security ones. Cost Savings: Private prisons save money—10 to 15 percent average savings on operations costs, based on fourteen independent cost comparison studies. Other evidence of cost savings is examined as well. Cost savings are achieved through innovation and efficient management practices. Quality Services: Private prisons provide at least the same quality services that government prisons do—based on six independent quality comparison studies, rates of American Correctional Association accreditation, recidivism comparison studies, contract terminations, and prisoner and correctional officer lawsuits. The evidence is overwhelming that the private sector delivers quality correctional services at lower cost to the benefit of taxpayers. Moreover, public official’s experiences with contracting for correctional services, through contract terms, legislation, and best practices, has resolved many of the thorny questions that come up when privatizing corrections is suggested. This study examines the answers to such questions as: Can private correctional officers use deadly force?, Can they manage riots?, How can we be sure private prisons do not violate prisoners’ rights?, Do private correctional officers receive lower-quality training than government correctional officers?, Have private prisons been “skimming the cream”—taking only low-security and less-expensive inmates?, and many others.

### Aerospace DA Link

#### Low wage prison labor is key to aerospace

Elk 11

Mike Elk (union organizer). “Defense Contractors Using Prison Labor to Build High-Tech Weapons Systems.” Alternet. 28 April 2011. \*\*Elk does not advocate prison labor. http://www.alternet.org/story/150777/defense\_contractors\_using\_prison\_labor\_to\_build\_high-tech\_weapons\_systems

It is a little known fact of the attack on Libya that some of the components of the cruise missiles being launched into the country may have been made by prisoners in the United States. According to its website, UNICOR, which is the organization that represents Federal Prison Industries, “supplies numerous electronic components and service for guided missiles, including the Patriot Advanced Capability Missile (PAC-3)”. In addition to constructing electronic components for missiles, prison labor in the United States is used to make electronic cables for defense items like “the McDonnell Douglas/Boeing (BA) F-15, the General Dynamics/Lockheed Martin F-16, Bell/Textron’s (TXT) Cobra helicopter, as well as electro-optical equipment for the BAE Systems”. Traditionally these types of defense jobs would have gone to highly paid, unionized workers. However the prison workers building parts for these missiles earn a starting wage of 23 cents an hour and can only make a maximum of $1.15 an hour. Nearly 1 in 100 adults are in jail in the United States and are exempt from our minimum wage laws, creating a sizable captive workforce that could undercut outside wage standards. "It's no different than when our government allowed a United Steelworkers-represented factory of several hundred good jobs in Indiana called Magnequench to shut down," United Steelworkers Public Affairs Director Gary Hubbard told AlterNet. "This was the last high-tech magnetics production plant in the U.S. that made guidance components for missiles and smart bombs. The factory was sold to a Chinese state enterprise that moved all the machinery to China. And now we depend on prison labor to build our defense products?" As the governments look to cut costs and trim deficits, they are giving more and more contracts for skilled work to prisons, whose workers often make 1/15th of the wages they would earn in the private sector. Whereas in the past prisoners made license plates and desks for state offices, they are now being trained for skilled work doing everything from assembling cable components for guided missiles to underwater repair welding. Even the much heralded green jobs aren’t immune to being outsourced to prison -- the solar panels being used to provide electricity for the State Department’s office in Washington, D.C. are constructed with prison labor.

# University School

## Misc. Ev for ILaw AC

### ILaw = Util

#### ILaw normatively includes the obligation to minimize suffering

**Heinze 9** writes[[312]](#footnote-312)

Beginning the analysis of the legal dimension of humanitarian intervention, Chapter 3 surveys international treaty and customary law relevant to the use of force and human rights. Here I explore whether **certain bodies of international law reflect the consequentialist insight that intervention is only permissible under certain extreme conditions**, as well as the extent to which these bodies of law specify such conditions. The central question addressed in this chapter is whether international law relevant to humanitarian intervention contains principles that delineate the conditions of human welfare under which military force may be pursued, and to what extent these principles parallel those advanced by a consequentialist concern for human security. In examining UN Charter principles relevant to the use of force, in addition to human rights treaty law and evidence of customary law, I find that these legal bases fail to govern humanitarian intervention in such a way that it is lawfully permitted only under exceptional and extreme cases, as would be prescribed by consequentialist logic. Chapter 4 explores an alternative international-legal grounding that recognizes the consequentialist insight that not all instances of human suffering constitute equal moral grounds for humanitarian intervention. This legal grounding is not international law on the use of force or Introduction 13 human rights treaty law per se, but rather jurisdictional principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. According to J. L. Brierly, “law is not a meaningless set of arbitrary principles to be mechanically applied by the courts, but . . . exists for certain ends, though those ends may have to be differently formulated in different times and places.”27 For Brierly, while law at times functions as technical, morally neutral precepts, it also maintains clear normative implications for what kinds of behavior are permissible on the international scene. A legal right to humanitarian intervention may be elusive, but insofar as **moral understandings of intervention** can be couched within this normative legal framework, it **can be said to have a “legal basis within the normative framework of international law**,” although still technically illegal.28 The argument of this chapter is that international law does regard certain forms of human abuse as fundamentally more important with regard to their prevention and punishment in order to achieve these normative ends that Brierly suggests. I refer here to international human rights and humanitarian crimes that entail universal jurisdiction. According to the logic of the principle of universal jurisdiction, **i**nterna- tional **law considers some crimes as such an affront to** human **dignity and well-being that it grants states the right** (even the duty) **to try in** their **domestic courts those accused of committing such crimes**, regard- less of where the crimes took place.29 International law considers these acts particularly heinous, **not unlike how a consequentialist concern for** human **security argues that certain human suffering is more detrimental** to individuals **than other forms, and that it is these conditions only that may be subject to the use of force**. This chapter explores crimes to which universal jurisdiction is attached—generally, genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes—and the extent to which these cate- gories of crimes parallel those threats to human security that justify humanitarian intervention according to a consequentialist concern for human security. To the extent that this parallel exists, I argue that these principles of international law create normative space in which viola- tions of this kind can find a legal basis as more extreme categories of human suffering, which are rightly halted and averted with more extreme measures such as the use of force. Chapter 5 addresses the third and final concern of this inquiry, exploring which actors in international society are best-suited to under- take humanitarian intervention in a way that most effectively minimizes human suffering. This chapter explores characteristics that affect the ability of potential agents of humanitarian intervention to effectively undertake this operationally and politically demanding task. Continuing with the consequentialist logic that underlies the book as a whole, this chapter identifies and articulates the **relevant material and nonmaterial factors** that **either facilitate or impede** an actor’s ability to mount an **effective humanitarian intervention**. While the military wherewithal of the intervener is fundamental, the potential intervener’s international legiti- macy as an agent or enforcer of humanitarian norms is also crucial in determining whether and to what extent it is a suitable agent. In other words, the efficacy of a potential intervener depends not only on its mili- tary wherewithal, but also on nonmaterial factors than can affect its ability to effectively exercise this power. These nonmaterial factors are a function of what can be described as the politics of legitimacy, which involves judgments about the humanitarian credentials of the intervener, whether it should be constrained multilaterally, and its position in the prevailing international political context. **What is ultimately a moral concern is therefore driven by** what are **essentially political considerations**—that is, the relationship between power, norms and consensus on the international scene. It is the complex relationship among these various power-political considerations that influences **the extent to which an actor can undertake humanitarian intervention** such that it **meets the consequentialist moral requirement of minimizing human suffering.**

a. Heinze is a professor of international law who’s interpreting laws for their meaning – this is more accurate than simply referring to text, and more accurate than a high-school student’s interpretation

b. Ilaw regards well-being as so important that it suspends the right of sovereignty to allow trials in foreign courts for heinous crimes – proves that util takes priority

### Economic Sovereignty Turn

#### Economic Sovereignty, Not ILaw, Is Central To State Obligations

Subedi, 2006:

(International Economic Law. Section A: Evolution And Principles Of International Economic Law. Revised Version- December 2006. S.P. Subedi, Professor of International Law At The University Of Leeds)

Economic sovereignty When states began to function as politically independent and sovereign entities, they realised that one of the most important attributes of state sovereignty was economic sovereignty. Without this, political sovereignty was not complete. Asserting economic sovereignty meant having control over the economic activities of both juridical and natural persons conducting business within the country, whether nationals of that country or foreigners. Owing to a number of historical reasons, many states inherited on independence a situation in which foreign individuals or companies enjoyed certain concessions or privileges or control over the economic activities of the country concerned. In many states the natural resources and mining rights were controlled by foreign companies or individuals under a concession agreement entered into with the previous administration, whether colonial or otherwise. When the country concerned wished to embark on a policy of economic development, one of the first initiatives it had to take was to consider harnessing its natural resources in accordance with its economic policies. It therefore became necessary for these states to assert sovereignty over the natural resources of the country and require that foreign individuals and companies comply with the new policy adopted by the state.

### AT Rule Following (Wittgenstien)

#### Wittgenstein’s Rule Model Presupposes The Universality Of Anterior Concepts

Wright, 2007:

(Rule-Following Without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism And The Constitutive Question. Ratio (New Series) XX. December 4, 2007. Crispin Wright, Professor of Philosophy At NYU)

My reaction to this consideration in the [1989] paper was to focus on the – for my purposes then – easier case where one’s judgement about the requirements of a rule may be seen as resting upon extricable major and minor premises after the fashion of the modus ponens model.18 Here, though – where our purpose is to try to get some kind of focus on the impact of Wittgenstein’s rule-following discussion quite generally – we have no option but to attend instead to the harder range of cases, where the modus ponens model seems to lapse as a framework for the explanation of a rule-governed response, for the want of extricable major and minor premises. Let us focus on the case of colour. Suppose, undeterred, we stubbornly try to assimilate predications of ‘red’ to the modus ponens model. The correctness of such a predication is thus to be seen as the progeny of an input condition of a certain character together with a rule associating such inputs precisely with the correctness of the predication: *Rule*: If . . . x . . . , it is correct to predicate ‘red’ of x *Premise*: . . . x . . . *Conclusion*: It is correct to apply ‘red’ to x. To conceive of predications of ‘red’ as rule-governed in the manner of the model accordingly requires an anterior concept, ‘. . . x . . .’, whose satisfaction determines an input as appropriate for the application of the rule. But now it stares us in the face that this concept can hardly be anything other than: *red*! So we get an interesting upshot: the stubborn extension of the modus ponens model to the cases Wittgenstein would seem to have in mind when he speaks of rule-following as ‘blind’ would demand that we think of linguistic competence in terms, broadly, of the Augustinian picture of languagewith which the *Investigations* begins, and from which it is a journey of recoil. The crucial aspect of the Augustinian picture for our purposes here, of course, is not the confusion of meaning and naming which Wittgenstein himself fastens on in the immediately succeeding sections of the text, and on which his commentators have largely concentrated. It is the aspect, rather, that is highlighted a little later, at *Investigations* §32: . . . And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the countrythat is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And ‘think’ would here mean something like ‘talk to itself’. In short, the problem with extending the modus ponens model to cover all rule-following, including that involved in basic cases, is that it calls for a conceptual repertoire anterior to an understanding of any particular rule – the conceptual repertoire needed to grasp the input conditions, and the association of them which the rule effects with a certain mandated, prohibited or permissible form of response. From the standpoint of the philosophy of thought and language of the Investigations, this is an enormous mistake. With respect to a wide class of concepts, a grasp of them is not anterior to the ability to give them competent linguistic expression but rather resides in that very ability. (This need not be a commitment to holding that there is never any sense at all to be made of the idea of thought without language. But it is to repudiate the *general* picture of thought as an activity of the mind which language merely clothes.)

#### Needs cutting

Wright, 2007:

(Rule-Following Without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism And The Constitutive Question. Ratio (New Series) XX. December 4, 2007. Crispin Wright, Professor of Philosophy At NYU)

In summary: To say that in basic cases, we follow rules blindly or without reasons is to say that our moves are uninformed by – are not the rational output of – any appreciation of *facts about what the rules require*. This is, emphatically, not the claim that it is inappropriate ever to describe someone as, say, knowing the rule(s) for the use of ‘red’, or as knowing what such a rule requires. Rather, it is a caution about how to understand such descriptions – or better: about how *not* to understand them. In any basic case, the lapse of the modus ponens model means that we should not think of knowledge of the requirements of the rule as a state which *rationally underlies* and enables competence, as knowledge of the rule for castling rationally underlies a chess player’s successfully restricting the cases where she attempts to castle to situations where it is legal to do so. In basic cases there is no such underlying, rationalising knowledge enabling the competence. *A fortiori* there is no metaphysical issue about the character of the facts it is knowledge of, with platonism and communitarianism presenting the horns of a dilemma. The knowledge *is* the competence. Or so I take Wittgenstein to be saying. *That* is why Wittgenstein’s own response to his well-argued rejection of platonism is quietist. A non-quietist response would be called for only if platonism had given a bad answer to a good question. Then one would have to try to give a better answer. But the question was bad too. The real error in platonism is not the unsustainability of its sublimated conception of rule-facts, or the vulnerable epistemology that attends the sublimation. Rather the whole conception of rule-following to which it was a response was already an over-rationalisation – an implicit attempt to impose on rule-following everywhere a rational structure which can only engage the non-basic case. **IV Rational judgements made for no reasons?** There is no doubt that the general tendency of the foregoing discussion goes deeply against the grain. Normal thought envel- ops even our basic judgements with a *rhetoric* of reasons. I assent to the judgement that something is red. You ask me: what reason do you have to think so? I can perfectly properly answer, ‘Well, the way it looks, of course’. But *how* does the look serve as a reason? In response, one immediately finds oneself thinking in terms of the modus ponens model: ‘Well, the object has a certain look; it is constitutive of the concept *red* that things that look that way are (defeasibly) appropriately taken to be red. Therefore, the object in question may appropriately be taken to be red.’ But this is just the model that in basic cases we have discarded. There are considerations that one may marshal to try to sugar the pill. Suppose I assent to a judgement about something’s colour, based purely on its look. In what sense is this assent rational? One can say several things: That it is an act possible only for a creature that is rational; That it is an act in the ‘space of’ reasons – open to assessment as correct, responsibly made, and so on; That it is an act that may in turn contribute to my reasons for (other) acts and judgements. But these considerations are all broadly concerned with the stagesetting and implications of the act: with how I must be regarded if I am credited with that very act, with how it may be appraised, and with what it commits me to. They do nothing, it seems, to restore the idea of the *input-rationality* of basic judgement – to explain how a basic judgement can be made on the basis of reasons which the thinker *has*, how it can be the *product* of a rational response to anterior, reason-giving states. It is clear where pressure would have to be exerted if the lost ground is to be (even partially) regained. Means would have to be provided to distinguish the conclusion that basic judgements are judgements made for *no reason that can be captured via the modus ponens model* from the stronger conclusion that they are made for *no reason at all*. I have been suggesting that the modus ponens model supplies the only means whereby facts about the requirements of rules can enter into a subject’s reasons for an act, – that it is only in terms of the model that we can make sense of the idea of the rationality of a judgement or action if it is to be conceived as the product of following a rule. If that is right, and if basic judgements are nevertheless input-rational, then the conclusion is clear: we have to understand them as rationalised in a way that takes them *outside* the category of rule-following. If basic judgements are judgements made for no reasons involving rational processing of information about the requirements of rules, and if they are nevertheless made for reasons, they are not to be thought of as delivered by the following of rules. (And of course, if they are made for no reasons, then they are not to be thought of as delivered by the following of rules in any case.) So how might we try to regard them instead? What kind of nature and structure might their reasons have if not that of the modus ponens model? There is one well-documented but, as it has proved, vexed proposal. As remarked, it is our normal rhetoric to say that it is looks – more generally, *experiences* – that rationalise our most basic empirical judgements. However, if experiences are to do this, then they have to possess attributes which fit them to do so. What kind of attributes would accomplish that? The modus ponens model will have it that, whatever they are, they will need connection, via a major premise presumed to be already part of the thinker’s information, with the appropriateness of the judgement the experience rationalises. If this is to be avoided, there must be no role for such a major premise. Therefore, experiences must have attributes which fit them to rationalise empirical judgements *immediately* – that is, without any kind of rational intermediary processing of thoughts. The idea is then apt to seem compelling that such rationalisation can be accomplished only if we conceive of experience as already *essentially conceptually contentful*: experience has essentially to consist in the reception of appearances that . . . , where what fills in the dots is a conceptual content. There has to be such a content because otherwise it is obscure how experience can *rationalise* judgement, rather than merely causally predispose to it; and the content has to be carried essentially since otherwise the assignment of content to an experience would have to proceed by principles connecting ‘given’, non-contentual characteristics with content – and that would take us straight back to the modus ponens model. Such is, of course, exactly the conception of experience propounded in John McDowell’s *Mind and World*.21 McDowell’s route into it is, familiarly, different: he presents it as a *via media* to avoid the unsatisfactory answers to the question, how can empirical judgements be rational, offered respectively by the (putative) Myth of the (non-conceptual, sensory) Given and Davidsonian coherentism. However, if what I have said is right, McDowell’s conception of experience is actually mandatory for any philosopher determined to have it that basic judgements are made for reasons furnished by experience. It is another question, of course, whether the conception is stable or satisfactory.22 Common complaints have concerned its apparent exclusion of the experience of infants and animals and the lack of any foreseeable principled account of which are the contents that experience can carry intrinsically (not presumably, for example, that this object is a geiger-counter . . .) However, a more urgent question about it now, in the light of the preceding discussion, is *how* experiences come to be fitted out with the conceptual contents which, according to the McDowellian idea, they essentially carry. Labeling the conceptual content of experiences ‘essential’ to them is, for the reasons just gestured at, a forced move. But it is a major concern whether there is any way of making sense of the idea which is not at odds with the broader lessons of Wittgenstein’s discussion. For if experience is to be intrinsically such as to rationalise judgement, it must carry the content it does *independently* of judgement. And how is that idea to be sustained except at the cost of crediting the concepts configured in an experience’s content with a kind of platonic propensity to self-application? The issues waiting in this direction must be material for another discussion.23

### EITC Solvency (Polls)

#### CP Accesses The 1AC Framework; Subsumes Living Wage Popularity

Simon, 2013:

(Wage Subsidies. December 7, 2013. Professor of Finance At SUNY Stony Brook. Former PhD Student At The University Of Michigan)

There has been a lot of talk about raising the minimum wage lately. Minimum wage is one of those things where the public strongly disagrees with economists - Americans are very strongly in favor of minimum wage hikes, but most economists think it's a bad idea. Economists generally prefer the EITC, also called a "negative income tax". Minimum wages can cause higher unemployment, and often just give money to high school kids who don't need it; EITC suffers these problems much less. Why do Americans like minimum wage hikes and ignore the EITC? Two reasons, I'm guessing. The first reason is that people like feeling like they are being rewarded for work. Wages are money that people feel like they have "earned", even if the government has mandated above-market wage levels. Second, EITC is just clunky to use - you have to file for it through the clunky tax system, you have to know about it in order to claim it, and the acronym "EITC" itself has no meaning for the vast majority of poor Americans. A bunch of eligible Americans don't even claim their EITC. Minimum wages, on the other hand, are easy to use, because the company does all work of administering it. So is there a policy that would combine the economic efficiency of the EITC with the popularity of the minimum wage? I believe that there is. It's called a wage subsidy. This means paying companies to offer their employees higher wages. Jim Pethokoukis of the AEI has recently endorsed this idea (I think I managed to convince him in our recent podcast interview, if he wasn't convinced already). It's a good one. Wage Subsidies vs. EITC Wage subsidies are better than EITC, for several reasons. For one, they are automatic - poor people don't have to take the time and initiative and mental energy to go claim them. Second, they will probably make people feel more valuable, since people tend to view wages as money they "earn". From the worker's perspective, it will just look like wages went up. In fact, a better name for wage subsidies might be "wage matching". Wage subsidies would replace the EITC, but in order to do this, we would have to supplement wage subsidies with some other form of welfare (such as a basic minimum income), since we don't want unemployed people to starve.

# Whitman

## AT: Migrant Workers

### CP

#### The United States should implement the Agricultural Worker Visa Program.

#### CP Solves Exploitation And Worker Stability; Bypasses H-2A Restrictions

Semuels, 2013:

(For U.S. Farmers, And Mexican Workers, It’s Tough Being Legal. Alana Semuels, Journalist For The Los Angeles Times. March 30, 2013)

A coalition of farmers has proposed a more flexible alternative to H-2A. The Agricultural Worker Visa Program would allow two options for guest workers. One would give workers visas good for 11 months — one month longer than is now permitted — and would allow them to move from employer to employer, which is difficult under existing rules. In theory that would allow undocumented workers to leave abusive employers and find jobs elsewhere, worker advocates say. The other option would allow an employee to work for an employer under contract for a fixed period, but would give the worker a visa term of up to a year. The visa could be renewed indefinitely as long as the worker returned to his home country for at least 30 days over a three-year period. This option would, in theory, ensure employers a more predictable supply of workers and would give workers more stability.

#### CP Is Key; H-2A Visa Provisions Means Migrant Workers Will Be Hired/ Paid Illegally. Turns Case

Semuels, 2013:

(For U.S. Farmers, And Mexican Workers, It’s Tough Being Legal. Alana Semuels, Journalist For The Los Angeles Times. March 30, 2013)

There are millions of undocumented workers in America, and thousands of employers who illegally hire them. But Rodolfo Benito Coy Garcia and Rusty Barr play by the rules. Barr is an employer and Garcia his employee, one who travels from Mexico to spend 10 months of the year planting, fertilizing and harvesting Christmas trees in this tiny mountain town near the Tennessee state line. For both, following the law has disadvantages. Barr must go through a lengthy, complicated and expensive process to hire Garcia, spending more than his competitors, who he says employ undocumented migrants. Garcia must leave behind his family for most of the year to work a job that pays little by American standards, with no chance of becoming a citizen in the country where he has spent much of his adult life. "I miss my family, yes," said Garcia, whose wife and two daughters live in Tamaulipas, a Mexican state that borders Texas. "But we come here to support our families and provide our kids with a better education." Much of the debate over immigration reform has focused on the millions of undocumented workers living in the United States. But many say fixes must also be made to the programs that bring tens of thousands of guest workers to America every year to work at farms, hotels and restaurants. Such programs were among those that led to a standoff between congressional negotiators before their spring recess. A tentative agreement reached over the weekend covered some low-wage workers but not agricultural employees. Employers say that the H-2A agricultural visa program, under which Garcia is employed, is broken and that the complicated rules and high costs push employers to hire undocumented workers. Labor advocates say that the programs create a group of second-class citizens who are brought here to do grueling and often dangerous work without protection against abuses.

#### H-2A Program Makes Migrant Hiring Inevitable; CP Is Key To Make Paying Higher Wages Viable

Semuels, 2013:

(For U.S. Farmers, And Mexican Workers, It’s Tough Being Legal. Alana Semuels, Journalist For The Los Angeles Times. March 30, 2013)

Although the H-2A program is the only legal way to bring foreign farmworkers to the United States, most employers don't use it. H-2A workers fill an estimated 6% of U.S. farm jobs, the majority in states such as North Carolina and Georgia, where employers are hard-pressed to find anyone else willing to do the work. Undocumented workers fill most of the 1 million or more farm jobs open nationally every year; California, which hires more farmworkers than any other state, uses H-2A workers less frequently because its location close to Mexico makes it easier for employers to find undocumented workers. Barr says it's easy to understand why only a handful of employers bring in guest workers. He spends $1,000 per worker for visas, consulate fees and transportation to North Carolina. He's required to pay for their housing, and he estimates he has spent more than $80,000 building a house on his property, plus $36,000 to buy a mobile home and $5,000 a year to rent an apartment for the 48 workers he employs during the growing season. The government makes him pay them $9.68 an hour, which is about one-third higher than the minimum wage in the state, and he spends thousands of dollars on workers' compensation insurance. Costs aside, the process is a headache of applications and paperwork required by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Labor. Barr must go through lengthy steps to make sure no American wants a job before he hires a Mexican worker. He must place ads around the state and hire any American who wants to work, even if the job has already been filled by a migrant worker. The chance of violating a rule, even by mistake, is high, he says — a neighbor had to pay a fine of $80,000 last year. Barr says these steps are worth it because he doesn't want to be raided by immigration officials and lose his crops. But the expense puts him at a competitive disadvantage with the other Christmas tree farms in the region, he says. Those that use undocumented workers pay the minimum wage and don't offer housing, insurance or transportation, he said. For employers like him, "It's definitely a disadvantage to be providing higher wages," Barr said.

### Case

#### Even Current Conditions Are Better Than Mexico

Semuels, 2013:

(For U.S. Farmers, And Mexican Workers, It’s Tough Being Legal. Alana Semuels, Journalist For The Los Angeles Times. March 30, 2013)

Labor is calling for strong union protections for workers and assurances that migrants aren't taking jobs Americans would want. Some in labor are calling for a path to citizenship for guest workers who come to the U.S. for a certain number of years. That makes farmers nervous because they fear they could lose their investment. "We've spent a lot of money training these guys, so yeah, we're selfish about it. We'd be sad to see them go," said Wicker, the growers association official. Barr helped six workers become citizens after the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which allowed some seasonal agricultural workers to gain legal status. All left agriculture within two years, he said, for fields such as construction and trucking. (Only those who had resided in the U.S. since before 1982 and those employed in seasonal farm work during a certain period were eligible to for legal status.) Garcia and the dozen other workers sitting around the house on Barr's farm swear they wouldn't leave farm work if they became U.S. citizens. Even without a chance at citizenship — even with the long bus ride, the crowded conditions, the separation from family — Garcia and others said, they'd be happy to keep coming to North Carolina for 10 months of the year. "In Mexico, they pay very little," Garcia said. "You work all day and you earn what you earn here in an hour. It's a big difference."

## Coherentism 1NC

### Util FW

Util is an axiomatic truth which proves coherence isn’t key. **Harris 10** writes[[313]](#footnote-313)

So, while it is possible to say that one can't move from "is" to "ought," we should be honest about how we get to "is" in the first place. **Scientific "is" statements rest on implicit "oughts" all the way down.** When I say, "Water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen," I have uttered a quintessential statement of scientific fact. But what if someone doubts this statement? **I can appeal to data** from chemistry, describing the outcome of simple experiments. **But in so doing, I implicitly appeal to the values of empiricism and logic. What if my interlocutor doesn't share these values?** What can I say then? What evidence could prove that we should value evidence? What logic could demonstrate the importance of logic? As it turns out, **these are the wrong questions.** The right question is, **why should we care what such a person thinks in the first place? So it is with the linkage between morality and well-being: To say that morality is arbitrary** (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), **because we must first assume** that the **well-being** of conscious creatures **is good, is exactly like saying that science is arbitrary** (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), **because we must first assume** that a **rational understanding** of the universe **is good.** We need not enter either of these philosophical cul-de-sacs.

Thus the standard is **maximizing happiness**.

Second, morality must take the form of a universal rule. **Singer 09** writes[[314]](#footnote-314)

**When I prescribe something**, using moral language, my prescription **[it] commits me to a** substantive **moral judgment about all** relevantly **similar cases. This includes hypothetical cases in which I am in a different position from my actual one. So to make a moral judgment, I must put myself** in the position of the other person affected by my proposed action – or to be more precise, **in the position of *all* those affected** by my action. Whether I can accept the judgment – that is, whether I can prescribe it universally – will then depend on whether I could accept it if I had to live the lives of all those affected by the action.

Universalizability justifies util. turns coherence because it proves non-util is internally contradictory. **Singer 93**[[315]](#footnote-315)

The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly utilitarian position. My reason for suggesting this is as follows. **In accepting that ethical judgments must be** made from a **universal** point of view, **I am accepting that my own interests cannot,** simply because they are my interests, **count more than the interests of anyone else. Thus my** very natural **concern that my own interests be looked after must**, when I think ethically, **be extended to** the interests of **others.** Now, imagine that I am trying to decide between two possible courses of action – perhaps whether to eat all the fruits I have collected myself, or to share them with others. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethical considerations – I am, we might say, in a pre-ethical stage of thinking. How would I make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant would be how the possible courses of action will affect my interests. Indeed, if we define ‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in their interests (unless it is incompatible with another desire or desires), then it would seem that at this pre-ethical stage, only one’s own interests can be relevant to the decision. Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. **This requires me to weigh** up **all** these **interests and** adopt the course of action most likely to **maximize the interests of those affected.**

### Farmers DA

#### Minimum wage hike causes farmers to lay people off—this encourages greater mechanization

**Owens 15**

Howard Owens. “Farmers say increase in minimum wage will hurt agriculture in New York.” The Batavian. March 18th, 2015. http://thebatavian.com/howard-owens/farmers-say-increase-minimum-wage-will-hurt-agriculture-new-york/47083

Farmers are facing ever escalating expenses, lower prices and now Gov. Andrew Cuomo wants to raise the minimum wage on them. That's just more than many New York farmers are going to be able to bear, said Dean Norton, a farmer in Elba and president of the New York State Farm Bureau. "New York is already a tough state to do business in and a minimum wage increase is going to continue to make us disadvantageous," Norton said during a conference call this morning with media from throughout the state. Joining Norton on the call were Sandi Prokop and Brian Reeves, owners of multi-generation farms in Middleburgh and Baldwinsville. Each said a minimum wage increase would add significant costs to their operations, $44,000 annually for Prokop and $50,000 for Reeves. And that doesn't include the pressure a minimum age increase would put on suppliers and service companies to raise their rates, driving operational costs up even further. The average farm worker in New York earns $12.50 an hour already, Norton said. Even though the proposed increase from Cuomo is less than that -- to $10.50 an hour -- a minimum wage increase tends to drive up wages across the board. When trainees and entry-level workers get more money, the people above them want to keep pace with the higher pay, so they demand higher wages. Farmers who don't meet those demands, Norton said, risk losing skilled and experienced workers to other farmers willing to pay those wages, or the workers will look for work in other states where conditions are more favorable. Workers who are dissatisfied with their current conditions will also change careers, going into related industries, Reeves said. The upward pressure on wages just encourages farmers to abandon labor-intensive crops or move to greater mechanization, such as robotics at dairy farmers, which means fewer workers churning economic buying power in their local communities. Both Prokop and Reeves noted that in their segments of agriculture -- dairy and vegetables -- they're not price makers, they're price takers." The food processors and supermarket chains who purchase their crops set the prices, based on supply and demand and in competition with other states. "We're already one of the higher cost states," Reeves said. "When I sell a box of zucchini, I'll have a buyer tell me he can get it cheaper in another state. He'll say, 'I can buy all I want for $11 a box, why do you want $13 or $14 a box?' " Dairy prices have been falling for months, Prokop said, and haven't hit bottom yet. In February, she said, she received $24,000 less for milk than the month before, and her revenue was down $13,000 the month before that. "It's only going to get worse this month," she said. "The price is now below the cost of production." It would help, Reeves said, if Congress would step in and set a higher minimum wage across the board, because at least then farmers in all states would be paying the same price for labor. "We need to be able to compete," he said, "with Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan."

#### Mechanized agriculture causes soil erosion

**Trautmann et al 12**

Nancy M. Trautmann and Keith S. Porter (Center for Environmental Research ) and Robert J. Wagenet (Dept. of Agronomy, Cornell University). “Modern Agriculture: Its Effects on the Environment.” 2012. http://psep.cce.cornell.edu/facts-slides-self/facts/mod-ag-grw85.aspx

Farm labor requirements diminished with the introduction of mechanization. Invention of machines for tilling, planting, reaping, and threshing vastly increased farm efficiency in the mid 1800s. The internal combustion engine was invented in Europe in the late 1800s, and in 1892 the first successful gasoline-powered tractor was introduced in Iowa. By the early 1900s tractors that were small enough and cheap enough to interest the average farmer and could do the work of 17 men and 50 horses were being produced. Tractors gradually became popular, although it was not until 1953 that there were more tractors than horses on U.S. farms. Ever since colonial days, agricultural leaders have been interested in increasing the productivity of American farming. George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were leading agricultural reformers in the late eighteenth century, experimenting with crop rotation, manure applications, new crops, and improved livestock. In 1862 President Lincoln signed legislation creating the U.S. Department of Agriculture and granting public land to the states for establishment of agricultural colleges. Federal support for state agricultural experiment stations began in 1887, providing the basis for scientific improvement of American agriculture. As land became less available for settlement in the West, people became more interested in maintaining soil fertility and increasing crop yields on their existing farms. In 1914 Congress responded to this need by providing funds for state agricultural extension programs assist farmers in adopting improved farming methods. Conservation Beginnings. The unprecedented damage to farmland caused by the dust bowl storms of the 1930s focused national attention on the need for soil and water conservation measures to maintain farm productivity. Before settlement the Great Plains had consisted of vast acreages of grasslands roamed by wandering herds of bison and antelopes. The grasses were adapted to cycles of moisture and drought, and their dense root systems held the powdery soils in place against the strong prairie winds. The Homestead Act signed by President Lincoln in 1862 offered free land to anyone willing to cultivate it for 5 years, but it was not until production of the steel plow in the late 1800s that widespread cultivation became possible on the dense sods of the plains. The rich soils produced bountiful crops, and between 1870 and 1910 the population of seven plains states increased by a factor of 10, faster than any other section of the country at any time. In the 1930s, however, disaster struck. Several years of severe drought caused crop failures leaving the light-textured, powdery soils unprotected against the strong prairie winds. Millions of tons of rich topsoils were lost in dust storms so severe that they caused virtual blackouts in the middle of the day and left houses, roads, and fields buried by dust and sand. Skies were blackened as far east as New York City, and even ships 300 miles out in the Atlantic Ocean reported dust accumulations on board. In response to the urgent need for soil and water conservation programs to halt farmland destruction, the Soil Conservation Service was established in 1935. SCS employees set up demonstration plots and taught methods such as contour plowing, terracing, and strip-cropping to retain water on the fields and reduce runoff and erosion. Windbreaks were planted to break the force of the prairie winds, tillage methods were changed to reduce exposed soils, and vegetation or stubble was retained on the fields after the growing season to provide protective cover. With these methods, damaged lands were reclaimed and the dust storms were brought under control. Intensification of Agriculture. Productivity of U.S. agriculture increased gradually until World War II when the additional demands for food led to rapid changes in farming methods. The war economy stimulated the conversion from animal to mechanical power, resulting in increased output per worker. Use of fertilizer increased by 50 percent between 1940 and 1944, resulting in greater crop returns. The discovery of DDT and other synthetic organic pesticides vastly increased pest control capabilities and made it possible to increase efficiency through practices such as continuous cropping and devoting large acreages to a single crop. In the 25-year period between 1950 and 1975, agricultural productivity changed more rapidly than at any other time in American history (fig. 1. See fact sheet). Although the acreage in farming dropped by 6 percent and the hours of farm labor decreased by 60 percent, farm production per hour of on-farm labor practically tripled, and total farm output increased by more than half. These dramatic changes were produced by technological innovations, development of hybrid strains and other genetic improvements, and a fourfold increase in the use of pesticides and fertilizers (fig. 2. See fact sheet). The result of all these changes has been that agriculture has become more intensive, producing higher yields per acre by relying on greater chemicals use and technological inputs. It also has become more expensive, relying on purchase of machinery and chemicals to replace the heavy labor rcquirements of the past. To remain competitive, farmers have been forced to become more efficient, farming ever larger acreages with bigger equipment and more fertilizers and pesticides. Small farms growing a wide variety of crops have in large part been replaced by much larger farms consisting of extensive fields of a single crop. As a result, the number of farms has dropped by half since 1950, and average farm size has doubled (fig. 3. See fact sheet). Today only 2 percent of U.S. farms produce 70 percent of the vegetables, 50 percent of the fruit and nuts, and 35 percent of the poultry products grown in this country. Although the intensification of agriculture has vastly increased productivity, it also has had a number of potentially detrimental environmental consequences, ranging from rapid erosion of fertile topsoils to contamination of drinking water supplies by the chemicals used to enhance farmland productivity.

#### Soil erosion causes extinction

**Monbiot 15**

George Monbiot 15, British author and syndicated columnist, environmental activist, “We’re treating soil like dirt. It’s a fatal mistake, as our lives depend on it,” 3/25/15, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/treating-soil-like-dirt-fatal-mistake-human-life

Imagine a wonderful world, a planet on which there was no threat of climate breakdown, no loss of freshwater, no antibiotic resistance, no obesity crisis, no terrorism, no war. Surely, then, we would be out of major danger? Sorry. Even if everything else were miraculously fixed, we’re finished if we don’t address an issue considered so marginal and irrelevant that you can go for months without seeing it in a newspaper.¶ It’s literally and – it seems – metaphorically, beneath us. To judge by its absence from the media, most journalists consider it unworthy of consideration. But all human life depends on it. We knew this long ago, but somehow it has been forgotten. As a Sanskrit text written in about 1500BC noted: “Upon this handful of soil our survival depends. Husband it and it will grow our food, our fuel and our shelter and surround us with beauty. Abuse it and the soil will collapse and die, taking humanity with it.”¶ The issue hasn’t changed, but we have. Landowners around the world are now engaged in an orgy of soil destruction so intense that, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, the world on average has just 60 more years of growing crops. Even in Britain, which is spared the tropical downpours that so quickly strip exposed soil from the land, Farmers Weekly reports, we have “only 100 harvests left”.¶ To keep up with global food demand, the UN estimates, 6m hectares (14.8m acres) of new farmland will be needed every year. Instead, 12m hectares a year are lost through soil degradation. We wreck it, then move on, trashing rainforests and other precious habitats as we go. Soil is an almost magical substance, a living system that transforms the materials it encounters, making them available to plants. That handful the Vedic master showed his disciples contains more micro-organisms than all the people who have ever lived on Earth. Yet we treat it like, well, dirt.¶ The techniques that were supposed to feed the world threaten us with starvation. A paper just published in the journal Anthropocene analyses the undisturbed sediments in an 11th-century French lake. It reveals that the intensification of farming over the past century has increased the rate of soil erosion sixtyfold.¶ Another paper, by researchers in the UK, shows that soil in allotments – the small patches in towns and cities that people cultivate by hand – contains a third more organic carbon than agricultural soil and 25% more nitrogen. This is one of the reasons why allotment holders produce between four and 11 times more food per hectare than do farmers.¶ Whenever I mention this issue, people ask: “But surely farmers have an interest in looking after their soil?” They do, and there are many excellent cultivators who seek to keep their soil on the land. There are also some terrible farmers, often absentees, who allow contractors to rip their fields to shreds for the sake of a quick profit. Even the good ones are hampered by an economic and political system that could scarcely be better designed to frustrate them.¶ This is the International Year of Soils, but you wouldn’t know it. In January, the Westminster government published a new set of soil standards, marginally better than those they replaced, but wholly unmatched to the scale of the problem. There are no penalities for compromising our survival except a partial withholding of public subsidies. Yet even this pathetic guidance is considered intolerable by the National Farmers’ Union, which greeted them with bitter complaints. Sometimes the NFU seems to me to exist to champion bad practice and block any possibility of positive change.¶ Few sights are as gruesome as the glee with which the NFU celebrated the death last year of the European soil framework directive, the only measure with the potential to arrest our soil-erosion crisis. The NFU, supported by successive British governments, fought for eight years to destroy it, then crowed like a shedful of cockerels when it won. Looking back on this episode, we will see it as a parable of our times.¶ Soon after that, the business minister, Matthew Hancock, announced that he was putting “business in charge of driving reform”: trade associations would be able “to review enforcement of regulation in their sectors.” The NFU was one the first two bodies granted this privilege. Hancock explained that this “is all part of our unambiguously pro-business agenda to increase the financial security of the British people.” But it doesn’t increase our security, financial or otherwise. It undermines it.¶ The government’s deregulation bill, which has now almost completed its passage through parliament, will force regulators – including those charged with protecting the fabric of the land – to “have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth”. But short-term growth at the expense of public protection compromises long-term survival. This “unambiguously pro-business agenda” is deregulating us to death.¶ There’s no longer even an appetite for studying the problem. Just one university – Aberdeen – now offers a degree in soil science. All the rest have been closed down.¶ This is what topples civilisations. War and pestilence might kill large numbers of people, but in most cases the population recovers. But lose the soil and everything goes with it.¶ Now, globalisation ensures that this disaster is reproduced everywhere. In its early stages, globalisation enhances resilience: people are no longer dependent on the vagaries of local production. But as it proceeds, spreading the same destructive processes to all corners of the Earth, it undermines resilience, as it threatens to bring down systems everywhere.¶ Almost all other issues are superficial by comparison. What appear to be great crises are slight and evanescent when held up against the steady trickling away of our subsistence.

#### The DA turns the case. Everyone wants to live, so coherency mandates avoiding extinction. Outweighs her offense because people feel more strongly about the death of the human race than they do about wage rates.

### UBI CP (Polls Shell)

#### Counterplan: [The aff actor] should provide every citizen 18 years of age and older the opportunity to receive a guaranteed basic income adjusted for inflation. Unemployment compensation and food stamps will phase out. Funding is through a reduction in corporate tax loopholes.

#### The CP is more consistent with public opinion; it has bipartisan support

**Hiebert 14** writes[[316]](#footnote-316)

Is basic income something both Democrats and Republicans might agree on? That’s the interesting thing; it is. Here’s why: **The left can agree because basic income provides economic security for all Americans. The right can get behind it because it**’s a form of economic security that **doesn’t interfere with market forces as much as other forms of social security, such as raising** the **minimum wage**. Do you implement a lot of labor market regulations that require companies to pay employees a certain amount, or do you just give everybody a base of economic security and then let them negotiate their wages in the marketplace? I also think Republicans could support basic income because right now we have a very, very complicated tax code. It’s complicated because we have multiple deductions for housing, education, families, and so on. Basic income could be part of an overhaul of the tax code that sheds all of those exemptions, deductions, credits, etc. People could use their basic income to invest as they choose, whether that’s in education or the stock market.

#### The counterplan reduces inequality and poverty

**Gibson 14**

Carl Gibson (co-founder of US Uncut). “The Case for a Basic Guaranteed Income for All.” Huffington Post. May 13th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-gibson/the-case-for-a-basic-guar\_b\_5311330.html

If you have to pay taxes for existing, you should be guaranteed a basic minimum income for surviving. It wouldn't amount to much, but guaranteeing every American citizen 18 and older $1,000 per month, or $12,000 a year, is the most reasonable, practical, and commonsense way to address the inequality crisis that everyone in the country and most of the world is talking about right now. By all, I mean everyone over age 18, regardless of their current job and income situation. It would be optional, so those who already have fulfilling careers or make sufficient enough income to not need the extra $1,000 a month don't have to take it. Ideally, this basic guaranteed income for all would be adjusted for inflation, and would phase in gradually while unemployment compensation and food stamps phase out. Other staples of the safety net, like Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, would still remain. And really, who could argue against this proposal? If we started our welfare spending over from scratch, and just went ahead and guaranteed everyone $1,000 a month, adjusted for inflation, people in poverty would be much better off. Especially given that Republicans in the House of Representatives continue to refuse an extension of unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed (and even refuse to hear stories of struggle from the unemployed), cut billions of dollars from food stamps (in a bipartisan bill), and continue to propose budgets that would rend all social safety nets to pieces in order for larger corporate welfare packages. Or that Senate Republicans who consistently approve "cost-of-living" raises for themselves still don't find it necessary to increase the minimum wage. What does $1,000 a month buy? It can pay for a modest apartment in the $600 to $700 range, a meager amount of groceries, provide enough to pay for a basic phone plan, and leave enough left over for bus/cab fare. It can't pay for high-end cars, flat screen TVs, condominiums, dining out for every meal or a cocaine habit. That amount of money is roughly the same amount of money one would get working a minimum wage job at part-time hours for a large corporation that only sees you as a tool to use for increasing its own profit margin. This means people working at fast food corporations like McDonalds would be able to quit their jobs and have enough to meet the most basic expenses, while looking for more fulfilling work, getting an education, starting their own businesses and otherwise working toward their dreams. Conversely, if someone spends one third of a 24-hour day sleeping, and one third of the day working a job they hate that doesn't pay nearly enough to live on, that only leaves another eight hours for meeting all of their daily obligations, caring for their families, and finding ways to dig themselves out of wage slavery. Until we get a basic guaranteed income for all, a wide majority of Americans who are lucky enough to be employed will serve indefinite sentences of indentured servitude to immensely profitable and profoundly greedy fast food and retail robber barons.

#### Reducing corporate tax loopholes is sufficient to fund a guaranteed basic income

**Gibson 14**

Carl Gibson (co-founder of US Uncut). “The Case for a Basic Guaranteed Income for All.” Huffington Post. May 13th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-gibson/the-case-for-a-basic-guar\_b\_5311330.html

The cost of guaranteeing every adult citizen (approximately 225 million, according to census figures) $12,000 a year is roughly $2.8 trillion. That sounds like a lot, until looking into just one of the least-mentioned sources -- offshore tax havens. Currently, $32 trillion is stashed in offshore accounts in notorious tax havens like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Much of that is profit made in the U.S. by American corporations, but booked overseas to avoid taxes. And as journalist Nicholas Shaxson wrote in "Treasure Islands," much more of it is held in blind trusts operated by oppressive authoritarian regimes, drug cartels, human traffickers, and other unsavory characters. $2.8 trillion isn't even one eighth of that amount. We aren't asking for the whole pie, just a piece. And we'll even save them a bite. A few commonsense loophole closures like getting rid of the "carried interest" loophole, eliminating transfer pricing schemes like the "Dutch Sandwich" and "Double Irish" tax loopholes, and instituting a one percent sales tax on all financial transactions on Wall Street would be more than enough to cover the cost of a universal guaranteed income for all. And we still haven't even discussed other widely-supported, commonsense initiatives like turning wasteful Pentagon spending like the F-35 project into money set aside for a universal basic income, taxing investment income at the same rate as real, actual work, raising the inheritance tax to pre-Bush levels, or creating new tax brackets for millionaires and billionaires. By providing a basic income for all citizens through ending tax loopholes and preferential tax treatments for the super-wealthy, we're directly correcting the ever-growing gap between the few who have more than they could ever spend in multiple lifetimes, and the vast majority fighting over crumbs. More importantly, we're also giving the poorest Americans a fighting chance at fulfilling their dreams, rather than spending their best years slaving away for a corporate giant that doesn't respect basic human needs. We can't call ourselves a free country until working Americans are freed from poverty wages and dead-end jobs.

#### Strong consensus of studies confirms minimum wage hikes cause unemployment

**Neumark 14**

David Neumark. (University of California—Irvine, USA, and IZA, Germany). “Employment effects of minimum wages: When minimum wages are introduced or raised, are there fewer jobs? Global evidence says yes.” IZA World of Labor 2014: 6 doi: 10.15185/izawol.6 | David Neumark © | May 2014 | wol.iza.org

An extensive review of this newer wave of evidence looked at **more than 100 studies** of the employment effects of minimum wages, assessing the quality of each study and focusing on those that are most reliable [2], [3]. Studies focusing on the least skilled were highlighted, as the predicted job destruction effects of minimum wages were expected to be more evident in those studies. Reflecting the greater variety of methods and sources of variation in minimum wage effects used since 1982, this review documents a wider range of estimates of the employment effects of the minimum wage than does the review of the first wave of studies [1]. Nearly two-thirds of the studies reviewed estimated that the minimum wage had negative (although not always statistically significant) effects on employment. Only eight found positive employment effects. Of the 33 studies judged the most credible, 28, or 85%, pointed to negative employment effects. These included research on Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Portugal, the UK, and the US. In particular, the studies focusing on the least-skilled workers find stronger evidence of disemployment effects, with effects near or larger than the consensus range in the US data. In contrast, few—if any—studies provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages.

#### Unemployment Turns The Framework; Flips The Poll Results. Their opinions are contingent on the consequences.

Ekins, 2014:

(Americans Will Only Support Obama’s Minimum Wage Increase If It Doesn’t Harm Jobs. July 28, 2014. Emily Ekins, Director Of Polling For He Reason Foundation. Ph.D. Candidat At The University Of California Los Angeles)

However, once Americans consider costs, support for a minimum wage plummets. If raising the minimum wage were to cause some employers to lay-off or hire fewer workers, 57 percent of Americans would oppose a minimum wage hike and 38 percent would favor. Additionally, if a minimum wage increase were to harm jobs, Democrats would swing 38 points, such that half would then oppose a wage hike. Likewise, majorities of independents (53 percent) and Republicans (68 percent) would oppose raising the wage floor. In both scenarios, the fact that Republicans are more likely to oppose raising the minimum wage is partly driven by their belief that doing so would harm employment. Indeed, a majority (54 percent) of Republicans believe raising the minimum wage would reduce jobs; however, this is a view only shared by 39 percent of Americans overall. Instead 69 percent of Democrats and 56 percent of independents believe Congress can raise the minimum wage with no adverse effects on employment.

**Unemployment is worse for the poor than low wages**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

The problem plaguing America’s poor is **not low wages, but** rather a **shortage of jobs.**34 At a time when the nation’s workforce participation is only 62.8 percent, policymakers must avoid policies that destroy job opportunities.35 Increasing the minimum wage does nothing to help the unemployed poor. In fact, as discussed above, it hurts individuals looking for employment as it decreases available job opportunities. So, who is helped by an increase to the minimum wage? According to a 2012 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, although workers under age 25 represented only 20 percent of hourly wage earners, they made up just over half (50.6 percent) of all minimum wage earners.36 The average household income of these young minimum wage earners was $65,900.37 Among adults 25 and older earning the minimum wage, 75 percent live well above the poverty line of $22,350 for a family of four, with an average annual income of $42,500.38 This is possible because more than half of older minimum wage earners work part-time and many are not the sole earners in their households.39 In fact, 83.5 percent of employees whose wages would rise due to a minimum wage increase either live with parents or another relative, live alone, or are part of a dual-earner couple.40 Only 16.5 percent of individuals who would benefit from an increase to the minimum wage are sole earners in families with children.41 With national unemployment still hovering around 7 percent, national, state, and local demands for an increased **minimum wage could not be more ill-timed.**42 Increasing the minimum wage would make it more difficult for emerging businesses to expand payrolls and for existing businesses to maintain employees. Further, a higher wage rate would make it more difficult for individuals with less education and experience to find work. Raising the minimum wage favors those who already have jobs at the expense of the unemployed. Public policy would be more beneficial if it lowered barriers to entry for employment and increased economic opportunities. Raising the minimum wage may be a politically attractive policy option, but it is harmful to the very people policymakers intend it to help.

#### Job loss hurts minority workers the worst

ALEC 14

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

The effects on employment are even more pronounced for minority youth. A 10 percent increase in the minimum wage decreases minority employment by 3.9 percent, with the majority of the burden falling on minority youth whose employment levels will decrease by 6.6 percent.23

### \*\*\*Case

### Preempts

Neg gets RVIs if I don’t run theory. Key to reciprocity. Also key to deter the 1AR from using blippy theory to minimize topic engagement. If the 1AR was too skewed to win substance, she should collapse to 4 minutes of theory anyway.

Don’t vote on presumption or permissibility because human fallibility means there’s always a nonzero risk of offense.

### Contention

#### Polls Are Biased; Question Framing Is Everything

Dorfman, 2014:

(People Support Raising The Minimum Wage Until Told The Costs. 5/22/2014. Professor of Economics At The University Of Georgia. Jeffrey Dorman)

Support for a higher minimum wage in the polls is also aided by the way the question is typically framed. For example, a recent Reason-Rupe Poll of 1,003 American adults found that 67 percent of respondents supported raising the minimum wage when the question was: “The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. Do you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour?” However, when the question was changed to: “What about if raising the minimum wage caused some employers to lay off workers or hire fewer workers? Would you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage?” support for raising the minimum wage dropped to 39 percent with 58 percent opposed. If the question was phrased as: “What about if raising the minimum wage caused some employers to raise prices? Would you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage?” the results were split with 51 percent in favor and 46 percent opposed to raising the minimum wage. This is a statistical tie given the poll’s margin of error of +/- 3.6 percent.

#### **Correcting The Bias Means Polls Flow Neg**

Dorfman, 2014:

(People Support Raising The Minimum Wage Until Told The Costs. 5/22/2014. Professor of Economics At The University Of Georgia. Jeffrey Dorman)

These poll results mean that once people stop to think about it, they realize where the money for a minimum wage increase will come from: mostly from workers and customers. Seattle is close to increasing the city’s minimum wage to $15 per hour over the next three to seven years, but that is being accomplished by the city council, not directly by voters. To be fair, the voters elected politicians who promised to raise the minimum wage, but those politicians certainly did not promise that the result of a higher minimum wage would be lost jobs and higher prices. Economists are famous for saying there is no such thing as a free lunch. By this, we mean that everything has a cost even if sometimes the cost is hidden. Free lunches only appear free. The extra cost of a fast food meal will not be listed on the menu as due to the increase in the minimum wage, but it will be there nonetheless. People not hired because their output is not worth enough to justify paying a newly increased minimum wage will be hard to identify, but they will exist nonetheless. The polls show most people support raising the minimum wage when it is presented as a free lunch, with no downside. Once people make the link between the benefit (higher pay for some) and the cost (fewer jobs, higher prices) the level of support shrinks to a clear minority. Unions and other liberal advocates for the poor can fool people with their slick media campaigns for a little while, but once educated, Americans (and the Swiss) are smart enough to see that the minimum wage is a very expensive lunch indeed.

#### TURN – actor specificity. Even if the public likes the aff, it’s not coherent with the political process. Aff author:

McGhee et al 12

Heather C. McGhee et al, “Stacked Deck: How the dominance of politics by the affluent and business undermines economic mobility in America.” http://www.demos.org/stacked-deck-how-dominance-politics-affluent-business-undermines-economic-mobility-america

**[Aff evidence begins]**

Public support for raising the minimum wage is striking. A recent poll found that nearly three-quarters of likely voters (73 percent) support not just increasing the minimum wage to $10 in 2014 but also indexing it to inflation, which would result in automatic increases even absent congressional action. Another poll found seventy percent of likely voters supported raising the minimum wage to $10.38. In fact, a large majority of the general public (78 percent) believes that the minimum wage should be high enough so that no family with a full-time worker falls below the official poverty line. In contrast, only 40 percent of the wealthy support a minimum wage that keeps a family above the poverty line.

**[Aff evidence ends]**

While raising the minimum wage is very popular with the public and would confer major benefits on low-income households, it would impose costs on business owners and corporations—groups that are **far better represented in the political process**. These businesses, or individuals associated with them, spend significant amounts of money on elections, whereas minimum wage households rarely make political contributions and certainly do not make large ones. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which strongly opposes raising the minimum wage, spent at least $36.1 million directly on election activities in the 2012 cycle—a fraction of the money spent by the corporations associated with the Chamber and individuals who work for them. Candidates, who understand that fundraising is essential to a successful campaign, have a significant incentive to oppose raising the minimum wage and little or no financial incentive to support it. This example shows how our current campaign finance system allows the donor class to set the agenda, or, in this case, keep items off the agenda.

### Framework

Should is defined *by* common usage, not *as* common usage, otherwise every word would mean polls.

Defaulting to polls isn’t coherent.

1. Most people aren’t experts on economics, so the opinions of experts get drowned out by the general public.

2. Polls are circular because if everyone adopted polls as absolutely true, they would change their own beliefs which would change what poll results are.

3. Devolves to util. Only util weighs all relevant opinions. Polls only answer a single question.

4. We don’t need to know others’ perceptions to know they value happiness. They can tell us.

Util is far and away the most coherent moral system. This evidence assumes and responds to counter-utilitarian intuitions.

**Yudkowsky 8**

Eliezer Yudkowsky (research fellow of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute; he also writes Harry Potter fan fiction). “The ‘Intuitions’ Behind ‘Utilitarianism.’” 28 January 2008. LessWrong. http://lesswrong.com/lw/n9/the\_intuitions\_behind\_utilitarianism/

However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, if you try to violate "utilitarianism", you run into paradoxes, contradictions, circular preferences, and other things that aren't symptoms of moral wrongness so much as moral incoherence. After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. After the two hundred and eighty-seventh research study showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, you could look at this intuition, and think it was revealing some kind of incredibly deep moral truth which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? Or you could look at that and say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't successfully multiply by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. But it ought to, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. When you've read enough heuristics and biases research, and enough coherence and uniqueness proofs for Bayesian probabilities and expected utility, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, then you don't see the preference reversals in the Allais Paradox as revealing some incredibly deep moral truth about the intrinsic value of certainty. It just goes to show that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of symbols standing for small quantities - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. When you've reflected on enough intuitions, and corrected enough absurdities, you start to see a common denominator, a meta-principle at work, which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply." Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. And that's why I'm a utilitarian - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

Coherentism means knowledge reduces to true belief.

**Sartwell 91**[[317]](#footnote-317)

It is widely held that **our epistemic goal** with regard to particular propositions **is achieving** true beliefs and avoiding false ones about propositions with which we are epistemically concerned. (We have seen that Alston, for one, endorses that view.) That is, it is widely admitted that on any good account of justification, there must be reason to think that the **beliefs** justified on the account are **likely to be true.** Indeed, proponents of all the major conceptions of justification hold this position. For example, the foundationalist Paul Moser writes: [E]pistemic justification is essentially related to the so-called cognitive goal of truth, insofar as an individual belief is epistemically justified only if it is appropriately directed toward the goal of truth. More specifically, on the present conception, one is epistemically justified in believing a proposition only if one has good reason to believe it is true.(22) The reliabilist Alvin Goldman claims, similarly, that a condition on an account of justification is that beliefs justified on the account be likely to be true; he says that a plausible conception of justification will be "truth-linked."(23) **And the coherentist** Laurence BonJour **puts it even more strongly: If epistemic justification were not conducive to truth in this way,** if finding epistemically justified beliefs did not substantially increase the likelihood of finding true ones, epistemic **justification would be irrelevant** to our main cognitive goal and of dubious worth. It is only if we have some reason to think that epistemic justification constitutes a path to truth that we as cognitive human beings have any motive for preferring epistemically justified beliefs to epistemically unjustified ones. Epistemic justification is therefore in the final analysis only an instrumental value, not an intrinsic one.(24) In fact, it is often enough taken to be the distinguishing mark of the fact that we are epistemically concerned with a proposition that we are concerned with its truth or falsity. That is what, on the view of many philosophers, distinguishes epistemic from moral or prudential constraints on belief, what distinguishes inquiry from other belief-generating procedures. (If the theory I gave in the first chapter is right, ther are no non-epistemic belief-generating procedures in this sense. That fact merely underscores the present point.) I have argued that a **plausible normative epistemology will be teleological**. And I have claimed that the conception which accounts of knowledge are attempting to analyze or describe is that of the epistemic telos with regard to particular propositions. It would follow that, if a philosopher holds that the epistemic telos is merely true belief, that philosopher implicitly commits himself, his own asservations to the contrary, to the view that knowledge is merely true belief. I think that this is the case. I think, that is, that in the above passages, these philosophers have committed themselves implicitly to the view that knowledge is merely true belief, and that justification is a criterion rather than a logically necessary condition of knowledge. By a criterion, to repeat, I mean a test for whether some item has some property that is not itself a logically necessary condition of that item's having that property. Justification on the present view is, first of all, a means by which we achieve knowledge, that is, by which we arrive at true beliefs, and second, it provides a test of whether someone has knowledge, that is, whether her beliefs are true. So again, the present view does not make accounts of justification trivial, or unconnected with the assessment of claims to know. If our epistemic goal with regard to particular propositions is true belief, then justification (a) gives procedures by which true beliefs are obtained, and (b) gives standards for evaluating the products of such procedures with regard to that goal. From the point of view of (a), justification prescribes techniques by which knowledge is gained. From the point of view of (b) it gives a criterion for knowledge. But in neither case does it describe a logically necessary condition for knowledge. Another way of putting the matter is like this. If we describe justification as of merely instrumental value with regard to arriving at truth, as BonJour does explicitly, we can no longer maintain both that knowledge is the telos of inquiry and that justification is a necessary condition of knowledge. It is incoherent to build a specification of what are regarded merely as means of achieving some goal into the description of the goal itself; in such circumstances **the goal can be described independently of the means.** So if justification is demanded because it is instrumental to true belief, it cannot also be maintained that knowledge is justified true belief. I will now certainly be accused of begging the question by assuming that knowledge is the goal of inquiry. There is justice in this claim in that I have not gone very far toward establishing the point. But I would ask my accusers at this point whether they can do better in describing the conception which theories of knowledge set out to analyze or describe without begging the question in favor of some such theory. And I ask also, if knowledge is not the overarching epistemic telos with regard to particular propositions, why such tremendous emphasis has been placed on the theory of knowledge in the history of philosophy, and just what function that notion serves within that history. If knowledge is not the overarching purpose of inquiry, then why is the notion important, and why should we continue to be concerned in normative epistemology above all with what knowledge is and how it can be achieved? If we want to withold the term `knowledge' from mere true belief, but also want to hold that mere true belief is the purpose of inquiry, then I suggest that what remains is a mere verbal dispute. That is, if we treat mere true belief as the purpose of inquiry, but do not equate it with knowledge, then I do not think that knowledge is any longer central to normative epistemology. And I would insist that we are not going to understand what `knowledge' means in the tradition, in Plato and Descartes, for example, if we do not regard them as holding knowledge to be the goal of inquiry. In fact, if it is allowed that mere true belief is the telos of inquiry, but that we should still reserve the term `knowledge' for justified true belief (and perhaps something more), I will simply abandon the term `knowledge' to the epistemology of justification. But first of all, as I suggested in the third chapter, I think that `knowledge' will now merely be a technical term with a stipulated definition. And second, I do not think it will be central to epistemology, since it no longer represents our epistemic goal. And third, I think the stipulated definition will either be redundant (if justification is held to be truth conducive) or, as I will argue, incoherent (if it is not). Now it may well be held that justification is of more than instrumental value, because if we are not justified in believing p, though p is true and we in fact believe it, we may have false beliefs that lead us to p, and we may continue to generate false beliefs in the future. All of this is true, but it is irrelevant to the present point. Recall that I have characterized knowledge as our epistemic goal with regard to particular propositions. Insofar as p is concerned, this goal has been realized if p is true and we believe it. Insofar as we have also such goals as continuing to generate true beliefs, rendering our system of beliefs coherent, and so forth, it is desirable to have justified beliefs. But with regard to any particular proposition, our goal has been reached if we believe that proposition and it is true. But I do not want simply to let the matter rest on a supposed agreement among some contemporary epistemologists that our epistemic goal with regard to particular propositions is true belief. Such epistemologists are agreed that knowledge is at least justified true belief. I think that Alston is right to think that the only plausible way to construe this claim is that **knowledge is** at least **true belief** based on adequate grounds, or true belief **reached from a strong position.** So perhaps the figures in question, on reflection, would describe the epistemic telos not as true belief but as true belief based on adequate grounds, or true belief reached from a strong position. Only it must now be asked, why do we want to have adequate grounds? Why do we want to be in a strong position? This question ought to be misguided if true belief based on adequate grounds or true belief reached from a strong position is in fact the purpose of inquiry. For there is no good answer to the question of why we desire our ultimate ends. **But** the question is hardly misguided. In fact, we cannot even specify what it is to have adequate grounds except that these grounds tend to establish that the proposition in question is true; **we cannot** even **specify** what it is to be in **a strong position except as being in a strong position to get the truth.** This indicates that **the purpose of inquiry can be formulated without reference to** the notions of ground or **position.** Thus, on the views in question, believing the truth is in fact our overarching epistemic telos with regard to particular propositions, on the only plausible conception of justification. **Hence,** on these views, **knowledge is merely true belief.**

That means util.

**Petersen 11**[[318]](#footnote-318)

To ask “why is knowledge of more instrumental value than mere true belief?” is, on this picture, like asking “why are earned proﬁts of more instrumental value than monetary windfalls?” The answer to the ﬁnancial version of this question is clearly that the earnings are not more valuable. By analogy, then, neither is knowledge. The epistemic utilitarian embraces this conclusion and denies the intuition that knowledge is better than mere true belief, even on the instrumental version of the value question. The reason, illustrated by the analogy, is fairly simple: like anything but welfare, epistemic states are at best of instrumental value, and (as we noted earlier) generalizations about instrumental value only make sense under uncertainty. Generally charity is more valuable than murder, but **to** the classical **util**itarian (and to the classical utilitarian alone) **it is not sensible to ask “why is** a **charit[y]**able act **more valuable than** a **murder that results in the same** amount of **utility?”** To assume there is an answer here begs the question against the utilitarian. The same goes, one step down the instrumental chain, for the question “why are earnings more valuable than windfalls?” **Under uncertainty, investments with high expected** monetary **value are** in an important, instrumental sense **more valuable than those with poor expected** monetary **value, but** this question builds in the assumption that **both result in the same monetary value** (given of course that all else is equal). Finally, **the same goes for knowledge and lucky-but-true belief**; in the description of the case, both have gotten the relevant epistemic (instrumental) good. To stipulate that, despite the odds, luck-sensitive belief formation nonetheless resulted in a true belief is just like stipulating that the murder under consideration ended up net beneﬁtting people, or that the stupid casino bet ended up paying off.

My arguments link into her epistemology. Even coherentism requires that we accept the beliefs that are most likely to be true.

Professor Michael **DePaul 88** writes[[319]](#footnote-319)

The coherentist can assume the same notion of theory as the methodist, and claim that it is unlikely both that the general beliefs among our considered moral judgments cover enough cases to satisfy the conditions on B\* and that these beliefs are as simple and elegant as they might be. Thus, the coherentist can also allow for what we would all regard as theory construction on the basis of our considered moral beliefs. No matter which of these approaches one takes, one **[the coherentist] must allow that there is** a certain amount of **tension between** the moral principles strictly determined by **one's** considered **moral beliefs, and considerations of simplicity** and elegance. It will most probably be the case that a set of moral propositions somewhat different from one's considered moral beliefs will determine a simpler, more elegant moral theory than the one determined by one's considered moral beliefs. Because the positions I've considered thus far hold that our considered moral beliefs are methodologically and epistemologically privileged, and that the epistemological status of the moral theory eventually accepted is dependent upon these beliefs, none of these positions can take this tension very seriously. This fact opens all of the revisionary positions to objections similar to the objection against revisionary methodism and particularism I just considered, an objection to which coherentism in particular should be sensitive. **Suppose** while constructing a theory of right action **a person realizes that by altering a few of his** considered **moral beliefs he could accept a far simpler** and more elegant **moral theory.** Suppose further that the considered moral beliefs involved in the changes are not among those the person is most strongly committed to, and that, upon thinking the matter through, it seems to the person that the revised set of moral beliefs and simpler theory of right action are much more likely to be true than the original set and theory. The new set of moral beliefs and moral theory the person is considering would not simply be another set of considered moral beliefs, since they would have been formed on the basis of theoretical considerations, so the revisionary versions of methodism, particularism and even **coherentism would dictate that the person stick stubbornly with his** considered **beliefs** about right action. I do not think that this would be a rational thing for the person to do in the circumstances described. **The obvious way of avoiding this** sort of **irrationality is to allow** a **revision of** considered **moral beliefs on theoretical grounds,** with such revisions **guided by what seems most likely to be true** to one **after thinking things through as completely as one can.**

Infinitism solves the infinite regress. Coherentism isn’t key.

**Klein 7** writes[[320]](#footnote-320)

A key notion employed in the infinitist's account of propositional justification is that an endless series of non-repeating propositions must be available to S. As mentioned earlier, that requirement might seem to lead to skepticism, since it might seem impossible for it to be satisfied. After all, **we have "finite minds." But even such minds can have dispositions such that were they to consider a proposition** - which might or might not have been previously considered - **they would come to believe the proposition. This is** an **important** point **because it helps to clarify** the notion of knowledge that lies at the heart of **the infinitist's requirement for** doxastic **justification, namely that we be able to produce reasons for our beliefs.** The issue is not what causes our beliefs; but rather whether we can cite a reason for our beliefs. & Springer Philos Stud (2007) 134:1-17 13 Suppose that I believe that Helena is the capital of Montana. Of course, I might have just read that. Or a reliable person may have just told me that. In those cases, the reason is readily available. It takes no effort on my part to locate the reason. But suppose that, at least at the moment, I can't come up with my reasons. Nevertheless, there could be a reliable process that was causally responsible for the belief and, as granted at the outset, in some perfectly good sense of "know," I do know that Helena is the capital of Montana. But I don't know that Helena is the capital of Montana unless there are some reasons for that belief available to me. How readily available must they be? Must they be armchair available, such that on mere careful reflection, ceteris paribus, S will produce them? In other words, must a proposition be entailed or otherwise implied by the content of S's current beliefs in order for that proposition to be available? That is a pretty stringent requirement and, although one could imagine such hard-to-please infinitists, infinitism is not committed to that. Infinitism could hold that a proposition, p, is available to S just in case there is an epistemically credible way of S's coming to believe that p given S's current epistemic practices. Available propositions to S are like money in S's bank account that is available to S if S has some legal way of withdrawing it even if S is unaware that the money is there or takes no steps to withdraw it. For example, suppose S's epistemic practices are such that S would check the state capital listings in the World Almanac were it required in order to satisfy the contextually determined parameters. Suppose further that such an authoritative source lists Helena as the state capital of Montana. This liberal view of availability would count the proposition the Almanac is a reliable source and it lists Helena as the state capital as available to S. Perhaps the armchair requirement is appropriate for a priori knowledge and the liberal view is required for a posteriori knowledge. **The crucial point here is that nothing** seems to **prevent[s] a finite mind from having an endless set of propositions available.**

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